

T H E

Politician's Dictionary ;

Or, a SUMMARY of

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE.

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T H E
Politician's Dictionary ;

Or, a SUMMARY of
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE:

Containing Remarks on the

INTERESTS,
CONNECTIONS,
FORCES,
REVENUES,
WEALTH,

CREDIT,
DEBTS,
TAXES,
COMMERCE, and
MANUFACTURES

Of the different STATES of EUROPE.

Alphabetically digested

For the USE of those who would wish to understand whatever
occurs in the SCIENCE of POLITICS.

V O L. II.

L O N D O N :

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THE
Politician's Dictionary

OF
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE

OF THE DIFFERENT STATES OF EUROPE
AND THE
MANUFACTURES
AND
INTERESTS
AND
CONNECTIONS
AND
RELATIONS
AND
INFLUENCES
AND
TENDENCIES
AND
RESULTS
AND
CONSEQUENCES
AND
EFFECTS
AND
IMPACTS
AND
REPERCUSSIONS
AND
REACTIONS
AND
COUNTERACTIONS
AND
COMBINATIONS
AND
DISINTEGRATIONS
AND
TRANSFORMATIONS
AND
REVOLUTIONS
AND
REGENERATIONS
AND
RENEWALS
AND
REFORMS
AND
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RENEWALS
AND
REFORMS

VOL. II



T H E

POLITICIAN'S DICTIONARY:

Or, CIRCLE of

POLITICAL OECONOMY.

MANUFACTURES. Those of Great Britain and Ireland are thus collected into one view, from many authors, by the author of Political Essays.

From this view, the immense importance of manufacturing all the product at home, appears in the clearest light; for the amount of the loss, by suffering 285,000 packs to be runned, is easily discovered by arithmetic. According to the proportion of that which is manufactured, the loss is 7,596,090*l.* an article of immense consequence to Britain; for it is a melancholy instance, to see such numbers of unemployed poor, and feel so heavily the weight of employing them, and at the same time suffer a raw commodity to be carried out of the country, which would give industry and maintenance to such numbers of people.

It would certainly be worth the while of any gentleman to understand the whole progress of a manufacture from its commencement to its consumption, and how much it pays to the subsistence of the people; which may be perceived in the fol-

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lowing instance, of 100 broad cloths sent to Turkey, and the returns of raw silk, that are manufactured for home consumption.

A clothier buys at market 50 packs of wool, picked and sorted, at 10l. per pack, 500l.

With which wool he makes 100 broad cloths; and the manufacture thereof in carding, spinning, weaving, milling, dressing, &c. as they are usually brought to, and sold white at Blackwell-Hall, will amount to about the first cost of the wool, 500l.

So that these 100 cloths are sold by the clothier to the merchant, at 10l. per cloth, 1000l.

And the merchants pay for dying of the said 100 cloths, one third part in grain colours, at 7l. and two thirds in ordinary colours, at 30s. per cloth, 333l. 6s. 8d.

Also for setting, drawing, pressing, packing, &c. 15s. per cloth, 75l.

The said 100 cloths will cost the merchant 14l. 1s. 8d. per cloth on board, which amounts to 1408l. 6s. 8d.

And to repay him their cost and charges here, and their charges abroad, with a bare allowance for insurance, and the interest of his money, they cannot purchase less than 22 great pounds of sherbafsee, or Persia fine raw silk, for every cloth. Thus he probably receives for the said 100 cloths, 2200 pounds weight of the said raw silk.

Now if the half part of this silk is wrought up into plain coloured tabbies, the manufacturers will receive, 13s. 7d. per lb. 747l. 1s. 8d.

And if the other half is wrought up into rich flowered silks, brocaded, the manufacturers will receive 1l. 19s. 9d. per lb. 2186l. 5s.

And the additional charge of dying, suppose but of one eighth part of the said silk, into grain colours, at 9s. per lb. 123l. 15s.

Then the cost and charges of 100 woollen cloths, shipped from London to Turkey, and the manu-

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facture of the raw silk brought thence, in returns thereof, must amount to, 4465l. 8s. 4d.

The freight of the said 100 cloths, and of the said 2200 lb. of raw silk, is computed at, 40l. 12s. 6d.

The customs on the said 2200 lb. raw silk, is, 156l. 15s.

English factor's commission abroad, on the sale of the cloth; and on investing the returns in silk, as aforesaid, computed at, 100l.

It is here clearly represented to the view of every reader, that every 2200 lb. of raw silk imported from Turkey, and manufactured here for our own consumption, without paying any thing to the merchants, or the mercer's gain, pays to the land-holders, the labourers, and the crown, the sum of, 4762l. 15s.

This account takes the returns upon the 100 cloths exported to Turkey, and makes them pay 5000 l. to the subsistence of the British workmen. But there have been annually exported from Great Britain, two hundred times as many cloths for Turkey: and the British merchants have received for about half that quantity of cloth, the same kind of returns in raw silk, for their own consumption*.

In respect to the number of sheep, and quantity and value of their wool, they must vary considerably in long terms of years. It might, for instance, be somewhat different twenty or thirty years ago from what it is at present, but whether increased, or decreased, it would be difficult to determine; many reasons might be advanced on both sides of the question. Salmon reckons the fleeces annually shorn in England, at 12,000,000l. † Another calculates the wool shorn and pulled in Great Britain and Ireland, at 596,160 packs ‡. Another supposes Eng-

* Rolt's new Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, art. Wool.

† Geographical Grammar, p. 237—1757.

‡ Proposals humbly offered to Consideration of Parl. p. 3—1737.

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land to yield 500,000 packs, and Ireland 300,000 packs, each pack, 240 lb. *. A fourth writer † makes it much more considerable, as appears by the following passage: " It appears by the toll books, that there are brought into Smithfield market for slaughter, to serve London within the bills of mortality, 36,000 sheep and lambs weekly. Now allow 6000 of these, throughout the seasons, to be lambs, and that there are 30,000 sheep slaughtered, one week with another, then the rest of England is generally computed to contain about seven times as many inhabitants as London, within the bills; but supposing it contains only six times as many, and that accordingly there are 210,000 sheep slaughtered in England weekly; and likewise, that four years sheep are kept for stock, so that there are always in being four times more than are thus slaughtered, as is usual with the sheep-masters to compute, and allowing every sheep, one with another, to bear four pounds of wool; and every pack to weigh 240 lb. then the yearly wool of England, according to this computation only, amounts to 728,000 packs.

Now in the country throughout England people feed as much on flesh as in town, and drinking less, they generally exceed them in the quantity they eat. Then as Scotland is of less extent, and less fruitful than England, admit there are but one quarter part of the sheep in it, it amounts to 182,000.

Then as Ireland is not one fourth part less than England, but is full as fertile, and taken up chiefly with feeding; it has been judged by some who have taken great pains thoroughly to inform themselves, that it hath near as many sheep in it as there are in England; but suppose we only say half the quantity England produces, or 364,000.

Total packs, 1,274,000.

* Trowel's Plan for preventing the clandestine running of Wool, p. 3—1738.

† London on the Wool Trade, p. 15—1739.

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In this calculation is not included the wool of sheep continually slaughtered, called vell-wool, nor the wool of lambs."

The same author reckons that all the wool and labour of England, that is consumed at home, and sent abroad, amounts to 14,000,000 l.

Davenant reckons the value of the unmanufactured wool of England, at 2,000,000 l. and when manufactured, at 8,000,000 l.

Busching * lumps the revenue of wool at one fifth of the whole land of England. D'Angueil says, 44,000 acres of salt marshes in Romney, maintains 132,000 sheep, and that 600,000 are kept in Dorsetshire, in a circle of 12 miles †.

These authorities are but dubious; however we may suppose them to be near the truth, the medium of several opinions nearest. Salmon makes the fleeces of England 12,000,000, if we proportion Scotland, and Ireland, in the same manner London did, it will be a fourth (3,000,000) for Scotland, and a half (6,000,000) for Ireland; the total will be 21,000,000 of fleeces; and supposing each to weigh 3 lb. (Salmon reckoning them at 2 s. 6 d. each, copied, I apprehend, from better authority,) and the pack 240 lb. the whole will amount to 262,500 packs.

The next writer calculates the quantity, at 596,160.

Trowel supposes 800,000 in England and Ireland, to which I shall add 125,000, for Scotland, 925,000.

London's account is, 1,274,000.

Davenant reckons the wool of England, worth 2,000,000 l. the price was then 5 l. per pack, therefore the number was 400,000 packs; and with a fourth for Scotland, and an half for Ireland, the total is, 700,000.

As to Busching's fifth, nothing is to be made of it.

* System of Geography.

† Avant. and Desavant. p. 111.

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The medium of these several quantities is, 751,532 packs; and it is observable, that the medium comes nearer to Davenant than any of the others; a presumption in its favour, as he is undoubtedly an author of good credit.

The value of the wool is at present 7 l. per pack, this total amounts therefore to 5,260,724*.

Later authority † makes the number of sheep in England to be 28,989,480.

Average, fleece 5 lb. weight, therefore of the wool, 144,947,400.

Packs at 240 lb. 603,947.

One half for Ireland, and one fourth for Scotland, make the total, 1,056,906.

Value of that of England, at 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ per lb. 694,539.

Of the total, 1,215,442.

Growth of wool in Great Britain and Ireland, 751,532 packs.

Value of ditto, at 7 l. 5,260,724 l.

Exported unmanufactured, 285,000 packs.

Manufactured in Great Britain and Ireland, 466,532 packs.

Value of the labour, 12,434,805 l.

Value of ditto, and the raw materials, 15,700,529.

Value of the whole growth, and labour, 17,695,529.

Amount of BRITISH MANUFACTURES.

The woollen	l. 15,700,529
Leather	11,725,000
Flax and hemp	2,500,000
Glass, paper, and porcelane	1,500,000
Silk	3,025,000
Cotton	900,000
Lead, tin, iron, &c.	9,000,000

l. 44,350,529

* Political Essays, p. 176, and the authors there quoted.

† Young's Six Months Tour, Vol. IV. p. 350, 2d edit.

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	People.
The woollen manufactures employ	1,557,834
Leather	892,500
Lead, tin, iron, and copper	900,000
Flax and hemp	200,000
Silk and cotton	475,000
Paper, glass, and porcelane	225,000
	4,250,334

If we deduct about 192,500 from leather, 100,000 from iron, &c. and all the hemp, the remainder 3,757,834, I should assign as England's share.

The prosperity of all manufactures depends upon the purchasing the raw material at a reasonable price, and the procuring the necessary labour at the same. If these circumstances do not combine in the manufacturers favour, it is impossible he should afford his goods so upon a par with foreigners, and the consequences of not equalling other nations in cheapness, is not only losing the exportation, but in multitudes of instances, the home consumption likewise. As to the raw materials, I do not find many complaints of the British and Irish manufacturers not being able to procure them at a reasonable price: those of our own products, are pretty regular in their rates. It is true they have risen within a certain number of years; but if the prices of all sorts of commodities, all over Europe, in a given time, rise ten per cent, manufacturers of any country, cannot suppose the materials they work upon should be the only ones to keep down. Their rising with the rest, must not be called being at too great a price: the reasonable rate is always being in proportion to every thing else at home, and in other countries. The same observation is applicable to the price of labour, about which our manufacturers have clamoured exceedingly. Labour must rise with the necessaries of life: while they are rising

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all over Europe, even proportion would be destroyed, if that was not likewise to advance. And when comparisons are made between the price of labour in Britain and Ireland, with that in France and Holland, the mere pay of the workmen *per* day, is alone, no proof at all; the only just comparison is by the quantity of work a given sum of money will procure in either country: for most certainly the pay of a weaver in France may be but nine pence a day, and that of one in England, a shilling, and yet the English manufacturer may undersell the French one all over the world. The hours of working, the ability of the workmen, and the time of recreation, or idleness, may make a much greater difference than this. There is no satisfactory account of the price of labour in these three countries, with a just comparison, yet published in the English or French languages: it is impossible therefore to assert, that our manufacturers are undersold, because of their high price of labour.

However, whether they are undersold upon that account or not, it is highly expedient for the good of our manufactures, to keep the price of labour as low as is really consistent with other prices; particularly in two respects; in contriving that workmen shall work full hours for their pay, whatever it is; and in not suffering them to have any certain dependence for a future maintenance, but on the strength of their own industry. If these points are not effected, let prices be high or low, there can be no ballance between the price of work, and general prices. It is sufficiently clear that our whole system of poor laws, act very contrary to these ends; and the remedying such tendency, is all the favour our manufacturers want in respect to the price of their labour. There is great reason to believe from the very superior ability of our workmen, that were these points properly managed, our manufacturers would

would undersell all Europe, at least as far as concerned the price of their labour.

Bounties on the exportation of manufactures, would have saved this nation not only the fifth of the present French exportation, (that to the Levant) but much of that nation's Spanish trade. For had bounties been given at first upon those articles of manufactures which the French founded their success upon, we should have preserved those trades; as it would have been impossible for them to undersell our cloths, &c. coming to market, with the advantage of a public premium on their exportation. The bounties, we will suppose, might have amounted for a few years to 100,000 l. a year; but the preservation of those trades might well be worth several millions. An hundred thousand pounds are paid out of the pocket of the public, for the benefit of — not the manufacturers alone — but of all the variety of poor people employed in making the numerous exports in such trades as those were — to the merchants, sailors, victuallers, ship-builders, and all that depend on navigation; — to the farmers, in the employment of those poor, who would otherwise burthen their rates; — and to the landlords in the same effect, with the addition of an increase in wealth and circulation, which raises the value of their lands. In one word, the publick pays the bounty, and the public receives the benefit: and I apprehend this fact to be so invariable, that I do not think a bounty upon exportation (provided it was not on a raw material) could be devised, that would not repay itself to the community at large, with cent per cent profit. However, some distinction should certainly be used in granting them: when given to the proper objects, (if I may use the expression) they will never fail paying, not cent per cent — but twenty thousand per cent,

Let

Let us suppose the ballance of our trade to Portugal to be 300,000*l.* per annum in our favour: a foreign nation invents a light cloth, which takes greatly in the Portuguese markets, and sells it at twenty-pence per yard; our manufacturers cannot afford such cloth under two shillings, the consequence of which is, first, the loss of that market for our cloths, and secondly, as before explained, that of the whole trade. But to prevent these consequences, the legislature throws in a bounty of six-pence a yard for such of our cloths as are exported to that market; this enables our merchants to undersell the foreign ones two-pence per yard, and consequently to secure the trade. Perhaps the exportation of the cloth may amount to a million of yards, in which case the bounty will amount to 25,000*l.* a year; the saving 300,000*l.* Double the bounty, will it cease to be the most prudent measure? Let us always remember that we should not in such cases calculate our loss at the mere amount of the former ballance in our favour, but in that vast variety of interests which are hurt and damaged by the loss of a large active trade, such as employment of the poor—stock of seamen—navigation—general wealth, &c. *

Never obstruct, or in any measure discredit, the sale of the cultivators products, in favour of the people employed in manufactures: enabling our manufactures to sell their goods cheap to foreigners, is undoubtedly a wise measure;—but it ceases to be such, when effected, (supposing it ever was) by cramping the sale of the produce of our lands; because more than we gain by one measure we lose by the other. But constant experience evinces, that whatever increases the sale of a production, likewise increases the quantity of it; therefore if we would have bread cheap for our manufacturers, we

* Political Essays, p. 225.

should suffer the exportation of corn to be constant, and unobstructed.

Colbert rather depressed than promoted the interests of France, when he conceived a project of enriching it, by establishing a vast number of manufactures; flattering himself at the same time, that by making the productions of his manufactures subservient to luxury, and falsely refined elegance, he should multiply the wealth of his own nation, by supplying and feeding the extravagance and vanity of other nations; but some part of the folly happened to stick where it took its rise, and became infectious at home; which shews, that luxury is an unfortunate fashion in any country; though at the same time it prescribes the mode to foreigners, and induces them to purchase such merely ornamental elegancies, as are the workmanship of our own artists. Under the idea of hoarding up great quantities of provisions, for the support of his work-folks, (and that principally by obstructing the free vent and exportation of corn) this minister had the applause of the poor, who naturally favour any scheme, real or imaginary, that promises to lower the price of bread; for their understandings can rarely see deeply into the truth of things, any more than the advantages of a nation in general, or of themselves, upon the whole. In like manner, the historians and poets loaded the prime minister with panegyrics, as the true father of the people, and made no ceremony to depreciate the wiser conduct of Sully. But alas! it never truly appeared, that trade and commerce, even in their most flourishing state, enriched a kingdom like the solid revenues that proceed from a right and effectual cultivation of the earth. Thus the French nation was intoxicated with the hopes of immense riches; and though they supplied all Europe with silks and embroideries, and expensive trifles, yet the fund of real wealth was deficient at bottom. Famine made its appearance frequently,
and

and almost periodically. The proprietors of landed estates (for they with others at first ran into the universal notion of admiring the project) thought themselves very happy, after a considerable tract of time, to advance their rents a sixth part, though money bore one third a greater value than before: imposts and taxes were increased immediately: and a considerable part of the lands (not being found, or at least, not being believed to answer the expences of cultivation) was overlooked, and neglected by little and little, and at length degenerated into waste and desolated tracts of country. All which may suffice to shew the cultivation of the earth ought not to be superseded by a passion for commerce*.

We may venture to determine, that the great ends of agriculture, arts, manufactures, commerce, and population, is the stability of that degree of prosperity enjoyed by a people: this stability is of far more consequence than an increase; and yet, the latter is what all the hot-headed politics of modern times, are busied most about: it is this system which has been so lavishly executed, in the case of our own country, to carry our manufactures, commerce, wealth, and population, to the highest pitch, and by such means, and with such celerity, that it is absolutely, and physically impossible to be permanent, and which has laid us open to a decline, which a different conduct might have kept off for many ages: I am not predicting the fall of Britain, in this or that year; I think her prosperity may grow for these hundred years; but let the day come when it will, it will have been accelerated at least five centuries, from a violent eagerness to be rich.

How are we so to harmonize agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and population, as to make them most beneficial to the collective interests of the

* *Essays on Husbandry*, p. 179.

state? This, I think; is the question, and it appears clearly enough from these disquisitions, that the national good requires that conduct which will bring not the greatest and quickest degree, of what is commonly called prosperity, but the greatest durability of the present advantages enjoyed by a people: but remember that I keep clear in this inquiry of the revolutions of the constitution, because, good government is a blessing, greater than that of all others; but we very well know, that great riches are better formed to destroy, than improve a constitution.

Here then the just conduct is explained; give whatever encouragement you please to agriculture, you will never thereby make the kingdom too rich, nor occasion too quick a rise; and all the population you create, is independant on the changes of trade, or foreign affairs, and can in no respect prove burthensome to the community. Confine manufactures to the satisfying that consumption which is certain, which is your own; but the moment you become manufacturers of foreign commodities, and for foreign markets, you lay the foundation of that quick rise and wealth which is sure soon to come tumbling down. Trade should grow out of agriculture, and manufactures, and be regulated by them; it will then never become so great, and insecure, as that of Holland has proved. Population depends on the three preceding; the people bred by such regulated interests, will be in proportion to their certain employment; industry can never decline, nor population be burthensome.

The true harmony is to make agriculture flourishing enough to support your own people; to make manufacturers subservient to the demand of your own people; and commerce, proportioned to agriculture and manufactures; these, so provided, population to be left to itself.

A conduct very contrary to this has been the fashion of late years throughout all Europe; and the quick progress of the power of England has been chiefly owing to a different system. This forms no sound reason against the preceding ideas; for I have admitted that the plan here laid down, is not formed for a quick progress in power, but for a durability of prosperity. As the practice of the age is so very different, it will not be improper to enquire into the probable consequences on the affairs of Britain.

We have attained to an amazing height of wealth and power, and with it have burthened the kingdom with a population much greater than we should know what to do with in case of a reverse of fortune; and we have not only run in debt to an amazing degree, but also set an example of profusion to all future administrations, which will, in all probability, have most speedy and wonderful effects in increasing such incumbrances; which, however rich the kingdom is, must undoubtedly end in bankruptcy.

Whatever may be the event, the plain fact is, that the great system of trade and manufacture have carried the kingdom to a height in which they cannot probably support it; or in one word, have rendered our state great, but extremely precarious. And this is so strongly the case, that the nation has, perhaps, of all others in the universe, the least reason to congratulate herself, on her sudden rise, to such boundless power.

For it is not the possession of great riches, and formidable power, that constitute the real prosperity of this kingdom; but, on the contrary, the mere durability of her prosperity; and it would not be a difficult task to prove that this durability lessons almost in proportion to the magnitude of the wealth and power. We have had great success in arms, but unfortunately our most brilliant wars (to reason for a moment on the principles of those whose doctrines

doctrines I am at present opposing) are merely the means of exhausting us, but never those of repairing, or adding to our strength. If trade and manufacture are made our grand supports, we are inconsistent if we do not push our advantages by enlarging both, or at least of making such acquisitions as shall repay us something of that immense waste of wealth which achieved the conquest: on the contrary, we conquer at the expence of hundreds of millions, only to show our generosity in giving back to our enemies. I need not observe that this has ever been the fatality of this country, and is a strong proof of how little avail our riches and our power are, if they only enable us to make conquests which we are necessitated to restore. For what should we be so eager to gain immense wealth and power, which, from their quick rise and magnitude, cannot be permanent? All that Britain can fairly assert to have gained by them, has been the entertainment, during the period of a war, of half a score extraordinary gazettes; this is the real fact: and every gazette, at a moderate computation, adding five millions sterling to her national debt. If these effects of her greatness are more desirable than that more modest state, but durability of national advantage, which I have mentioned, as the effect of a very different conduct—of harmonizing, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and population, I must confess myself utterly mistaken*.

MINORCA. Gibraltar and Minorca were ceded to us by the treaty of Utrecht. Though the possession of both these is greatly advantageous to the nation, yet of the two, Minorca is by much the most valuable, not only as it can be kept with greater ease, and has one of the finest harbours in the world, but also, because it gives less umbrage to Spain, with whom it is our interest to live upon good

* Letters concerning the Present State of England, p. 182.
terms.

terms. You will see by the map, that Gibraltar is situated upon the continent of Spain, at the mouth of the straits, in a fine climate, an healthy country, and where there is most excellent water; and consequently extremely convenient for ships going up, or returning from the straits, to stop at, water, and refresh their men. And as it is opposite to the Barbary shore, and but a few leagues distant from it, must be of great service to our ships, in affording them a sanctuary, when we are at war with those pyrratical states, which always will be the case, when they think they can get any thing by breaking with us; but as this is very near their territories, our men of war from Gibraltar, can fall upon them suddenly, and consequently keep them in such awe, as will make them afraid to break with us.

Our possession of it must be a great eye-sore to Spain, between whom and us, it is our mutual interest to cultivate a strict friendship. Suppose the Spaniards were masters of Plymouth, could the British nation ever be easy till they had recovered it out of their hands? If therefore some place equally advantageous to us, and less invidious to them, could be given for it, undoubtedly it would be our interest to agree to an exchange. An island would be best, as most easily defended; and if there be a good harbour in the Canary islands, one of them would be as useful to our East and West India trade, as Minorca is to our Straits trade.

Minorca has all the advantages that Gibraltar has, though in a much higher degree, and none of the disadvantages. As it is an island, at a distance from the continent, which has oftener than once changed its masters, the possession of it is not so invidious to the Spaniards; and our government might, by proper means, be made agreeable and habitual to the natives; and as we are masters at sea, the defence of it is more easy to us, as attacking it must be more difficult to our enemies. The harbour of Mahon,

hon, is one of the finest in the world, capable to contain and protect all the royal navies in Europe, so that our fleets may winter there, clean, and repair, without any danger or molestation; our men may refresh themselves, and be permitted to go ashore, without much hazard of their being able to run away, and our squadrons be ready at any time of the year to sail from thence to annoy the trade, or alarm the coasts of our enemies, in those parts, without fear of intelligence being sent of their designs. It is situated in a fine climate, between 39 and 46 degrees of north latitude; and is about 33 miles long, and between 8 and 12 broad. The advantage of a place so situated, with such a harbour as has been mentioned, must appear at once. It makes us respectable to all the Italian states, and to those of Barbary; in a French or Spanish war, whether to annoy them, or to protect our trade, it is inestimable, and every other nation in Europe, who have any trade in the Mediterranean, will feel the consequences of it, while it is in our possession, by having a sure asylum there, if they are our friends, and by the mischiefs our men of war and privateers from thence can do them, if our enemies.

To assist the garrison upon a sudden attack, it would be highly advantageous to make the constant inhabitants of the island our firm friends. This might have been done, either by buying their property, and peopling the island with British and Irish, or uniting our interest, and that of the Minorquins, firmly together. Both these ways were, I believe, practicable; but neither of them have ever been attempted.

The rent of the lands and houses of the island of Minorca, is computed to be about 10,000 l. a year: it could not be so much when we were first masters of the island; for under the benign administration of the worthy Governor Kane, the value of lands was almost doubled; but suppose that had really been the value of the lands, and twenty years purchase had been paid for

them, which would have amounted to two hundred thousand pounds, most, if not all, the proprietors would have freely consented, and the island might have been peopled with British subjects; every man of whom would have been willing, in case of a sudden attack, to have assisted the garrison to defend the place. Nor would the government have lost their money; they would have found it a cheap purchase, as the lands were capable of great improvements: and though the first occupiers of them would merit, and expect some encouragement, yet in time, both principle and interest, might have been repaid, without any hardship to the inhabitants.

Our regiments never stay long in one place, but change their quarters every year. There are some reasons alledged why troops in England should not stay long in one place; but they can have no weight here; and as none of the quarters in Minorca are bad, it would serve many good purposes, if they were to continue in the same quarters as long as they staid in the island; it would encourage the soldiers to industry, and the officers to purchase lands, and make improvements, by which they might have, by degrees, a considerable property in the island, and facilitate an acquaintance with the natives, which would more and more reconcile them to us*.

It has been proposed to make the whole island of Minorca a free port, which would probably be attended with extreme good consequences.

But to introduce a spirited culture of the soil, in this fine and happy climate, would be the way to make the possession of the most advantage to us; the ballance of their trade, is 53,100 l. against them.

To enable these people in some measure to support the charge of this great ballance, we are to

* Letters relating to the Navy, Gibraltar, and Port-Mahon, p. 130.

reckon the large sum of money yearly brought into the island, and spent among them by the troops, a sum that falls but little short of their whole balance; greatest part of which goes to market for the common necessaries of life.

Every vintage produces 18,000 hogsheads of wine, and if we allow for the clergy 2000 hogsheads, and for all the rest of the natives 1000, the remaining 15000 hogsheads are sold to the English for 27,825*l.* in ready money; the price of a hogsheaf taken at a medium being 35*s.*

This is a very considerable article in their favour, and they are so sensible of the advantage they draw from their vineyards, that they are continually enlarging them, and increasing their number, notwithstanding they are taxed to near half their value.

It is certain this people can never be rich, unless they become industrious; the sea is open to them, as well as to their neighbours, on every side, who thrive by a foreign commerce, and yet not one of them can victual or navigate their vessels, near so cheap as these slothful Minorquins, who lie in the centre of so many trading ports, that it is amazing how they can have so long overlooked their true interest, and suffered themselves to be supplied with so many of the necessaries of life in foreign bottoms.

The Minorquins are naturally listless, and, if they contrive the means to keep their families from poverty, they are but little solicitous to enquire into the arts and manufactures by which sudden fortunes are acquired on every side of them. Tell them the Maltese are enriched by the quantity of cummin-seed and annis-seed they export; remind them that the plant which produces the canary-seed grows spontaneously all over the island; or that a gum is produced by the mastic tree, of very great value abroad, (and though this tree is an incumbrance, which they eagerly root out of their grounds) they treat you as a visionary, and with a shrug of

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contempt,

contempt, seem to thank heaven, that they have no turn to whims and projects; but are contented to jog on in the plain track which their fathers trod before them*.

Cotton, sugar, and many other valuable crops, might be there produced.

MINE S. If Europe has derived so many advantages from the American trade, it seems natural to imagine that Spain must have derived much greater. She drew from the newly discovered world, so prodigious a quantity of gold and silver, that all we had before could not be compared to it.

But (what one could never have expected) this great kingdom was every where baffled by its misfortunes. Philip II. who succeeded Charles V. was obliged to make the celebrated bankruptcy, known to all the world. There never was a prince who suffered more from the murmurs, the insolence, and the revolt of troops, constantly ill paid.

From that time the monarchy of Spain has been incessantly declining. This has been owing to an interior and physical defect in the nature of these riches, which renders them vain; a defect which increases every day.

Gold and silver are either a fictitious, or a representative wealth. The representative signs of wealth are extremely durable, and in their own nature but little subject to decay. But the more they are multiplied, the more they lose their value, because the fewer are the things which they represent.

The Spaniards, after the conquest of Mexico and Peru, abandoned their natural riches, in pursuit of a representative wealth, which daily degraded itself. Gold and silver were extremely scarce in Europe, and Spain becoming all of a sudden mistress of a prodigious quantity of these metals, conceived hopes to which she had never before aspired; the wealth

* Armstrong's History of Minorca.

the found in the conquered countries, great as it was, did not, however, equal those of their mines. The Indians concealed part of them, and besides, these people who made no other use of gold and silver than to give magnificence to the temples of their gods, and to the palaces of their kings, sought not for it with an avarice like ours. In short, they had not the secret of drawing these metals from every mine, but only from those in which the separation might be made with fire: they were strangers to the manner of making use of mercury, and perhaps of mercury itself.

However, it was not long before the specie of Europe was doubled: this appeared from the price of commodities, which every where was doubled.

The Spaniards raked into the mines, scooped out mountains, invented machines to draw out water, to break the ore, and separate it; and as they sported with the lives of the Indians, they forced them to labour without mercy: the specie of Europe soon doubled, and the profit of Spain diminished in the same proportion; they had every year the same quantity of metal, which was become by one half less precious.

In double the time the specie still doubled, and the profit still diminished another half.

It diminished even more than half: let us see in what manner.

To extract the gold from the mines, to give it the requisite preparations, and to import it into Europe, must be attended with some certain expence; I will suppose this to be as 1 to 64. When the specie was once doubled, and consequently become by one half less precious the expence was as 2 to 64. Thus the galleons, which brought to Spain the same quantity of gold, brought a thing which really was of less value by one half, though the expences attending it had been one half higher.

If we proceed doubling and doubling, we shall find in this progression the cause of the impotency of the wealth of Spain.

It is about two hundred years since they have worked their Indian mines. I suppose the quantity of specie at present in the trading world is to that before the discovery of the Indies as 32 is to 1; that is, it has been doubled five times: in two hundred years more the same quantity will be to that before the discovery as 64 is to 1; that is, it will be doubled once more. Now at present fifty quintals of ore yield four, five, and six ounces of gold; and when it yields only two, the miner receives no more from it than his expences. In two hundred years, when the miner will extract only four, this too will only defray his charges. There will then be but little profit to be drawn from the gold mines. The same reasoning will hold good of silver, except that the working of the silver mines is a little more advantageous than those of gold.

But if mines should be discovered so fruitful as to give a much greater profit, the more fruitful they will be the sooner the profit will cease.

The Portuguese in Brazil have found mines of gold so rich, that they must necessarily, very soon, make a considerable diminution in the profits of those of Spain, as well as in their own.

I have frequently heard people deplore the blindness of the court of France, who repulsed Christopher Columbus, when he made the proposal of discovering the Indies. Indeed they did, though perhaps without design, an act of the greatest wisdom. Spain has behaved like the foolish king, who desired that every thing he touched might be converted into gold, and who was obliged to beg of the gods to put an end to his misery.

The companies and banks established in many nations, have put a finishing stroke to the lowering of gold and silver, as a sign, or representation of riches,
for

for by new fictions they have multiplied in such a manner the signs of wealth, that gold and silver having this office only in part, are become less precious.

Thus public credit serves instead of mines, and diminishes the profit which the Spaniards draw from theirs.

True it is that the Dutch trade to the East Indies has increased, in some measure, the value of the Spanish merchandize; for as they carry bullion, and give it in exchange for the merchandizes of the East, they ease the Spaniards of part of a commodity which in Europe abounds too much.

And this trade, in which Spain seems to be only indirectly concerned, is as advantageous to that nation as to those who are directly employed in carrying it on.

From what has been said, we may form a judgment of the last order of the council of Spain, which prohibits the making use of gold and silver in gildings and other superfluities; a decree as ridiculous as it would be for the States of Holland to prohibit the consumption of spices.

My reasoning does not hold good against all mines: those of Germany and Hungary, which produce little more than the expence of working them, are extremely useful. They are found in the principal state; they employ many thousand men, who there consume their superfluous commodities, and they are properly a manufacture of the country.

The mines of Germany and Hungary promote the culture of land; the working of those of Mexico and Peru destroys it.

The Indies and Spain are two powers under the same master; but the Indies are the principal, while Spain is only an accessory. It is in vain for politics to bring back the principal to the accessory, the Indies will always draw Spain to themselves.

Of the merchandizes, to the value of about fifty millions of livres annually sent to the Indies, Spain furnishes only two millions and an half: the Indies trade for fifty millions, the Spaniards for two and a half.

That must be a bad kind of riches which depends on accident, and not on the industry of a nation, on the number of its inhabitants, and on the cultivation of its lands. The king of Spain, who receives great sums from his custom-house at Cadiz, is in this respect only a rich individual in a state extremely poor. Every thing passes between strangers and himself, while his subjects have scarcely any share in it: this commerce is independant both of the good and bad fortune of his kingdom.

Were some provinces of Castile able to give him a sum equal to that of the custom-house of Cadiz, his power would be much greater; his riches would be the effect of the wealth of the country; these provinces would animate all the others, and they would be altogether more capable of supporting their respective charges: instead of a great treasury, he would have a great people*.

MEXICO. *See Spanish America.*

MISSISSIPPI. By the treaty of peace of 1763, Britain acquired a vast tract of country in North America, lying upon this river and the Ohio, comprehending all the country from that of the Illinois to the Gulph of Mexico. This immense country is not sufficiently known, and, probably, its importance not properly considered, from the English settlers being forbid to go beyond bounds laid down in a proclamation in October 1763; which bounds confined them to the sea coasts of Florida, (which it seems are perfectly pestiferous) and to the heads of the rivers falling into the Atlantic ocean: this measure has been most severely, and ap-

* Spirit of Laws, vol. II. p. 86.

parently with a great deal of justice, animadverted on. A description of these countries will set this matter in a clear light. We shall take it as collected by a writer who seems to have made himself a more perfect master of all American affairs than any one that has written on them†

“The new colony of West Florida extends from the sea coast of the gulph of Mexico northwards to the 31st degree of latitude, that is, pretty near as far as the low country continues; for, about a quarter of a degree further upon the river is Manchac, where the high lands begin. From the sea coast thither, the whole country is either a marsh, or sand, so white as to be pernicious to the eye-sight; absolutely barren, and in unwholesomeness, the sink of the earth. But after you get to Manchac, the scene is totally different; from thence to the Ohio, the lands are between 1 and 200 feet higher than the Mississippi in its greatest floods. The slope of these lands goes off perpendicularly from the Mississippi. All these high lands are besides surrounded in a good many places by little eminencies, or small hills, and rising grounds running off lengthwise with gentle slopes. It is only when we go a little way from the Mississippi that we find these high lands are overtopped by little mountains, which appear to be all of earth, though steep, without the least gravel or pebble being perceived on them.

“The soil on these high lands is very good; it is a black light mould, about three feet deep. The grass growing in the hollows is of the height of a man. All these high lands are generally meadows and forests of tall trees, with grass up to the knee. The tall forests are all hiccory, or all oak, and many walnut trees; which spontaneous

† Political Essays on the present State of the British Empire, p. 380.

productions, says another writer, are ever a sign of good lands in the southern parts of North America. These high lands likewise produce mulberry-trees, native indigo, tobacco and cotton. The indigo yields more than in the French islands." "Without despising, says another writer, the tobacco which is made in other countries, we may affirm, that which grows in the country of the Natchez is even preferable to that of Virginia or St. Domingo." And a third, equally well acquainted with this country, says, "the French in Louisiana made two or three crops upon the same ground as easily as we made one. Even rice thrives to great profit there, without being planted in a marsh or swamp. Vines are so common, for 500 leagues to the northward, that, whatever way you walk, you cannot proceed one hundred steps without meeting with one." Lastly, even the very sides of the hills are covered with canes, which in our colonies only grow in the deepest and richest swamps. Consistent with these accounts is the report of the people sent from Virginia to view these countries, in 1742, who asserted they saw more good land on the Mississippi than was in all our colonies. I have just run through these circumstances to shew the reader, by way of contrast, the country we have colonized with that we have not; and characterized the one from the same authority as the other. The country, as far as the bounds of West Florida extend, is one of the vilest in the world, and the unwholesomest; in which circumstance the concurrent testimony of all our officers quartered there perfectly agrees. But almost as soon as you leave that colony, you enter one of the finest and healthiest in the universe, and precisely such as we want; whereas we have colonized that which no human creature can want, at the same annual parliamentary expence as would have commanded, had we chose a single colony so large, the whole tract to the Ohio!

Now

Now the remedy which I would in this case humbly propose is an exceeding plain one ; only to extend the bounds of the colony of West Florida : for as political motives, relative to the sea-coast, may induce the government to have a regular watch upon it, under the eye of a governor, the wretched low country might be included in the colony ; but all settlements should be made in the high rich lands above-mentioned. Nor would this be even settling any country but what the French had begun to settle before ; for a full proof of which see Du Pratz. The spot whereon the French fort Rosalia was built, is the properest situation for the grand settlement, as ships may come up thither with the greatest ease. As to the extent of this colony (which might be called FLORIDA, to distinguish it from East Florida) it might extend to the Ohio. By means of taking in so large a country, the expence of establishments would be the same for all as the present West Florida, and there would be plenty of country left nevertheless for the Indians ; but that tract, as it could not all be near wanting for many years, need not first be purchased of the Indians, (where, I mean, the French had not bought before ; for, far to the north of West Florida they had, and consequently our right to it by the peace took place) but by degrees, as the settlements extend. As to the more northerly tract of the Mississippi and that of the Ohio, the following minutes will sufficiently particularize them.

This country, on the Mississippi, is called Illionois ; it extends north-west of the Ohio, against the Mississippi, up to the river Illionois, and to the lake of the same name. This country is extremely good, insomuch that for the production of wheat and all grain the slightest culture is sufficient. Tobacco likewise thrives there, " but comes to maturity, says Du Pratz, with difficulty : " but it is evident he means in comparison with that more southerly,

southerly, since the greatest part of this country is in the same latitude with Virginia, and was formerly called a part of it. Governor Pownal gives, from a letter of M. de Vaudreuil's in his possession, the exports of the settlements which the French had formed in the Illionois country, among which appear tobacco, cotton, myrtle wax, and a vast quantity of provisions ; and says, that the convoys on the river came down annually the latter end of December, and returned at latest by the middle of February. He likewise says, that the French government restrained the Canadians from settling there, or they would totally have abandoned Canada. All which proves sufficiently the great excellency of the country.

The tract of the Ohio is in every respect the same ; or, if we attend to the accounts of our own people who have traversed it, still better. A part of this country, lying against Virginia, was what our colonists wanted so much to possess before the last war, for cultivating tobacco in ; and we cannot suppose that would have been the case, if it had been less proper for their staple than their lands at home.

Such are the tracts of country confirmed to Britain by the peace of 1763 ; but which, by the most unaccountable policy, she has chosen to make no use of, at the very time when she wants them to the utmost necessity. . Now the proceeding which is at present requisite to prevent the ill effects that are arising in our colonies, is to form, as I before observed, new ones here. That of West Florida should be extended along the banks of the Mississippi to the Ohio ; and then, for several reasons, I should apprehend it more adviseable to station the other colony in the northern forks of the Mississippi and Ohio, than in any parts of the country adjoining to our present settlements. Such colony might extend north to lat. 42, or the forks of the
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the river Illionois, and from thence in a direct line east to the river Miamis, on the banks of which south again to the Ohio; the vast importance of which situation, and especially that of the country around the forks of the Ohio (a share of which I have given to both colonies) did not escape the penetration of a late writer. He justly characterizes it in the following passage:—The most important place in this country, and perhaps in North America, is at the forks of the Mississippi, where the Ohio falls into that river, which, like another ocean, is the general receptacle of all the rivers that water the interior parts of that vast continent. Here those large and navigable rivers the Ohio, the river of the Cherokees, Wabache, Illionois, Missouri, and Mississippi, besides many others, which spread over that whole continent, from the Apalachian mountains to the mountains of New Mexico, upwards of a thousand miles, both north, south, east, and west, all meet together at this spot, and that in the best climate, and one of the most fruitful countries of any in all that part of the world, in the latitude 37° , the latitude of the capes of Virginia, and of Santa Fé, the capital of New Mexico. By that means there is a convenient navigation to this place, from our present settlements to New Mexico, and from all the inland parts of North America further than we are acquainted with it. And all the natives of that continent, those old friends and allies of the French, have by that means a free and ready access to this place; rights to which the French formed a settlement to secure their interests on the frontiers of all our southern colonies. In short, this place is in the center of that vast continent, and of all the nations in it, and seems to be intended by nature to command them both; for which reason it ought no longer to be neglected by Britain. As soon as we pass the Apalachian mountains, this seems to be the most proper place to settle at, and was pitched upon

upon for that purpose by those who were the best acquainted with those countries, and the proper places of making settlements in them of any we know.

As to our colonists settling in that part of the Ohio tract which borders on our old colonies, the want of water carriage is a very great objection to it; for tobacco, and most of the staples proposed to be raised in this country, being very bulky, would never pay the expence of a land-carriage over the mountains; but from the central colony proposed, or that of Florida, the Mississippi would convey them at a very small expence directly to the shipping. Indeed it is very necessary to know how high that river is navigable. A ship of 500 tons may come up to Fort Rosalia, and, for any thing we know to the contrary, much higher, even to the fork itself; and at the same time that such a most advantageous water-carriage subsisted for the export of the bulky staples, the Ohio would connect our old and new colonies in as beneficial a manner as is requisite, that river being navigable from the back of Pennsylvania. Nor should any one suppose the water-carriage down the Mississippi to be too expensive for the conveyance of the most bulky commodities. The hemp and iron which we have from Russia are transported by a much longer and more difficult inland navigation, with the addition of a considerable land-carriage on them.

As to the benefits of forming these colonies, very little here is requisite to be inserted. In the present state of our old ones, manufactures are every day taking the place of planting, and that for want of such excellent lands as all upon these rivers are. Our tobacco trade is upon the decline, and will soon be annihilated; for the lands in Virginia and Maryland, having for an hundred and fifty years produced that exhausting vegetable, are worn out, and daily converting into corn farms, from
which

which no benefits result to Britain. This great want of fresh land, in those plantations, was felt many years ago; the inhabitants have been doubled since; how much greater, therefore, must that want be now! In the northern colonies likewise the inhabitants are driven to manufactures for want of lands to make staple commodities on. We are told by one who knows their country well, that 200,000 people, bred to the culture of the earth, are there out of employment for want of land, and actually petitioned for the territory of Sagadahoc to settle in; which they would never have thought of, had the least idea of a colony on the Ohio or Mississippi been current. Nor is that a country in which Britain wants planters, but to the southward in these fertile tracts where there is alone any hope of planters raising staples enough to purchase there-with all their necessaries from her.

These proposed colonies would raise hemp and flax sufficient to supply all Europe, nay, all the world. The ships that might be built at Louisiana, says Du Pratz, would never be sufficient to employ all the hemp which might be raised in that colony, did the inhabitants cultivate as much of it as they well might. The inland parts of America, says another, are well known to be fitted for the production of hemp, flax, and silk. Such lands as are described on the Mississippi, says a third, have a natural moisture in them, which is the very soil that both hemp, flax, and indigo delight in; and these are the three first commodities that the nation wants from the colonies. Upon such lands hemp and flax may be made in quantities as a staple commodity to send to Britain; whereas, on the poor lands, in our colonies, and their small plantations, they commonly make a little for their own use. The one would be the greatest service, when the other is a prejudice to the nation. The climate, likewise, is as fit for these commodities. Here they

they might sow hemp and flax in winter, which is the only proper season for them in any part of North America. This would afford time for making another crop in summer, which should be indigo. Now a crop of indigo, hemp, and flax would be much more profitable than any thing which America produces, whether on the continent or the islands. Every labourer might cultivate two acres, or more, in hemp, and one or two in indigo, the produce of which would be worth from 30 to 40 l. a year. This would enable them to purchase negroes, and to enlarge the British plantations beyond what they are otherwise capable of. Such plantations would be more profitable than even sugar colonies, and supply the nation with more valuable and necessary commodities. A hundred thousand labourers, which might be easily found in all our colonies, would, at this rate of 20 l. a-head, make 2,000,000 l. a year; but suppose they make only one half of this, it is as much as all our colonies in North America now produce. By these means the nation might get the trade both of indigo, hemp, and flax, and supply all Europe with these commodities, as we now do with tobacco; which last these lands are as fit to produce, and in much greater plenty and perfection than any other part of North America. And when our tobacco plantations are worn out, there are no lands to supply their place in all the British dominions, but those on the Mississippi.

Seeing, therefore, that these proposed colonies are not only so valuable in themselves, but so peculiarly necessary to this nation at this time, I would humbly propose that they be immediately established. The first business (as I think we have already forts and garrisons both at the Forks and at Rosalia) would be to provide at Fort Pitt a sufficient number of decked sloops, fit for the navigation of those great rivers, (such as the French used) and give notice

notice throughout all the northern and the tobacco colonies, of the intended settlements; and that sloops were ready on the Ohio, at Pittsburg, to carry all persons with their families, slaves, furniture, implements, &c. and a proper quantity of provisions (with which, by the bye, the new colony, for the first year, might be supplied by the French settlers in the Illionois country, by the Mississippi, or from Pensylvania by the Ohio) to settle there. If the whole was to be done at the government's expence, it ought not, considering the great importance of the measure, to be neglected even then. But no such matter would be necessary; for the numbers of people in those colonies who are in want of fresh land are so great, that a new settlement would speedily be performed at their own expence. There can be no greater proof of this than the repeated petitions from all parts of those colonies, for leave to penetrate into the back country; but unhappily rejected, and the proclamation of October 7, 1763, adhered to.

MINISTER. A plan of favouritism for our executory government is essentially at variance with the plan of our legislature. One great end undoubtedly of a mixed government like ours, composed of monarchy and of controls, on the part of the higher people and the lower, is, that the prince shall not be able to violate the laws. This is useful indeed, and fundamental. But this, even at first view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armour merely defensive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in importance, "that the discretionary powers, which are necessarily vested in the monarch, whether for the execution of the laws or for the nomination to magistracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, should all be exercised upon public principles and national grounds, and not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies

of a court." This, I said, is equal in importance to the securing a government according to law. The laws reach but a very little way. Constitute government how you please, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of ministers of state. Even all the use and potency of the laws depends upon them. Without them your commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper; and not a living, acting, effective constitution. It is possible that through negligence, or ignorance, or design artfully conducted, ministers may suffer one part of government to languish, another to be perverted from its purposes, and every valuable interest of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without possibility of fixing any single act on which a criminal prosecution can be justly grounded. The due arrangement of men in the active part of the state, far from being foreign to the purposes of a wise government, ought to be among its very first and dearest objects. When, therefore, the abettors of the new system tell us, that between them and their opposers there is nothing but a struggle for power, and that therefore we are no ways concerned in it; we must tell those who have the impudence to insult us in this manner, that of all things we ought to be the most concerned who and what sort of men they are that hold the trust of every thing that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of indifference to the nation but what must either render us totally desperate, or soothe us into the security of ideots. We must soften into a credulity below the milkiness of infancy to think all men virtuous. We must be tainted with a malignity truly diabolical, to believe all the world to be equally wicked and corrupt. Men are in public life, as in private, some good, some evil. The elevation of the one, and the depression of the other, are the
first

first objects of all true policy. But that form of government, which neither in its direct institutions, nor in their immediate tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the most trust-worthy hands, but has left its whole executory system to be disposed of agreeably to the uncontrouled pleasure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective, not only in that member, but consequentially erroneous in every part of it.

In arbitrary governments, the constitution of the ministry follows the constitution of the legislature. Both the law and the magistrate are the creatures of will. It must be so. Nothing indeed will appear more certain, on any tolerable consideration of this matter, than that "every sort of government ought to have its administration correspondent to its legislature." If it should be otherwise, things must fall into an hideous disorder. The people of a free commonwealth, who have taken such care that their laws should be the result of general consent, cannot be so senseless as to suffer their executory system to be composed of persons on whom they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the public love and confidence have recommended to those powers, upon the use of which the very being of the state depends. The popular election of magistrates, and popular disposition of rewards and honours, is one of the first advantages of a free state. Without it, or something equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot long enjoy the substance of freedom; certainly none of the vivifying energy of good government. The frame of our commonwealth did not admit of such an actual election, but it provided as well, and (while the spirit of the constitution is preserved) better, for all the effects of it, than by the method of suffrage in any democratic state whatsoever. It had always, until of late, been held the first duty of parliament, "to refuse to support government until power was in the hands of persons

who were acceptable to the people, or while factions predominated in the court in which the nation had no confidence." Thus all the good effects of popular election were supposed to be secured to us, without the mischiefs attending on particular intrigue, and a distinct canvass for every particular office throughout the body of the people. This was the most noble and refined part of our constitution. The people, by their representatives and grandees, were intrusted with a deliberative power in making laws; the king, with the controul of his negative. The king was intrusted with the deliberative choice and election to office; the people had the negative in a parliamentary refusal to support. Formerly this power of controul was what kept ministers in awe of parliaments, and parliaments in reverence with the people. If the use of this power of controul on the system and persons of administration is gone, every thing is lost, parliament and all. We may assure ourselves, that if parliament will tamely see evil men take possession of all the strong holds of their country, and allow them time and means to fortify themselves, under the pretence of giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of discovering whether they will not be reformed by power, and whether their measures will not be better than their morals, such a parliament will give countenance to their measures also, whatever that parliament may pretend, and whatever those measures may be.

Every good political institution must have a preventative operation as well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude bad men from government, and not to trust, for the safety of the state, to subsequent punishment alone; punishment which has ever been tardy and uncertain, and which, when power is suffered in bad hands, may chance to fall rather on the injured than the criminal.

Before

Before men are put forward into the great trusts of the state, they ought by their conduct to have obtained such a degree of estimation in their country, as may be some sort of pledge and security to the public, that they will not abuse those trusts. It is no mean security for a proper use of power, that a man has shewn by the general tenor of his actions, that the affection, the good opinion, the confidence of his fellow citizens, have been among the principal objects of his life; and that he has owed none of the gradations of his power or fortune to a settled contempt, or occasional forfeiture of their esteem:

That man who before he comes into power has no friends, or, who coming into power is obliged to desert his friends, or who losing it, has no friends to sympathize with him; he who has no sway among any part of the landed or commercial interest, but whose whole importance has begun with his office, and is sure to end with it, is a person who ought never to be suffered by a controuling parliament, to continue in any of those situations which confer the lead and direction of all our public affairs; because, such a man has no connexion with the interest of the people.

Those knots, or cabals of men, who have got together avowedly, without any public principle, in order to sell their conjunct iniquity, at the higher rate, and are therefore universally odious, ought never to be suffered to domineer in the state, because they have no connexion with the sentiments and opinions of the people.

These are considerations, which, in my opinion, enforce the necessity of having some better reasons in a free country, and a free parliament, for supporting the ministers of the crown, than that short one, that the king has thought proper to appoint them. There is something very courtly in this. But it is a principle pregnant with all sorts of mischief in a constitution like ours, to turn the views of active men, from

the country to the court: whatever be the road to power, that is the road which will be trod. If the opinion of the country be of no use, as a means of power and consideration, the qualities which usually procure that opinion, will be no longer cultivated. And whether it will be right in a state so popular in its constitution as ours, to leave ambition, without popular motives, and to trust all to the operation of pure virtue, in the minds of kings and ministers, and public men, must be submitted to the judgment and good sense of the people of England*.

MONARCHY. A monarchical state ought to be of a moderate extent. Were it small it would form itself into a republic: were it very large, the nobility possessed of great estates, far from the eye of the prince, with a private court of their own, and secure moreover from sudden executions, by the laws and manners of the country; such a nobility, I say, might throw off their allegiance, having nothing to fear from too slow, and too distant a punishment.

Thus Charlemain had scarce founded his empire, when he was obliged to divide it; whether the governors of provinces refused to obey, or whether, in order to keep them more under submission, there was a necessity of parcelling the empire into several kingdoms.

After the decease of Alexander, his empire was divided. How was it possible for those Greek and Macedonian chiefs, who were each of them free and independent, or commanders, at least, of the victorious bands dispersed throughout that vast extent of conquered land, how was it possible, I say, for them to obey?

Attila's empire was dissolved soon after his death; such a number of kings, who were no longer under restraint, could not resume their fetters.

* Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontents, p. 47.

The sudden establishment of unlimited power, is a remedy, which in those cases may prevent a dissolution; but how dreadful the remedy, which after the enlargement of dominion, opens a new scene of misery!

The rivers hasten to mingle their waters with the sea; and monarchies lose themselves in despotic power.

Let not the example of Spain be produced against me; it rather proves what I affirm. To preserve America, she did what even despotic power itself does not attempt; she destroyed the inhabitants. To preserve her colony, she was obliged to keep it dependent, even for its subsistence.

In the Netherlands, she essayed to render herself arbitrary; and as soon as she abandoned the attempt, her perplexity increased. On the one hand, the Walloons would not be governed by Spaniards; and on the other, the Spanish soldiers refused to submit to Walloon officers.

In Italy, she maintained her ground merely by exhausting herself, and by enriching that country; for those who would have been pleased to have got rid of the King of Spain, were not in a humour to refuse his gold.

A large empire supposes a despotic authority in the person who governs. It is necessary that the quickness of the prince's resolutions, should supply the distance of the places they are sent to; that fear should prevent the remissness of the distant governor, or magistrate; that the law should be derived from a single person, and should shift continually, according to the accidents which incessantly multiply in a state, in proportion to its extent.

If it be therefore the natural property of small states to be governed as a republic, of middling ones to be subject to a monarch, and of large empires to be swayed by a despotic prince, the consequence is, that in order to preserve the principles of the esta-

blished government, the state must be supported in the extent it has acquired, and that the spirit of this state will alter in proportion as it contracts or extends its limits*.

M O N A R C H. The manners of a prince contribute as much as the laws themselves to liberty; like these, he may transform men into brutes, and brutes into men. If he prefers free and generous spirits, he will have subjects: if he likes base, dastardly souls, he will have slaves. Would he know the great art of ruling, let him call honour and virtue to attend his person; and let him encourage personal merit. He may even sometimes cast an eye on talents and abilities. Let him not be afraid of those rivals, who are called men of merit; he is their equal, when once he loves them. Let him gain the hearts of his people, without subduing their spirits. Let him render himself popular; he ought to be pleased with the affections of the lowest of his subjects, for they too are men. The common people require so very little condescension, that it is fit they should be humoured; the infinite distance between the sovereign and them, will surely prevent them from giving him any uneasiness. Let him be exorable to supplication, and resolute against demands: let him be sensible, in fine, that his people have his refusals, while his courtiers enjoy his favours.

Princes ought to be extremely circumspect with regard to raillery; it pleases with moderation, because it is an introduction to familiarity; but a satirical raillery is less excusable in them than in the meanest of their subjects, for it is they alone that give a mortal wound.

Much less should they offer a public affront to any of their subjects; kings were instituted to pardon, and to punish, but never to insult.

* Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. p. 189.

When they affront their subjects, their treatment is more cruel than that of the Turk, or the Muscovite. The insults of these are a humiliation, not a disgrace ; but both must follow from the insolent behaviour of monarchs.

Such is the prejudice of the eastern nations, that they look upon an affront from the prince as the effect of paternal goodness ; and such, on the contrary, is our way of thinking, that besides the cruel vexation of being affronted, we despair of ever being able to wipe off the disgrace.

Princes ought to be overjoyed to have subjects to whom honour is dearer than life, an incitement to fidelity, as well as to courage.

They should remember the misfortunes that have happened to sovereigns for insulting their subjects the revenge of Chærea, of the eunuch Narses, of count Julian, and in fine, of the dutchess of Montpensier, who being enraged against Henry III. for having published some of her private failings, tormented him during his whole life*.

MONEY is not properly one of the subjects of commerce, but only the instrument which men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. It is none of the wheels of trade : it is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more smooth and easy. If we consider any one kingdom by itself, it is evident that the greater or less plenty of money is of no consequence, since the prices of commodities are always proportioned to the plenty of money ; and a crown in Henry VII's time, served the same purpose, as a pound does at present. It is only the public which draws any advantage from the greater plenty of money, and that only in its wars and negotiations with foreign states.

* Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. p. 300.

The greater number of people, and their greater industry, are serviceable in all cases; at home, and abroad, in public, and in private. But the greater plenty of money is very limited in its use, and may even sometimes be a loss to a nation in its commerce with foreigners.

There seems to be a happy concurrence of causes in human affairs, which check the growth of trade and riches, and hinder them from being confined intirely to one people, as might naturally at first be dreaded, from the advantages of an established commerce. Where one nation has got the start of another in trade, it is very difficult for the latter to regain the ground it has lost; because of the superior industry and skill of the former, and the greater stocks of which its merchants are possessed, and which enable them to trade for so much smaller profits. But these advantages are compensated in some measure by the low price of labour in every nation, which has not an extensive commerce, and does not very much abound in gold and silver. Manufactures, therefore, gradually shift their places, leaving those countries and provinces which they have already enriched, and flying to others, whither they are allured by the cheapness of provisions and labour, till they have enriched these also, and are again banished by the same causes. And in general we may observe, that the dearness of every thing from plenty of money, is a disadvantage which attends an established commerce, and sets bounds to it in every country, by enabling the poorer states to undersel the richer in all foreign markets.

But notwithstanding this conclusion, which must be allowed just, it is certain, that since the discovery of the mines in America, industry has increased in all the nations of Europe, except in the possessors of those mines; and this may justly be ascribed, amongst other reasons, to the increase of gold and silver. Accordingly we find, that in every kingdom

dom into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, every thing takes a new face; labour and industry gain life; the merchant becomes more enterprising, the manufacturer more diligent and skilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with more alacrity and attention. This is not easy to be accounted for, if we consider only the influence which a greater abundance of coin has in the kingdom itself, by heightening the price of commodities, and obliging every one to pay a greater number of these little yellow or white pieces for every thing he purchases. And as to foreign trade, it appears that great plenty of money is rather disadvantageous, by raising the price of every kind of labour.

To account then for this phænomenon, we must consider, that though the high price of commodities be a necessary consequence of the increase of gold and silver, yet it follows not immediately upon that increase; but some time is required before the money circulate through the whole state, and make its effects be felt on all ranks of people. At first no alteration is perceived; by degrees the price rises, first of one commodity, then of another; till the whole at last reaches a just proportion with the new quantity of specie which is in the kingdom. In my opinion it is only in this interval, or intermediate situation, between the acquisition of money and the rise of prices, that the increasing quantity of gold and silver is favourable to industry. When any quantity of gold and silver is imported into a nation, it is not at first dispersed into many hands, but is confined to the coffers of a few persons, who immediately seek to employ it to the best advantage. Here are a set of manufacturers or merchants, we shall suppose, who have received returns of gold and silver for goods which they sent to Cadiz: they are thereby enabled to employ more workmen than formerly, who never dream of demanding higher wages,

wages, but are glad of employment from such good pay-masters. If workmen become scarce, the manufacturer gives higher wages, but at first requires an increase of labour, and this is willingly submitted to by the artizan, who can now eat and drink better to compensate his additional toil and fatigue. He carries his money to market, where he finds every thing at the same price as formerly, but returns with greater quantity, and of better kinds, for the use of his family. The farmer and gardener, finding that all their commodities are taken off, apply themselves with alacrity to the raising more; and at the same time can afford to take better, and more cloaths from their tradesmen, whose price is the same as formerly, and their industry only whetted by so much new gain. It is easy to trace money in its progress through the whole commonwealth, where we shall find that it must first quicken the diligence of every individual, before it increases the price of labour.

From the whole of this reasoning, we may conclude, that it is of no manner of consequence with regard to the domestic happiness of a state, whether money be in greater or less quantity. The good policy of the magistrate consists only in keeping it, if possible, still increasing; because by that means he keeps alive a spirit of industry in the nation, and increases the stock of labour, in which consists all the real power and riches. A nation whose money decreases, is actually at that time much weaker and more miserable than another nation which possesses no more money, but is not in the increasing hand. This will be easily accounted for if we consider that the alterations in the quantity of money, either in the one side or the other, are not immediately attended with proportionable alterations in the prices of commodities. There is always an interval before matters be adjusted to their new situation; and this interval is as pernicious to industry, when gold and
silver

silver are diminishing, as it is advantageous when these metals are increasing. The workman has not the same employment from the manufacturer and merchant, though he pays the same price for every thing in the market. The farmer cannot dispose of his corn and cattle, though he must pay the same rent to his landlord. The poverty, beggary, and sloth which must ensue, are easily foreseen.

There are some kingdoms, and many provinces in Europe, (and all of them were once in the same condition) where money is so scarce that the landlord can get none at all from his tenant, but is obliged to take his rent in kind, and either to consume it himself, or transport it to places where he may find a market. In those countries the prince can levy few or no taxes but in the same manner. And as he will receive very small benefit from impositions so paid, it is evident that such a kingdom has very little force, even at home, and cannot maintain fleets and armies to the same extent as if every part of it abounded in gold and silver.

There is a fallacy in the remark often to be met with in historians, and even in common conversation, that any particular state is weak, though fertile, populous, and well cultivated, merely because it wants money. It appears that the want of money can never injure any state within itself: for men and commodities are the real strength of any community. It is the simple manner of living which here hurts the public, by confining the gold and silver to few hands, and preventing its universal diffusion and circulation. On the contrary, refinements of all kinds incorporate it with the whole state, however small its quantity may be: they digest it into every vein so to speak, and make it enter into every transaction and contract. No hand is entirely empty of it. And as the prices of every thing fall by that means, the sovereign has a double advantage: he may draw money by his taxes from every part of the state;

state; and what he receives, goes farther in every purchase and payment.

We may infer from a comparison of prices, that money is not more plentiful in China than it was in Europe three centuries ago. But what immense power is that empire possessed of, if we may judge by the civil and military list maintained by it? Polybius tells us that provisions were so cheap in Italy, during his time, that in some places the stated club at the inns was a *senis* a head, little more than a farthing; yet the Roman power had even then subdued the whole known world. About a century before that period, the Carthaginian ambassadors said, by way of raillery, that no people lived more sociable amongst themselves than the Romans; for that in every entertainment, which as foreign ministers they received, they still observed the same plate at every table. The absolute quantity of the precious metals is a matter of great indifference. There are only two circumstances of any importance, viz. their gradual increase, and their thorough concoction and circulation through the state, and the influence of both these circumstances has been here explained.

Suppose four-fifths of all the money in Britain to be annihilated in one night, and the nation reduced to the same condition, with regard to specie, as in the reigns of the Henrys and Edwards, what would be the consequence? Must not the price of all labour and commodities sink in proportion, and every thing be sold as cheap as they were in those ages? What nation could then dispute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate, or to sell manufactures at the same price, which to us would afford sufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, must this bring back the money which we had lost, and raise us to the level of all the neighbouring nations? Where, after we have arrived, we immediately lose the advantage of the cheapness of labour

labour and commodities, and the further flowing in of money is stopped by our fulness and repletion.

Again, suppose all the money in Britain were multiplied five-fold in a night, must not the contrary effect follow? Must not all labour and commodities rise to such an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became so cheap in comparison, that in spite of all the laws that could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out, till we fall to a level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches which had laid us under such disadvantages?

Now it is evident that the same causes which would correct these exorbitant inequalities, were they to happen miraculously, must prevent their happening in the common course of nature, and must for ever, in all the neighbouring nations, preserve money, nearly proportionable to the art and industry of each nation. All water, wherever it communicates, remains always at a level. Ask naturalists the reason, they tell you, that were it to be raised in any one place, the superior gravity of that part, not being ballanced, must depress it, till it meets a counterpoise; and that the same cause which redresses the inequality when it happens, must for ever prevent it, without some violent external operation.

But as any body of water may be raised above the level of the surrounding element, if the former has no communication with the latter, so in money, if the communication be cut off, by any material or physical impediment, (for all laws alone are ineffectual) there may in such a case be a very great inequality of money. Thus the immense distance of China, together with the monopolies of our India companies, obstructing the communication, preserve in Europe the gold and silver, especially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom.

kingdom. But notwithstanding this great obstruction, the force of the causes above-mentioned is still evident.

The skill and ingenuity of Europe, in general, surpasses that of China, with regard to manual arts and manufactures, yet are we never able to trade thither without great disadvantage; and were it not for the continual recruits which we receive from America, money would very soon sink in Europe and rise in China, till it came nearly to a level in both places. Nor can any reasonable man doubt, but that industrious nation, were they as near us as Poland or Barbary, would drain us of the overplus of our specie, and draw to themselves a larger share of the West Indian treasures. We need have no recourse to a physical attraction to explain the necessity of this operation. There is a moral attraction, arising from the interests and passions of men, which is full as potent and infallible.

I scarce know any method of sinking money below its level but those institutions of banks, funds, and paper credit, which are so much practised in this kingdom. These render paper equivalent to money; circulate it through the whole state; make it supply the place of gold and silver; raise proportionably the price of labour and commodities; and by that means either banish a great part of those precious metals, or prevent their farther increase. What can be more short-sighted than our reasonings on this head? We fancy that because an individual would be much richer were his stock of money doubled, that the same good effect would follow were the money of every one increased; not considering that this would raise as much the price of every commodity, and reduce every man in time to the same condition as before. It is only in our public negotiations and transactions with foreigners that a greater stock of money is advantageous; and as our paper is there absolutely insignificant, we
feel

feel by its means all the ill effects arising from a great abundance of money, without reaping any of the advantages.

Suppose that there are 12 millions of paper which circulate in the kingdom as money, (for we are not to imagine that all our enormous funds are employed in that shape) and suppose the real cash of the kingdom to be 18 millions; here is a state which is found by experience able to hold a stock of 30 millions. I say, if it be able to hold it, it must of necessity have acquired it in gold and silver, had we not obstructed the entrance of these metals by this new invention of paper. Whence would it have acquired that sum? From all the kingdoms of the world. But why? Because if you remove these 12 millions, money in this state is below its level, compared with our neighbours; and we must immediately draw from all of them till we be full and saturate, so to speak, and can hold no more. By our present politics we are careful to stuff the nation with this fine commodity of bank bills and exchequer notes, as if we were afraid of being over-burthened with the precious metals. 'Tis not to be doubted but the great plenty of bullion in France is in a great measure owing to the want of paper-credit. The French have no banks; merchants bills do not there circulate as with us. By this means provisions and labour still remain much cheaper among them, than in nations that are not half so rich in gold and silver. The advantages of this situation, in point of trade, as well as in great public emergencies, are too evident to be disputed.

As our projects of paper-credit are almost the only expedient by which we can sink money below its level, so, in my opinion, the only expedient by which we can raise money above its level, is a practice which we should all exclaim against as destructive, viz. the gathering large sums into a pub-

lic treasure, locking them up, and absolutely preventing their circulation. The fluid not communicating with the neighbouring element, may, by such an artifice, be raised to what height we please. To prove this, we need only return to our first supposition of the annihilating half or any part of our cash; where we found, that the immediate consequence of such an event would be the attraction of an equal sum from all the neighbouring kingdoms. Nor does there seem to be any necessary bounds set by the nature of things to this practice of hoarding. A small city, like Geneva, continuing this policy for ages, might ingross nine-tenths of the money of Europe. There seems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invincible obstacle to that immense growth of riches. A weak state, with an enormous treasure, will soon become a prey to some of its poorer, but more powerful neighbours. A great state would dissipate its wealth in dangerous and ill-concerted projects, and probably destroy with it what is much more valuable, the industry, morals, and numbers of its people. The fluid, in this case, raised to too great a height, bursts, and destroys the vessel that contains it; and mixing itself with the surrounding element, soon falls to its proper level *.

Money is a sign which represents the value of all merchandizes. Metal is taken for this design, as being durable, because it consumes but little by use, and because, without being destroyed, it is capable of many divisions. A precious metal has been chosen as a sign, as being most portable. A metal is most proper as a common measure, because it can be easily reduced to the same standard. Every state fixes upon it a particular impression, to the end that the form may correspond with the

* Hume's Essays, Vol. I. p. 357.

standard and the weight, and that both may be known by inspection only.

The Athenians, not having the use of metals, made use of oxen, and the Romans of sheep; but one ox is not the same as another ox, in the manner that one piece of metal may be the same as another.

As specie is the sign of the value of merchandize, paper is the sign of the value of specie; and when it is of the right sort, it represents this value in such a manner, that as to the effects produced by it, there is not the least difference.

When civilized nations are the mistresses of the world, gold and silver, whether they draw it from amongst themselves or fetch it from the mines, must increase every day; on the contrary, it diminishes when barbarous nations prevail. We know how great was the scarcity of these metals, when the Goths and Vandals, on the one side, and, on the other, the Saracens and the Tartars, broke in like a torrent on the civilized world.

The bullion drawn from the American mines, imported into Europe, and from thence sent to the East, has greatly promoted the navigation of the European nations; for it is a merchandize which Europe receives in exchange from America, and which she sends in exchange to the Indies. A prodigious quantity of gold and silver is therefore an advantage, when we consider these metals as a merchandize; but it is otherwise when we consider them as a sign, because their abundance gives an allay to their quality as a sign, which is chiefly founded on their scarcity.

Money is the price of merchandizes or manufactures. But how shall we fix this price? Or, in other words, by what piece of money is every thing to be represented?

If we compare the mass of gold and silver in the whole world with the quantity of merchandizes

therein contained, it is certain that every commodity, or merchandize in particular, may be compared to a certain portion of the entire mass of gold and silver. As the total of the one is to the total of the other, so part of the one will be to part of the other. Let us suppose that there is only one commodity or merchandize in the world, or only one to be purchased, and that this is divisible like money; a part of this merchandize will answer to a part of the mass of gold and silver, the half of the total of the one to the half of the total of the other; the tenth, the hundredth, the thousandth part of the one to the tenth, the hundredth, the thousandth part of the other: but as that which constitutes property amongst mankind is not all at once in trade, and as the metals or money, which are the sign of property, are not in the compound ratio of the total of things with the total of signs, and that of the total of things in trade with the total of signs in trade also; and as the things which are not in trade to-day may be in trade to-morrow, and the signs, not now in trade, may enter into trade at the same time, the establishment of the price of things fundamentally depends on the proportion of the total of things to the total of signs.

Thus the prince, or the magistrate, can no more ascertain the value of merchandizes, than he can establish by a decree that the relation one has to ten is equal to that of one to twenty. Julian's lowering the price of provisions at Antioch, was the cause of a most terrible famine*.

A later writer examines this subject in a different manner, and draws different conclusions.

Let the specie of a country, says he, be augmented or diminished in never so great a proportion, commodities will still rise and fall according to the principles of demand and competition, and

* Spirit of Laws, Vol. II. p. 83.

these will constantly depend upon the inclinations of those who have property or any kind of equivalent whatsoever to give; but never upon the quantity of coin they are possessed of.

Let the quantity of coin be ever so much increased, it is the desire of spending it alone which will raise prices. Let it be diminished ever so low, while there is real property of any denomination in the country, and a competition to consume in those who possess it, prices will be high by the means of barter, symbolical money, mutual prestations, and a thousand other inventions.

No body ever denied that the extraordinary demand for a commodity had the effect of raising the price of it; and certainly no body will deny that the demand for a particular commodity may be greater at one time than at another, though the same quantity of that commodity be found at both times in the country; and the same quantity of specie likewise, not only in the country, but also in circulation.

“Increase commodities, they become cheaper; increase the money, they rise in their value.” This proposition is much too general: the first part of it is commonly true, the last part is more commonly false.

What can increase commodities, but a demand for them? If the demand be equal to the augmentation, there will be no alteration in the price.

Let extraordinary plenty increase subsistence, it will naturally fall in the price; but it may be hoarded up, and made to rise in spite of the plenty; it may be demanded from abroad; this also will make it rise.

Let the production of superfluities, not exportable, be produced by workmen whose branch is overstocked, prices will undoubtedly fall.

The same observations are true of a diminution in the quantity of commodities. If this diminishes

by degrees from a diminution of demand, the price of them will not rise.

If the quantity of subsistence falls below the necessary consumption of the inhabitants, prices will undoubtedly rise.

If the articles of superfluity are diminished, prices will only rise in proportion to the eagerness to buy, that is, to the competition, not to the deficiency. On the other hand as to coin or money, increase the money, nothing can be concluded as to prices, because it is not certain that people will increase their expences in proportion to their wealth; and although they should, the moment their additional demand has the effect of producing a sufficient supply, prices will return to the old standard.

But diminish the quantity of specie employed in circulation, you both retard this and hurt the industrious; because we suppose the former quantity exactly sufficient to preserve both in the just proportion to the desires and wants of the inhabitants.

Suppose the specie of Europe to continue increasing in quantity every year, until it amounts to ten times the present quantity, would prices rise in proportion?

I answer, that such an augmentation might happen without the smallest alteration upon prices; or that it might occasion a very great one, according to circumstances. If industry increases to ten times what it is at present, that is to say, were the produce of it increased to ten times its present value, according to the actual standard of prices, the value of every manufacture and produce might remain without alteration. This supposition is possible, because no man can tell to what extent demand may carry industry. If, on the other hand, the scale of demand could be supposed to preponderate, so as to draw all the wealth into circulation without having the effect of augmenting the supply, (which

(which I take to be impossible) then prices would rise to ten times the present standard, at least, in many articles*.

N.

N A V Y of FRANCE in 1681.

	Ships.	Guns.	Men.
First rate	12	1080	7850
Second rate	21	1518	8850
Third rate	36	1928	11500
Fourth rate	26	1088	5450
Fifth rate	20	608	2790
Total	115	6222	36,440
Small frigates	24	400	1880
Fire ships	8	74	240
Barca longas	10	43	280
Pinks	22	341	637
Total	179	7080	39,477
Galleys	30		3010
Total	209		42,487

The expence of this whole navy, armed and equipped, would cost *per* month the sum of 1,212,013 livres.

Supposing the whole to be equipped for 6 months of the year, a thing which never happens, every year that formidable navy would cost 7,272,081 livres†.

* Principles of Political Oeconomy, Vol. I. p. 414.

† Reflexions Politiques sur les Finances & Commerce de France.

We have met with two lists of the French navy, both the totals of which we shall lay before the reader; their variations owing, we apprehend, to being taken at different times.

In 1756.

	Ships.	Guns.	Men.
First rates	6	516	5600
Second rates	22	516	16500
Third rates	29	1856	16820
Fourth rates	9	468	3600
Line of battle	66	4468	42520
Frigates	23	624	3050
Flutes	7	204	2000
Chebeques	4	84	680
Advice boats	3	30	300
Bomb ketches	1	6	
Sloops	9		
Galleys	12		
Total	125 *		

Another list, which appears to have been of a later date than the above, makes the navy more numerous; and we must observe, that some ships, during the war, were taken, the names of which are not to be found in the preceding list, from whence we conclude the following to be more accurate.

	Ships.	Guns.	Men.
Line of battle	95		
Frigates, &c.	142		
Total	237	9682	110,755
Taken by the English.			
Ships of the line	47		
Frigates	84		
Total	131	5278	60,430

* Account of the Maritime Provinces of France, p. 112.

I have given them their full complement of men, whereas many of them, being taken at the latter end of the war, were not completely manned: perhaps the number of men taken by the English, in part of these ships, did not exceed 40,000; some were burnt, &c.

Total number of guns	9682
Taken, &c. by the English	5278

Remainng, in 1763, of their old fleet, be-	}	4404
sides such new ones as were built during the war, and not taken		

Cost of the total fleet, at one thousand	}	£. 9,682,000
pounds a gun, ready for the sea		
Cost of those taken, &c.		£. 5,278,000

The foregoing tables offer matter for reflection of the most curious and important kind. It is from thence very evident, that the French ministry made most prodigious efforts to raise a formidable naval force after the war of 1741, for most of the preceding list were built after 1748; as to the number of ships, and their force, it must be confessed, that, in five or six years, to raise so shattered a navy as theirs was, at the conclusion of the war, to 95 sail of the line, and 142 frigates, was acting with amazing vigour and wonderful expedition; and proves, in the clearest manner, that, in respect of ships, the king of France, in any ten years, if the point is determined, may exceed, and that greatly too, the puissant navy of Great Britain*.

1. Is the position of France favourable enough for forming a marine equal to that of the maritime powers?

* Letters concerning the present State of the French Nation, p. 130.

2. Is

2. Is the general commerce of France sufficient to furnish the means of disputing with those states the empire of the sea?

3. Can the commodities of its growth employ as many ships in transporting them as those of England and Holland united?

4. Are the means of raising a great marine, such as might exist independently of those of all other states, who might endeavour to prevent it?

5. Is the population of France great enough to furnish a sufficient number of mariners?

It is a fact, that our (a French writer that speaks) proximity with the states that are the granaries of the nations which want subsistence, particularly Spain and Portugal, gives us a great advantage over the maritime powers.

Our ports in the Mediterranean are contiguous to those of Italy. We are much nearer to Sicily and Barbary than the English or Dutch, who, at present, take this navigation upon themselves; an advantage which might alone decide our superiority over all other maritime states.

No people could navigate more for others than ourselves. We are in the center of the navigation of Europe. There is no government in the political world capable, with so great a facility, of rendering itself the master of the two seas. We have a prodigious quantity of ports in each.

The Dutch have not one in the Mediterranean; the English have none considerable. [Written in 1761.]

Our position gives us the maritime empire. We have greater advantages upon the ocean than upon the Mediterranean; both these seas equally wash the kingdom.

We might divide our navy into two branches, whereof the interests and the views might be separate, and have different objects.

The

The English, Dutch, and all the northern people in general, who have a trade on both the seas, are indispensably obliged to pass the streights of Gibraltar; but for us, our commodities may be transported from one sea to the other by the canal of Languedoc, without passing that streight, which, in case of wars, especially with the states of Barbary, is to us a considerable advantage.

In another respect, our climate is one of the most favourable for navigation.

In Holland, and many states of the North, the sea is not navigable in all seasons; the frosts prevent their ships from entering their ports during many months in the year. England has not so great inconveniencies; but she is not without them.

We know nothing of this in France. Our climate, soft and temperate, permits our ships to go in and out of our havens freely in all seasons of the year.

The English and the Dutch are obliged to be longer at sea than we are. In a word, whatever may be the cause, it is certain, that every thing equal, of place, time, and distance, our ships in general make five voyages to four of the maritime nations; this upon the total of navigation, gives us a very considerable advantage.

It is certain that our colonies offer us the greatest maritime resources, such as those of other states cannot yield them.

Of all the people who have divided among them the rich treasures of America, our lot is found to be the best. Our sugar islands are by far beyond those of England or Holland: the soil is more fruitful, and the commodities better and more abundant.

From the state of the improvement of the land of our colonies, it is easy to prove that we might employ a greater number of ships of transport than the other maritime governments.

The other branches of our commerce might equally furnish us with great means of augmenting the number of our ships, and, in particular, those of the north.

The exchange of the produce of our manufactures for their masts, plank, pitch, and tar, is greatly advantageous to us; as these commodities are bulky in their transport, and lay the foundation of a powerful marine.

Our commerce with Constantinople, Smyrna, Grand Cairo, Aleppo, Cyprus, Salonica, &c. might contribute to form different branches of the marine, and all considerable.

The commerce of the isles of the Archipelago might become equally proper for employing a great number of our ships; nor could any thing prevent our securing the commerce of the Black Sea, till lately unknown to all the Christian nations. The Grand Seigneur would consent to it most willingly, as it might prove the only means left to the Porte of holding a check on the power of the house of Austria. The vast resources which the corn trade might furnish us with, would considerably augment the number of our ships.

In general, our ships are better sailers than those of other nations. The goodness of our ports gives us powers in the constructing of our ships which other maritime powers have not: few of their havens are so deep as ours; a circumstance which, in their ship-building, greatly retards their navigations. On the contrary, our ports are the deepest in Europe, which alone gives us an immense advantage over the nations who are our rivals in navigation.

When we speak of a great French marine, it ought always to be relatively to that of England; for we have no other measure of maritime power.

When the population of France suffices for forming a body of seamen capable of looking that power in the face, the calculation is made.

England

England has only eight millions of inhabitants ; she is able (at least many politicians think so) to have 100,000 mariners.

France has from 17 to 18,000,000, therefore in proportion she might have 220,000 seamen. I know there are some things to be said to this calculation, in respect to the numbers of our clergy, which are much more numerous than in England ; but the disproportion is not so great as to prevent their being a great difference between the body of our mariners, compared with those of that monarchy.

There is in France about 140,000 parishes ; if every one was obliged to furnish a sailor to the state, France would immediately possess a number greater than that of England.

Can France change 50,000 soldiers into as many seamen, without endangering her power ?

Within these 60 years most of the princes of Europe have changed their political system ; it is we only who have not changed ours.

We continue always to keep the same number of troops, although they are now become useless.

The combined armies of England and Holland do not exceed 40,000 men. We, in maintaining, even in time of peace, 150,000, keep 110,000 men more than these two powers.

It is because England keeps only a small land-army that she is powerful at sea ; and it is because she has so formidable a navy that she can at present measure her power with ours.

There is no medium ; we must render ourselves small on one element, if we would become great on another.

The maintaining of 300,000 soldiers and 100,000 seamen, is an impracticable project *.

* Les Interets de la France mal entendu.

Of Russia,

In 1756.

	Ships.	Guns.
Line of Battle	22	1556
Frigates, &c.	15	383
Total	37	1939

According to M. Strahlenberg, there were on the Baltic, in 1730, 36 ships of the line, 12 frigates, 9 small frigates, and 240 gallies.

When the ships companies and the gallies are complete, the number of officers, soldiers, and sailors, amounts to 20,239; and the persons employed in the admiralty, with the workmen in the several ports, to 9879; but the number of soldiers and sailors is by no means complete.

The officers are but little acquainted with the theory of navigation, and still less with the practice; because they seldom go to sea. The ships, surrounded with ice, and lying in fresh water, perish in the ports. A great number of ships have been condemned before one sail has been hoisted on them, and many officers have gone through their several ranks without having ever been once on board a ship; besides, the Russians are too much afraid of the sea ever to become good seamen. They have none who deserve to be called sailors; and the empire of Russia will never have any till she carries on trade by herself*.

* Abbé Chappe's Journey to Siberia, p. 367.

Of ENGLAND.

In 1755.

6 of 100 guns	600
11 of 90	990
13 of 80	1,040
3 of 74	222
17 of 70	1,190
2 of 68	136
3 of 66	198
9 of 64	576
27 of 60	1,620
5 of 58	290
35 of 50	1,750

 131

42 of 44	1,848
2 of 30	60
50 of 24	1,200
3 of 20	60
14 of 14	196
6 of 12	72
7 of 10	70
9 of 8	72
7 of 6	42

 271

 12,232

At l. 1000 a gun

 l. 12,232,000

In

In 1772.

1 of 120	120
1 of 116	116
1 of 100	100
11 of 90	990
4 of 80	320
41 of 74	3034
9 of 70	630
2 of 66	132
29 of 64	1856
20 of 60	1200
9 of 50	450
128	
3 of 44	132
6 of 40	240
6 of 36	216
27 of 32	864
1 of 30	30
19 of 28	532
10 of 24	240
1 of 26	26
1 of 22	22
14 of 20	280
6 of 18	108
3 of 16	48
7 of 14	98
8 of 10	80
7 of 8	56
236	11,916

From

From these lists, we find the navy declined since 1755; but we should observe that there are a considerable number of ships building, viz.

4 of 90	360
8 of 74	592
9 of 64	576
4 of 50	200

25

1728

NAVAL WAR. Britain since the peace of Paris has, in one respect, been unusually fortunate; I mean in the exemption from the curse of continental connexions and subsidies: I can find many faults with several of the administrations, which have since that period been in power, but this is a subject of genuine praise, which should never be forgotten; for never was there a such a system of absurdity, as we constantly saw until that period, of subsidizing in peace those powers that were sure to fight against us in war.

But the great enquiry here which arises from this subject, is the case of a naval war; for such only is to be looked for on a quarrel, while continental treaties and connexion are so much slighted as at present. Here opens a great and disputed point in the politics of Britain; how far can we rest a war on our navy alone? Is such a conduct probable, or adviseable? Is it what we may look for at present?

The arguments upon this head, that have on all sides the question, been advanced by a great man, whose memory will ever be revered in this country, must on no account be taken for our guide, as many arguments for as against it may be found in his speeches: and no wonder when it is considered that his general conduct was always to say not what truth demanded, but what would most distress his antagonists.

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gonists. Such expressions, therefore, must necessarily be thrown out of the question.

Let me remark, that according to the present state of affairs, there is no slight probability of the next war being a naval one, independent of land operations on the continent, that is, of armies in Germany or Flanders.

If our enemies the French had it in their power to chuse the war, on what element would they fix? Most undoubtely on land; is not this reason sufficient to determine us in a contrary idea?

France is much more powerful than England in a land war; England much more powerful than France in a naval one; can any thing therefore but folly instigate the French to prefer a naval quarrel? Can any thing but madness throw us into the choice of a land one?

The power of Britain at sea is certainly superior to that of all the world; why therefore should she not throw her full weight into that vast exertion of her force, her navy, instead of being at a boundless expence, in order to fight the French with their own weapons, in a manner wherein defeats must be ruinous, and victories of no avail.

If it is said that the operations of a great war cannot be confined to naval armaments, but that you must go to meet your enemy wherever he goes in hopes of meeting you, it may be replied, that such a conduct is giving the choice at once to the enemy: a maritime power at once gives up all her natural advantages; a landed one the same. In France, who could wish a better event, than a British determination of resting a quarrel in the decision of a land war in Flanders or Germany? Who in Britain could desire better than a mere naval war with France? But the latter kingdom has always yet been able to turn aside this nation from the element on which her power is irresistible; she has always first marched by land, in order to force us

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to follow her; well knowing that a naval quarrel would end in nothing but her defeat.

An argument has been used in continental wars that is weakness itself. It would be dangerous, say some, to let the French exert all their wealth and power in their navy, lest they should acquire a degree of strength on the sea that might prove truly formidable. But this objection is absolutely begging the question; for it presupposes that the degree of their power by sea resembled that by land, dependant totally on money: if they can raise and bring into the field an hundred regiments, can they with as much ease fit out an hundred sail of the line? Money, on a moderate computation, will in a twelve-month send forth a well disciplined and well provided army into the field; but how different the navy! The mines of twenty such countries as Peru will not at once create a powerful navy; ships must be had; vast stores of all sorts ready, and of a due age; and above all, hardy veteran seamen must be procured, which no discipline can form, but trade alone nourish and increase.

What if the French invade us? Say some: this is a very paltry argument, and shews an utter want of knowledge in the whole matter. It should never be advanced unless it was at the same time proved that our continental wars prevented it. The French have never yet been powerful enough at sea to think of this game as one of conquest, but merely as a method of distressing us; in all their attempts, it has reached no further than aiming at running over a small fleet—slipping out of their own ports in the dark—but never boldly in the face of the English fleets, forcing their way through the channel, and landing an army in Sussex or Hampshire. This has never been their idea; it has never been their conversation: they once seemed much in earnest; for the conquest of all their colonies having united several squadrons at Brest, with no other

business than invasion, they did think of landing in Ireland, but they dared only to attempt it, when Sir Edward Hawke was blown from before Brest.

Now let me observe, that all such invasion schemes as these are by no means set aside by any continental wars they may be engaged in with us; nor would any plan of this nature, as far as their marine would allow, be delayed on such account. Past experience tells us that that crown has always had a small army at command for an invasion, notwithstanding any German or Flanders wars, but a superior fleet has been wanting. Had they millions of men in arms on the other side of the water, it would be just the same; armies in this case are not the point, but fleets. But there is another reason, which if any was wanting, ought to be decisive; granting more than there is any necessity to suppose, that money could add to a navy, in proportion to the sums expended on it; still I reply, that the expenditure in Britain has the same effect as that in France; if by being free from a land war, that nation is able to make the greater figure at sea, by a parity of reasoning, we also, by being freed from the same expence, are enabled to add in the same proportion to our fleet: so that if we possessed the superiority at setting out, we must also possess it in the addition. In this respect, however, the two nations are not upon a par, for a continental war with France is at their own doors; whereas it costs Britain almost as much to go and fight her enemy, as the expence of the campaign after she takes the field: so that if the absence of a land war enabled France to spend four millions on her navy, it would enable Britain to lay out six at least.

The navy royal of England is of so great power and capacity, that an immense land war might be carried on subordinately to it; by such a war I mean every operation in which the navy bears a considerable share; all for instance in the last war, except

cept the army in Germany; all the American and Indian expeditions; the attacks upon the the coast of France, &c. An hundred thousand land forces might act in subordination to only a part of the navy of England. The operations of the war might be of amazing extent and importance, though the war was truly naval.

But it is urged on another hand, that the naval operations in the last war were carried on with as much spirit as if no war had been in Germany, which is a proof, say they, that the sphere of the marine was not extensive enough for all the operations of the war.

In reply to this, I first deny the fact; and secondly assert, that granting the truth of it, yet the conclusion drawn from it is false. Throughout the war, all the conquests made under the influence of the fleet were achieved by the extraordinary valour of our men, aided by much great conduct and good fortune; witness Quebec, Louisburg, Martinico, the Havannah, in all of which we were undoubtedly too weak, and certainly weaker than we should have been had no army been in Germany. And to assert that more land forces could not have been employed in subordination to the navy, is an utter mistake. Ask my lord Albemarle if he could not have employed ten thousand men more at the Havannah. Ask the British admirals if they could not have convoyed the transports. Name any expedition which would not have been surer in success, and earlier in the conquest, if the force employed had been greater: why was Canada so long in conquering? Why was Martinico so late taken? I am not arraigning the particular conduct of that glorious war, but only shewing that a greater land force might certainly have been employed in subordination to the navy.

However, let us in the second place grant the fact, that as many troops were so employed as could have been with propriety, yet does there result from

thence any necessity of spending forty millions sterling in Germany? The peace was patched up in 1763, under the pretence that more money could not be found to carry on the war; and had the same ministers continued in power, they would certainly have found the abundant advantage of treating with France, while they had borrowed forty millions less. That sum, if the naval war continued, would have enabled them to have pushed their advantages to the furthest point, and utterly ruined France, by keeping possession of her colonies and fishery, and regularly destroying her little trade as fast as it arose: or had the war been of no longer duration, the peace would have been concluded with a less debt by forty millions, which was surely a matter of ten times the importance of all the advantages gained by the breach of the convention of Clostersevern.

You observe that I take no notice of the flower of speech that *America was conquered in Germany*, or that the German war was a war to direct the French forces. Such strokes pass well enough in the house of commons; but when they come to be coolly examined, vanish into that empty declamation, which amuses the people's ears, but gives no satisfaction to their understanding*.

To say the truth, our title to maritime power is that which we ought chiefly to regard, and as it is impossible to succeed in all, if we engage in too many designs at once; so if we fix our attention upon this, and pursue it with vigour, we shall find that it will have a better effect, both with regard to ourselves and our allies, than if we diverted our views to other objects, which at first sight may appear of equal importance. The truth of this will be clearly discerned if we consider that the encreasing of our naval power will render us more formidable than any thing else, and the recovering and

* Letters concerning the Present State of England, p. 114.
extending

extending our trade, prove the surest means of bringing in riches. The former will render us most dreadful to our enemies, as the latter will make us most useful to our friends. While we are able to carry terror into the most distant parts of the world, our foes can never be out of our reach; and while we can without impoverishing ourselves, grant timely and suitable assistance to our allies, when attacked; there is no danger either of disturbing domestic quiet, or losing the balance of power. For whatever speculative politicians may pretend, we must derive our title to both, from the superiority of our fleets, and the wealth of our subjects. Arbitrary governments may attain strength and influence from other maxims, but a free people never.

It is our peculiar happiness that the glory of the crown, and the interest of the people, depend upon the very same thing; so that whatever advances one must necessarily enlarge the other; and what diminishes this may sooner or latter destroy that. In France the government is obliged to take unwearying pains for the encouragement and protection of commerce. In Great Britain again, this may be entirely spared; for, provided the government does not oppress trade, private men will carry it on with all the success that can be wished for; and the less the hand of power meddles therewith, so much the better. This shews at once the difference between our constitutions, and the excellence of that under which we live. It is to this constitution that we owe our trade, being natural to our island. It is to their living under a different constitution that the French feel by experience the difficulty of carrying on commerce to any advantage. If ever our trade fails it must be owing to ourselves; if ever theirs flourishes it must be the effect of accidents, or rather of miracles. In short, nothing but tyranny, under the mask of corruption, can possibly hurt the commerce of this nation; whereas nothing but

the wise and gentle administration of despotic power, can possibly raise the trade of that *.

N A T I O N S, Origin of. A celebrated writer thus ridicules the deep researches of historians into the pretended origins and affinities of nations.

We have not given ourselves the unnecessary trouble of inquiring into the original of most of those nations, who compose the immense empire of Russia from Kamtschatka to the Baltic sea. It would be a strange undertaking to attempt to prove by authentic records that the Huns removed in former times from the north of China into Siberia, and that the Chinese themselves are an Egyptian colony. I am not ignorant that philosophers of great merit seem to observe a kind of conformity between those nations; but too great a stress has been laid upon their conjectures, which some have even attempted to convert into certainty.

Thus, for instance, they now pretend to prove that the Chinese are descended from the Egyptians. An ancient author informs us, that Sesostris, the Egyptian, went as far as the river Ganges; now if he went so far, he might go to China, which is at a great distance from the Ganges; therefore he went thither; therefore China was not then peopled; and therefore it is evident that Sesostris peopled China. The Egyptians at their feasts used to light up candles; the Chinese have lanthorns; there can be therefore no manner of doubt but the Chinese are an Egyptian colony. Again, the Egyptians have a large river, and so have the Chinese; lastly, it is evident that the first kings of China bore the same names as the ancient kings of Egypt, for in the name of the family of Yu we may find characters which in a different manner of arrangement, will form the word Menes. It is therefore incontestible that the emperor derived his name from Menes, king

of Egypt, and the emperor *Ki* is evidently king *Atoes*, by changing *k* into *a*, and *i* into *toes*.

But if one of the literati of Tobolsky, or Pekin, were to read some of our books, he might demonstrate still clearer, that the French are descended from the Trojans; and thus he might prove it, and surprise his countrymen by his profound researches. The books of greatest antiquity, he would say, and the most respected in that little spot of the west, known by the name of France, are the romances; these were written in a pure language, derived from the antient Romans, who never told a falsity. Now there are upwards of twenty of these authentic books, which affirm that Francus, the founder of the French monarchy, was the son of Hector; this name has ever been preserved in that nation, and even in the present century, one of her greatest generals was called Hector de Villars.

So unanimously have the neighbouring nations acknowledged this truth, that Ariosto, one of the most learned men in Italy, declares in his *Rolando*, that the knights of Charlemain fought for Hector's helmet. In fine we have an incontestible proof of the truth of this opinion; for the antient Franks, willing to perpetuate the memory of their ancestors, the Trojans, built a new city of Troy in the province of Champagne; and these modern Trojans have retained so great an aversion to their enemies, the Greeks, that there are not at present four of the inhabitants of that town who choose to learn their language. Nay, they would never admit the Jesuits among them; probably from their having heard that some of those fathers used formerly to explain Homer in their public schools.

No doubt but that such arguments would make a great impression at Pekin and Tobolsky, but in like manner, another might overturn this whole hypothesis, by proving that the Parisians are descended from the Greeks. For thus he would proceed

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the first president of a court of judicature at Paris, was named *Achille du Harlai*. *Achille* is evidently derived from the Greek *Achilles*, and *Harlai* comes from *Aristos*, by changing *istos* into *lai*. The Elian field, which still exists near one of the gates of the city; and mount Olympus, still visible not far from Meziere, are monuments sufficient to convince the most determined incredulity: besides, all the Athenian customs are preserved at Paris; the citizens pass their judgments on tragedies and comedies as superficially as the Athenians; they crown the generals of their armies at the theatre, according to the custom of Athens; and in short Marshal Saxe received a crown in public from the hands of an actress, which could not be conferred upon him in the cathedral of that metropolis. The Parisians have academies derived from those of Athens; they have likewise ecclesiastical canons, with parishes, dioceses, and a liturgy, all Greek invention, and all words borrowed from the Greek; even their distempers are of Greek original, as the apoplexy, phthisic, peripneumony, cachexy, dysentery, jealousy, &c.

We must confess that these arguments would go a great way towards invalidating the authority of the learned person who has just demonstrated the French to be a Trojan colony. These two opinions would be still combated by other skilful antiquarians, some of whom would plainly prove that we are Egyptians, from the worship of Isis, established in the village of Issy, on the road from Paris to Versailles: others would demonstrate that we are descended from the Arabs, as appears by the words almanac, alembic, algebra, admiral. The literati of China and Siberia would be very much puzzled to decide the important question, and at length would leave us where we are.

The origin of all nations seems to be involved in this obscurity. It is the same with respect to a whole people as with particular families; many German
barons

barons pretend to be descended in a direct line from Arminius; in like manner a genealogy was drawn up for Mahomet, by which his origin was derived from Abraham and Hagar.

Thus the families of the old Czars of Muscovy was said to be sprung from Bela king of Hungary, this Bela from Attila, Attila from Turck, the father of the Huns, and Turck was the son of Japhet. His brother Russ founded the empire of Russia; and another brother, whose name was Camari, established his dominion in the neighbourhood of the river Wolga.

All these sons of Japhet were, as every body knows, the grandsons of Noah, whose three sons made what haste they could to procure settlements for themselves, at the distance of a thousand leagues from each other, in order to avoid being of mutual assistance, and probably they begot a million of inhabitants in a very few years, by lying with their sisters.

A number of grave writers have traced these filiations with as much exactness, and with the same sagacity, as they discovered in what manner the Japonese came to people the kingdom of Peru. This was long the taste of modern historians, in which they have not been followed, either by the president De Thou, or by Rapin Toyras*.

NATURALIZATION. A very sensible writer, considering the general naturalization bill, asks the following pertinent questions: "Whether it can be known before trial is made, that foreigners cannot still introduce some new manufacture, or improve those already established? And what effect must goodness of work, and cheapness of labour, have upon our foreign trade?"

* Voltaire's History of the Russian Empire, under Peter the Great, Vol. I. Preface, p. xii.

Whether it is not assuredly known that foreigners do still excell us in making several sorts of paper, some kinds of silks, velvets, and brocades, gold and silver stuffs, and all sorts of embroidery, thread, thread laces of various kinds, gold and silver laces, also in dying of blacks and scarlets, making of thin cloth for the southern countries, carpets and tapestry, in many branches of the linen, cambrick, and lawn manufactures, drawing and designing, carving, gilding, and coach-making, statuary, painting, and prints, also in Nuremburgh, and some other sort of toys, making of soap, porcelaine, and dressing some kinds of leather, cutting and engraving upon glass, making and tempering of steel, &c. And whether it is not the interest of the people of England to give a rational invitation to such foreign manufacturers to settle here, for the increase of useful and industrious hands, which are beyond dispute the strength and riches of a nation?

Whether the trade of Great Britain is not capable of being further extended? And whether more hands, new adventurers, a larger correspondence, greater industry, frugality, and sobriety, might not encrease our manufactures, commerce, navigation and national riches? And whether the connection of those that come hither with their relations and acquaintances left behind, would not extend our trade by new correspondence, new commissions, and new traffick?

Whether we work up at present all such raw materials as either are or might be raised in Great Britain, Ireland, and our own plantations, or imported from abroad? That is, whether we might not make use of much larger quantities of wool, raw silk, cotton, hemp, flax, iron, copper, brass, tin, lead, &c. in our respective manufactures, than we now do? And whether there can be a want of materials, as long as they may be either raised at home, or imported from abroad?

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Whether labour can so well be circulated in a country thinly peopled as in one very populous, where the inhabitants create mutual employment for each other? And whether it is not observable that the people in those countries, which are thinly inhabited, are forced to seek for employment in distant populous places, for want of work at home?

Whether the keeping out of sober, frugal, and industrious foreigners, will create more employment at home, or be a means of exporting greater quantities of manufactures abroad?

If we have a considerable number of hands now unemployed for want of a demand for their labour, which would be the right policy, to drive out some of the present, or admit more consumers?

Suppose the expulsion of one half of the people of all denominations in Great Britain;—would this be a means of procuring more work for them that remained? Or would not five millions more of people increase all employments and consumptions one half?

If vacancies are first to be found out in some particular trades, and kept unfilled before the foreigners are permitted to come over, what kind of trades are they to be? and what customers can wait so long?

What vacancies are there now in Holland? And yet if forty thousand foreigners were to offer to settle there, would they not be all accepted?

Which sort of foreigners are most to be dreaded as taking the bread out of the mouths of the natives? Those without the kingdom or those within?

If the good people of England could see through a telescope those merchants and manufacturers in the several parts of Europe, who out-rival them and prevent the sale of their manufactures, would they not rather say, "These are the people that take the bread out of our mouths!" But will the refusal

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ful of a naturalization-bill be a means of curing this evil?

What could a lazy and indolent foreigner propose to himself by coming into England, where he doth not understand so much as the language of the country? Or how would such a person defray the expence of a passage hither?

If any Englishman proposes to push his fortune in a foreign country, doth he intend to live by laziness and idleness? and can a foreign merchant or mechanic, here in England, hope to thrive by any other means than by an application and industry, equal at least, if not superior, to that of the natives?

Is that objection, "that we shall swarm with foreign beggars," consistent with the other, "that foreigners will come over to under-work the natives, and take the bread out of their mouths?"

What restraints are put upon the vicious and abandoned from coming over now? Do not all the rakes in Europe know, by the example and conversation of the English that travel abroad, that England is a country where people may be as wicked as they please? And what is it to a rake, a prostitute, or sharper, whether they are naturalized or not? Are not they for the most part citizens of the world?

If our rivals had it in their choice to send either a colony of merchants and manufacturers, or of singers and fidlers into each trading town in England, which of the two would they be the likeliest to send? and which do we seem most disposed to receive?

Will the English constitution be weakened by a naturalization-bill, at the same time that all others are strengthened by it? Will it be right in the French government to entice the English, Scotch, and Irish catholics to settle in France, and be wrong in the English to invite the persecuted protestants

testants to come over to England? Is not every manufacturer drawn from a rival country a double loss to that country?

Whether every miscarriage of the naturalization-bill in England is not industriously made use of by the priests in France as an argument to persuade the protestants to turn papists? And whether they have not, from this circumstance, a very plausible pretence for saying, That the English refuse to receive the foreign protestants in distress, when the Roman catholics give all possible assistance to the members of their communion? Whether, therefore, when our practice is compared with theirs, the popish religion doth not appear in a more advantages light, to our great scandal and reproach*?

NOBILITY. The English nobility buried themselves with Charles I. under the ruins of the throne; and before that time, when Philip II. endeavoured to tempt the French with the allure-ment of liberty, the crown was constantly supported by a nobility who think it an honour to obey a king, but consider it as the lowest disgrace to share the power with the people.

The house of Austria has ever used her endeavours to oppress the Hungarian nobility, little thinking how serviceable that very nobility would be one day to her. She would fain have drained their country of money, of which they had no plenty, but took no notice of the men with whom it abounded. When princes combined to dismember her dominions, the several parts of that monarchy fell motionless, as it were, one upon another. No life was then to be seen but in those very nobles, who, resenting the affronts offered to the sovereign, and forgetting the injuries done to themselves, took up

* Tucker's Reflections on the Expediency of a Law for the Naturalization of foreign Protestants, &c. Part II. p. 3. &c.

arms to avenge her cause, and considered it as their highest glory bravely to die and to forgive.

In a monarchical government, it is contrary to the spirit of commerce that any of the nobility should be merchants. This, said the emperors Honorius and Theodosius, would be pernicious to cities, and would remove the facility of buying and selling between the merchants and the plebeians.

It is contrary to the spirit of monarchy to admit the nobility into commerce. The custom of suffering the nobility of England to trade, is one of those things which has there mostly contributed to weaken the monarchical government.

Persons struck with the practice of some states imagine, that in France they ought to make laws to engage the nobility to enter into commerce. But these laws would be the means of destroying the nobility, without being of any advantage to trade. The practice of this country is extremely wise; merchants are not nobles, though they may become so; they have the hopes of obtaining a degree of nobility, unattended with its actual inconveniencies. There is no surer way of being advanced above their profession, than to manage it well, or with success; the consequence of which is generally an affluent fortune.

Laws which oblige every one to continue in his profession, and to devolve it to his children, neither are nor can be of use in any but despotic kingdoms, where no body either can or ought to have emulation.

The possibility of purchasing honour with gold, encourages many merchants to put themselves in circumstances by which they may attain it. I do not take upon me to examine the justice of thus bartering for money the price of virtue. There are governments where this may be very useful.

In France, the dignity of the long robe, which places those who wear it between the great nobility
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and the people, and without having such shining honours as the former, has all their privileges; a dignity which, while this body is the depositary of the laws, is encircled with glory, and leaves the private members in a mediocrity of fortune; a dignity in which there are no other means of distinction but by a superior capacity and virtue, yet which still leaves in view one much more illustrious. The warlike nobility, likewise, who conceive that whatever degree of wealth they are possessed of, they may still increase their fortunes; who are ashamed of augmenting, if they begin not with dissipating their estates; who always serve their prince with their whole capital stock, and when that is sunk, make room for others who follow their example; who take the field that they may never be reproached with not having been there; who, when they can no longer hope for riches, live in expectation of honours; and when they have not obtained the latter, enjoy the consolation of having acquired glory: all these things together have necessarily contributed to augment the grandeur of this kingdom; and if for two or three centuries it has been incessantly increasing in power, this must be attributed not to fortune, who was never famed for constancy, but to the goodness of its laws*.

The nobility of England have been called the guardians of the throne, and with reason. They buried themselves under the ruins of that of Charles I. and would, in a similar convulsion, act in these days in the same manner.

The liberty of this country was fixed by the commons; it will never be preserved by the nobles. The house of Lords never venture to shew that spirit of freedom which leads to liberty. Oppositions, of consequence, and some of that rough violence,

* Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. p. 169. Vol. II. p. 20.

which accompanies a free people, break out in the house of commons. Ministers are there sometimes hard pushed, but never in the house of lords. It would be a monster of a fact to see that house pretend to a freedom which they never asserted, and will never defend: that branch of the legislature is and always will be devoted to the crown.

While the prejudice in favour of the crown is so strong amongst the English nobility, that, in any future day of dispute, we may be certain, all their power would be exerted in its favour, what are we to think of the immense, lavish, and prodigal manner in which the peerage is bestowed? What are the consequences relative to the safety of the constitution? The balance of property in the kingdom, from the number of new creations, is inclining strongly to the lords. This shews a depth of politics in the crown of late years, which one would have been far enough from looking for, considering the characters of certain persons. All men who gain great riches are advanced to the peerage, inso-much that there are not more than five capital estates in the kingdom at this day among the commons. The thin house of lords, in Charles's days, fell from a want of property and number: some estates among them were very large, but the number so small, that the total bore no comparison with the commons. Yet these few lords, by means of their retainers and followers, rendered the king victorious in the beginning of the quarrel; but how different is the case now! Where is the power to be found at present that is to break the united force of king and lords? Never was a case more totally changed. And this is ventured with an eye to a dissolution of that harmony which has for so long a time existed between the orders of the state; but if a change was to happen, the dependants in the house of commons on the crown and peers, would thin every bench in St. Stephen's.

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From hence we may venture to conclude, that all additions to the house of lords are so many weights thrown into the scale of the crown; a scale which has proved so loaded, during many years last past, that there can be no doubt of its out-weighing all that can be thrown into its opposite*.

N O R T H. (People of the) Great heat enervates the strength and courage of men; and in cold climates they have a certain vigour of body and mind which renders them patient and intrepid, and qualifies them for arduous enterprizes. This remark holds good, not only between different nations, but even in the different parts of the same country. In the north of China, people are more courageous than those in the south; and those in the south of Corea have less bravery than those of the north.

We ought not to be astonished that the effeminacy of the people in hot climates has always rendered them slaves; and that the bravery of those in cold climates has enabled them to maintain their liberties. This is an effect which springs from a natural cause.

This has also been found true in America: the despotic empires of Mexico and Peru were near the line, and almost all the little free nations were, and are still, near the poles.

Asia has properly no temperate zone, as the places situated in a very cold climate immediately touch upon those which are exceeding hot, that is, Turkey, Persia, India, China, Corea, and Japan.

In Europe, on the contrary, the temperate zone is very extensive, though situated in climates widely different from each other; there being no affinity between the climates of Spain and Italy, and those of Norway and Sweden.

* Letters concerning the present State of England, p. 21.

From hence it comes, that in Asia the strong nations are opposed to the weak; the warlike, brave, and active people, touch immediately on those who are indolent, effeminate, and timorous; the one must therefore conquer, and the other be conquered.

In Europe, on the contrary, strong nations are opposed to the strong; and those who join to each other have nearly the same courage. This is the grand reason of the weakness of Asia, and of the strength of Europe; of the liberty of Europe, and of the slavery of Asia: a cause that I do not recollect ever to have seen remarked. From hence it proceeds, that liberty in Asia never increases, whilst in Europe it is enlarged or diminished according to circumstances.

What we have now said is perfectly conformable to history. Asia has been subdued thirteen times; eleven by the northern nations, and twice by those of the south. In the early ages it was conquered three times by the Scythians; afterwards it was subdued once by the Medes, and once by the Persians; again by the Greeks, the Arabs, the Moguls, the Turks, the Tartars, the Persians, and the Afghans. I mention only the Upper Asia, and say nothing of the invasions made in the rest of the south of that part of the world, which has most frequently suffered prodigious revolutions.

In Europe, on the contrary, since the establishment of the Greek and Phœnician colonies, we know but of four great changes; the first caused by the conquests of the Romans; the second by the inundation of the barbarians, who destroyed those very Romans; the third by the victories of Charlemain; and the last by the invasions of the Normans. And if this be rightly examined, we shall find, even in these changes, a general strength diffused through all the parts of Europe. We know the difficulty which the Romans met with in conquering

conquering Europe, and the ease and facility with which they invaded Asia. We are sensible of the difficulties the northern nations had to encounter in overturning the Roman empire, of the wars and labours of Charlemain, and of the several enterprizes of the Normans. The destroyers were incessantly destroyed.

The nations in the north of Europe conquered as free men; the people in the north of Asia conquered as slaves, and subdued others only to gratify the ambition of a master.

The reason is, that the people of Tartary, the natural conquerors of Asia, are themselves enslaved. They are incessantly making conquests in the south of Asia, where they form empires; but that part of the nation, which continues in the country, find, that they are subject to a great master, who, being despotic in the south, will likewise be so in the north, exercising an arbitrary power over the vanquished subjects, and pretends to the same over the conquerors. This is at present most conspicuous in that vast country called Chinese Tartary, which is governed by the emperor with a power almost as despotic as that of China itself, and which he every day extends by his conquests.

We may likewise see, in the history of China, that the emperors sent Chinese colonies into Tartary. These Chinese are become Tartars, and the mortal enemies of China; but this does not prevent their carrying into Tartary the spirit of the Chinese government.

A part of the Tartars, who were conquerors, have very often been themselves expelled, when they have carried into their desarts that servile spirit which they had acquired in the climate of slavery. The history of China furnishes us with strong proofs of this assertion, as does also our ancient history. The Scythians thrice conquered Asia, and thrice were driven from thence.

From hence it proceeds, that the genius of the Getic, or Tartarian nation, has always resembled that of the empires of Asia. The people in these are governed by the cudgel, the inhabitants of Tartary by whips. The spirit of Europe has ever been contrary to these manners; and, in all ages, what the people of Asia have called punishment, those of Europe have deemed the most outrageous abuse.

The Tartars, who destroyed the Grecian empire, established in the conquered countries slavery and despotic power. The Goths, after subduing the Roman empire, founded monarchy and liberty.

I do not know whether the famous Rudbeck, who, in his *Atlantica*, has bestowed such praises on Scandinavia, has made mention of that great prerogative which ought to set this people above all the nations of the earth, namely, this country's having been the source of the liberties of Europe, that is of almost all the freedom which at present subsists amongst mankind.

Jornandez, the Goth, called the north of Europe the forge of the human race. I should rather call it the forge where those weapons were framed which broke the chains of southern nations. In the north were formed those valiant people, who sallied forth and deserted their countries to destroy tyrants and slaves, and to teach men that nature, having made them equal, reason could not render them dependant, except where it was necessary to their happiness.

One of the consequences of what we have been mentioning is, that it is of the utmost importance to a great prince to make a proper choice of the seat of his empire. He who places it to the southward, will be in danger of losing the north; but he who fixes it in the north, may easily preserve the south. I do not speak of particular cases. In mechanics there are frictions by which the effects of the

the theory are frequently changed or retarded ; and policy hath also its frictions *.

N O R T H. (future Trade of the) I will venture to hazard a thought of my own, which I desire may not be despised, till the arguments I offer in support of it are clearly refuted. It is this ; I am apprehensive that while we are contending about the balance of power, and sacrificing each other's trade to a spirit of mutual jealousy, trade itself will remove to the north ; and when it is too late we shall perceive, that not only the French and Spaniards, but the English and Dutch, have been doing the business of the nations bordering upon the Baltic, and putting it in their power to become rich and potent at our expence. For, to me it is a thing past all doubt, that if the Swedes had not an actual and immediate benefit accruing to them annually from the trade to China they would not carry it on, since Sweden is a country that cannot afford to export great quantities of bullion, as all the other nations engaged in this trade actually do ; and if by the bare vending their own manufactures they can make this trade turn to account, it must be visible to all who have a true insight into commerce, that sooner or latter they will become entire masters of this branch of traffic, or, at least, whatever share we have in it must be a dead weight upon us, as furnishing the instruments of luxury only in exchange for our coin ; and when once this comes to be the case, we may please ourselves with the thoughts of the China trade, but, considered in a national light, it would be better for us that we had none.

There is nothing more common than for such as are actually concerned in commerce to smile at and

* Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. p. 398.

despise speculations upon that subject; but, I believe, it would, on due search, be found, that, though companies of merchants and private traders may be enriched by pursuing their own schemes, and contriving to make the management of them an impenetrable mystery, yet, with respect to national advantage, the nations of speculative men have been, generally speaking, right. It is agreed on all hands, that trade is a thing of a nice and delicate nature; that from secret and imperceptible causes it ebbs and flows; is possessed now by one nation, and then by another; and that when it is once lost, it is very hard to be regained. If, therefore, we obstinately persist in the old road till the northern nations actually become possessed of this and other branches of trade, and, in consequence thereof, of a great naval force, it will be to no purpose to look back, or to consider by what means this might have been prevented. There is a national vigour that attends an increasing, growing trade; and there is also a natural supineness and negligence which accompanies the declension of trade; so that when nations, in these different circumstances, come to contend with each other, it is no difficult thing to perceive which must go to the wall.

We well know, that there was a time when we had very little trade; that it was with great difficulty we first raised, and then extended it; and that our doing this made way for the declension of the Spanish and Portuguese trade, which have never recovered since. We also know, nay we even remember, when the Swedes and Danes had little or no trade, and when themselves considered it as impracticable for them to interfere with us, or the Dutch, in the trade of the East Indies; but we now learn from experience that they are able to do it; and we cannot but be sensible that the greatest obstacles to such endeavours are felt at the beginning, and that when these are once got over, as in respect to them,
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they are already got over, things go on a pace; that is to say, exportation increases; navigation is extended; wealth rolls in; shipping multiplies, and a naval power is suddenly raised. The business, therefore, is to reflect in time, and to make enquiries into the properest means for preserving what we have got, while it is yet in our hands. Opportunities once slipped are never to be retrieved. We are still a naval power, and a great naval power; but if we imagine that this depends on the nature of our government, upon the supplies granted for the navy, and the orders issued from the admiralty, we shall very soon become sensible of our mistake. Philip II. of Spain fell into this mistake. He fancied that naval power might be maintained, as well as employed, by policy; but what followed? In 1588 the efforts of Spain were terrible to Europe in general, and to us in particular; in less than twenty years the returns from the Indies became absolutely precarious, the Spanish fleets were the contempt of their enemies, and in half that time both we and the Dutch insulted the coasts of Spain. The source and support of a naval power is commerce; and if we cannot keep this, we must lose that, let the administration in this country be ever so honest or so wise; from whence my conclusion is, that though there may be other very important concerns, yet the most important of all is our trade; and may providence incline us to see this in time!

But that we may not seem to be always complaining, and never thinking of any means of removing the evils of which we complain, let us consider a little with ourselves if somewhat may not be thought of which may afford us rational hopes of preserving the commerce we have left, and even of extending it. Such an attempt as this would be serviceable many ways; it is peculiarly adapted to our present situation; we have a rich and powerful company, who are interested with the commerce
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in these parts, and who might be excited, by the desire of expressing their gratitude to the public for what they have received, to try what might be achieved on this side.

We have mentioned somewhat of the possibility of venturing once more into the island of Japan; but if that should be thought too hazardous, what can hinder some of our ships from visiting Formosa? a fruitful, pleasant, and well situated island. Are there not a thousand pretences that may be suggested for putting in there? And if the vessel that makes this attempt be a ship of force, and well-manned, is there any reason to doubt that she would be able to procure that respect which would make way for trade? It may be replied, that the Chinese laws are so strict, that there is no trading in Formosa without the emperor's leave. To which I reply, that it is very well known the Chinese insist upon their laws in the most peremptory manner, where they are sure they have force enough to support and carry them into execution. On the other hand, where this is not to be done, they are very slow in coming to extremities, and had rather abate some of their punctilios than run the hazard of a dispute that might be attended with bad consequences.

In times past, the Dutch made the conquest of this island, or rather the Dutch East India company made it, and kept possession of it, in spite of the whole force of the Chinese empire. I am very far from saying that this should become a precedent to our East India company, or that they ought to attempt either a conquest or a settlement by force; all I contend for is, that if the Dutch East India company conquered it, the English East India company might find a way to trade there. They would find their account in it, and the nation would find their account in it; and though it might cost some time and trouble to bring it about, yet this very
time

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time and trouble would, for so long a space, exclude other nations; and we might, perhaps, find a means of putting the trade there on such a foot, as to keep it wholly and for ever to ourselves.

If we never try, it is certain we shall never succeed; and if the Swedes or Danes had been discouraged by such obstacles, there is no doubt but they had never brought that trade to bear which they now enjoy. Besides, when our Drakes and Cavendishes undertook those perilous voyages in the dawn of our navigation, they had much greater difficulties to struggle with, and much less assistance to hope for, yet they overcame them all; and to their boldness and intrepidity we owe that figure we have since made as a maritime power. If, therefore, a spirit of this kind could be raised, or rather revived, why should not we expect some such like effect? Or why should we rest satisfied with the present state of things, and lay aside all thoughts of improving or extending our commerce, when we see other nations, far less able and powerful than our own, and under much greater difficulties than we have any grounds to fear, making such attempts, and making them with success*.

NORTH - WEST PASSAGE. (Advantages of it) If a north-west passage could be discovered, it would open a communication between the North and South Seas, infinitely shorter and easier than the only one that is at present known round Cape Horn, or through the Straights of Magellan. We have seen, in the history of the circumnavigators, how very tedious and troublesome that method of reaching the coasts of Mexico and California is; with how many and great inconveniencies it must be always at-

* Harris's Voyages, Vol. II. p. 999.

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tended, and how far it lies out of our power; which is the true reason why the Spaniards enjoy, with so little disturbance, so many fine countries, and hinder others from discovering many more; the knowledge of which might be highly advantageous to this northern hemisphere.

But if ever a passage could be this way found into the South Seas, we might very probably reach, in six weeks, countries which we cannot now visit in twelve or fifteen months, and this by an easy and wholesome navigation, instead of those dangerous and sickly voyages that have hitherto rendered the passage into the South Seas a thing so unfrequent and ungrateful to British seamen. If such a passage could be found, it would bring us upon the unknown coasts of North America, which we have many good reasons to believe are very populous, inhabited by a rich and civilized people, no strangers to trade, and with whom we might carry on a very great and beneficial commerce; for this is apparently that country concerning which we have had some dark hints given us by the savages that come to trade with us at Hudson's Bay, mentioned by several of the French writers, from the information of the Indians inhabiting about the lakes beyond Canada; from Doctor Cox, in the account of the advantages which might be drawn from settling his province of Carolina; from various passages in almost all the Spanish historians, in reference to the extremities of North America, of which they acknowledge themselves to have very indifferent accounts, and are, perhaps, not much inclined to gratify the rest of the world even with the best accounts they have; from the memorable fragment of the Spanish admiral's voyage, with Mr. Dobb's judicious remarks; and a multitude of other passages, which it is needless to enumerate: all of which agree in this, that the part of America,

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America to which this north-west passage would lead us, is a rich, fertile, and well inhabited country, which would abundantly reward our pains taken for the discovery of it, even supposing this passage would lead us to no other country besides.

Yet this is far from being the case, since it is evident that it would likewise bring us to an acquaintance with those countries that lie opposite to America, whether continents or islands, and that fill up that vast space between California and Yedzo, of which, at present, we have heard so much, and yet know so little. But though we know so little of them by actual discoveries, yet we may be confident from reason and the consideration of the climate in which they lie, that these countries abound with valuable commodities; and that the inhabitants, living as they do in a cold country, would be very glad to deal with us for woollen goods, and perhaps for iron-ware, and many other commodities. If to this it be objected, that in the few accounts we have of this country and these people, it is expressly said, they are well clothed, use large ships, and have arms, and various utensils of iron and other metals, as well as the European, which they barter with the inhabitants of North America for gold and other things; if, I say, this should be objected, then the plain and easy answer is, they are a mercantile people, and considering the vast distance between us and them, there is no doubt but a very great and profitable trade may be driven between us; and this is more than sufficient to prove the great and general proposition, that the discovery of such a passage would be very profitable to this nation, though we should be ever so much mistaken as to the nature of the commodities in which this profit may lie. Some benefit we see results to the Danes by their commerce with the poor barbarous Greenlanders; and can we doubt of bringing things to a better market among a rich
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and civilized people? The former, indeed, part with what they have for a trifle, but then they have not much to part with; the latter may not be so soon over-reached, but they have more to trade for, and consequently more is likely to be gained by them.

There is still another great advantage which would result from the discovery of a north-west passage, and was that originally proposed from it, which is the reaching Japan, the land of Yedzo, &c. by a much easier and shorter route than either that by the Cape of Good Hope or round by Cape Horn; so that the finding it would give us a much more facile passage to the East Indies, as well as the South Seas, and, which is more, to those parts of the East Indies with which we have no correspondence, and consequently would in that respect be absolutely a new branch of commerce, probably of much greater benefit to this nation than the whole of our East India trade, as it is now carried on. All these benefits are so far from being hazardous or uncertain, that at first sight, and from the bare inspection of the globe and charts of the northern hemisphere, they appear certain and indubitable; neither have they hitherto been called in question by any who have sought to discredit this passage, who all bend their endeavours to prove the discovery impracticable, without insinuating any thing to the prejudice of the expectations raised from it, in case it could be discovered and sailed through. We need not, therefore, wonder at all that so much has been written on this subject, so many undertakings set on foot, such a variety of attempts made on all sides, and by all means to come at this north-west passage, since, in respect to this part of Europe, it would be a kind of maritime philosopher's stone, a discovery every way equal, if not superior, to that of Columbus. I do not mean in regard to the subject of the discovery, but in respect to us; and what I would

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would say is, that we should for our part, owe as much obligation to whoever should find this new passage, as to Columbus, who found out the new world; to which it is a passage, and such a one as to us would double the value of that discovery*.

The world is well informed of the reasons why the last attempt made under the patronage of Mr. Dobbs, failed: the undertaking was abandoned at the very moment of completion——the boats called off, when at the mouth probably of this very passage. It is very generally, and I believe justly attributed to the villainy of the Hudson's Bay company; the only returns made by that pernicious monopoly to their country, has been to leave no stone unturned to baffle all attempts for the discovery of this passage, notwithstanding its being so great a national object. They have taken every occasion to defeat the success of every enterprise that has been made; by refusing all intelligence; denying all assistance from their forts; and bribing the commanders on every expedition, to defeat by design, the ends of their voyages. It will therefore be in vain to think of any more attempts at this discovery, while the Hudson's Bay company is in being: but it must certainly be the wish of every friend of his country, to see this pernicious monopoly at an end, not only for reasons connected with their trade, but also, that this most important object may again be pursued with vigour.

NORTH-EAST PASSAGE. The advantages proposed by the discovery of a passage to the north-east, may be reduced to three. The first is, that it would save a great deal of time; for, whereas we are now obliged to go round by the Cape of Good Hope, or, which is still a longer na-

* Harris's Voyages, Vol. II. p. 400.

vigation,

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vigation, by the Streights of Magellan, we might then pass by the coast of Muscovy and Great Tartary, into the sea of Japan, in little more than three months. The second turns on the wholesomeness of the voyage, which, according to the methods now in use, consumes abundance of seamen; but by this means would become as healthy as any navigation can be, and be performed with very little hazard. In the third place, there is good reason to hope that it would change the very nature of the East-India trade, by bringing the balance over to the side of Europe; whereas in the way we now carry it on, it is morally certain, that if the West-Indies had not been discovered, the East-India trade must have eat up, and destroyed us; I mean the people of Europe in general, for whatever there may be gained by us, or by the Dutch, it is an uncontroverted point, that immense sums in silver are annually sent from Europe, to balance the accounts of our traders with those in the East-Indies; but if a passage should be found to this country by the north-east, we might then hope to gain as much by cloathing the inhabitants of the northern countries, as would balance our commerce with those in other parts. We are next to examine the reasons why such a passage has been expected and sought for; and this may be likewise reduced under three heads. The first is grounded on the disposition of the terraqueous globe, which seems to require a perfect circulation of that great body of water, which is intermixed with the earth; and as we find this conjecture verified towards the south pole, it makes the argument so much the stronger with respect to the north. The second arises from observation, which affords variety of instances in confirmation of the same notion. We will mention one or two: all the wood that is thrown on the coast of Greenland, Nova Zembla, Lapland, and other northern countries is worm-eaten; which is a proof that this wood

came from a warmer climate; since it is certain that ships are not worm-eaten in northern seas. There is likewise a kind of Molucca bean, thrown almost by every tide, upon the northern coasts, which is with great probability believed to be the product of the eastern climes; and what still more strongly corroborates this manner of reasoning, some Dutch seamen who were shipwrecked at Corea, observed a harpoon in the head of a whale, cast upon that coast, which must therefore have come thither from the northern seas. Lastly, there are some facts, which if they could be depended upon, would put this matter out of dispute, since they relate to ships, which have actually passed this way, or at least have discovered an open sea, through which they might have passed; but as this cannot be verified by proper vouchers, they ought to be considered only as reports, and as such I lay no great stress upon them*.

It is worthy of observation, that Mr. Robert Thorne, in the reign of Henry VIII. was so early aware of the insuperable difficulties that have been found in searching for a passage to the north-east, and therefore proposed very sensibly, and for good reasons, sailing directly north, or at least very near it; from which he thought many advantages might be gained, and many inconveniencies avoided. As for instance, he conceived that this might be undertaken at such a season of the year as to enjoy the benefit of the half year's day in that climate; and he thought it absurd and ridiculous to suppose that the seas were frozen under the north pole, at a time when the sun from its long continuance on the horizon, must have such prodigious force. He likewise judged, that whatever difficulties might occur in the beginning of such a passage, they must be certainly and quickly got over, and be fully recompensed by coming soon on the coast of Tartary and Japan, and so to

* Harris's Voyages, Vol. II. p. 452.

China, and the Manillas. To say the truth, if we consider the time when this proconsul was made, the sagacity and penetration of this gentleman can scarce be enough commended or admired, since it is very certain, that if ever any discovery is made on this side, it must be by this method *.

The Spaniards, says Dampier, having mines enough to manage, they have not taken the pains to discover those in the neighbourhood of California; and the vast distance of this country, has, no doubt, been the occasion that no discoveries have been made by others, or are like to be made, unless a nearer way thither could be found, I mean by the north-west: I am not ignorant that divers unsuccessful attempts have been formed for the discovery of a north-west passage; the reason whereof I attribute to their searching for the passage, at the beginning, through Davis's, or Hudson's bay; whereas, in my opinion, the search ought to have been begun in the south seas, and thence along by California, and so a passage made back into the west seas. The same rule might be observed in discovering the north-east passage, viz. to winter about Japan, Corea, and the north-east part of China, and so take the advantage of the approaching spring and summer, to go along the coast of Tartary, whence you may have time enough to reach Archangel, or some other port on those coasts †.

P.

PARLIAMENT. The house of commons is chosen by the freeholders of the county, by certain corporations in some towns, and by the freemen in others. The election by freeholders is equal and rational; but the number of their re-

* Harris, Vol. I. p. 874.

† Harris, Vol. I. p. 105.

presentatives

representatives amounts only to one hundred and twenty-two; indeed the difference of propriety between this election, and that of the boroughs is very evident, for the wretched system of the vilest bribery, and most detestable corruption, which is carried on in the latter cannot possibly obtain in any such degree in the former. But to pass on to by far the greatest number of representatives, those of the towns, many that contain ten, twenty, and thirty thousand inhabitants, have their members elected by their corporations, which seldom contain above thirty or forty men; and in others, certain of the inhabitants that are free of the town, more numerous indeed than in the former case, but very far from comprehending the total.

Such are the electors of the representatives of Great Britain! I have formed many calculations of their numbers, on a variety of plans, and could never raise them with the utmost attention to the subject to much above two hundred and fifty thousand: I am very clear they do not amount to three hundred thousand: if the people at large, therefore amount to eight millions, about a thirty-second part, or something more, of them have votes. Preciseness is not to be attained in such a calculation, but I believe this is not far from the truth.

It must be confessed by all, that this is a very imperfect representation. Vastly the greatest part of the people have no more to do with the choice of the members, than the Turks have with that of the grand Vizier; how, therefore, can any one assert that the people of England are represented in parliament? And as for the few that vote for the representatives, what are the requisites for the duly performing so important a duty, that are peculiar to those that enjoy the right? I have already allowed the propriety and equality of the freeholders votes; but why are members of corporations to possess the right of election, in exclusion of thousands of townsmen

equally, and in all probability, better qualified for the purpose? In what manner are nineteen out of twenty of the inhabitants of the boroughs represented? How are many of the most populous places in England, especially manufacturing ones, who have no charters? Where are we to find the representatives of the most important body of men, the nation boasts, the farmers? In what manner are the labourers represented? It may be said in answer to these queries, that there could be no benefit result from members being elected by people so low and dependent; but that I deny; the very increasing the number alone, by whomsoever elected, would have vastly beneficial consequences: but let me ask if the labourers themselves are not as able to elect with propriety, as that lowest scum of the earth, the freemen of most boroughs? Surely if we have the least regard to the use of any body of men, they rank infinitely before them! How much more worthy therefore of being represented, is the respectable body of the farmers? As to these classes of men being dependent, can they possibly be more so than nine-tenths of the present constituents? Far from it; on a general view of the latter, it will be found (county freeholders excepted, that scarce any people are so meanly, and viciously dependent. Why are not copyholders to vote? Are they not as independent as freeholders? For what purpose preserve this ridiculous rag of an exploded system?

Upon the whole, we may determine that infinitely the greatest part of the nation (about thirty-one parts out of thirty-two) are totally governed by laws to which they never in the most distant manner gave their assent, and of course cannot be said to enjoy real liberty. For a Frenchman has as much to do with the edicts of a king of France, as this vast part of the British people with the acts of the British parliament*.

* Political Essays, p. 34.

PARLIAMENT, (Danger to) from the national debt. Thus much is indisputably certain, that the present magnitude of our national incumbrances very far exceeds all calculations of commercial benefit, and is productive of the greatest inconveniences. For first the enormous taxes that are raised upon the necessaries of life for the payment of the interest of this debt, are a hurt both to trade and manufactures, by raising the price both of the artificers subsistence as of the raw material, and of course, in a much greater proportion, the price of the commodity itself. Secondly, If part of this debt be owing to foreigners, either they draw out of the kingdom annually a considerable quantity of specie for the interest, or else it is made an argument to grant them unreasonable privileges, in order to induce them to reside here. Thirdly, if the whole be owing to subjects only, it is then changing the active and industrious subject, who pays a share of the taxes, to maintain the idle and indolent creditor who receives them. Lastly, and principally it weakens the internal strength of a state, by anticipating those resources which should be reserved to defend it, in case of necessity. The interest we now pay for our debts would be nearly sufficient to maintain any war, that any national motives could require. And if our ancestors, in king William's time had annually paid, so long as their exigencies lasted, even a less sum than we now annually raise upon their accounts, they would in the time of war have born no greater burdens than they have bequeathed to, and settled upon their posterity in time of peace, and might have been eased the instant the exigence was over. But (besides these inconveniences) our national debt and taxes have in their natural consequences thrown such a weight of power into the executive scale of government, as we cannot think

was intended by our patriot ancestors, who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative; and by an unaccountable want of foresight, established this system in their stead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rise to such a multitude of new officers, created by, and removeable at the royal pleasure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witness the commissioners, and the multitude of dependents on the customs, in every port of the kingdom; the commissioners of excise, and their numerous subalterns in every inland district, the post-masters and their servants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commissioners of the stamps, and their distributors, which are full as scattered, and full as numerous; the officers of the salt duty, which though a species of excise, and conducted in the same manner, are yet made a distinct corps from the ordinary managers of that revenue; the surveyors of houses and windows, the receivers of the land-tax; the managers of lotteries; and the commissioners of hackney coaches; all which are either mediately or immediately appointed by the crown, and removeable at pleasure, without any reason assigned: these, it requires but little penetration to see, must give that power on which they depend for subsistence an influence most amazingly extensive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in loans, subscriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money transactions, which will greatly increase this influence, and over those persons, whose attachment on the account of their wealth, is frequently most desirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen consequence of enacting our funds of credit, and to support them establishing our present perpetual

perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new since the restoration in 1660, and by far the greatest part, since the revolution 1688. And the same may be said with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has created; all which put together gives the executive power so persuasive an energy with respect to the persons themselves, and so prevailing an interest with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the loss of external prerogative.

But though this profusion of offices should have no effect on individuals, there is still another newly acquired branch of power; and that is not the influence only, but the force of a disciplined army, paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the crown, raised by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot, it is true, only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament: but during that year they must by the nature of our constitution, if raised at all, be at the absolute disposal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonstrate how great a trust is thereby reposed in the prince by his people; a trust that is more than equivalent to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives. Add to all this, that besides the civil list, the immense revenue of seven millions sterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the public, or carried to the sinking fund, is first deposited in the royal exchequer, and thence issued out to the respective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise, because it is made perpetual by act of parliament: which also when well considered, will appear to be a trust of great delicacy and high importance. Upon the whole, therefore, I think it is clear that whatever may have become of the nominal, the real power of the crown has not been too far weakend by any transactions in the last century. Much is indeed given up, but much

is also acquired. The stern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence; the slavish and exploded doctrine of non-resistance has given way to a military establishment by law; and to the disuse of parliaments has succeeded a parliamentary trust of an immense perpetual revenue. When indeed by the free operations of the sinking fund, our national debts shall be lessened; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the universal introduction of a well planned and national militia, will suffer our formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when (in consequence of all) our taxes shall be gradually reduced, this adventitious power of the crown will slowly and imperceptibly diminish, as it slowly and imperceptibly arose. But till that shall happen, it will be our especial duty as good subjects and good Englishmen to reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and servile influence, from those who are intrusted with its authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by a sovereign, who in all those public acts that have personally proceeded from himself, hath manifested the highest veneration for the free constitution of Britain; hath already, in more than one instance, remarkably strengthened its outworks; and will therefore never harbour a thought, or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public liberty*.

PARTIES. Factions or parties may be divided into personal and real; that is, into factions founded on personal friendship, or animosity amongst those who compose the factions, and into those founded on some real difference of sentiment or interest. The reason of this distinction is obvious, though I

* Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I. B. 1. Ch. 8.

must acknowledge that parties are seldom found pure and unmixed, either of one kind or the other. It is not often seen that a government divides into factions, where there is no difference in the views of the constituent members, either real or apparent, trivial or material: and in those factions which are founded on the most real and most material difference, there is always observed to be a great deal of personal animosity or affection. But notwithstanding this mixture, a party may be denominated either personal or real, according to that principle which is predominant, and is found to have the greatest influence.

Personal factions arise most easily in small republics. Every domestic quarrel becomes an affair of state. Love, vanity, emulation, every passion begets public division, as well as ambition and resentment. The Neri and Bianchi of Florence, the Tregosi and Adorni of Genoa, the Colonesi and Orsini of modern Rome, were parties of this kind.

Men have such a propensity to divide into personal factions, that the smallest appearance of real difference will produce them. What can be imagined more trivial than the difference between one colour of livery and another in horse races? Yet this difference begot two most inveterate factions in the Greek empire, the Prasini and Veneti, who never suspended their animosities till they ruined that unhappy government.

We find in the Roman history, a very remarkable faction between two tribes, the Pollia and Papiria, which continued for the space of near three hundred years, and discovered itself in their suffrages at every election of magistrates. This faction was the more remarkable that it could continue for so long a tract of time; even though it did not spread itself, nor draw any of the other tribes into a share of the quarrel.

Nothing

Nothing is more usual than to see parties which have begun upon a real difference, continue even after that difference is lost; when men are once enlisted on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists: and these passions they often transmit to their posterity. The real difference between Guelf and Ghibbelline was long lost in Italy before these factions were extinguished. The Guelfs adhered to the pope, the Ghibbellines to the emperor; and yet the family of Sforza, who were in alliance with the emperor, though they were Guelfs, being expelled Milan by Lewis XII. king of France, assisted by Jacomo Trivulzio and the Ghibbellines, the pope concurred with the latter, and they formed leagues with the pope against the emperor.

The civil wars which arose some few years ago in Morocco, betwixt the Blacks and Whites, merely on account of their complexion, are founded on a very pleasant difference. We laugh at them. But I believe were things rightly examined, we afford much more occasion of ridicule to the Moors. For what are all the wars of religion, which have prevailed in this polite and knowing part of the world? They are certainly more absurd than the Moorish civil wars. The difference of complexion is a sensible, and a real difference: but the difference about an article of faith, which is utterly absurd and unintelligible, is not a difference of sentiments, but only a difference of a few phrases and expressions, which one party accepts of without understanding them, and the other refuses in the same manner. Besides, I do not find that the Whites in Morocco ever imposed on the Blacks any necessity of altering their complexion, or threatened them with inquisitions and penal laws, in case of obstinacy; nor have the Blacks been more unreasonable in this particular.

Were the British government proposed as a subject of speculation to a studious man, he would immediately perceive in it a source of division and party, which it would be almost impossible for it under any administration to avoid. The just balance between the republican and monarchical part of our constitution, is really in itself so extremely delicate and uncertain, that when joined to men's passions and prejudices, it is impossible but different opinions must arise concerning it, even among persons of the best understanding. Those of mild tempers who love peace and order, and detest sedition and civil wars, will always entertain more favourable sentiments of monarchy, than men of bold and generous spirits, who are passionate lovers of liberty, and think no evil comparable to subjection and slavery. And though all reasonable men agree in general to preserve our mixed government; yet when they come to particulars, some will incline to trust larger powers to the crown, to bestow on it more influence, and to guard against its encroachments with less caution, than others who are terrified at the most distant approaches of tyranny and despotic power. Thus are there parties of principle involved in the very nature of our constitution, which may properly enough be denominated those of court and country. The strength and violence of each of these parties, will much depend upon the particular administration. An administration may be so bad as to throw a great majority into the opposition; as a good administration will reconcile to the court, many of the most passionate lovers of liberty. But however the nation may fluctuate between them, the parties themselves will always subsist, so long as we are governed by a limited monarchy.

But besides this difference of principle, those parties are very much fomented by a difference of interest, without which, they could scarce ever be dangerous or violent. The crown will naturally be-
flow

flow all its trust and power upon those whose principles, real or pretended, are most favourable to monarchical government; and this temptation will naturally engage them to go greater lengths than their principles would otherwise carry them. Their antagonists, who are disappointed in their ambitious aims, throw themselves into the party whose principles incline them to be most jealous of royal power, and naturally carry those principles to a greater length than sound politics will justify. Thus the court and country parties, which are the genuine offspring of the British government, are a kind of mixt parties, and are influenced both by principle and interest. The heads of the factions are commonly most governed by the latter motive, the inferior members of them by the former. I must be understood to mean this of persons who have motives for taking party on any side. For to tell the truth, the greater part are commonly men who associate themselves they know not why; from example, from passion, from idleness. But still it is requisite that there be some source of division, either in principle or interest; otherwise, such persons would not find parties to which they could associate themselves.

Every one knows the event of the civil wars; fatal to the king first, and to the parliament afterwards. After many confusions and revolutions, the royal family was at last restored, and the government established on the same footing as before. Charles II. was not made wiser by the example of his father, but prosecuted the same measures, though at first with more secrecy and caution. New parties arose under the appellations of Whig and Tory, which have continued ever since, to confound and distract our government. What the nature is of these parties is perhaps one of the most difficult questions which can be met with, and is a proof that history may contain problems as uncertain as any which are to be found in the most abstract sciences. We have

have seen the conduct of these two parties during the course of seventy years, in a vast variety of circumstances, possessed of power, and deprived of it, during peace, and during war : persons who profess themselves of one side or other, we meet every hour in company, in our pleasures, in our serious occupations : we ourselves are constrained in a manner to take party ; and living in a country of the highest liberty, every one may openly declare all his sentiments and opinions. And yet we are at a loss to tell the nature, pretensions, and principles of the parties.

When we compare the parties of Whig and Tory, to those of Round Head and Cavalier, the most obvious difference which appears between them, consists in the principles of passive obedience and indefeasible right, which were but little heard of among the Cavaliers, but became the universal doctrine, and were esteemed the true characteristic of a Tory. Were these principles pushed into their most obvious consequences, they imply a formal renunciation of all our liberties, and an avowal of absolute monarchy ; since nothing can be a greater absurdity than a limited power, which must not be resisted, even when it exceeds its limitations. But as the most rational principles are often but a weak counterpoise to passion, it is no wonder that these absurd principles, sufficient, according to a celebrated author, * to shock the common sense of a Hottentot, or Samoiède, were found too weak for that effect. The Tories as men, were enemies to oppression ; and also as Englishmen, they were enemies to arbitrary power. Their zeal for liberty was perhaps less fervent than that of their antagonists, but was sufficient to make them forget all their general principles, when they saw themselves openly threatened with a subversion

* Dissertation on Parties, Letter 2d.

of the antient government. From these sentiments arose the revolution, an event of mighty consequence, and the firmest foundation of British liberty. The conduct of the Tories during that event, and after it, will afford us a true insight into the nature of that party.

A Tory since the revolution may be defined, in a few words, to be a lover of monarchy, though without abandoning liberty; and a partizan of the family of Stuart. A Whig may be defined to be a lover of liberty, though without renouncing monarchy, and a friend to the settlement in the protestant line.

The author above cited has asserted, that the real distinction between Whig and Tory was lost at the revolution, and that ever since they have continued to be mere personal parties, like the Guelfs and Ghibbellines, after the emperor had lost all authority in Italy. Such an opinion, were it received, would turn our whole history into an ænigma.

I shall first mention as a proof of a real distinction between these parties, what every one may have observed or heard, concerning the conduct and conversation of all his friends and acquaintance on both sides. Have not the Tories always borne an avowed affection to the family of Stuart, and have not their adversaries always opposed with vigour the succession of that family?

The Tory principles are confessedly the most favourable to monarchy; yet the Tories have almost always opposed the court these fifty years; nor were they cordial friends to king William, even when employed by him. Their quarrel, therefore, cannot be supposed to have lain with the throne, but with the person who sat on it.

They concurred heartily with the court, during the four last years of queen Anne. But is any one at a loss to find the reason?

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The succession of the crown in the British government is a point of too great consequence to be absolutely indifferent to persons who concern themselves in any degree about the fortune of the public; much less can it be supposed that the Tory party, who never valued themselves upon moderation, could maintain a Stoical indifference in a point of such importance. Were they therefore zealous for the house of Hanover? Or was there any thing that kept an opposite zeal from openly appearing, if it did not openly appear, but prudence and a sense of decency?

It is monstrous to see an established episcopal clergy in declared opposition to the court, and a nonconformist presbyterian clergy in conjunction with it. What could have produced such an unnatural conduct in both? Nothing; but that the former espoused monarchical principles too high for the present settlement, which is founded on principles of liberty; and the latter, being afraid of the prevalence of those high principles, adhered to that party from whom they had reason to expect liberty and toleration.

The different conduct of the two parties, with regard to foreign politics, is also a proof to the same purpose. Holland has always been most favoured by one, and France by the other. In short, proofs of this kind seem so palpable and evident, that it is almost needless to collect them*.

PEOPLE, (Number of) It appears from the most diligent enquiry made for several years, and by the most able hand, (Dr. Brakenridge) both from the number of houses and the quantity of bread consumed, that the number of people in England, which was formerly computed to be eight millions, is now found to be not six.

* Hume's Essays, Vol. I. p. 69.

This decrease of people is owing to the monopolizing of the farms, and pulling down the houses in order to save the repairs, by which so many people are extirpated; and as there is reason to believe, that since this practice has so much prevailed in England, not less than 300,000 houses may have thus gone to decay, that number will sufficiently account for the loss of two millions of people, as we cannot allow less than 6 or 7 for each house. Accordingly, the number of houses which paid the tax on hearths in 1688 was 1,175,951; but, in 1758, they being counted again for the window-tax, the number of inhabited houses was but 961,578. Their number was in all 986,482, of which 282,429 were cottages, and 24,904 uninhabited, which makes but 961,578 inhabited houses and cottages. Now if the cottages were not included in the account of 1692, as they did not pay the hearth-tax, and are not mentioned in the account, the decrease of houses since that time is much greater than we here make it; although many seem to be unwilling, rather from good hopes than good reasons, to own even this. It makes a decrease of 214,373 inhabited houses in the whole, notwithstanding the towns are so much increased; and allowing 6 people for each house, this shews that we have lost 1,286,238 people in the whole kingdom, and not less perhaps than 2 millions in the country since the year 1692.

As this is the most certain account of the number of houses in England that we ever have had, allowing 6 for each house, the number of people is but 5,769,468, whereas in 1692 they must have been 7,055,706, which agrees very rightly with the account of Sir William Petty, who made them 7,369,000 in 1682. As for the account given by Dr. Brakenridge in 1755, from a tax said to have been intended in 1710, we can see no certainty

tainty in it, especially as it makes the number of houses 264,641 less than in 1692, which he was not aware of.

Even if we suppose the number of people to be the same now as formerly, as many would flatter themselves without any sufficient reasons, yet there must be a very great decrease in the country, and a scarcity of labourers to supply the great increase of the towns, especially as the opulent farmers, who engross the lands, are above working, and complain so much of the want of hands, whom they extirpate, and thereby deprive themselves, as well as the whole nation, of the benefit of their labour. Accordingly, the want of hands in the country has been much complained of, and was at first attributed to the war; but since that, the workmen and manufacturers have wanted employment more than hands; great numbers have been turned out of employ, and many have been obliged to desert the kingdom, however they may want hands in the country.

What certainty there may be in this decrease of people, is not our subject at present particularly to enquire into. We only take the facts as we find them, in order to apply them to the present occasion, and to see if the people thus decrease, as there is at least good reason to suspect, how that ruinous state may be prevented, and before it is too late; as it is certain this nation wants nothing more than people, who appear to be too few, for her many concerns and extensive trade both at home and abroad. If we may hope for the best, we ought likewise to provide against the worst, and not risque the ruin of the nation on vain hopes and groundless conjectures, when there are such sufficient grounds to believe that the people decrease, notwithstanding they are so much wanted; and especially to extend the agriculture of the kingdom

at home in proportion to its trade, and many concerns abroad.

Now as this decrease of people must be in the country, since the towns are so much enlarged, it may easily be accounted for from this practice of monopolizing farms and pulling down the houses. As far as we can learn, there are few or no estates on which some houses have not thus gone to decay, and a great number on others, which must amount to a considerable number in the whole kingdom. There were formerly, by all accounts, many farms under 20 l. a year, on which the greatest number of people is bred, and great numbers under 40 l. and 50 l. which last is now reckoned a very low rent, and such as few care to have on their estates.

Thus one half of the farms in the kingdom may have been incorporated, and so many people expelled from them, for aught we know; which seems to proceed from the great change of property in the country from the landlords living in and resorting to the towns, and from their tenants following them.

This concourse of people to the towns, which has become so common in England, is the more to be regarded and reprehended, as it appears that they decrease in them much faster than they increase in the country; to which the decrease of people seems to be owing. It has been found by a gentleman of distinction, who is well acquainted with such important concerns of the nation, and has had the curiosity to examine the register of the births and burials in several parts of the country, that in the country parishes of England the people increase very fast, generally at the rate of one-third or one-fourth every year; so that they would double their numbers every three or four years, were they not to be expelled from the country both for want of habitations and employments, and to be taken off by the large towns, in which they decrease very fast, as appears by the bills of mortality. Now, as the proprietors

propriators of lands, who at present resort to the towns, were formerly obliged to live in the country, as appears from several proclamations in former reigns issued for that purpose; and as the common people then resided entirely upon small farms in the country, from which they are now expelled; this will abundantly account for a loss and decrease of people, and appears to render it unavoidable.

The accounts we have had of the increase of mankind have been taken from observations made in populous cities, in which they decrease. To perceive their increase, we should take it from the country. In the parishes here mentioned, to the number of about twenty in different parts of the country, the births yearly exceeded the burials by 7 in 20, or 35 in 100, upon an average, which is an increase of more than one third. But as many might be born in these parishes who did not die in them, that may make some difference, as it does in all the like calculations; allowing for this, the increase may be 20 in 100, or a fifth part every year. Mr. Graunt makes the births to the burials in the country as 70 to 58, which is an increase of about 18 in 100.

The only doubt concerning the people is about their number in former times, and whether they decrease or not. Now this doubt chiefly arises from a computation of the number of houses given to Dr. Brakenridge, as is above-mentioned, from an unknown office which had got an account of them in order to lay an intended tax in 1710; that makes the number of houses and of people to have been much the same at that time, as they are at present; and as that agrees with the more certain account taken from the window-tax, it seems not unreasonable to conclude, that they both confirm one another, and that the number of the people is as great at present as formerly.

But this account in 1710 seems to be contradicted by another in 1692, taken from a numeration of the houses for the tax on hearths; the first makes the number of houses, then intended to be taxed, but 729,048, to which one-fourth is added for cottages, and that makes the whole number 911,310; whereas the account in 1692 makes the whole number of houses 1,175,951. These accounts, therefore, make the number of houses 264,641 less in 1710 than in 1692, as we have said; whereas, there is all the reason to believe, that the great numbers of foreigners who came into England after the revolution from Holland, Germany, and France, between these two periods here mentioned, might have increased the number of people, or at least that they did not decrease upwards of a million and a half in so short a time as they must have done if we allow both these accounts to be genuine. Thus there must be a mistake either in the one or the other of these accounts; and the question is, which is most to be relied on?

As to the account in 1710, it is given to us from an office; we know not from what nor how they came by it, whether it was from a computation, as is most likely, for a tax that was only intended, but never laid, as from an actual numeration of the houses: neither does it appear how many houses, or of what denomination, may be included in that list of those which were only intended to be taxed, so that we cannot tell for certain what the tax might have cleared if it had been laid, and consequently we must be very uncertain of the number of houses at that time.

In the mean time we may be pretty certain of the number of people in England at present, from the number of houses taken in 1758, which is confirmed by a like account in 1756, when the inhabited houses were but 961,578, as we have said above. As for the number of people to a house,

it

it is generally found to be 6, and that from an observation that every marriage produces four children; and thus a house or family consists of two adults, two youths, and two children, which is found to be the proportion of people according to their ages. Some indeed have made a doubt about inmates, or servants and lodgers; but as these must belong to some family in which they were born, they do not make the number of people more than six to a house or family, wherever they may reside. From these accounts, therefore, the number of people in England cannot be more than five millions seven hundred and odd thousands. Of the people in Scotland we find no certain account; they are computed by Templeman at a million and a half, and as these computations generally exceed the truth, they may probably be fewer: Thus, if we allow 5,700,000 for England, and 1,300,000 for Scotland, there are but 7,000,000 of people in Great Britain, or seven and a half at most. In Ireland again they are reckoned to have not above a million, which makes the whole British nation at home but eight millions, or eight and a half at most, which is but half as many as there are in France*.

The inhabitants of the British continental colonies have been found to be 2,200,000, and in the islands 314,000; in all 2,514,000†.

Another writer observes, there have been four several accounts taken of the number of houses in England and Wales since 1685.

The first from the hearth-tax, published in 1691-2 by John Houghton, F. R. S. and reprinted in 1727 by Richard Bradley, F. R. S. in a collection of papers, called "Husbandry and

* Present State of Great Britain and North America, p. 12.

112.

† Political Essays, p. 291. 325.

Trade improved," which makes the number 1,175,951: there are reasons to think this was the work of Dr. Halley, and this account is copied in the present State of England.

The second, which is published in the Philosophical Transactions, vol. xlix. fol. 268, by Dr. Brakenridge, who says, the houses about the year 1710, he finds from a public office, which had caused an account to be taken of them in order to lay a tax, were 729,048, and the cottages, which were omitted, he supposes one-fourth more; in all 911,310.

The third, not published, was in 1755, but contained only the total number of houses in England and Wales charged with the duty, which was 692,389.

The fourth, which also was not published, was in the year 1758, and contains an account of the total number of houses in England and Wales, charged and not charged, inhabited and not inhabited, the whole number of which is 986,482, of which there were cottages 282,429, and there were uninhabited 24,904.

This last must be supposed the most exact account ever taken, and by its agreement with 1710 and 1755, we may conclude that the number hath in general continued much the same; as to that published in 1692, it appears to have been only a calculation made from the produce of the hearth-tax; and the number of houses set down, by supposing a certain number of hearths, about three to each house, for the whole tax is said to have produced 256,000 l. per ann. which, at 2 s. per hearth, allowing three to each house, will make the whole number amount to 853,333, the remaining number of 322,618, being little more than one fourth of the whole, may have been supposed to have been added for houses of and under 20 s. a year that were not chargeable.

And

And that this is not mere conjecture appears, in the number of houses in the counties of York, Middlesex, including London, Kent, Essex, Surrey, and Sussex, in the account of 1758, is only 279,277, whereas in that of 1692 it is 336,103, that is more by 56,826 at that time than now; and it will be difficult to prove that the number of houses is lessened in those counties since 1692. The number of the people, therefore, at present are 5,918,892 *.

Another writer on this subject observes, that six to a house is too large an allowance. Many families now have two houses to live in. The magistrates in Norwich, in 1752, took an exact account of both the number of the houses and individuals in that city; the number of houses was 7,139, and of individuals 36,169, which gives nearly five to a house. Dr. Short, in his comparative history of the increase of mankind says, that in order to be fully satisfied about the number of persons to be allowed to a family, he procured the true number of families and individuals in fourteen market towns, some of them considerable for trade and populousness, and that in them were 20,371 families and 97,611 individuals, or but little more than four and three-fourths to a family. He adds, that in order to find the difference in this respect between towns of trade and country parishes, he procured from divers parts of the kingdom the exact number of families and individuals in 65 country parishes; the number of families was 17,208, individuals 76,284, or not quite four and a-half to a family. In the Gentleman's Magazine there is an account of the number of houses and inhabitants in Oxford, exclusive of the colleges; and in Wolverhampton, Coventry, and Birmingham, for 1750, the number of persons to a house was, by this account, four and four-fifths in the two former towns, and five

* Three Tracts on the Corn Trade, p. 179. 185.

and three-fourths, in the two latter. Dr. Davenant, from Mr. King's observations, gives four and one-thirteenth as the number of persons to a family for the whole kingdom. From an account, with which a friend at Shrewsbury has favoured me, it appears, that in that town, in 1750, the number of inhabitants to a house was four and one-third. Very exact accounts prove, that in the parish of Holy-Cross, one of the suburbs of Shrewsbury, and at Northampton, the same proportion is four and one-third to a house in the former, and four and three-fourths in the latter. It seems, therefore, that five persons to a house is an allowance large enough for London, and too large for England in general; from whence it will follow, that Dr. Brakenridge has likewise over-rated the number of people in England. In a letter to George Lewis Scott, Esq; published in 1756 in the *Phil. Trans.* vol. xlix. p. 877, he says, that he had been certainly informed that the number of houses rated to the window tax was 690,000. The number of cottages not rated, he adds, was not accurately known, but from the accounts given in, it appeared that they could not exceed 200,000; and from these data, in consequence of allowing six to a house, he makes the number of people in England to be 5,340,000. Perhaps the number of houses in this account is too little. Suppose it a million, and let five be allowed to a house, the number of people in England will be five millions; which, since five to a house is too large an allowance, ought to be considered as probably more than the true number. The number of people in Scotland and Ireland, Dr. Brakenridge estimates at three millions. See *Phil. Trans.* vol. l. p. 473.

From an account taken in 1770, it appeared, that the number of inhabitants at Leeds in Yorkshire was 16,380, and of families 3899. In this populous and opulent town, therefore, the number of persons

persons in a family is only four and one-fifth; and the number in each house will not be quite five, supposing every fifth house to contain two families.

Call the number of houses a million, and the number of people in England and Wales will be four millions and a half, allowing four and one half to a house; and five millions, allowing five to a house. The former is probably too large an allowance, but the latter is certainly so. The number of people in the kingdom may therefore be stated as probably not more than four million and a half, but certainly not five millions.

Mr. Muret, on the depopulation of the Pais de Vaud, attributes it to luxury and the engrossing of farms. I wish his observations on these subjects were not applicable to the present state of this kingdom; but perhaps there is no kingdom in the world to which they are so applicable. In consequence of the easy communication lately created between the different parts of the kingdom, the London fashions, and manners, and pleasures have been propagated every where; and almost every distant town and village now vies with the capital in all kinds of expensive dissipation and amusement. This enervates, debilitates, and destroys virtuous industry, and brings on poverty, dependence, and venality. With respect particularly to the custom of engrossing farms, Mr. Muret observes, with the highest reason, that a large tract of land in the hands of one man does not yield so great a return as when in the hands of several, nor does it employ so many people; and as a proof of this, he mentions two parishes in the district of Vaud, one of which (once a little village) having been bought by some rich men, was sunk into a single demesne, and the other (once a single demesne) having fallen into the hands of some peasants, was become a little village. How many facts of the former kind can this country now furnish? And there is reason to apprehend

prehend they will go on increasing. The custom of engrossing farms eases landlords of the trouble attending the necessities of little tenants, and the repairs of cottages.

Dr. Davenant (the best of all political writers) tells us, that at Michaelmas, in the year 1685, it appeared, by a survey of the hearth-books, that the number of houses in all England and Wales was 1,300,000, of which 554,631 were houses of only one chimney. See Davenant's Works, Vol. II. p. 203. In his Essay on Ways and Means, he gives a particular account of the number of houses in every county according to the hearth-books of Lady-day 1690, and the sum total then was 1,319,215. At the restoration it appeared, by the same hearth-books, that the number of houses in the kingdom was 1,230,000. In the interval, therefore, between the Restoration and the Revolution, the people of England had increased above 300,000; and of smaller tenements, Dr. Davenant observes, there had been, from 1666 to 1688, about 70,000 new foundations laid. But what a melancholy reverse has taken place since? In 1759 the number of houses in England and Wales was 986,482, of which not more than 330,000 were cottages, having less than seven windows. In 1766, notwithstanding the increase of buildings in London, the number of houses was reduced to 980,692. (See Considerations on the Trade and Finances of this Kingdom, p. 95.) According to these accounts, then, our people have, since the year 1690, decreased near a million and an half.—And the waste has fallen principally on the inhabitants of cottages: nor indeed could it fall any where more unhappily; for from cottages our navies and armies are supplied, and the lower people are the chief strength and security of every state. What renders this calamity more alarming is, that the inhabitants of the cottages
thrown

thrown down in the country fly to London and other towns, there to be corrupted and perish.

Dr. Davenant says, from Mr. King's observations, "that the supply of London alone takes up above half the neat increase of the kingdom." Is it then to be wondered at that the supply of the waste in all the towns of the kingdom, added to that increase of luxury and taxes, and of the drain to our armis, navies, and foreign settlements, which has taken place within these seventy years, should have so far exceeded the increase of the kingdom as to produce the depopulation I have mentioned? It has been asserted by political calculators, that no population can bear more than one soldier for every hundred souls. This is saying a great deal too much; but, were it true, the number of our soldiers and sailors, even in peace, would alone be sufficient to reduce us to nothing in a little time.

A flourishing commerce, though favourable to population in some respects, is, I think, on the whole, extremely unfavourable; and, while it flatters, may be destroying; particularly by increasing luxury, the worst enemy of population, as well as of public virtue, and by calling off too many persons from agriculture to unhealthy trades and the sea-service. Suppose 50,000 sailors, added to other burthens, to have been formerly the whole number the nation could bear without decreasing; in such circumstances, it is plain, that any causes which doubled or trebled that number would depopulate with rapidity*.

This picture is certainly a very melancholy one; but we shall next turn to an author who gives us a much more chearful prospect, and, to say the truth, seems to have adopted the right side of the question: for the data on which Dr. Price has calculated are very suspicious, and, in some instances, full of fallacy,

* Price on Reversionary Payments, p. 182. Suppl. 17.
59.

particularly

particularly in calculating from a few averages, garbled: for why are the colleges of Oxford left out? And why did he not procure the number of houses in London before he asserted so positively?

“ It is asserted by these writers who affect to run down our affairs, that, rich as we are, our population has suffered; that we have lost a million and a half of people since the revolution, and that we are at present declining in numbers.”

To enter into a particular examination of these points, to answer the spirit of the argument step by step, would exceed the bounds of this article. I shall therefore only venture to a few remarks on the subject in general; if they are just, the ideas of these writers must be false.

I purposely omitted speaking of population before, because I conceived it to be only a secondary object, and dependent upon others.

All public works and public employments require men for the execution, and population should flourish sufficiently for affording such assistance without injuring the oeconomy of agriculture, manufactures, commerce, or any useful profession in the nation. I have before proved the nation to be in the possession of a vast income, highly sufficient for all demands; to possess a vigorous agriculture, flourishing manufactures, and an extended commerce; in a word, to be a great industrious country. Now I conceive that it is impossible to prove such points without proportionably proving the kingdom to be a populous one. Riches and population, I apprehend, will eternally be found synonymous terms; for I have no conception of riches any where abounding without numbers of people.

It is certainly a fact, that men have never been wanting in this country when money was at command, either for foreign wars or domestic improvement; nor do I remember reading any such case in history.

Some

Some politicians, from very fallacious materials, published before the last war accounts of the progress of population in this kingdom, in which they attempted to prove that we had lost above a million of souls since the revolution. That war succeeded; they saw near half a million of men taken into the pay of the public; they saw at the same time an agriculture more flourishing than had ever been known before; they saw our manufactures carried on with more spirit than any preceding period could boast of; they beheld the commerce of Britain extended to a degree almost inconceivable: at the same time that agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, made such strides, that the public service reckoned her men by hundreds of thousands, they saw all kinds of public and private undertakings conducted with a spirit unknown before: they viewed turnpikes, inclosures, and navigations, making on every side; harbours opening where scarcely boats had sailed before; fortifications erecting in every quarter; every city, town, and village in Britain receiving additions to her buildings; in a word, all the marks of an amazing system of employment, which seemed to call for fresh millions of people to supply such immense demands. Surely these facts ought to have taught them a better system of politics, and convinced them of the utter impossibility of a nation's declining in population that made such immense efforts without her domestic oeconomy receiving the most transient wound.

But, to our amazement be it spoken, other writers, who have seen all this, or might have seen it, have since repeated the same tale, and gravely inform us of the millions we have lost, learnedly preaching upon the sad consequences of depopulation. It is in vain to talk of tables, of births, and lists of houses and windows, as proofs of our loss of people. The flourishing state of our agriculture, our manufactures and commerce, with our general wealth,

wealth, prove the contrary beyond the power of any such vouchers to invalidate their testimony.

During the course of the last war, and since, not a session of parliament has passed without numerous acts for inclosures, turnpikes, and navigations. We have, in every county of the kingdom, seen these works carried on with unabated spirit, at the same time that all other demands for men are fully satisfied. It has, however, been complained, that a want of hands has been felt in agriculture in several parts of the kingdom. This information I received more than once during my tour. I never failed to make minute enquiries into the real state of the case, and always gained the satisfaction I sought.

I found the want of hands complained of was relative to nothing more than price. Labour was sometimes unusually dear, which occasioned an unusual clamour; but as to any work that ever stood still for want of hands, when the money requisite was ready, I could no where discover a single instance.

In some places where I made these enquiries, I found many causes conspired to render hands scarce: turnpikes, navigations, drainages, and inclosures, all at once had operated with the war to distress the farmer; I nevertheless could not discover one instance of any necessary work in husbandry standing still for want of hands; no unploughed field; none unreaped; no barn of corn unthreshed. At the same time I conversed with many gentlemen upon their buildings and improvements, and I never found one that wished to form a water, improve a park, or to execute any great work, that ever dreamt of a want of hands; the cash was the only object.

At certain seasons of the year a man may certainly want to lay out in a hurry forty or fifty pounds extraordinary, without being able; but that proves nothing: it is an employment of some
regularity

regularity and continuance that attracts hands in spite of all obstacles. I was a farmer myself during the last war, as well as at present, and have often heard of these complaints among my neighbours, at the very time that I could have procured hundreds of men for two-pence extra per day.

But to this it is answered, that although raising prices will command numbers of men, yet, as those men must come from somewhere, some persons who before employed them must be distressed. But the reply to such an argument is but the combination I before noticed. A farmer, in the parish of A, hires twenty men more than usual; these twenty men come from the parishes of B, C, and D; but the quantity of labour in those places being proportioned to the old demand, the farmers are distressed for want of those twenty hands; they add a trifle to their wages, and gain by that means eighteen hands from the parishes of E and F; the rise of wages adds the other two hands to make up the complement from the non-industrious, that is, from the class who are idle when pay is but a shilling, but work when it is fourteen pence: E and F, distressed for their eighteen hands, gain sixteen from G and H, and add two to the number of their own industrious by an advance of wages: G and H do the same by I and K, and so on through the circle till the twenty hands are added to the number of the industrious. In some places the loss of men may be made up by lads and women; but it undoubtedly is made up by some means or other.

Against this reasoning, perhaps, other arguments are used; but I by no means pretend to decide matters of opinion: however, I shall ask those gentlemen that think differently in what manner they account for the phenomena before their eyes? "A war, in three or four years, takes a million of able hands from industry." Surely this is a sad stroke, and severely felt! "Commerce is so prodigiously increased,

increased, that the manufactories can scarcely supply its demands." Worse still ! for she must apply to her sister of the soil for the hands she wants. " More turnpike roads made during the few years of the war than ever known in any former period of equal length." Every man employed taken from the farmers ! How could they support themselves under such accumulated evils ? " More parliamentary drainages at the same time than were ever experienced." And all the men furnished by agriculture ! The plough must have stood still, or women driven to hold it. " All public works flourishing ; navigations cut through every county." Nay, then the people must have starved, the barns must have remained full for want of hands to thresh the corn. " And to complete the melancholy tale, riches flowing in from north, south, east, and west, the possessors of millions spreading themselves over the kingdom, and bribing away the farmers few remaining hands to raise buildings, dig waters, and lawn those acres that once were Ceres's own." Enough ! enough ! Name not the catastrophe of so sad a state ! We apprehend it well ; the nation's ruin followed ; rents could no longer be paid when hands were wanting to till the land ; husbandry died.

" No, says common sense, she at that moment flourished more than Britons ever knew." But, to be serious, if my argument is false, let these gentlemen account for the agriculture of this kingdom never being in a more prosperous or improving state than just at the time that every cause conspired to rob her of her hands.

These, it is true, are facts ; but reason tells us that it would be miraculous were the case otherwise. It is employment that creates population : there is not an instance on the whole globe of an idle people being numerous in proportion to their territory ; but, on the contrary, all industrious countries are populous, and proportionably to the de-

gree of their industry. When employment is plentiful, and time of value, families are not burthens. The father, mother, and most of the children, apply themselves to labour, and earn such a competency that laziness is the only road to poverty. Marriages are early and numerous in proportion to the amount of employment. The great point is to keep it on the increase, however slowly, for then industrious population will always be active. In a great kingdom there must always be hands that are either idle, backward in the age of work, unmarried for fear of having families; or industrious only to a certain degree. Now, an increase of employment raises wages, and high wages changes the case with all these hands: the idle are converted to industry; the young come early to work; the unmarried are no longer fearful of families; and the formerly industrious become so in a much greater degree. It is an absolute impossibility that in such circumstances the people should not increase. Great numbers being carried off by war, or otherwise, matters nothing; it is rather a spur to the industry of the remainder; for the greater the consumption of hands, the greater the demand for industry; and that demand can never exist without a proportionable increase of population in consequence of it.

But still, say these writers, we are not so populous as at the revolution. Now, supposing all I have said is false; supposing that agriculture, arts, manufactures, and commerce, have made vast advances; supposing that the whole kingdom is adorned, and every enjoyment of life increased; suppose all this has been regularly the destruction of population, and that we have lost a million and a half of people; yet, I answer, that this loss is no otherwise an evil than being the sign of a decay in general prosperity. What are the hands that it is possible we should have lost? Many of these writers allow (indeed they cannot possibly deny) the in-

crease of agriculture, manufactures and commerce; consequently we cannot have lost any industrious hands: they must have been on the increase. It is equally impossible that the rich classes can have decreased, because, if those professions which yield riches have been augmented, it would be strange indeed if that class was fallen off. Besides, the old taxes on consumption that continue to the present time; the rise of rents; the creation of new income, as well as universal opinion, confirm this remark. The loss of population must therefore have been only in the idle poor, or, in other words, the loss of those only that were burthenome. No nation is rich or powerful by means of mere numbers of people; it is the industrious alone that constitute a kingdom's strength.

Those who urge the consequence of indiscriminate population should take a view of many of our present numbers, and try to conceive the use of them. Do they think that beggars, vagrants, gypsies, thieves, pickpockets, and all that blessed population that fill our gaols and furnish Tyburn, to be of utility to the state? These are the scum of the non-industrious poor; all of whom are a burthen, without repaying the loss by breeding useful hands, or causing any circulation of industry. Industrious hands are not bred by the idle; and the share which this class bears of our taxes is contemptible. The number of them is very great, and when wages are low it increases: high wages lessens it, in tempting those to work who otherwise would not touch a tool. When, therefore, it is said the nation is populous, let this class be struck out of the question: the only people that should come into the account are the rich and the industrious. There are many politicians who would harangue much on the benefit of England's containing ten millions of souls, without enquiring whether five were not non-industrious. There is no doubt but this country may be more
populous

populous in every respect that concerns wealth, power, and general prosperity, with only six millions than in some cases with ten.

I think there is no slight reason to apprehend that the number of the people, as commonly received at present, is mistaken: it is thought to amount by some to not more than five millions, and by others six, in England and Wales.

The only method hitherto taken to discover the number, has been by calculating six to a house. The houses are very near a million. But this idea I have the greatest reason to believe erroneous. From a variety of enquiries and particular observation, I should conceive the number more consonant with eight or nine millions of people, or eight or nine to a house: the mere foundation for concluding it six, is the calculation that a marriage gives two adults and two young children at once; but the point of marriage has little to do with it, unless the number of houses was regulated by it, which is far enough from being the case. The only just rule is to gain the average of souls that inhabit a house from the king's palace to the lowest cottage. Now, in this view, without troubling ourselves about marriages, is it conceivable that the average can be so low as six? Cottages are in general the habitation of labourers, who all swarm with children; and many have double, treble, and even quadruple families. And, in most parishes, view the parish cottages with dozens of families in them; reflect upon the vast number of houses in towns, where poor families occupy only a floor, where every one, from the cellar to the garret, has each a family; and in all these cases it will be found, that the actual resident number will be much higher than six, or probably eight, without reckoning sons or daughters that are absent in service. Then rise to the next ranks.—Farmers with houses full of children and servants; and, in towns, small shops, with

their one or two maids and a lad; until rising, you come from ten, to forty, fifty, and an hundred in an house.

It is astonishing that our political arithmeticians should have been so blind as to imagine that house was merely a synonymous word for marriage. The latter is a calculation that cannot possibly give the truth; but the number of houses is certainly a good rule to judge by. However, we should not be too ready to suppose the number of souls per house at all times the same. Houses are much enlarged within fifty years; and among the poor, more families may be reckoned to a certain number of houses at present than formerly. The exact number of houses in 1758 was 961,578; but if we consider the vast progress which every art and trade has made from the inundation of wealth after the war, and which we see in the increase of towns and villages within the last ten years, there can be little doubt of the number now amounting to a million. Suppose population is in the proportion of seven families, at six souls to five houses, the number of souls in England and Wales, will then be 8,400,000.

Six houses giving nine families, the number is 9,000,000.

Five giving eight, it is 9,600,000.

Whatever number is fixed on, there is the greatest reason to believe that the total is much more considerable than the common notion makes it*.

At present we are very much in the dark on this head; our numbers are guessed every day; but from such imperfect authority, and with such great variations, that no sure dependence is to be placed in such random ideas. Some assert that population declines; that we have lost a million and a half since the revolution; and that the decrease now continues

* Tour through the North of England, Vol. IV. p. 417, 2d. edit.

strong; others are of a direct contrary opinion: decisive certainty remains with neither. But I shall just remark that the calculations drawn up from the number of houses, are in all probability fallacious; that they are mere guesses we well know; for by what rule is the number of souls per house to be determined? How is the medium to be found out between the palace and the cot? What allowances are made for hospitals, prisons, schools, colleges, ships, &c. lumping them at four, five, or six per house? Is this a method that can ascertain the average of numbers so vastly different? It is nonsense, and pretence to suppose it. Besides, how are we to know that the number per house is always the same? So that the increase or decrease could not be discovered, even if the number of houses at a given time determined that of the people.

An accidental agreement between the common supposition per house, and the real numbers in any small district, cannot with accuracy be extended to the kingdom at large.

Nor should it be forgotten, that administration is as ignorant of the point as other people: the ministers of state have no better opportunities of accurate information in this very important affair, than the lowest clerk in office. This indeed may be gathered from the diversity of opinion; for out of six first lords of the treasury, three will assert that the people are increasing, and as many that the numbers decline. If therefore the knowledge would be useful, the expediency of gaining it is not superseded by any possessed at present.

The information to be wished for, I apprehend not to consist merely in the total number of souls, but a division of them into various classes, it would be proper, for instance, to distinguish the number relative to that of families, and also to that of houses.

General divisions to be made of counties, and also of towns and cities.

Every man, or family (if he has one) to be distinguished by his business or profession; and, if belonging to any manufacture or branch of commerce, to be minuted under the head of such manufacture or trade.

Shopkeepers to be distinguished by the goods they sell.

Parish poor that are regularly chargeable, to be distinguished separately.

Parish poor that are only chargeable at times, to be noted also.

Vagrants, (if their numbers could be gained) likewise to be distinct.

Landlords not included in other classes, to form one by themselves; which would admit of subdivisions.

For the sake of perspicuity, no person to be ranked in more than one class; for instance, a labourer in husbandry might be chargeable to the parish; in which case R. C. prefixed to his name, signifying regularly chargeable, would enable any one afterwards to cast up the numbers, and other distinctions in the same manner.

The numbers to be taken regularly every five years, unless a change of national circumstances called for variation; of which more hereafter.

Respecting the advantages which would attend so perfect a knowledge of the population of Great Britain, a very little attention will be sufficient to comprehend many great and cogent ones.

The legislature would at once discover the distribution of the people, into the three great classes of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce: and also discern the number of another set, which may be called the idle consumers. The local distribution of these classes would furnish information of a very important nature.

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By comparing them with other local circumstances, such as customs, excises, &c. proportions would be found that might offer lessons of consequence.

The effect of these first great employments on population, would be seen at a single glance, by exhibiting the numbers maintained by each; and every subdivision clearly understood in the same manner.

A statesman possessing such a table, and knowing at the same time other circumstances of great import, such as the average rental of all counties and districts, the rates, tythes, taxes, products, &c. would at once be able to decide the degree of prosperity enjoyed by the people; and, what is of more consequence, would comprehend at once the causes of such prosperity, the means of advancing it, and preventing a decline. Will any statesman assert that he understands these objects at present? He may give a sensible guess, but there is a world of difference between the shrewdest suspicion, and plain certainty.

The advantage would not be trivial of knowing the sum-total of the people; this clearly appears from supposed numbers being made a matter of importance; random ideas become the parent of great national measures, instead of that decisive certainty, which should alone be followed.

I read the other day in a printed speech, the following paragraph: "When I compare the numbers of our people estimated highly at seven millions, with the population of France and Spain, usually computed at twenty-five millions, I see a clear self-evident impossibility for this country to contend with the united power of the house of Bourbon, merely upon the strength of its own resources."

Whether this was the real speech of a great statesman, is not here a matter of consequence; I quote it merely as an instance that ministers and great men

may think thus: that many of them do frame their conduct from their ideas of national population, cannot be doubted.

Here we find an idea of population produced as a motive which should lead us to the greatest variations of political conduct. Because we have only seven millions, we must do so and so. Now let me ask any person, if a certain fact would not be greatly more satisfactory, when interests of such mighty importance are depending, than our imaginary number?

If the measure of population becomes the measure of national conduct, the same consequences cannot be deduced from numbers largely different. Is the same conclusion to be drawn from nine, as from seven millions? From twelve, as from eight? Or must the balance of population between two kingdoms preceding a war, be struck with as great accuracy as the debtor and creditor pages of a merchant's books?

But does not this point out the propriety of numbering the people, that false ideas, or false conclusions drawn from true ideas of this important matter, should not mislead those who have the honour of being entrusted with the helm of government? It cannot be, that the same conduct should be applicable to all the possible numbers, in which the totals may be found. Seven millions simply set down, without any explanation of attendant circumstances, have been mentioned as a number so few, that continental connections and wars must be had in succour.

Suppose the number proves ten millions, attended by various circumstances, will the same reasoning hold good?

If the reply is always the same, I answer, that then population has no more to do in the case than the colour of the minister's coat.

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But the advantages which would inevitably attend taking the numbers of the people, will fully explain all these circumstances. The increase or decrease of the various classes of the people, would shew administration the consequences of all sorts of measures, and prove in the clearest manner how far power depended on indiscriminate population: it would shew the importance of every class; and point out the necessity and the means of increasing the most valuable. Ill founded fears of a more numerous enemy on one hand, or too secure ideas of self-safety on the other, would at once be banished: certainly in these truly important points, would be the thermometer of the state; it would guard us from great and dangerous errors, and point the road to sure prosperity.

Let us for a moment suppose that the people had in this manner been numbered in the years 1739, 1744, 1749, 1754, 1759, and 1764: by comparing 1739, 1744, and 1749 together, one a year of peace before the war, one a year of war, and the other a year of peace after the war, the effect would have been fully known. By comparing 1754 with 1759 and 1764, in the same manner, the effect of the late war, which was of such unbounded extent, and in which we raised such an amazing number of men, would also be clearly seen. It would appear from what classes men were raised for the service of the public; whether those classes suffered in population from such drains; and by considering with some attention the taxes, the consumption, and the amount of industry in excises, exports, &c. it might possibly be found that certain classes, and local divisions, furnished a great proportion of the men, at the same time that they suffered in no one particular. I state this supposition, because I believe that it was really the case.

It would further appear, how much the people in general decreased from the loss of four or five hundred

hundred thousand soldiers and sailors. It would be very curious to see a great consumption of men, and yet no decrease. It would be too hardy, boldly to assert, that this must be the case; but I have no conception that half a million of men so taken off, in a successful war, would decrease the people in the same proportion; and for these reasons among many others.

—Decreasing the idle, increases the industrious.

—Decreasing the industrious, has the immediate effect of repairing the loss, and perhaps more than doing it by the increase of demand.

It might also very probably have appeared, that in the ten years from 1754, to 1764, the nation, instead of losing people, gained in numbers. I have in my own mind little doubt of its being the case; but how important would it be to decide the point! If this kingdom was able, during nine years of war, to keep three or four hundred thousand men in pay, raise such immense sums of money, add four millions a year to her taxes; and at the same time increase in wealth and income, without suffering in population, will not such a fact be pregnant with important conclusions? Not however that I lay a stress on the point of indiscriminate population; she might decrease in people, and yet make great advances in every point of real consequence. Taking from the non-industrious is an advantage; you must examine the classes of the list before you are to decide whether population has essentially suffered.

To shew by an instance that population may decrease without the interests of population suffering, let us suppose that in one night five hundred thousand beggars, vagabonds, pick-pockets, and idle people were to disappear; if you then took a fresh account of your total numbers, you would find a decrease of half a million; but who will be hardy enough to assert, that we should in consequence be a weaker, a poorer, or a less flourishing people?

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I only mean from hence, that ideas of profit or loss relative to population should never be general, but depend on the classes which decrease.

Perhaps the result of executing such a plan would be proving to administration, that the power of the kingdom was (as far as concerns population) fully equal to that of its neighbours; while a contrary supposition is a plea for national measures, peculiarly arising from the circumstance; and at the same time, by no means of acknowledged propriety. Surely a certainty of the contrary fact must lead to different ideas, and therein tend to the most beneficial consequences.

But if, contrary to expectation, the population of the kingdom was found really and efficiently to decline, still I beg leave to observe, that a clear knowledge of the state, nature, cause, and degree of the evil, must be the first step to a remedy. By the renewal of the lustrum every five years, all this would appear: it would be seen in what classes was the greatest loss, and in what places; by which means the cause would be discovered. A very attentive eye should be kept on the state of agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and the levy of public taxes, that the exact proportion of the evil might be known; and those branches of industry which suffered, and were the cause, pointed out and clearly ascertained. Let any person impartially declare if they think that such a quick and accurate knowledge of the disease would not greatly accelerate the cure? Measures might be taken that bore immediately on the point, that yielded effectual assistance, far different from the usual progress of affairs, which move on in utter ignorance of the case.

When the particulars were reported to the treasury, they should be drawn up into a regular table and published. This part of the plan is not immaterial; for the benefit resulting from the execution, would probably be much greater if generally known,
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than if confined to the cabinet of the statesman. Many facts might appear, from which very important deductions might be made, if attentively considered by studious private men, whose leisure and inclinations lead them to such sort of studies; observations might be made, which would point out methods of advancing industry and population, or preventing their decline. But who can suppose that people high in office (whatever their abilities) can have the leisure necessary for attending properly to such affairs? Hence, therefore, the open liberal policy of making known to a free people their real state and situation, that every man may know the fact and reason on its causes and consequences.

There could not be a happier thought than publishing regularly the average prices of corn by authority of parliament. Those who promoted that measure, certainly thought that the nation in general should be possessed of the real truth, and who can dispute the propriety of the idea? The publication of one fact dissipates a thousand errors. Why not in the same manner inform us of the state of population? The importance of it demands every attention; the general ignorance concerning it, leads to unbounded error*.

P E R S I A, (Revenues of.) In good times the provinces are supposed to bring into the exchequer the following sums:

1743.

The conquered provinces in India	£. 3,125,000
Kandahar and Hærat	250,000
Khorazan	500,000
Astabad	12,500

* Proposals to the Legislature for numbering the People 1771. P. 5, &c.

Mazanderan

Mazanderan	100,000
Ghilan	125,000
Shirvan, including Georgia, and some part of Dagestan	375,000
Erivan, and the parts of Armenia subject to Persia	500,000
Irac, including Casbin, Ispahan, and the country extending to the gulph, being the antient Parthia	375,000
Aderbeitzan, in which Ardevil and Tauris are included	375,000
Total	1,573,500

It was computed that Nadir Shah had near 200,000 men in pay, the charge of whom, officers included, was computed at twenty-five pounds a year each, and consequently the expence of maintaining his army was 5,000,000 *l.*

If either the extent or the quality of the countries could make princes easy or happy, the sovereigns of Persia might be so without making slaves of their subjects, or disturbing their neighbours. We may from hence also discover the value of right principles, with regard to industry and commerce, which always include due respect to liberty and property, without which the former can never subsist, and the latter can never be attained. If we could with any probability suppose that a well constituted government could take place, and be thoroughly established in Persia, it is very evident that in the space of a century not only the affairs, but the very face of the country would be changed; their great cities would be repeopled, the trade through Persia to India and Tartary would be revived, their silk-works and manufactures would be restored, and multitudes of people would flock into all their provinces,

provinces, for the sake of that plenty, which in such a situation of things they would be sure to enjoy. But as this supposition is on the one hand improbable, so on the other it is very evident, that for this very reason the Persian monarchy must for a long series of years continue broken and weak; for it is by commerce only that the people of that country can become formidable; for while on the one side they want a naval power to maintain the sovereignty of the Caspian Sea to which they pretend; and, on the other hand, to have no fortresses of great strength to secure their frontiers against the Usbeg Tartars on the north, and the Turks on the west, they will always be in a danger from both those neighbours.

These things are so plain, that they cannot be denied or doubted. The single inference I would draw from this is, that so far as human foresight reaches, there seems to be a disposition in providence to overturn the Mahometan powers every where; for if we compare the present state of things with the past, we cannot help seeing that they are much in the same situation that the Greeks were at the time their empire began to decline; and though it may be some centuries before their total destruction comes on, yet we must shut our eyes against evidence, if we are not convinced that it is coming. We must indeed allow that there were some visionary people here in Europe, who apprehended mighty things from the Shah Nadir, and believed that he would over-whelm the Turkish empire; but there is no kind of reason for this, except the known weakness of that empire; and if it were not for this, we might with more reason expect that the Turks at this juncture should make some impression upon Persia, which, however, I am persuaded will not happen. But if the feuds of christian princes were once laid asleep, there is no improbability in the conjecture, that the Russians might make themselves

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themselves masters, at least of some of the provinces of this empire, which lie nearest to the Caspian sea; and whenever it shall happen, it may prove a beginning to much greater revolutions, since there are multitudes of christians in the adjacent countries, who are either of the Greek religion, or very little removed from it; and if their spirits should once revive, the weakness of the Mahometans, both here and elsewhere, would be quickly seen. I know very well how little heed the present generation will give to remarks of this nature; but I flatter myself, that how weak, or how impertinent soever they may be now esteemed, experience will justify them to posterity*.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. (Expediency of planting colonies in them.)—The first territories I shall presume to name for planting new colonies in are the islands of Mindanao and Gilolo, both formerly tributary to the Spaniards, but have long ago thrown off their yoke, and have at present no connection with them†. Mindanao contains 39,200 square miles, and Gilolo 10,400‡. The equator crosses the latter, and no part of the former is above 10 degrees north from it; accordingly their productions are as rich as possible. A modern author, who is very accurate, and has examined all accounts extant of the Indian islands, says§, that they produce all the vegetables found in the other islands of the Archipelago of St. Lazarus, that is, a vast variety of palm-trees, the most excellent cocoas, and the best of cassia; wild cinnamon, nutmegs and cloves||; ebony and sandalwood, with gold in every mountain; but cinna-

* Harris's Voyages, Vol. II. p. 891.

† Modern Universal History, Vol. IX. p. 447.

‡ Templeman's Survey, Plate 29.

§ Modern Universal History, Vol. IX. p. 449. § 11.

|| Dampier's Voyages.

mon in much greater plenty and perfection than in any. As to sugar canes, they have long thriven so well, that sugar there is at a very low price, and exceeding good in its kind †. Lastly, a vast plenty of elephants in Gilolo ‡. These circumstances I select from many others, as the most important proofs that these islands contain the very richest productions in the world, and such as would greatly repay any nation that had the spirit to secure their coasts; an object which would never have been omitted by the Dutch, had not the Spaniards been driven out by the natives; and, as to the English, they depended on our want of enterprize. I should, however, add, that the Dutch are dreadfully feared and abhorred in reputation by all the natives, consequently the undertaking would to them be very difficult.

Now the idea of forming a settlement in these islands is by no means a new one; for Dampier, when at Mindanao, received invitations from the king to settle, and gives many very good reasons to shew the expediency of such a plan. But as both Mindanao and Gilolo are inhabited by numerous nations of Indians, and as some of those nations are reported to be cruel and revengeful, it would not be adviseable, at first, to colonize by way of planting, except upon a small scale, but chiefly to gain a good and secure port or two, with proper spots to erect fortifications upon, and enter into trade with the natives; by which means we should secure a sale of great quantities of our own manufactures in exchange for the richest and most valuable commodities. And when once a good understanding was secured with the natives, and they saw how much preferable our neighbourhood was to that of the Spaniards, or the Dutch, who, near their spice

† Dictionnaire de Commerce, T. II. p. 891.

‡ Tour du Monde Careri, p. 5. b. ii. c. 6.

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islands, are yet worse, there can be no doubt but plantations of spices and other valuable plants might be formed in great security. That the trade carried on by such means would be of immense consequence, no one who considers the situation, amidst all the richest countries of the East, and where we at present have neither settlements nor factories, can a moment doubt.

The situation of the New Philippines has been very imperfectly laid down, at which we cannot wonder, for the Spaniards have even denied their existence. That, however, is now incontestible. The accounts of their latitude and longitude differ, probably from the great number of them, or neighbouring islands little known. Those distinguished by the above name are situated to the south of the Marian islands, between the 10th and 13th degrees of north latitude. The author, whom I chiefly follow in these accounts, has given many very satisfactory reasons for supposing them the same which were seen by Magellan, the inhabitants of which met him with canoes loaded with cloves, cinnamon, ginger, pepper, nutmegs, mace, and gold, wrought into many antic forms *. To the south-east of the Marian islands were other clusters, once named *Islas de Abrosas*, *Mira Comovas*, &c. and the island of *St. Bartholomew*, which lies in lat. 14 degrees north and 20 degrees east of Guam. It is larger than any of the Marian islands †; but we have no accounts of their inhabitants or produce, probably because only seen by ships on their passage. To the south-west of the Marians lie others, called the *Coral Islands*, the *Archipelago de los Reyes*,

* *Modern Universal History*, Vol. IX. p. 593. *Ramusio Racolto delle Navigazioni et Viaggi*, Tom. I. p. 350. *Purchas's Pilgrims*, Vol. I. b. 2. ch. 2. p. 37. *Eden's History of Travaile*, p. 430.

† *Galvano's Discoveries*, translated by Hackluyt.

and several others *. When first these islands were discovered they were very full of people, who had proas of different sizes. But though, says my author, we have these and other particulars in our old collections, yet we find no mention of them in modern books, as if it was designed they should retire again from the knowledge of men, and relapse into their original obscurity. If this arises from negligence, it ought to be prevented; if from a point of mistaken policy, we ought, in justice to the rights of mankind, to defeat it †. As we are sincerely persuaded of the great importance of the New Philippines, and look upon them, considered in this light, as a kind of literary introduction to a commercial discovery, in favour either of Spain or some other country, we have treated them accordingly; and though there are some variations in accounts of them, yet, after all allowances made, the great facts, as to the number and nearness of these islands; their abounding in the necessaries of life; their having a multitude of inhabitants; their living under a certain form of government; their having the art of boat-building and navigation in some degree of perfection; and their being an ingenious and docile people, are put beyond all manner of doubt. These islands are unquestionably rich and valuable, because they possess almost all the blessings that the indulgence of nature can bestow. They have a soft and serene climate, not exposed to excessive heat, though in the midst of the torrid zone, and never visited by blasts of cold. Their soil is wonderfully fruitful, and from the conjunction of these they produce all the necessaries of life. Their situation again is so fortunate, that if they wanted the greater part of these blessings, this alone would compensate all their wants; for they lie at an equal distance

* Heirera Description de las Indes Occidentales, cap. 28.

† Modern Universal History. Vol. IX. p. 595.

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from all the rich countries in the world, surrounded by the widest and mildest of all seas, and capable, from thence, of the safest, the most commodious, and most extensive navigation †. Are these then countries to be desired? Yet neither are these all their advantages; for mark but the number and nature of their inhabitants; the latter shews us that the former must be very great: we know but very little of them, but we know enough to be very sure of this, because we know they are peaceable and prolific. There would be no difficulty in introducing improvements in their conduct of civil life, which would lead them to the discovery of more wants, but, at the same time, would instruct them how they might be supplied. They have already a great fund of industry, which is the genuine source of wealth, and with a very little help would render them a civil, polite, commercial nation, in countries the best adapted to, and probably as well furnished as any with materials for an enlarged commerce. Some relations actually say they possess both gold and silver. That they have spice too is more than probable, since almost all the countries to the west of them certainly have spices, though the inhabitants, from prudential motives, chuse to conceal them. But whether they have or have not precious metals, or rich spices, they may have many other valuable commodities, of which we, and perhaps they, have not the least knowledge, but which a spirit of commerce would quickly bring to light. We know what prodigious pains the Dutch take to prevent cloves from growing in those islands to which they were given by nature; and with what pains, as well as policy, they have secured the monopoly of mace and nutmegs, as well as with what anxiety they prevent

† Galvano's Discoveries in Hackluyt. Eden's History of Travaile. Du Bois Geographie Moderne. p. 701.

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cinnamon from being brought into Europe by any but themselves *. We have already shewn, that notwithstanding all this care and concern, there are both cinnamon and cloves in Mindanao; and it is very certain that there is still greater plenty in the small islands of Meangis, which either make a part of this archipelago, or are within a few hours sail of it. We farther know, that the finest nutmegs in the world lie at no great distance from these islands, and yet where they are out of the power of the Dutch †. What then should hinder the transplanting all these rich spices into some or other of these islands? or what should hinder them from growing when transplanted out of islands nearly in the same latitude where they grow by nature, more especially when it is remembered, that the very thing we propose the Dutch have done already, and with the greatest success ‡? For managing such a design, and carrying all the arts of cultivation to the highest perfection, what nation could be wished for more fit than, without the least thought of an attempt of this nature, these people are described to be? What, with less injury and corruption of their old manners, could supply the wants that a higher degree of civility would introduce better than this project, if carried into execution? There is no need of arms, of expence, or much trouble, to do all this: so that if the sources of immense wealth are not in these islands, they may be fetched from next door. They may be kept too with the same ease that they are brought. To bring all this to

* Dictionnaire de Commerce, Tom. II. p. 891. Dampier's Voyages, Vol. VI. p. 173.

† Galvano's Discoveries in Hackluyt. Dampier's Continuation of the Voyage to New Holland, chap. III. Histoire de la Expedition de Trois Vaisseaux, chap. 18. sec. 3.

‡ Funnel's Voyage round the World, chap. ix. Memoires sur le Commerce Hollandois dans toutes les Etats & Empires du Monde, p. 145. 147.

pass there wants only an active spirit, a tolerable degree of contrivance, and a steady perseverance in those who shall attempt it †.

These reflections, which are of the most important kind, we have introduced at length, from being more peculiarly adapted to the present time than even that in which they were wrote. An absolute lethargy throughout Europe, twenty years ago, stopped all enquiries of this sort; but now we are making so many expeditions round the world, it is requisite that such proposals should be considered as the only probable means of making these voyages turn out to the commercial benefit of Britain.

POLITICAL ARITHMETIC, is the title given (first by Sir William Petty) to calculations of national circumstances, respecting the number of the people, their consumption, &c. the general products of a kingdom; its wealth, coin, income, &c. reducing all circumstances to numbers, instead of treating them by way of verbal disquisitions. It is a most useful science, and has tended to throw more truth into that of politics in general than any thing else could have done. For politics is but the art of comparing nations, which can only be done effectually by reducing them to numbers, when you may add, subtract, multiply, or divide, and thereby discover much more solid truth than by all the declamatory harangues in the world.

POOR. See **PROVISIONS.**

P O P U L A T I O N. 1. A rude and barbarous people living by hunting, fishing, or pasturage, or on the spontaneous product of the earth, without agriculture, commerce, and arts, can never be so numerous as a people inhabiting the same tracts of land who are well skilled in agriculture and civilized commerce; since uncultivated

† Mod. Univ. Hist. Vol. IX. p. 620. 622. 624, &c. Political Essays, p. 455.

can never maintain so many inhabitants as cultivated lands. In every country there shall always be found a greater number of inhabitants *ceteris paribus*, in proportion to the plenty of provisions it affords, as plenty will always encourage the generality of the people to marry.

2. As the earth could not be well peopled in rude and barbarous ages, neither are all countries, climates, and soils, equally favourable to propagation. There must therefore be a great difference in respect of inhabitants, notwithstanding the best culture, discipline, and constitutions.

3. Besides the nature of the climate or soil, the number of people in every country, depends greatly on its political maxims and institutions concerning the division of lands.

For if there be very nearly an equal division of the lands, and into such small shares, that they can yield little more than what is necessary to feed and cloath the labourers in a simple and frugal manner; though in such a situation, there is little room for commerce with strangers, and none but the most simple and necessary arts can be in use; yet if the country be naturally fertile, it must of necessity be well stored with people.

In every country where nothing is known but agriculture and pasturage, and a few more simple arts, such as those of building and cloathing in a frugal taste, without ornament; of necessity there must be few inhabitants, unless the lands are nearly equally divided, and into small portions. And in a fertile soil, the shares of land must be extremely small, if they are not able to support many more than are necessary for cultivating them. Hence in every such soil, where a great extent of property is allowed, there is room for elegance, sumptuousness, and the encouragement of arts; and in whatever country industry prevails about what subject soever it is employed, provided the produce of it gives a price

price either at home or abroad, such a country may abound in people, and flourish by arts and commerce: it may even flourish though agriculture is not encouraged to the full, and several tracts of land are much neglected. Nay, such is the force of industry and commerce, that by means of them, many more inhabitants may be maintained in a country, than the produce of the lands can possibly support, as their food may be brought from a distance.

At the same time if the lands of any country be neglected, the world in general must suffer for it, and the earth must contain a smaller number of inhabitants, in proportion to the numbers which might be supported by these uncultivated lands.

4. As the number of people in every nation, depends most immediately on the number and fruitfulness of marriages, and the encouragement that is given to marry; wherever the greatest care is taken in this respect, the number of the people *ceteris paribus* shall be greatest; and a bad policy in this article must give a considerable check to propagation.

Hence in a debauched nation, addicted to sensuality and irregular amours, and where luxury and a high taste of delicate living prevails, the number of the people must be proportionally small, as their debauchery will hinder many from marrying, and their luxury and delicacy will render them less able to maintain families.

For the same reason, a nation shall be more populous in proportion, as good morals and a simplicity of taste and manners prevail, or as the people are more frugal and virtuous.

5. As mankind can only be supported by the fruits of the earth, and animal food, and it is only by agriculture, fishing, and hunting, that food can be provided, to render the earth as populous as possible; these arts must be duly cherished, especially agriculture and fishing.

Hence the more persons employ themselves in agriculture and fishing, and the arts which are necessary for managing them to the greatest advantage, the world in general will be more populous; and as fewer hands are employed in this manner, there will be fewer people. It is of no consequence in this argument, how the people are employed otherwise, nay, though they are employed in arts which may increase the riches and numbers of particular nations, if they are not employed in such as are necessary for providing food.

In order to have the greatest possible number of inhabitants in the world, all mankind should be employed directly in providing food; and this must always be the case till the whole earth is cultivated to the full. But whenever the earth shall happen to be as richly cultivated as is possible, then will there be room for those arts that tend only to ornament, since such as are employed in the more necessary labour of providing food, must be able to purchase it for a much greater number than themselves.

It follows likewise, contrary perhaps to what many may apprehend, that trade and commerce, instead of increasing, may often tend to diminish the number of mankind; and while they enrich a particular nation, and entice great numbers of people into one place, may be not a little detrimental upon the whole, as they promote luxury, and prevent many useful hands from being employed in agriculture. The exchange of commodities, and carrying them from one country to another, by sea or land, does not multiply food; and if such as are employed in this exchange, were employed in agriculture at home, a greater quantity of food would be provided, and a greater number of people might be maintained.

The same principle will teach us that huge and overgrown cities, which are nurseries of corruption and debauchery, and prejudicial in many other respects,

spects, are in a particuar manner destructive to the populousness of the world, as they cherish luxury, entice great numbers of all ranks to resort to them, and drain the rest of a country of useful labouring hands, who otherwise would be employed in agriculture, and the most necessary arts.

Nor do the operose manufactures of linen and woollen, toys and utensils of wood, or metals, or earth, in which so many hands are employed in a commercial nation, contribute so much to the increase of the people, as many are apt to apprehend: and it is not always true, that in proportion as manufactures are numerous and flourishing, a country must of course be more populous than in times of greater simplicity.

In general, living must be cheaper where fewer things are wanted, and what is needed, may be easily purchased. Wherever living is cheapest, and a family can be most easily supported, there will be more frequent marriages, and greater numbers of people. Where scarce any thing is needed but simple food, a simple garment, and a little plain furniture, living will be cheapest. This agrees best to a state where few mechanic arts are in use, and men are chiefly addicted to agriculture.

But operose manufactures of linen and woollen for cloaths, and furniture of houses, a variety of utensils of wood and metals, and all the refinements of an opulent and trading nation, tend to multiply men's wants, make the most necessary and substantial things dearer, and in general increase the expences of living.

Food and cloaths, houses and a little furniture, are necessary for all. And if a nation be laborious and industrious, these necessities of life will be in such abundance, that almost every one will have them at an easy rate; and while the people persevere in their simple taste, and continue to be industrious, they will multiply prodigiously. But when this simplicity
of

of taste is lost, which must always happen in proportion as opulose manufactures increase: though they continue to be industrious, yet more of the people will apply themselves to less necessary manufactures, and fewer to provide what is more substantial; and as the proportion of those who apply to elegant manufactures increases, and fewer hands are employed in providing food, necessaries will become more scarce; toys abound and become more necessary for the bulk of the people. This will still keep them dear, though they are in plenty. Hence living, even in the most simple manner, will become more expensive: consequently mankind will be less able to support families, and less encouraged to marry.

And though the value of labour will become higher as manufactures increase, it will not compensate the greater expences of living. For this is only one article, and will not enable the labourer to furnish himself with such a variety, as growing manufactures render both necessary and difficult to be purchased.

It must be confessed, that numerous manufactures make a nation more elegant and magnificent. They introduce a variety of fine cloaths and furniture; but at the same time they divert the attention of mankind from providing food: and while they create a taste for delicacies, and make them necessary in some degree for the bulk of the people, they increase the number of artists, and diminish that of husbandmen.

In one respect, therefore, a variety of manufactures diverts the attention of mankind from more necessary labour, and prevents the increase of the people.

This will become more evident, if it shall appear that in a state where manufactures abound, every inhabitant has four or five acres of ground to maintain him; and in another where the taste is more simple,

simple, there is not one acre for every member of the society.

However, if in any state, whether the territory is small or great, there be more people than the whole lands can maintain, even with the best culture, the society must depend on manufactures; and by manufactures alone they can flourish.

But if they have so much uncultivated land, that notwithstanding flourishing manufactures, they have still a much greater number of acres than people: had they a more simple taste, and applied more vigorously to agriculture, their people would increase more speedily.

This argument will be equally strong, whether we suppose these manufactures consumed at home or exported abroad, provided what is returned in exchange for the exported commodities is not substantial food, such as corn or cattle, but only other manufactures, which support elegance, or contribute to delicacy of living.

Nor has the greater or less plenty of money any influence in this case; for men cannot live on money, but on food; and if from the policy and the general customs of a country, the people want a variety of things they cannot easily purchase, especially if by a greater attention to manufactures than agriculture common food becomes scarce and dear, whatever plenty of money may be supposed in such a situation, there must be great discouragements to marry, as it will be impossible to support families easily.

What chiefly encourages marriages, and enables men to support families easily, is the easy purchase of food, and what is necessary for the bulk of the people. If these things can be easily purchased, it is of little consequence in this argument whether money be in plenty or not. But if by means of operose manufactures such a variety of things becomes necessary as the bulk of the people cannot purchase without difficulty, whatever is the quan-

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tity of money, multitudes will be discouraged from marrying.

Suppose the great body of manufacturers in some trading nations that have a large territory to lay aside their manufactures, and employ themselves in agriculture, pasturage, and fishing, they would provide a vast quantity of food; they would make all the necessaries of life cheap and easy to be purchased; and it would soon become visible how great a difference there is between agriculture and manufactures in rendering a nation populous*.

To prove that people create employment, it may be urged, - that the reality of the scarcity of men is proved by the rise and height of wages and pay; but this proves nothing: for sure every one must be sensible, that if men were not in being, money could not buy them. A rise of wages is a contingency; a circumstance that operates we know not how, and is founded in a multiplicity of cases on we know not what; but the existence and increase of the working hands are visible; the progress of all public and private works at the same moment sufficiently prove this. Thus it is of no consequence to either side of the present argument to talk of wages and pay; whether they are immensely high or unreasonably low, it makes no kind of difference; the number of industrious hands is the single point to be attended to as proof. If we recur to the chain of causes of an increase of industry, we shall there find the rise of wages coming in for its share, and forming one material link.

Two shillings and six-pence a-day will undoubtedly tempt some to work who would not touch a tool for one shilling. A fellow that has been used to lounge at home in an idle cottage may be tempted out by high wages, though not by low ones:

* Wallace's Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind, p. 15, &c.

another,

another, that in cheap times used to bask himself all day in the sun, holding a cow by a line to feed in a balk, in dear ones betakes himself to the pick-ax and the spade. In a word, idle people are converted by degrees into industrious hands; youths are brought forward to work; even boys perform their share, and women, at the prospect of great wages, clap their hands with chearfulness and fly to the sickle. Thus a new race of the industrious is by degrees created, and its increase is proportioned to its creation; an effect so undoubted, that any village in this country might, by an increasing employment, be presently raised to a Sheffield or a Birmingham: but who is weak enough to suppose that the surrounding farmers would therefore want hands.

But there is another circumstance, which is a strong additional proof that the increase of the industrious, occasioned by an increase of employment, must be immense, and even more than apparent, and that is, the effect which great pay is attended with of making men idle. This now appears a striking contradiction to what I have before asserted; but a very few words will sufficiently explain it.

Great earnings operate, as I have already explained, in bringing people to work who otherwise would have continued idle; but they, at the same time, have a strong effect on all who remain the least inclined to idleness or other ill courses, by causing them to work but four or five days to maintain themselves the seven: this is a fact so well known in every manufacturing town, that it would be idle to think of proving it by argument. The operation of great wages, therefore, is this, they prodigiously increase the number of the industrious, but, at the same time, take away the necessity of working a day for a day's maintenance, which, though
it

it cannot be supposed to render all at times idle, yet must affect a great number.

It is for these reasons, which are founded upon the most simple of all principles, the common emotions of human nature, that no industrious nation need ever fear a want of hands for executing any the most extensive plans of public or private improvement. It would be false to assert that such plans could any where be executed at a given expence, or at a certain rate of wages; but, wherever employment exists, that is, money to be expended, workmen can never be wanting. A new war may draw of some hundred thousand men; turnpikes may at the same time be greatly extended; marshes may be drained; open fields be inclosed; harbours may be opened, and new cities raised, without any prejudice to husbandry: let but the requisite money be found, men can never be wanting. It is no paradox to assert, that money will at any time make men*.

Tell me of a kingdom, state, or prince, that has many millions of subjects; this decides nothing; tell me of some that is immensely rich, no other enquiry is requisite: he must have men. No fear can be more vain than that of an industrious wealthy kingdom wanting subjects. Let this nation continue to encourage and honour agriculture, manufactures and commerce; to be rich in the possession of great wealth from a vast stock of industry; let her see to these points, and she need not be concerned about the number of her people. Population will take care of itself. If you think you have not people enough, make more, which is as easily done as to manufacture a statue. Provide new employment, and new hands will inevitably follow. An act of parliament to raise money for the improvement of a million of waste acres, would in-

* Six Months Tour, Vol. I. p. 178.

crease population more than twenty score of naturalization-bills*.

P O R T U G A L, (British Trade to.)—The black French drugget is the cloth in which the French undersel us at Lisbon. I have received patterns, says Mr. Postlethwayte of these French druggets, and put them into the hands of certain manufacturers, in order that trials might be made thereof in our kingdom; and the trial has succeeded in respect to the quality of the manufacture, but not in price, by every one who has attempted it. I have been informed that one of the manufacturers did succeed at Penryn in Cornwall, and it has been affirmed that they were made so cheap at the commencement of the last war as to have been delivered at the list on markets for the same price that the French do theirs; but it seems that it so fell out that this branch of manufacture, which would have been attended with great national advantages, has been put a stop to, and the manufacturer almost ruined, because he voted according to his conscience for members of parliament at the last general election.

Whether this can be done since the increase of our taxes, occasioned by the last war, I have never heard.

These light druggets, commonly called the French druggets, is a kind of cloth greatly esteemed by the Spaniards and Portuguese, for its being well worked, though, at the same time, thin, light and cheap. The French were the first introducers of this manufacture; and are at this time the sole vendors thereof in the Lisbon and Spanish markets, to the great detriment of our trade. These druggets are made in France of the best of the Spanish or Turkey wool, which are very well prepared and

* Six Months Tour, Vol. IV. p. 414.

scribbled, and afterwards spun into the finest yarn that those wools will admit of. When placed in the loom, the chain and filling, or warp and woof, must be of one quality, and be driven pretty close, as this cloth must not be beat up after it is wove: (these last particulars are what the generality of our British manufacturers have erred in) a yard of this cloth, which is half-ell-wide, when finished, should not weigh above four ounces.

The French sell their druggets at Lisbon from 1 s. 6 d. to 1 s. 10 d. *per* yard. The French and Dutch superfine cloths, which they undersell us with at the Lisbon and other southern markets, are greatly inferior to the superfine cloths which are made in England for lasting; but this is not the principal quality which the inhabitants of those hot countries desire in their cloth: they desire a cloth which is thin and light, and of an inferior price to our superfine cloth, but, at the same time, it must be well dyed, and look pleasing to the eye. This is the kind of cloth which the French and Dutch supply them with, and which our manufacturers cannot be brought to manufacture, because they imagine it greatly inferior to our own; but if we expect those people should buy our goods, we must supply them with such as are most agreeable to them. Both of those branches of manufacture may be carried on in several parts of this kingdom; and therefore, if the government would give a bounty on the exportation of those cloths for a few years till proper manufactories were established, by way of encouragement, and use every measure to annihilate those taxes which fall the heaviest upon our manufactures, and duly regulate all the poor of the kingdom, we shall be able to rival and undersell both the French and Dutch at all the southern markets.

Relative to the ill state of the British trade to Portugal, did all their gold that temporarily circulates

culatēs in this nation proceed from the advantageous balance of our trade with that kingdom, it would even in such case be a high indignity to Great Britain to suffer such treatment as our merchants have met with in Portugal. Would not this be the natural step to bring us into irrecoverable contempt and ignominy, without due resentment? And would not that soon reduce the balance of trade, as well as sink the honour and glory of the British nation? But when nine-tenths of the Portugal gold, that makes its appearance among us occasionally, belong to other countries, and England only is the carrier thereof, and the bridge over which it passes, to pay the balances due from Portugal to other nations that are greater gainers by her, what obligation is there on us to bear with the least insult? Where is the nation that takes so much of their wines and their fruit as Great Britain does? What state is more highly favoured in the duties laid upon their productions imported into these kingdoms than Portugal? Is not an hundred pounds worth of our woollen goods worth an hundred pounds of their wine, without a pipe of which we can easily do, and yet not drink worse in quality or less in quantity? And what nation will they get to take their luxuries off their hands in the like proportion that Great Britain does? Is not a thousand pounds worth of our lead or our tin worth a thousand pounds of their gold? Cannot Great Britain find the way to the Brazils as well as the Portuguese, as lord Galway, in effect, gallantly told the late king of Portugal, and as his late majesty king George had resolution and magnanimity enough to threaten to send a fleet to bombard the city of Lisbon; may not that be one day done in reality, if that nation should once dare to rouse that lion against them who has been their great safety and protection? What potentate have the Portuguese to depend upon, in case of need, except Great Britain?

Britain? And does wisdom and policy dictate to them to ill-treat their best and tried friends *?

Our Portuguese trade, once very beneficial, has of late become so altered for the worse, that the rates of exchange shew the scales so nearly poised as almost to vibrate on the balance.

While they have been favouring other nations to our prejudice, and with the violation of a commercial treaty, in their needful supply of manufactures, they have so raised the prices of their wines on us, with the deprivation of rights by treaty, as nearly to double the cost of them: yet we have been so impolitic as to suffer those treaties of alliance to subsist, though they expose us to the demands of such succours as we have often experienced to be enormously expensive, without any reciprocal obligation on them. The equivalent for this protection was our exclusive right to import woollen manufactures into that kingdom, which was implied by the treaty of Queen Anne, and heretofore so understood, nay, made evident by their custom-house regulations, woollen goods not being allowed entry from any other country; but we first suffered this essential right to be invaded in favour of the Dutch, who have no such commercial treaty with them, and since, in practice at least, in favour of the French, who have no existing treaty with them whatever, and who grant them no kind of equivalent as we do, expressly by stipulation in the duties on their wines. What motives a succession of administrations may have had for suffering every stipulated condition in our favour to be openly violated, without formally renouncing the conditional burthen some ties on us in favour of Portugal, they themselves must best know; but it may be said, with great truth, that some of them ought, long

* Postlethwayte's Dictionary, Art. Portugal.

ago, to have been made answerable for so doing to the justice of their country.

It is ridiculous any longer to pretend that we have any treaties in force with Portugal, but such as are entirely to our national prejudice; and it will be as infamous, as injurious, to suffer those to continue any longer unannulled. We are not in want of means for taking full satisfaction, as well as greatly serving ourselves, by the effectual humbling of Portugal, and therewith awing other powers, if we were animated by the spirit that did so much honour to Cromwell's times, and occasioned the oldest treaty existing at present between the two crowns. But why that treaty, and also those of Charles II. and Queen Anne, have not been kept in full force, it is to be hoped will speedily be made a subject of parliamentary enquiry.

At present our Portuguese trade is no object to this country, and therefore a needless regard for it should no longer be suffered to hazard any future inconvenience or burthen from engagements of alliance. It formerly was supposed to be in our favour, to the amount of between 4 and 500,000 l. *per annum*; but the schemes of the Conde de Oeyras have proved equally fatal to the interests of both kingdoms, however they may have served to cram his own coffers. The whole of their colony-trade, and much of their home, has been converted into hurtful monopolies and iniquitous jobs, contrary to every principle of sound policy, while the kingdom has been ruining, and the colonies oppressed and disgusted, by mischievous regulations and taxations that are enormous*.

PRIVATEERING IN SOUTH-SEA. It cannot be denied that Shelvocke's voyage was almost in

* Considerations on the Policy, Commerce, and Circumstances of the Kingdom, p. 230.

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every respect an ill-conducted as well as unsuccessful expedition; and yet, if we examine things closely, we shall see, that there is no reason to be discouraged by the unluckiness of this attempt. There is a light in which this voyage may be viewed that will afford quite another kind of prospect. It is a fact not to be controverted, that the *Speedwel* made her voyage round Cape Horn into the South-Seas, and took afterwards abundance of prizes on the coasts of Chili, Peru, and Mexico, without the least assistance from her consort. This then furnishes us with the following observations, that it is possible for a ship of 200 tons, with 100 stout men on board, under proper officers, to make such an expedition into these seas as may prove very advantageous to them and to their owners; for, according to both captain Shelvøcke and captain Betagh's account, the expence of this ship did not much exceed 6000 l. and the profits of their voyage, if prudently and honestly managed, could not have amounted to less than 50,000 l. If, therefore, we consider this case as it is now stated, instead of frightening, it ought to encourage us to undertakings of a like kind; for if such a ship, so indifferently manned, subject to perpetual mutinies, and without any just regard to the true interests of the voyage, could perform so much, and the principal officers on board her come off so well, it is a natural conclusion that a ship of the same force, well-manned, and properly commanded, might do much more, and return safe. If we suffer our opinions to be governed purely by events, we may come to fancy that the greatest naval power in the world can perform little by sea, because perhaps some instances can be given in some certain period of time wherein something like this may have happened; but, alas! this is a very wild way of reasoning; and we may with the same justice imagine, that because a stout man does not resent a scratch

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on the forehead in his sleep, he could not avenge himself if awake upon the feeblest of his enemies. To say the truth, it is such notions as these that keep us asleep. One such expedition as that of captain Rogers proves more in favour of our sending ships to the South-Seas than ten such unlucky adventures as this can prove against it; for these only shew, that when commanders disagree, and their men become mutinous, mistake follows upon mistake, till all falls to ruin; which is a lesson that may be learnt without going to the South-Seas, and therefore concludes nothing as to the point in question*.

The Duke and Dutcheſs, captain Rogers, cleared 170,000 l. †.

PROVISIONS (Price of.) In butter, the difference between London and the cheap part of the kingdom is three-pence *per* pound, which is very considerable, much more than I apprehended. The variation will appear at one view in the following little table.

London, and 20 miles round, mean price	8
From 20 miles to 60	6 $\frac{3}{4}$
From 60 miles to 110	6
From 110 miles to 170	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
The general medium is	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.

The general medium of cheese through the whole journey is 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.

London and 20 miles round, mean price of	d.
meat, beef, mutton, and veal	4 $\frac{3}{4}$
From 20 to 60	4 $\frac{1}{6}$
From 60 to 110	3 $\frac{3}{4}$
From 110 to 170	3 $\frac{1}{2}$

* Harris's Voyages, Vol. I. p. 240.

† Ibid. p. 198.

Mediums of mutton and beef.

London and 20 miles round	-	-	-	-	$4\frac{3}{4}$
From 20 to 60	-	-	-	-	$4\frac{1}{6}$
From 60 to 110	-	-	-	-	4
From 110 to 170	-	-	-	-	$3\frac{3}{4}$

From hence it appears, that the difference between London and the cheapest places of this journey, in the price of meat in general, is $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ and of mutton and beef only $1d.$ If we consider the expences of driving, and what is more, the waste of flesh upon the road, we shall not be surprized at this difference. The general mediums of the three meats is $4d.$

Of only mutton and beef $4\frac{1}{2}d.$ upon the whole we find provisions to be on a medium.

Bread	-	-	-	-	-	2	per lb.
Butter	-	-	-	-	-	$6\frac{1}{2}$	
Cheese	-	-	-	-	-	$3\frac{1}{2}$	
Meat	-	-	-	-	-	4^*	

In 1768

Average of Bread	-	-	-	-	-	$1\frac{1}{4}$	
Butter	-	-	-	-	-	6	
Cheese	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Mutton	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Beef	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Veal	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Pork	-	-	-	-	-	$3\frac{1}{2}$	
Average-meat	-	-	-	-	-	3	

	Bread.	Butter.	Cheese.	Meat.
To 50 miles round	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$6\frac{1}{4}$	4	$3\frac{3}{4}$
London				
50 to 100	$1\frac{1}{2}$	6	$3\frac{3}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$
100 to 200	$1\frac{1}{4}$	6	$3\frac{1}{4}$	3
200 to 300	1	6	2	$2\frac{3}{4}$
300 and upwards	—	5	$2\frac{1}{2}$	$2\frac{1}{2}$

* Six Weeks Tour, p. 318. 1767.

The influence of the capital appears very strongly in this table. It is apparent even in the article of bread, which one would suppose in reason not to be much affected. The equality of the price of butter surprizes me; but even that is dearest near London, and cheapest the farthest from it. Cheese near the capital is double the price it is at a distance from it; but this circumstance requires some explanation. Scarce any cheese is made around London; it answers so much better to make butter and to suckle, that the quantity of cheese made is very trifling. The cheese of the western counties is to be had through all England, nearly as cheap as at London; but the poor do not eat it as their brethren do about London: they consume only their own country cheese, of a much poorer sort.

The variations in the prices of butcher's meat are so regular, the fall so unbroken in proportion to the distance from the capital, that one cannot but attribute it to the distance. The fall of price is regular, even in circumstances that one would apprehend sufficient totally to destroy it. The populous manufacturing counties of Lancaster, and the West-Riding of Yorkshire, I expected to find as dear as London; but, on the contrary, the fall of price is regular throughout them*.

In 1770.

	d.
Average of Bread	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ per lib.
Butter	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
Cheese	3 $\frac{3}{4}$
Mutton	3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Beef	3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Veal	3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Pork	3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Average meat	3 $\frac{1}{2}$

* Six Months Tour, Vol. IV. p. 284.

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Bread

	Bread.	Butter.	Cheese.	Meat.
50 miles round } London }	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$7\frac{3}{4}$	$4\frac{1}{4}$	4
50 to 100 - - -	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$6\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$
100 to 150 - - -	$1\frac{1}{4}$	$6\frac{1}{4}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{4}$
150 to 170 - - -	$1\frac{1}{8}$	$7\frac{1}{8}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$	$3\frac{1}{2}$

It is here to be observed, that the result of scarcely any table can be more natural than this; the effect in each column is such as might be expected. Bread is uninfluenced in its price by the neighbourhood of the capital, arising from the ease with which wheat is transported, and from all places that have a regular demand in the way of trade, (for so wheat at London may be called) being better supplied than others with any commodity. This equality of the price of bread throughout England is a proof of the excellent internal police of corn, which obtains in this kingdom from an aggregate of improvements and natural advantages, principally owing to the near neighbourhood of the sea, and to the country being intersected by numerous navigations.

Butter, on the contrary, rises greatly at the capital, which must always be the case with a product in which distant parts cannot partake in the supply; the neighbourhood of London producing the whole, it commands an high price.

Cheese is in general equal; this is consistent with the foregoing principles, being easily conveyed in large quantities. The small rise at London, is owing to all being of the better sort.

Butchers meat rises gradually and regularly with the approach to the capital; this is a consequence that might be expected, because the increase of demand has not a corresponding neighbouring increase of product, and must therefore be supplied from a distance, at a pretty heavy waste and expence*.

PROVISIONS (Connection with Labour.) Relative to provisions, the rise of labour should corres-

* Farmer's Tour, Vol. IV. p. 305.

pond with the increase of their prices; but no such dependence is found. The lowest price of provisions should be attended by the highest rise of labour; but it is almost directly contrary, and where the price of provisions is equal, the variations in the rise of labour are great: the rise of a third, a fourth, and a fifth, are attended by the same rates of provisions.

The rise of poor-rates ought to have an intimate connection with the prices of provisions; but nothing that chance could cast can be further from the fact. The lowest price of provisions is attended by nearly the highest rise in rates, and in one column of the highest price, superior.

It is sufficiently clear from the variations in those sums which the poor receive either in pay or rates do not, in scarcely any case, depend on their necessities. Increase poor rates, you pay most to those who want the assistance least: raise the prices of labour, the effect is the same.

Has the rise in labour and poor rates been proportioned to the rise in the prices of provisions? This is a very important point, but would require more minute elucidation than the present pages will allow.

The rise of rates in 20 years, one-half and one-seventh.

That of labour in 18 years, one-fourth.

The first is, *per cent.* - - - - - 64

The second - - - - - 25

Relative to the progress of the prices of provisions not being the immediate subject of these papers, I can only give a sketch from an author before me, whom I shall trust to with the more readiness, as his professed aim is to magnify the miseries of the poor from high prices; so that if he is wrong, we may be tolerably safe that it is not in lessening them. He gives, among others, two periods, from 1706 to 1730, and from 1730 to 1760; these will serve the

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the purpose nearly as well as if they came down later, because that period was to the full as much complained of as any one since; and going so far back will be the more satisfactory, as it will give the reader an idea of prices, compared with the rise of poor rates, in the period preceding the last twenty years.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
From 1706 to 1730, mutton and beef <i>per stone</i>	0	1	8
From 1730 to 1760	0	2	0
The rise	0	0	4
Which is, <i>per cent.</i>	20		
From 1706 to 1730, pork *	0	2	0
1730 to 1760	0	2	6
The rise	0	0	6
Which is, <i>per cent.</i>	25		
Mutton and beef	20		
Average of the three	22½		
From 1706 to 1730, wheat <i>per quarter</i>	1	15	0¾
1730 to 1760	1	9	5½
The fall	0	5	7½
Which is, <i>per cent.</i>	16½		
From 1706 to 1730, malt	1	6	2½
1730 to 1760	1	4	5½
The fall	0	1	8
Which is, <i>per cent.</i>	6½		

* Enquiry into the Prices of Wheat, &c. 1768.

Now

Now the question is, the comparison between a fall in wheat of $16\frac{1}{2}$ and in malt of $6\frac{1}{2}$, against a rise of meat of $22\frac{1}{2}$. Every one knows, that with respect to the consumption of the poor, wheat is of far greater consequence than meat, insomuch that a fall in it of $16\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* cannot be estimated less than $22\frac{1}{2}$ in meat. I must be allowed to think the difference much greater; however, if we take it only at that proportion, the average of those different articles of food is balanced: the fall in malt is not great, but uniting with that of wheat, it makes the equality of the two periods the more certain.

From these data I cannot apprehend (that one period relative to the consumption of the poor) is dearer than the other. It is true, wheat, &c. was high in particular years, and there were many clamours and much rioting; but particular years are not the inquiry, for a rise in labour, or poor rates, is not for one, two, or three years, but for perpetuity: it is the average of many, therefore, that is alone to be regarded.

The two periods appear to be equal; but how different has it been with poors-rates and labour? The price of the latter has been pretty regularly rising; in the last 18 years the increase is 25 *per cent.* at the same time that poor-rates have increased 64 *per cent.* and in the period preceding in as rapid a manner, as appears from various minutes, both those and labour extending in various instances throughout the same period, as these now quoted of the prices of provisions.

But whether these comparisons are minutely exact is not of consequence at present, because it is from this slight sketch manifest that the rise of labour has more than kept pace with that of provisions, at the same time that that of rates has far outstripped it.

This is a point of no slight importance. The distresses of the poor are in many mouths, and have been

been so constant a subject of late as capitally to affect the greatest public measures; but I will venture to assert, that they are equally ill-understood and misrepresented by the numerous writers who plume themselves on their humanity, because they plead for removing the distresses of the poor by raising the price of labour, sinking that of provisions, and increasing poor-rates.

That there are distresses among the poor, and such as ought to be alleviated, no one will dispute; but they proceed not from these causes. Their grand source is the application of that money to superfluities, which ought to be, and formerly was, expended in necessities. I shall for the present name only tea and sugar, because it is universal throughout this tour, except, I think, in one single place. Wherever I came every body agreed in their assertions on this head; whether they were for or against the poor in their arguments made no difference; all united in the assertion that the practice twice a day was constant, and that it was inconceivable how much it impoverished them. In very many parishes they attributed their exorbitant rates solely to this luxury; in many parishes does it reign uncontrouled among those very families that receive regular and large allowances from the rates.

This is no matter of trivial consequence; no transitory or local evil: it is universal and unceasing; the amount of it great. It is the principal cause of high rates and labour, without a corresponding relief to the poor, and as such cannot be too seriously considered. The slightest calculations, of which I have had many given me in various parts of the kingdom, are sufficient to shew that this single article costs numerous families more than sufficient to remove those real distresses, which they will submit to rather than lay aside their tea. And an object, seemingly of little account, but in reality of infinite importance,

importance, is the custom coming in of men making tea an article of their food almost as much as women; labourers losing their time to come and go to the tea-table; nay, farmers servants even demanding tea for their breakfast with the maids! which has been actually the case in East-Kent.

If the men come to lose as much of their time at tea as the women, and injure their health by so bad a beverage, the poor in general will find themselves far more distressed than ever.

If the real distresses of the poor are in question; if their pay will not properly maintain them; if they are not cloathed in a warm and decent manner; well-lodged, and nourished plentifully with wholesome food; if the sick man has not wherewithal for cure, or the hand of death leave the widow and her orphans in distress; if unrelenting time brings grey-hairs on the head of the industrious, without strength for support or store to resort to: in the name of God force the purses of the rich, if humanity does not open them, to relieve the wants of their fellow-creatures. Raise the price of labour; increase your rates; do whatever the necessity of the case requires: it is then humanity that speaks, nor is this a nation that will ever be deaf to her call. Had it ever entered my heart to arraign the police of the kingdom for administering comfort to poverty in distress, I should well have deserved the assassinating strokes more than once levelled, but which I disdain too much to feel.

The man who takes the charitable virtues of humanity for his theme, is sure at least of being un-attacked on that head; consequently, if he has any interested point to carry, any secret motive of his conduct, he has nothing to do, but in the true hypocritical strain, to interweave the concealed idea with the plausible covering, and mark himself for an asserter of the rights of humanity, or a defender
of

of the interests of the poor. I cannot but conceive that this must have been the case with several publications, in which humanity and charity are so intermixed with rates, labour, and provisions, that the reader may naturally take them all for synonymous terms, and think the road to heaven is to dispense liberally to the poor; no matter how, for what purpose, or in what manner.

But I beg to be excused from such wholesale dealing, and to keep clear from jumbling such different matters into the same account. What is the object in view? Is it merely to raise rates and labour, and sink provisions indiscriminately to all the poor, till they may live idle as well as industrious? Or, is it to reduce the necessities of the poor to such a balance with their means of procuring them, that they may be comfortable and happy who are or have been industrious? If the latter is not the point, I am perfectly in the dark.

Now let us slightly examine the matter thus stated. Suppose the price of labour raised, who will be the better? I reply, not those who most want it; and this from the facts of the present tour: not a fourth of the rise will go to those whose former low earnings most demanded an increase. Suppose the poor-rates to rise, will that remedy the evil? Not a jot; those (it is very plain) are dispensed by no rules of want or propriety, but are given to them who earn the greatest wages instead of the least. But the price of provisions may be sunk? True; but the supposition must be over the whole kingdom, not on division according to necessity, but a general average; and I think I have proved sufficiently clear, that the variations will be as wild as the winds; those who can hardly live would have no relief, and others who earn plentifully would be eased to idleness. These suppositions are not more capricious than the facts have appeared to be throughout three-fourths of England.

Does not all this tend strongly to prove what I have remarked more than once before, that the poor laws of this kingdom are so thoroughly defective, that let the poor be ever so distressed you cannot relieve them with tolerable equality; you must spend ten shillings in mischief, in order to lay out half-a-crown effectually?

But hitherto I have taken the corner-stone of the argument for granted, supposing that the poor are distressed through necessity; but the contrary, I aver. That some few may be so, nobody can deny; but it would be the same under the best regulations that could possibly be framed, for human laws can never exclude exceptions; but in such debates as this we must reason only on the multitude.

Wants, I allow, are numerous; but what name are we to give to those that are voluntarily embraced, in order for indulgence in tea and sugar? I again repeat, that this is not in reference to a few individuals, it is to the point with the whole body of the poor. Rates are to rise enormously; labour to do the same; and the prices of provisions are to be sunk, contrary to all the laws of common sense; for what? Not to house, clothe, or support your poor; not to alleviate their sickness, support their old-age, or fill their bellies with beef or pudding, but to enable them to drink tea. Labour has risen *25 per cent.* in 18 years, and rates *64 per cent.* in the same time, in order that the poor might drink tea twice instead of once a-day. In 20 years more we may look for such another rise; most assuredly it will be, that, instead of twice, they may have their tea thrice a-day. There is no clearer fact than that two persons, the wife and one daughter, for instance, drinking tea once a-day, amounts, in a year, to a fourth of the price of all the wheat consumed by a family of five persons; twice a-day one half: so that those who leave off two tea-drinkings,

drinkings, can afford to eat wheat at double the price (calculated at 6s. a bushel).

Under such circumstances, will any one complain of the price of wheat on account of the poor? And who but an idiot will reflect on a man, for not seeing the propriety of heavily taxing the kingdom, that the poor may have the greater plenty of tea and sugar; for as to the necessaries of life, all the rubbish that has been published concerning their high prices, are continued strings of falsehoods and absurdities.

I am no enemy to the poor expending that money which their industry earns in whatever they please: let them drink Burgundy if they chuse; but let it not be with money raised by rates; and let not the fools in politics harrangue on the necessity of raising the price of labour, that tea may supply the place of milk, or that wine should be substituted for beer: our ancestors taxed themselves with other views.

A very few facts, well attended to, would open the eyes of those who do not voluntarily shut them. The price of labour has risen more than provisions; rates have increased enormously, and for no use but providing tea.—I have a pretty clear idea of these two points, but they will admit of more decisive proofs than I have given here*.

P R U S S I A. The astonishing efforts made by his Prussian majesty during the last war, renders every particular concerning him interesting. The following political disquisition was written and published before the war began, and though in part it has been found contrary to events yet, as the king escaped that war, and is now much more powerful than before, the reflections are perhaps as applicable as ever.

* Farmer's Tour, Vol. IV. p. 358.

It would be no difficult thing to shew the reader that the revolutions in Russia, in Sweden, and in Holland, were foreseen, and foretold some years before they happened; but we will confine ourselves at present to the points immediately before us. And though all the world allows that there never was a cabinet more impenetrable than that of the present king of Prussia, yet we shall endeavour to shew, that as our past conjectures have not been altogether vain, so we are able to guess at what his politics may produce in time to come. We were inclined to think that upon the conclusion of a general peace, that monarch might be induced to change his system; but upon seeing the peace concluded at Aix la Chapelle, and considering the conduct of other powers, we are clearly of opinion that time is not yet come. We are satisfied that the schemes formed for abasing or circumscribing the power of this monarch, will have a contrary effect; and that instead of diminishing, there is the highest probability that they will increase his power. We were always, and are still of opinion, that he might be detached from France; and that he will never be the dupe of France: but we see no ground for supposing that proper measures have been taken to bring about the former, or that by the steps he is now taking, he is in danger of falling into the latter.

He has great forces, large revenues, a genius capable of conducting both, and a moderation that will restrain him from attempts superior to these. He knows perfectly well the grandeur of the sovereign must be established on the welfare of the subject; and this has excited him to shew the same regard for the happiness of his people, as for the extension of his own power, or rather has induced him to make the latter always subservient to the former. He is known to have an inclination to become a maritime power, or which is the same thing in other words, to enable his subjects to in-

crease their wealth by their industry, through the channels of foreign trade. Yet though there are many, and amongst them, perhaps some statesmen who treat this as a chimera, yet we hold the direct contrary, and are inclined to think that this monarch and his successors will actually carry that point; and we think so, because there is no great improbability in supposing that they may be some time or other masters of a sea coast, four or five hundred miles in extent. It would require more time, and more room than we have at present to bestow, to endeavour the explanation of this, so as to bring it within the reach of every capacity: but whoever will consult the maps, consider the present state of things, and the vast improvements in the power of an absolute monarch to make, who knows what he is doing, and what is to be done to carry a favourite point, which is at the same time his people's point as well as his own; I say, whoever will reflect on these things, will not consider what we have advanced as a visionary delusion.

His views might certainly have been altered, his measures changed, and his designs otherways directed than they are. But then this did not depend entirely upon him, there must have been a concurrence in other powers to have brought this about; for to manage a wise prince, and one true to his own interests, he must be shewn that those who desire to have him for a friend and ally, have no intention to restrain, no inclination to defeat the measures he takes for that purpose, while they are not destructive or dangerous to them. To manifest a disposition contrary to this, is sufficient to give another bias to his councils; and when we see a prince of the king of Prussia's turn, continue armed at an immense expence, we must conclude that he has some great enterprize in view, which, whenever time shall disclose, it will also discover that he took proper measures for carrying that point,

point, whatever it is that those armaments were meant to compass.

The situation of his Prussian majesty's territories, is such as obliges him to have a constant eye to the affairs of the North, where no power was ever predominant, but his predecessors suffered for it, and their dominions and estates. With respect to the dukes of Courland they have been, generally speaking, closely allied to the house of Brandenburg by marriage, which shews the antient connection of their interests. The province of Samogitia in Poland, with the dutchy of Courland, divide the ducal Prussia from the territories of the Czarina; and therefore in the present state of things, it is but natural that the king of Prussia should desire to see the hands of the Polanders strengthened, and the inhabitants of Courland set entirely free, because he might then flatter himself, that in case at any time hereafter the troubles of Germany should revive, his territories would be safe from any sudden invasion by the Russians.

It is also very likely that he would be glad to annex what the Swedes still retain in Pomerania, to the rest of that country which is already in his possession, not from any jealousy of the Swedes, or from a desire of aggrandizing himself at the expence of his neighbours and allies, but on the score of convenience, and the better connection of his estates. We may from thence infer that he will never seek to procure this in any other than in an amicable way, and with the consent of the Swedes, in consideration of some kind of equivalent or other, which may be also more acceptable to them. It may be, this acquisition is still at a great distance, and it may be also that the measures which this great monarch has concerted in reference to the affairs of the North, will bring this about sooner than is generally imagined. But be that as it will, there is no question that whenever it is effected,

the power of Prussia will be very much augmented thereby, and the liberties of the empire will then stand in need of no guardian without the limits of Germany. While these designs attract the thoughts, and employ the hands of this active prince, he will certainly maintain a good correspondence with all those powers that are neighbours to him, in respect to the rest of his dominions, which will leave the inhabitants of the United Provinces at full liberty to redress their own grievances, in their own manner, and to recover the antient strength and vigour of their government, in consequence of restoring that form under which it was first constituted, and for a long series of years happily flourished.

But whenever those struggles for power, which at present embarrass and distract the potentates of the North shall be, by negotiation or otherwise composed, we have very little room to doubt that his majesty of Prussia will again turn his views towards the countries of Cleves and Gueldres, and the principality of East Friesland, where he has the very important and commodious port of Embden, to facilitate the schemes he may form in favour of the commerce of his subjects, to which there is no doubt but he will apply himself with equal industry and spirit, whenever the tranquility of Europe shall be so thoroughly settled as that he has no reason to suspect his neighbours may force him suddenly into a war, while his councils are wholly taken up in cultivating the arts of peace. His erecting an Asiatic company, demonstrates what we have advanced to be truth.

He will by that time have served himself to the utmost of whatever assistance France may have found it her interest to give him; for more than that she will never give, and his sense of this will engage him not to persist any longer in the prosecution of measures acceptable to the court of Versailles, than they are conducive to the extension,

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or establishment of his power and influence. He will then see that independency, and the being at the head of the protestant interest in Germany, is sufficient to gratify his utmost ambition, and to raise him to the highest point of authority, by making him courted and respected by all his neighbours, and, as occasions offer, the umpire of all their differences.

These are indeed but suppositions, but then they are built upon solid and rational foundations; whereas those who fancy that he will be some time or other swallowed up by a great confederacy of powerful neighbours, or despoiled of a great part of his territories, are not able to offer either facts or arguments to countenance their opinions, since hitherto we have never seen him attempt beyond his strength*. Notwithstanding the events of the last war, this was politically just, for that confederacy was contrary to every idea in the system of Europe, and at last ended in fixing the Prussian power on yet stronger foundations. The king is certainly in a surer and firmer situation, than on the day the war began.

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REPRESENTATION (Of the colonies.) The scheme of American representatives, which was enlarged upon in a pamphlet published by the direction of the late Mr. Grenville, is thus refuted in an answer to it.

But let us suppose the happy time arrived, when the author comes into the ministry, and is to realize his speculations. The writs are issued for electing members for America, and the West-Indies. Some provinces receive them in six weeks, some in ten, some in twenty. A vessel may be lost, and then some provinces may not receive them at all. But let it be that they all receive them at once, and in

* Present State of Europe, p. 144.

the shortest time. A proper space must be given for proclamation, and for the election, some weeks at least. But the members are chosen, and if the ships are ready to sail, in about six more they arrive in London. In the mean time the parliament has sat, and business far advanced without American representatives. Nay, by this time it may happen that the parliament is dissolved, and then the members ship themselves again, to be again elected. The writs may arrive in America before the poor members of a parliament in which they never sat, can arrive at their several provinces. A new interest is formed, and they find other members are chosen whilst they are on the high seas. But if the writs and members arrive together, here is at best a new trial of skill amongst the candidates, after one set of them have well aired themselves with their two voyages of 6000 miles.

However, in order to facilitate every thing to the author, we will suppose them all once more elected, and steering again to old England with a good heart, and a fair westerly wind in their stern. On their arrival they find all in a hurry and bustle; in and out; condolence and congratulation; the crown is demised. Another parliament is to be called. Away back to America again on a fourth voyage, and to a third election. Does the author mean to make our kings as immortal in their personal as in their political character? Or whilst he bountifully adds to their life, will he take from them their prerogative of dissolving parliaments, in favour of the American union? Or are the American representatives to be perpetual, and to feel neither demises of the crown, nor dissolutions of parliament?

But these things may be granted to him, without bringing him much nearer to his point. What does he think of re-election? Is the American member the only one who is not to take a place, or
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the only one to be exempted from the ceremony of re-election? How will this great politician preserve the rights of electors, the fairness of returns, and the privilege of the house of commons, as the sole judge of such contests? It would certainly be a glorious sight to have eight or ten petitions, or double returns from Boston and Barbadoes, from Philadelphia and Jamaica, the members returned, and the petitioners with all their train of attorneys, solicitors, mayors, select men, provost marshals, and about five hundred or a thousand witnesses come to the bar of the house of commons. Possibly we might be interrupted in the enjoyment of this pleasing spectacle if a war should break out, and our constitutional fleet loaded with members of parliament, returning officers, petitioners, and witnesses, the electors and elected should become a prize to the French or Spaniards, and be conveyed to Carthagená, or to La Vera Cruz, and from thence, perhaps, to Mexico or Lima, there to remain until a cartel for members of parliament can be settled, or until the war is ended.

In truth, the author has little studied this business, or he might have known that some of the most considerable provinces of America, such for instance as Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay, have not in each of them two men who can afford, at a distance from their own estates, to spend a thousand pounds a year. How can these provinces be represented at Westminster? If their province pays them, they are American agents with salaries, and not independent members of parliament. It is true, that formerly in England members had salaries from their constituents; but they all had salaries, and were all in this way on a par. If these American representatives have no salaries, then they must add to the list of our pensioners, and dependants at court, or they must starve: there is no alternative.

Enough of this visionary union, in which extravagance appears without any fancy, and the judgment is shocked without any thing to refresh the imagination. It looks as if the author had dropped down from the moon, without any knowledge of the general nature of this globe, of the general nature of its inhabitants, without the least acquaintance with the affairs of this country. Governor Pownall has handled the same subject. To do him justice, he treats it upon far more rational principles of speculation, and much more like a man of business. He thinks (erroneously, I conceive, but he does think) that our legislative rights are incomplete without such a representation. It is no wonder, therefore, that he endeavours by every means to obtain it. Not like our author, who is always on velvet. He is aware of some difficulties, and he proposes some solutions. But nature is too hard for both these authors; and America is, and ever will be, without actual representation in the house of commons: nor will any minister be wild enough even to propose such a representation in parliament, however he may chuse to throw out that project, together with others equally far from his real opinions, and remote from his designs, merely to fall in with the different views, and captivate the affections of different sorts of men*.

R E P U B L I C. It is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist. In an extensive republic there are men of large fortunes, and consequently of less moderation; there are trusts too considerable to be placed in any single subject; he has interests of his own, he soon begins to think that he may be happy and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens; and that he may raise himself to grandeur on the ruins of his country.

* Observations on a late State of the Nation, p. 102.

In an extensive republic, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a small one, the interests of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have less extent, and of course are less protected.

The long duration of the republic of Sparta, was owing to her having continued in the same extent of territory after all her wars. The sole aim of Sparta was liberty; and the sole advantage of her liberty, glory.

It was the spirit of the Greek republics to be as contented with their territories, as with their laws. Athens was first fired with ambition, and gave it to Lacedæmon; but it was an ambition rather of commanding a free people, than of governing slaves; rather of directing than breaking the union. All was lost upon starting up of monarchy, a government whose spirit is more turned to increase of dominion.

Excepting particular circumstances, it is difficult for any other than a republican government to subsist long in a single town. A prince of so petty a state, would naturally endeavour to oppress his subjects, because his power would be great while the means of enjoying it, or of causing it to be respected, would be inconsiderable. The consequence is, he would trample upon his people. On the other hand, such a prince might be easily crushed by a foreign, or even a domestic force; the people might every instant unite and rise up against him. Now as soon as the sovereign of a single town is expelled, the quarrel is over; but if he has many towns, it only begins.

DEMOCRACY.

There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government.

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The force of laws in one, and the prince's arm in the other, are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular state one spring more is necessary, namely virtue.

What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of historians, and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things. For it is clear, that in a monarchy where he who commands the execution of the laws, generally thinks himself above them; there is less need of virtue than in a popular government, where the person entrusted with the execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direction.

Clear it is also that a monarch, who through bad advice, or indolence, ceases to enforce the execution of the laws, may easily repair the evil: he has only to follow other advice, or to shake off this indolence. But when in a popular government there is a suspension of the laws, as this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic, the state is certainly undone.

A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy. As they who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of virtue; as their ambition was inflamed by the success of the most daring of their members, (Cromwell) as the prevailing parties were successively animated by the spirit of faction, the government was continually changing: the people, amazed at so many revolutions, in vain attempted to erect a commonwealth. At length when the country had undergone the most violent shocks, they were obliged to have recourse to the very government they had so wantonly proscribed.

The politic Greeks, who lived under a popular government, knew no other support than virtue. The modern inhabitants of that country are intirely taken

taken up with manufactures, commerce, finances, opulence, and luxury.

When virtue is banished, ambition invades the minds of those who are disposed to receive it, and avarice possesses the whole community. The objects of their desires are changed; what they were fond of before is become indifferent; they were free while under the restraint of laws, but they would fain now be free to act against law; and as each citizen is like a slave who has run away from his master, what was a maxim of equity he calls rigour; what was a rule of action he stiles constraint; and to precaution he gives the name of fear. Frugality, and not the thirst of gain, now passes for avarice. Formerly the wealth of individuals constituted the public treasure; but now this is become the patrimony of private persons. The members of the common-wealth riot in the public spoils, and its strength is only the power of a few, and the licentiousness of many.

Athens was possessed of the same number of forces when she triumphed so gloriously, and when with so much infamy she was enslaved. She had twenty thousand citizens when she defended the Greeks against the Persians, when she contended for empire with Sparta, and invaded Sicily. She had twenty thousand when Demetrius Phalereus numbered them, as slaves are told by the head in the market place. When Philip attempted to lord it over Greece, and appeared at the gates of Athens, she had even then lost nothing but time. We may see in Demosthenes how difficult it was to awake her: she dreaded Philip, not as the enemy of her liberty, but of her pleasures. ("They had passed a law which rendered it a capital crime for any one to propose applying the money designed for the theatres, to military service.") This famous city, which had withstood so many defeats, and after having been
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been so often destroyed, had as often risen out of her ashes, was overthrown at Chæronea, and at one blow deprived of all hopes of resource. What does it avail her that Philip sends back her prisoners, if he does not return her men? It was ever after as easy to triumph over the Athenian forces, as it had been difficult to subdue her virtue.

How was it possible for Carthage to maintain her ground? When Hannibal, upon his being made prætor, endeavoured to hinder the magistrates from plundering the public, did they not complain of him to the Romans? Wretches who would fain be citizens without a city, and beholden for their riches to their very destroyers! Rome soon insisted upon having three hundred of their principal citizens as hostages; she obliged them next to surrender their arms and ships; and then she declared war. From the desperate efforts of this defenceless city, one may judge of what she might have performed in her full vigour, and assisted by virtue.

ARISTOCRACY.

As virtue is necessary in a popular government, it is requisite also under an aristocracy. True it is, that in the latter it is not so absolutely requisite.

The people, who in respect to the nobility, are the same as the subjects with regard to a monarch, are restrained by their laws. They have therefore less occasion for virtue, than the people in a democracy. But how are the nobility to be restrained? They who are to execute the laws against their colleagues, and will immediately perceive they are acting against themselves. Virtue is therefore necessary in this body, from the very nature of the constitution.

An aristocratical government has an inherent vigour, unknown to democracy. The nobles form a body, who by their prerogative, and for their own particular

particular interest, restrain the people; it is sufficient that there are laws in being to see them executed.

But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people, it is difficult to restrain themselves. Such is the nature of this constitution, that it seems to subject the very same persons to the power of the laws, and at the same time to exempt them.

Now such a body as this can restrain itself only two ways; either by a very eminent virtue, which puts the nobility in some measure on a level with the people, and may be the means of forming a great republic; or by an inferior virtue which puts them at least upon a level with one another, and on this their preservation depends.

Moderation is therefore the very soul of this government; a moderation I mean founded on virtue, not that which proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity.

R E V E N U E (Public.) Public revenue raised in England, by the long parliament, November 1640, to November 1649.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
The subsidies	600,000	0	0
The armies	32,780,721	13	0
Tonnage and poundage	5,700,000	0	0
Captives	102,000	0	0
Sale of Irish lands,	1,322,500	0	0
Contributions for Irish } protestants	180,000	0	0
Forces for defence of } particular counties	4,141,088	8	0
Excises	10,200,000	0	0
Duty on coals	850,000	0	0
Ditto on currants	51,000	0	0
Sequestrations of estates	6,044,924	17	0
Postage of letters	301,000	0	0
Wine licences	312,200	0	0
		Composition	

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Composition for court of wards }	1,000,000	0	0
Offices to public service	850,000	0	0
Vintner's delinquency	4000	0	0
Compositions for estates	1,277,226	0	0
Sale of English lands	25,380,687	3	11½
Settled out of gentlemen's estates to pay P. Palatine }	85,000	0	0
Compound with Irish delinquents }	1,000,000	0	0
Charge of justice six years	1,200,000	0	0
To the house of commons, fourteen years comes to }	754,472	0	0
Free gifts to the saints, viz. in money }	679,800	0	0
In offices	306,110	0	0
In estates per annum	189,365	0	0
Total	l. 95,312,095	1	11½

Raised since the REVOLUTION.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
1688 William	2,743,142	6	2
1689 - -	3,768,191	10	0
1690 - -	2,651,702	18	0
1691 - -	1,816,702	18	0
1692 - -	2,000,000	0	0
1693 - -	5,588,506	5	10
1694 - -	5,413,709	11	1
1695 - -	8,161,469	0	0
1696 - -	5,600,000	0	0
1697 - -	5,184,015	1	11¾
1698 - -	1,484,015	0	0
1699 - -	1,000,000	0	0
1700 - -	2,620,000	0	0
			1701

R E V E N U E.

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			<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
1701	-	-	6,913,628	15	5½
1702	Anne	-	3,887,630	0	0
1703	-	-	4,200,000	0	0
1704	-	-	4,914,888	3	3½
1705	-	-	5,282,233	17	2
1706	-	-	6,142,381	15	6½
1707	-	-	6,189,067	15	6½
1708	-	-	6,868,839	0	0
1709	-	-	6,896,552	9	11½
1710	-	-	16,246,325	0	0
1711	-	-	6,304,615	16	9½
1712	-	-	3,400,000	0	0
1713	-	-	3,100,000	0	0
1714	George I.	-	7,317,751	15	6½
1715		-			
1716	-	-	3,211,313	1	0
1717	-	-	2,229,514	3	2½
1718	-	-	2,775,509	3	2½
1719	-	-	2,742,000	17	10¾
1720	-	-	2,920,264	13	8
1721	-	-	2,719,412	10	9
1722	-	-	1,837,799	8	2½
1723	-	-	1,730,744	19	5¾
1724	-	-	1,782,212	0	1¾
1725	-	-	3,282,328	6	7¾
1726	-	-	3,173,287	12	0¼
1727	George II.	-	5,544,594	2	2½
1728		-			
1729	-	-	3,540,478	10	4¾
1730	-	-	3,530,766	12	11
1731	-	-	3,826,825	7	0¾
1732	-	-	2,883,180	2	5½
1733	-	-	2,887,943	6	1½
1734	-	-	3,989,689	11	10½
1735	-	-	3,269,000	0	0
1736	-	-	3,380,565	6	10
1737	-	-	3,269,000	0	0
1738	-	-	3,769,000	0	0
1739	-	-	2,908,506	9	9

1739

		<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
1739	- - -	4,097,831	11	10 $\frac{1}{2}$
1740	- - -	5,039,102	18	3 $\frac{3}{4}$
1741	- - -	6,188,065	11	5
1742	- - -	6,119,157	13	10 $\frac{3}{4}$
1743	- - -	6,624,065	11	5
1744	- - -	6,609,310	5	1 $\frac{3}{4}$
1745	- - -	7,303,065	11	5
1746	- - -	9,400,574	10	7
1747	- - -	10,088,065	11	5
1748	- - -	8,018,007	4	4
1749	- - -	4,313,730	0	5 $\frac{1}{2}$
1750	- - -	5,175,023	11	7
1751	- - -	4,178,459	18	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
1752	- - -	2,422,911	8	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
1753	- - -	3,077,897	15	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
1754	- - -	4,256,909	5	0 $\frac{3}{4}$
1755	- - -	7,427,261	5	7
1756	- - -	8,689,051	19	7
1757	- - -	11,079,722	6	10
1758	- - -	12,991,240	0	10
1759	- - -	16,130,561	9	8
1760	George III.	19,953,922	9	11
1761	- - -	18,655,750	2	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
1762	- - -	14,199,375	16	0
		* <i>l.</i> 408,898,369	6	4 $\frac{1}{2}$

1763
1764
1765
1766
1767
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772

* Collection of the Supplies, p. 185.

RIVERS.

RIVERS (navigable.) By an account kept of cutting the new canal at Chester, in the year 1735, it appears, that a canal dug 100 feet wide at top, 6 feet deep, and 60 wide at bottom, cost 28*s.* every 10 feet, which amounts to 709*l.* 4*s.* per mile; that the expence of that canal, 20 miles, did not exceed 17000*l.* but for a canal from the Trent to the Severn, half these dimensions will answer all purposes.

A barge 120 feet long, 15 feet broad, and drawing 2 feet water, is equal in weight to 3600 cubic feet; each foot cubic weighing 70 pounds, amounts to 252,000 pounds weight; this barge, if drawn with 6 horses, will carry 126 tons, with 2 feet water, or very little more.

RUSSIA. The power that most attracts the attention of Europe at present is that of Russia; and it must be confessed that empire has risen in a manner very surprizing, and hitherto has shewn none but marks of rising: the day of her meridian most assuredly is not yet come.

There is a Russian influence spreading through the northern kingdoms, which looks much like an increase of power, and the affairs of Poland are just such as an ambitious sovereign of Russia would wish for: a concatenation of events which, joined with their late great successes against the Turks, may have consequences much beyond the ideas commonly embraced at present. It is not a power well knit together in its limbs for the threatening universal empire; but its growth, without any such magnitude, may be the cause of much trouble to the rest of Europe.

Well situated, and very populous provinces, filled with industry, cultivation, and riches, have ever been the source of the power of the great empires, and of those kingdoms that have justly alarmed the world with ideas of such. But when a nation by

conquests adds dominions, whose consequence is greater than the original, there can never be a good union of the parts; but, on the contrary, a dissimilitude and division in manners, language, temper, &c. that must shake the whole to the foundations on the least failure of success. If the progress of great power be traced from the beginning of the world to the present day, I do not think there can be any reason to dread the utmost that ever can be accomplished by the Russians.

I have seen a manuscript relation of a plan for improving the vast dominions of the Russians, which, it is affirmed, I know not how truly, has been debated in the councils of her imperial majesty; and some edicts, since issued, shew an approbation of it, and give some reasons to suppose, when a peace happens, that it will be more considered.

The principal proposition is, to draw all the inhabitants from the northern and eastern parts of the empire, and plant them in the southern provinces, which extend from Poland to the Euxine and Caspian Seas, to people fully the tract to the south-west of Petersburg and Moscow, particularly the Ukraine, Little and Grim Tartary, and all the provinces on the two seas; to unite them with such conquests as may be made from the Turks, leaving all Siberia, the Tartarian and northern tracts, to many absolute deserts.

It is asserted that the empress has twenty millions of subjects, but is unable to draw from them a force proportioned, by reason of their being scattered over such immense countries.

The idea is as bold a one as could be conceived; for the southern tracts of the empire are well known to consist of as fertile tracts of land as any in Europe; all the productions of agriculture that are exported from Russia, particularly hemp and flax, being the produce of the Ukraine; the southern tracts

tracts of the Don and the Wolga are a moist rich soil; those on the Euxine and Caspian seas some of them dryer and more hilly, but wonderfully adapted to cultivation: and the provinces now conquered from the Turks, and which it is not doubted but the empress will retain, having caused the oaths of allegiance to be administered to all the inhabitants as fast as she conquered them. All these provinces are some of the richest and most fruitful in Europe, and if they were peopled on this, or any plan, would form an empire much more powerful than the Russian is at present.

But the situation of this tract of country is, if any thing, more important than the richness of the soil. It preserves the communication with the Baltic, including the province of Livonia, &c. and the city of St. Petersburg, with all the tract between them and the Euxine, which borders on Poland, Lithuania, and Turkey. Thus the great strength of the empire would be concentrated in that part where attacks could alone be apprehended, where it might be used with the greatest probability of making acquisitions of importance, with the vast advantage of being ready for such wars, without desarts of a thousand miles to penetrate, which has always hitherto been the case.

But relative to future operations against the Turks, the importance of these southern tracts, being filled with people and cultivated, is immense; the greatest acquisitions which the Russians can look to, even in their boldest successes, are the European provinces of the Turkish empire. This acquisition indeed might move the jealousy of the German potentates to so great a degree, as to render it next to impossible to be made; but nevertheless the views towards it may remain the same, and the consequences of it debated.

Such an acquisition, while the southern provinces of the Russian empire remain desarts, would be

comparatively of small consequence ; for while the immense tracts between Moscow and the Niester are wastes, the more southern conquests would be as it were cut off from the main body of the empire, and at such a distance, that all idea of contiguity and compactness would be destroyed ; whereas if the vast desarts of Siberia and the northern tracts of the empire were neglected, and these more valuable provinces peopled, the whole weight and force of the empire would bear immediately upon Turkey, and readily unite the conquests with the original.

The great object would be to extend the empire to the Mediterranean sea, so as to possess in one continued tract of cultivated country all the provinces that bordered on that sea, and extended to the Euxine, Caspian, and Baltic, which would certainly comprehend a tract situated in the most advantageous manner for wealth and power that can possibly be imagined.

These, it must be confessed, are vast plans of greatness ; but they do not seem to be impossible, or even improbable. There is in the Turkish provinces of Europe a principle of insecurity that has never been changed ; it is, the bulk of the inhabitants being Greeks, the remains of the antient Greek empire of the East, which was overthrown by the Turks under Mahomet II. a governing people, that do not mix and become one with the peopled governed, must ever be insecure. Montesquieu has illustrated this maxim by many instances much to the purpose.

The Greeks, throughout the Turkish European provinces, are very numerous ; miserably oppressed by the Turks ; different from them in manners, language, and religion ; of the Greek church, whereof the sovereigns of Russia are the head, and to whom, since Peter the Great's time, they have constantly turned their eyes for support : a specimen

men of this has been seen in the quick and active submission of the provinces of Walachia and Moldavia to the Russians, and their flocking in crowds with the greatest haste to swear allegiance to the empress as their sovereign. The Greeks of the Morea were likewise the same, and shewed the same eagerness to take arms the moment they were countenanced by a foreign power.

This is a circumstance incredibly favourable to the Russians; they have the advantages of fighting in a country where every peasant is a friend, and whatever acquisitions they make, will be of a people who wish to be their subjects: such acquisitions are in their nature secure, and not liable to those revolutions which are pretty sure to happen when all the power that is used is founded in force alone. Acquisitions under such circumstances are infinitely desirable to Russia, as their situation brings them nearer to the Mediterranean, and gives them the full command of the Black Sea.

The probable event of the present war is clearly the destruction of the Turkish power in Europe, as far, at least, as the circumstances hitherto mentioned prognosticate; but if the German powers unite, in order to prevent such a vast accession to the Russians, then the turn of affairs cannot be conjectured, but they would probably terminate very differently. European Turkey would be a vast addition to the Muscovite power; but I do not think it would pave the way by any means to universal empire. The Grand Signior, driven into Asia, and probably at peace, or more likely a truce, with Russia, would be at leisure to destroy the rebels of Egypt, and unite all the power of his Asiatic territories. When he was somewhat recovered, the war would again break out with Russia; for we may be certain that the Turks would never leave Europe without infinite contention to return, and endless wars;

wars; nor could the Russians well think of pushing their conquests far upon the Turks in Asia, from the distance and vast extent of those provinces, which would involve them in greater mischiefs than the power of their enemies. Thus the acquisition of European Turkey would bring with it the attendance of a perpetual war, in which great success would rouse all Persia and Arabia to arms, and certainly excite such a jealousy in the European potentates as to lay the foundation of a storm too general for the power of the Russians to adventure.

The acquisition, therefore, with a view to universal monarchy, would undoubtedly fail of its end; but if undertaken and pursued upon more moderate principles, with a view to enlarge the wealth and trade of the empire, rather than making it a mere step to further conquests, it would then prove of infinite importance, and be the means of diffusing commerce, manufactures, riches, and population, over all those southern provinces; the consequence of which I have already explained. All the products of these fertile tracts would be conveyed by water directly to Constantinople with the utmost facility; all the hemp and flax, which now take such a vast circuit to get to St. Petersburg, would have a ready water-carriage to the Mediterranean: add to this, that European Turkey produces numerous very valuable commodities, which, with such industry as the Russians have exhibited since the time of the great Peter, would alone open a trade in their ports which they have been far enough from possessing since the dominion of the Turks. The connection of the three seas, the Mediterranean, the Euxine, and the Caspian, with the possession of the rich provinces adjacent, would open a trade in those regions which would probably draw all the riches of Persia to it.

These circumstances could not fail enlarging, in a very great degree, the commerce of the Russian empire,

empire, and they would probably increase their naval power in proportion. Here comes the question, Where lies the interest of England in such revolutions?

In whatever light we view these supposed conquests, I do not see any reason to dread the power of Russia by sea, from thence, equalling that of England. They might gain immense wealth by their sale of products, and add much to their shipping, without such a degree of naval power being the consequence. The marine strength of Holland and England did not arise from the sale of products, but the one from being for an age the carriers of the whole world, and the other from carrying on great commerce in every quarter of the globe, and having the sole supply of the most advantageous colonies the world ever knew. The greatest empires upon earth, whose riches and products are immense, do not therefore possess naval power, which depends on an union of circumstances very different from, and almost incompatible with, great power by land. To whatever pitch of greatness the Russians may arise, it will undoubtedly be by land, not by sea; and, considering our alliance, I may say natural alliance, with that empire, we have great reason to expect advantages, rather than evils, from their succeeding the Turks in Europe, who have so long, in the way of commerce, been such fast friends to the French, and occasionally so in arms.

What may happen in a distant period is very difficult to conjecture, and very little to the purpose. The naval power of England will fall into the lowest decay of itself, without the superior power of any nation being able to hasten it; when a train of miserable politics has driven the Americans, before their time, to independency, the trade of this country will sink, and with it that naval power which was created by it. When such a period arrives, it will matter very little to this nation

whether the Russians have an hundred or a thousand sail of the line ; but as to their being formidable to us while we preserve the power we possess at present, it is a vain idea *.

The house of Holstein will very soon occupy all the thrones in the North, and consequently appear one of the most considerable families that has been known in Europe. The house of Oldenbourg, of which are the present royal family of Denmark, is the same with that of Holstein. The king of Sweden, who certainly owes his dignity to the interposition of the Czarina, is the near relation, and as such, was the administrator of the dominions of the duke of Holstein, now grand duke and heir of Russia. Prince Augustus of Holstein may possibly obtain the duchy of Courland ; and if that should ever happen, this house will be truly formidable ; and if all its branches unite, their interests must necessarily have a great influence on the general affairs of Europe : such an influence as our modern politicians seem not to have sufficiently considered, but which, I conceive, will daily display itself more and more. [“ Printed in 1752, since which several events have happened seemingly contradictory to this author’s ideas ; but they are rather transitory, the material part of the observation remains just †.”]

S.

SARDINIA, (King of.)—The territories of this monarch are very far from being extensive ; but it must be allowed that they are very populous, and the people of Savoy and of the valleys are naturally martial, so that, under the two last reigns, a very considerable army of regular troops has been constantly kept up, and the king can never be at a

* Letters concerning the present State of England, p. 183.

† Present State of Europe, p. 36.

tofs to bring forty or fifty thousand men into the field when occasion requires it. This force is indeed nothing in comparison of that of France and Spain, but it will appear very considerable when compared with the strength of other Italian princes. Besides this, the fortresses of Piedmont are in so good order, that his Sardinian majesty can always make a stand till he is supported by the Austrians, which he must be so long as they desire to preserve their dominions in Italy.

Upon these principles, therefore, we may safely lay it down, that though his revenue is not so large as that of the Great Duke, yet he is one of the greatest powers in Italy, and is justly esteemed so by his neighbours, his allies, and his enemies.

With respect to the house of Bourbon, though it will be always decent and proper for his Sardinian majesty to preserve for it a just measure of respect and complaisance, yet as his safety must perpetually depend upon the greatness of his own strength and the limitation of their power, so it can never become either requisite or agreeable to him to enter into any close alliance with that family, the aggrandizing of which must be always, if not at his expence, at the risque of his security. There are also good reasons to believe that France will not easily be drawn to quarrel with a prince, who keeps, as it were, the gates of her dominions, and who may be justly stiled a terror to her, while she is so to all the rest of her neighbours; for, without doubt, if the king of Sardinia were thoroughly provoked, and the house of Austria at full liberty to support him, he might carry his arms either into Dauphiny or Provence, or perhaps into both at the same time, more efficaciously than in the last or the preceding war; in both which, however, irruptions on this side have brought the French monarchy into circumstances of very great distress.

As to the maritime powers, they are, though at a distance, the natural and constant allies of the monarch of whom we are speaking, because their interests and his are the same; and if a good port could be made in the county of Nice, capable of admitting men of war, he would quickly be able, not only to maintain his own freedom, but also to protect the liberty and independency of Italy against all invaders, and though he would not be, even then, in a capacity of giving law to others.

Since the alliance between France and Austria, this prince has been in a more dangerous situation than ever his family experienced before, and yet no ill effects have resulted from it, sufficiently great for him to feel; but this may be attributed to that alliance finding their hands full with a quarrel with England and Prussia, that would afford them no opportunity of involving Italy in flames. Other occasions may arise, and probably will, in which this alliance may turn out extremely inconvenient to him. France, Spain, and Austria, in close conjunction, will doubtless think rather of dictating to Sardinia than of treating with her; and her power will be insufficient for resistance, without assistance. In case the affairs of Italy come to such a crisis, the other Italian potentates ought certainly to enter into the closest connection with his Sardinian majesty, at the same time that the maritime powers would be bound, by all the rules of prudence, to support and protect such a league of defence; nor could the Switzers, with any appearance of political sagacity, allow the Sardinian monarch, or the other smaller powers of Italy, to be oppressed by a league whose success could not fail of becoming formidable to themselves. And we may also observe, that his Prussian majesty would find his interest too nearly at stake to allow Austrian conquests in Piedmont. In case, therefore, the alliance between France,
Spain,

Spain, Austria, Naples, Parma, Tuscany, &c. should aim at oppressing the states of Italy, England, Holland, Switzerland, Venice, the Pope, &c. and all Germany, except the Austrian dominions, would have an interest in a firm and vigorous opposition.

SAXONY. This electorate was, in the last century, considered as the head of the protestant interest in Germany, and made a very different figure from what it has done since. This has been owing to two principal causes: first, the vast increase of power in the house of Brandenburg; and, secondly, to the elector of Saxony becoming a Roman catholic. A succession of very able princes carried the Prussian power to a height really astonishing; while a set of weak ones depressed the interests of the house of Saxony. Nor could it well be on any score, but that of religion, which induced the late electors to throw themselves so much into the arms of Austria, a power they had more reason to fear than Prussia. This mistaken conduct, which laid themselves open to a resentment they were unable to face, ruined their dominions, making every part of Saxony the theatre of a consuming war, which has given it so severe a wound that a century's repose will scarcely recover it, and at the same time left the elector the name only of his former power; for his dominions are miserably depopulated; their trade and manufactures fled; their agriculture in ruins; and the public revenues and force of the state reduced proportionably. Twice has the house of Saxony committed the great error of negotiating in prejudice of Prussia, and being at the same time defenceless against her arms.

SHIPS. Two ships of unequal swiftness do not perform their voyage in a time proportioned to their swiftness. Slowness is frequently the cause of much greater slowness. When it becomes necessary to follow

follow the coasts, and to be incessantly in a different position; when they must wait for a fair wind to get out of a gulph, and for another to proceed; a good sailer takes the advantage of every favourable moment, while the other still continues in a difficult situation, and waits many days for another change. Great disadvantages attend ships that are made use of in ports of little depth of water. Such are those of Venice, and even all Italy in general, (but Sicily has excellent ports) of the Baltic, and of the province of Holland. Their ships, which ought to be able to go in and out of port, are built round and broad at the bottom; while those of other nations, who have good harbours, are formed to sink deep into the water. This mechanism renders these last mentioned vessels able to sail much nearer to the wind, while the first can hardly sail, except the wind be nearly in the poop. A ship that sinks deep into the water sails towards the same side with almost every wind: this proceeds from the resistance which the vessel, whilst driven with the wind, meets with from the water, from which it receives a strong support; and from the length of the vessel, which presents its side to the wind, while, from the form of the helm, the prow is turned to the point proposed; so that she can sail very near to the wind, or, in other words, very near the point from whence the wind blows. But when the hull is round and broad at the bottom, and consequently draws little water, it no longer finds this steady support: the wind drives the vessel, which is incapable of resistance, and can run then but with a small variation from the point opposite to the wind*.

Dimensions of a first-rate ship of war, the Royal Sovereign, built at Woolwich, 1701.

Length of the taffarel to the head, 210 feet.

* L'Esprit des Loix, Tom. II. p. 34.

Guns, 110.

The men, full complement, 1250.

Breadth, 50 feet.

Tons, 2000*.

The full tread, 158 feet.

Draught of water, 22 feet.

The cloaths, 10,544 yards.

Mainfail in length, 54 yards.

Ditto in depth, $19\frac{1}{2}$ feet.

Mainmast in length, 39 feet.

Diameter of ditto, 38 inches.

Weight of anchor, 4 ton 2 cwt. 1 qr. 14 lib.

Cable in length, 200 yards.

Diameter of ditto †, 22 inches.

In the year 1732, there were 1417 ships belonging to the city of London, whose burthen were 178,557 tons, and manned with 21,797 men.

From Christmas 1727 to Christmas 1728, there arrived at London from all foreign parts, foreign ships 213, and British ships from ports beyond sea 1839, in all 2052; and from the several ports of Great Britain, the numbers that appear below.

	Ships.	
Aberdeen	-	24
Aberdovey	-	2
Adleburg	-	92
Alloa	-	13
Anstruther	-	3
Arundel	-	43
Beaumaris	-	3
Berwick	-	121
Biddeford	-	8
Blyth	-	207
Borrowstounness	-	15
Boston	-	17
Bridgewater	-	1

* Not 2300, as by error in Rolt's Dictionary of Commerce.

† Chamberlayne's Present State of England, 1707, p. 221.

	Ships
Bridlington	19
Bristol	36
Cardiff	12
Cardigan	1
Caermarthen	24
Chepstow	3
Chester	73
Chichester	73
Clay	50
Clovelly	1
Colchester	160
Cowes	39
Dartmouth	56
Deal	34
Dover	65
Dunbar	7
Dundee	12
Exeter	74
Falmouth	8
Feverham	359
Folkstone	10
Fowey	4
Gloucester	1
Gweek	6
Harwich	193
Hartlepoole	19
Hastings	36
Haverford West	17
Hull	59
Hythe	9
Inverness	23
Ipswich	48
Kingston upon Hull	4
Kirkaldy	12
Kircudbright	1
Leigh	140
Leith	24
Liverpool	24

Lyme

	Ships.
Lyme	4
Lymington	21
Lynn	37
Maldon	136
Milford	43
Milton	132
Montrose	12
Neath	1
Newcastle	1525
Newhaven	26
Newnham	1
Penryn	5
Penzance	7
Perth	5
Plymouth	35
Poole	144
Portsmouth	69
Preston	1
Prestonpans	8
Rochester	133
Rye	31
Sandwich	238
Scarborough	18
Shoreham	37
Southampton	105
Southwold	40
Stockton	75
Sunderland	2
Swansey	102
Tenby	5
Truro	12
Wells	33
Weymouth	75
Whitby	44
Wigton	1
Wisbeach	36
Woodbridge	168
Yarmouth	159
Foreign	

Foreign ships	-	-	-	2051
Coasters	-	-	-	6837
Total	-	-	-	8839

Since this period the numbers are supposed to be greatly increased.

SPAIN. The present state of this monarchy deserves a particular attention from those who are curious in remarking the rise, fall, and restoration of kingdoms. The debility into which the Spanish monarchy was fallen, about the beginning of the present century, was as clear and as visible to all Europe as her power and splendor had been under Charles V. and Philip II. The accession of the house of Bourbon has given some appearance of a renovation; for it is at present much to be doubted whether Spain is not pretty much on the increase of power. Certainly there can be no comparison between that kingdom now, and its state under the last kings of the Austrian line. We would not be supposed to assert that Spain is become again formidable, or that she is recovering again with any speed; her impotence in several branches of the late war, particularly that against Portugal, proves the contrary. But as the restoration of the power of a great kingdom is a point of uncommon importance in the science of politics, since we have no example upon record of it, too much attention cannot be given to such circumstances as mark it. If ever it is effected, it must probably be the work of more than one, or even two centuries: above three-score years have elapsed without our being able more than to form some slight conjectures, and we have no where met with any writer that has even hinted at the probability of the restoration of the Spanish power.

This kingdom has at present on foot a well-disciplined and well-paid army of an hundred thousand men,

men, with a strong fleet in excellent order: such a force may be ill conducted, but it certainly is much more considerable than any thing she possessed under the last of the Austrian kings. We are also told, on pretty good authority, that the finances of the kingdom are in tolerable order, particularly in the circumstance of the receipt exceeding the expenditure.

The present politics of the court of Madrid are remarkable in their declared opposition, not to say enmity, to Great Britain. Every circumstance that could shew this, from the joining with France in the last war to the very latest advices, prove it: nor is it to be doubted that the affair of Falkland's Island would have produced a war, had France been as eager for it as her ally. This conduct it is true is and must be ruinous to Spain, who still bleeds at the wounds of the late war; but it is the result of a court-prejudice, pernicious to the interests of the whole kingdom. It much behoves Great Britain, while Spain discovers such sentiments, to be strongly on her guard, especially by sea.

SPANISH AMERICA. Respecting the number of people in the Spanish settlements, a certain author has guessed, that there may be in the whole three millions of Spaniards, mulattoes, and negroes; besides which there are certainly a much larger number of Indians. When these countries were first reduced, the settling many ecclesiastics might be a very proper measure, since it is certain they were in those days very zealous, not only in converting, but in protecting the Indians, interposing on all occasions in their favour; but as times are altered since, they and their measures should have altered accordingly. Monasteries and nunneries, if they are not contrary to the spirit of christianity, are at least incompatible with that of settling colonies, and so they have been found. Priests, generally speaking, proceed upon narrow

and selfish views, and so do all religious orders, particularly the Jesuits, who therefore are the least qualified for missionaries, though deficient in no other respect, as fully appears from their conduct in Paraguay, where the fathers have established a much more regular government than subsists any where else in America, and are able to raise a greater number of regular troops in a week than could be assembled by the viceroy of Peru in a year.

The corruption and tyranny which reigns among all the officers, who derive their authority from the crown, sensibly affects the state, since it not only ruins the revenue, but discourages industry, and extirpates public-spirit. An unaccountable fondness for gold and silver is another prejudice to the Spanish settlements, has prevented the government from encouraging new discoveries, and spread such a sordid spirit through all its subjects, as is visibly productive of the worst effects; for though mines may be most beneficial to the sovereign and to the mother-country in the first instance, yet, taking all things together, they are least so; of which the present state of Spanish America is the strongest proof.

The great point which deserves notice is the profits which might accrue to the crown of Spain from these prodigious acquisitions, if she had known how to have managed them with skill and prudence, proportionable to that wisdom and spirit which her brave and active officers discovered in bringing such extensive and such valuable provinces under her dominion.

In order to give some opportunity of doing this, it may not be amiss to enquire, as far as it is in our power to do, what the two great empires of Mexico and Peru really produce; for when this is once known, we may very well judge who is in the fault, and whether, in respect to the Spanish nation, the boundless ambition of those conquerors, or the ill-management

management of those who have received the benefits that have arisen from these conquests, deserves the blame.

To begin then with Mexico. The ecclesiastical state of the country at present consists of an archbishop and eleven suffragan bishops, whose revenues, computed according to their own returns of their tenths, which we may be sure do not exceed the value of them, amount to one million and a half sterling *per annum*. It is farther computed, that their revenues make about a fourth of those belonging to the clergy, and that the estates of the ecclesiastics may be reckoned a fourth of the whole province or vice-royalty; according to which computation, the total revenues of Mexico may be taken at twenty-four millions of our money. But there is another way of calculating the wealth of Mexico, which I will present to the reader, because I am pretty confident he will find it no where else. There was brought into the king's exchequer at Mexico, in the year 1730, somewhat better than a million of marks of silver. This was the king's duty from the mines, which ought to be one fifth of the metal taken out of them. It is true, most people think the king is pretty roundly cheated; but because this does not appear to us, we will suppose he is honestly paid, and that this is a fifth part of what is dug out of the mines; the whole, therefore, must amount to five millions of marks (a mark is equivalent to eight of our ounces;) so that if we compute this silver at five shillings an ounce, then the inhabitants of Mexico receive annually from their mines ten millions in money.

With respect to the riches of Peru, we cannot give quite so distinct an account; but, however, we will give the reader the best account we can. And first, as to the mines of Potosi, we have a clear relation of them for fifty years, that is, from their discovery to 1595; within which space they had

produced forty-four millions of our money : but it is allowed that since that time they have sunk very much in their value ; and it is no less certain, that other very rich mines have been since discovered. The gold and precious stones brought from this country and Chili are of incredible value ; and if we may trust to the accounts that are given us of the city of St. Jago, in the last mentioned country, the wealth of the inhabitants is so great, or rather they have such a plenty of gold, that almost all their utensils for common kitchen-service are made of that metal. After all, if we had the clearest accounts of the produce of their several mines, they would not go a great way towards satisfying us as to the advantages that Spain reaps from these countries, inasmuch as the Spaniards settled in America are known to have vast hoards of plate, send annually prodigious sums in silver to the East Indies, and employ larger quantities in a contraband trade with the English, French, and Dutch. But we have a tolerable account after all these deductions are made of what is annually returned to Spain in time of peace, and therefore upon this we shall chiefly insist. The galleons bring home about three millions in gold, and the flota one. In silver, the ordinary cargo of the galleons is twenty millions, and of the flota ten. In precious stones, such as pearls, emeralds, turquoises, &c. they export about half a million : in other rich commodities, such as cochineal, indigo, logwood, &c. about three millions and a half : so that, taking all these together, they bring home thirty-eight millions, without reckoning what comes by register ships and in a clandestine way, which those who are best acquainted with it have estimated at twelve millions more. Upon the whole, therefore, keeping ourselves within the strictest bounds of moderation, we may venture to assert, that Spain draws now from seven to ten

ten millions sterling from these countries every year, and must formerly have drawn much more.

If she is able to keep very little of this, which is very positively said, and I believe may be very true, it does not at all lessen the value of these acquisitions. She might keep every penny of it if she would, by setting up and encouraging proper manufactures in her dominions. But if a few wise and good princes were to rule in Spain, the case would very soon be altered; they would first make use of their treasures to erect manufactures in their European dominions, and next lay open this rich trade to all their subjects in those dominions. Such a conduct would, in the space of a few years, change the face of their affairs entirely, and nothing could hinder their becoming again, what they once were, the most formidable maritime power in this part of the world.

The emperor, Charles V. happened not to be born in Spain, and, which was still more fatal to that country, was chosen emperor of Germany, which quite turned his thoughts from Spanish affairs; so that though he was as great a captain, as able a statesman, and as wise a monarch as ever sat upon that throne, yet, with all his virtues and all his abilities, he laid the foundation of their misfortunes, and at the very time when he thought he was laying the ground-work of an universal monarchy, and at a time too, when by attending closely to the affairs of Spain, he might have made it a greater, happier, and more potent nation than ever the Persians, Greeks, or Romans had been. His son Philip heightened all these misfortunes, though he pursued quite a different conduct; but then he pursued it to the same end, that is to say, by affecting universal monarchy, he ruined his own.

He was generally, and very justly, reputed a prince as well versed in politics as any in his age, or perhaps of any other; yet he was so much taken up

in endeavouring to reduce the Netherlands, enslave Italy, conquer England, over-run France, and in annexing Portugal to his dominions, that he never considered his subjects in Spanish America further than as they enabled him, by constant supplies of money, to carry on these his vast designs *.

It must be allowed, that of all the monarchs that were ever seized with a passion for universal empire, there never was one who seemed to have it more in his power to gratify ambition in its largest extent than Philip II. of Spain, who was not led thereto by the incitements of ministers more capable than himself, but formed his own schemes, and conducted them with such wisdom and policy, that if the end he aimed at had been attainable by human abilities, one could scarce conceive how he came to be frustrated in his designs. He had gained the court of Rome entirely to his interest, and was thereby able to bend the predominant religion in Europe to his purposes. He had the whole force of the Spanish monarchy, and of the house of Austria in Germany, at his command; the greatest maritime power in the world was at his disposal, a great part of Italy was in his possession; he had a strong party in England, and a stronger in France, and all the riches of the Indies flowed into his coffers: but what was still of greater consequence, he had the most able ministers, the most experienced generals, and the best disciplined troops in the world at his devotion; all which advantages were doubled by his skill in making use of them; for he had a soul above the reach of fortune, and a capacity more extensive than his dominions; so that had he undertaken what was in the power of man to achieve, he had easily and happily performed it; but as his project was without bounds, so the methods he used, though wisely contrived, and, generally speaking, well carried

* Harris's Voyages, Vol. ii. p. 165.

into execution, proved not only fruitless, but so dissipated the wealth and strength of his empire, that as he died himself of discontent, so he left the Spanish monarchy under an incurable consumption.

But amongst all the vast designs which this monarch formed, that which was best digested was attended with the worst effects. He knew that a monopoly of trade was the first step to universal empire, and therefore formed a plan for fixing the whole trade of the world to his dominions. It was with this view that he set on foot two schemes, which proved abortive indeed, but which will eternally prove the strength of that genius which devised them. The first was the seizing and securing the Sound or narrow passage into the Baltic, by which he hoped to become master of all the trade of the North; the other was building a city of his own name in the streights of Magellan, and establishing such a colony there as might put it out of the power of other nations to trouble the commerce of the South Seas, or find a passage that way to the East Indies: but, failing in these designs, he turned his thoughts another way, and finding that his revolted subjects in the Netherlands began to make a great figure in trade, especially after the ruin of the city of Antwerp, he resolved to cut them short in that as much as lay in his power, and being become master of Portugal, he absolutely forbid them all commerce, not only with the Indies, but in the commodities of the Indies, which they had hitherto purchased at Lisbon, and with great profit to themselves had distributed to the northern parts of Europe. It was by this prohibition, expressly calculated for the ruin of their trade, that the inhabitants of the Low Countries were compelled to those undertakings which have since made them lords of India. If the Spaniards had never forbid them, they had never thought of going thither; if they had remained the sole carriers of spices, or even

been allowed a reasonable proportion of that trade, they had never been the proprietors of it *.

From what has been said, it is evident, that however wise, however penetrating, the Spanish monarchs might be, they certainly overshot themselves in their schemes concerning the Western Indies. Instead of looking upon it as an estate, they seemed to think it only a farm, of which they were to make presently what they could. In doing this, it must be owned, they acted with skill and vigor; for they drew immense sums from thence, which they wasted in Europe to disturb others, and in the end to destroy their own state. Mr. Lewis Roberts, author of the Map of Commerce, an excellent book for the time in which it was written, tells us, That it appeared by the records in the custom-house of Seville, that in the space of seventy-four years, computing backwards from the time in which he wrote, the kings of Spain had drawn into that country from America two hundred millions of gold, which make about ninety-one millions sterling. He also observes, that this very prince, Philip II. of whom we have been speaking, spent more in his reign than all his predecessors in the whole of their respective reigns, though no less than sixty-two kings had reigned before him. Yet this cunning, this ambitious monarch, left his subjects in a manner quite exhausted, and by establishing a most pernicious system of politics, left the total ruining of his dominions, by way of legacy, to his successors; a point which, with wonderful obstinacy, they have steadily pursued ever since.

All who are in any degree acquainted with the history of Europe know, that for a long course of years Spain maintained at once wars in Flanders, Germany, Italy, and sometimes in Ireland, which created a prodigious expence of treasure and of

* Harris's Voyages, Vol. I. p. 925.

troops,

troops, neither of which, from the death of Charles V. they were in any condition to spare. As families were reduced by the expence of serving in the army, they were induced to seek new fortunes in the West Indies; and thus numbers went over thither, not to cultivate the country or to improve trade, but to strip and plunder those who went before them. Other great families again concurred with the measures of the crown, in hopes of vice-royalties and other valuable offices in its conquests; but if ever their schemes were beneficial to their families, which may admit of doubt, certain it is that they contributed more and more to the ruin of the Spanish nation. For though his Catholic majesty once possessed Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, Milan, with other territories in Italy, besides the Low Countries and some other provinces which are now lost, yet, for want of attending to commerce, and by having no sort of oeconomy, all this turned to his prejudice; and it plainly appeared, towards the close of the last century, that with all their boasted sagacity and firmness, the Spaniards had ruined themselves by acquiring too great power, and rendered themselves beggars by abusing their immense riches: with swelling titles and wide dominions, they were despicably weak, and scarce any but copper money was to be seen in a country which received above twenty millions annually from its plantations.

Before I quit this topic, I must take notice of another thing, which is certainly very extraordinary. This wrong turn in the Spanish policy had a wonderful effect: it made all the enemies of that nation rich, and all its friends poor. Every body knows that the United Provinces not only made themselves free and independent, but rich and powerful also, by their long war with Spain. Our maritime power was owing to the same cause. If Philip II. had not disturbed queen Elizabeth, our fleet

fleet might have been as inconsiderable at the close of her reign as it was at the beginning, when we were pestered with pirates even in the narrow seas. Our plantations abroad were chiefly owing to expeditions against the Spaniards. Our manufactures at home were the consequence of affording refuge to the king of Spain's protestant subjects. When queen Elizabeth's successor closed with Spain, he suffered by it, while France, the only country then at war with Spain, was a gainer. I say nothing of Cromwell's breach with Spain, and the advantages he drew from it, because the world seems well enough apprized of all I could say on that subject already.

But I cannot help observing, that both the Dutch and we were at vast expences after the Restoration to preserve the Spanish Flanders, while the Spaniards themselves were inactive, and left all to be done by their allies. As soon as the tables were turned by the accession of king Philip V. the French became great losers by siding with this nation, though they had always got by fighting against them, insomuch that all the true patriots in France complained, that while Lewis XIV. shewed himself an excellent parent in his family, he discharged but indifferently his trust as the father of his people: but to what end should I look abroad, when it is plain, from our own situation, that we were never friends with her but at our cost, and never foes to her but at her's. By so long a series of mismanagement, the Spaniards have brought their affairs into so wretched a situation, that they neither have nor can have any very great benefit from their vast dominions in America. They are said to be stewards for the rest of Europe: their galleons bring the silver into Spain, but neither wisdom nor power can keep it there. It runs out as fast as it comes in, nay, and faster, insomuch that the little canton of Bern is really richer, and has

has more credit than the king of Spain, notwithstanding his Indies.

At first sight this seems to be strange and incredible; but when we come to examine it, the mystery is by no means impenetrable. The silver and rich commodities which come from the Indies, come not for nothing, (the king's duties excepted) and very little of the goods and manufactures for which they come, belong to the subjects of the crown of Spain. This shews how the wealth of the Spanish Indies becomes the property of other nations; and how the preservation of their dominions becomes as much the concern of their neighbours, as it is their own. It likewise shews how terribly they are hurt by the ambitious schemes of their court in Europe; and how every fresh war in Italy serves to weaken Spain, and exhaust her colonies; so that in the end, some great revolution will happen there, but of what kind it is not easy to foresee; but certain it is that the Spanish power gradually declines, and many of their best settlements are already sunk to nothing.

As for instance, Florida is become a burthen to them, they having nothing there of consequence but fort St. Augustine; which they keep to cover the passage of their plate fleets: the island of St. Domingo is impoverished to the last degree, and the city of that name had been long enough ago left desolate, if it was not for the general tribunal of justice held there, which is its only support. Yet the French have a large and flourishing colony on the same island; and if ever they should, as it is more than probable they will, elbow out the Spaniards from thence, it will change the face of affairs in the West-Indies extremely. The island of Cuba is no longer what it was; and in short their affairs decline so fast under their present management, that unless some timely remedies are applied, the ruin of their colonies must follow very soon*.

* Harris, Vol. II. p. 165.

No country in Europe receives such vast treasures as Spain. In no country in Europe is seen so little money. The truth is, from the time that the Indies fell into the hands of Spain, the affairs of that monarchy have been constantly going backward. In America their settlements were carried on conformably to that genius, and to those maxims which prevailed in their government in Europe. No means of retaining their conquests but by extirpating the people; no schemes for the advancement of trade; no attempts at the reformation of abuses, which became venerable in proportion to the mischiefs they had suffered by them. In government, tyranny; in religion, begotry; in trade, monopoly.

When the Spaniards found, to their ambition, which was boundless, that they had joined a treasure which was inexhaustible, they imagined there was nothing too vast for them to compass. They embraced a thousand projects at once; many of them noble ones in theory, but to be executed with different instruments, in different parts of the world, and all at a vast expence of blood and treasure. The wars, which were the result of these schemes, and the Indies, which were to support them, were a continual drain, which carried off their people, and destroyed all industry in those who remained. The treasure which flowed in every year from the New World, found them in debt to every part of the Old; for to the rest of their revenues they had forgot to add that which is a great revenue of itself, and the great support of all the others, œconomy. On the contrary an ill order in their finances at home, and a devouring usury abroad, swallowed up all their treasure, whilst they multiplied the occasions for it. With the best scheming heads in Europe, they were every where outwitted; with the bravest and best disciplined troops, they were almost always defeated; with the greatest treasures they were in want; and their armies were ill provided, and ill paid. Their friends

friends exhausted them by trade; their enemies by plunder. They saw new states arise out of the fragments of their dominions; and new maritime powers start up from the wrecks of their navy. In short, they provoked, troubled, and enriched all Europe; and at last desisted through mere want of strength. They were inactive, but not quiet; and they were enervated as much by their laziness during this repose, as they had been weakened before by their ill judged activity.

All this happened in a country which abounded with men of capacity, as much as any state in Europe, and often with men of great capacity at its head. But their talents took a wrong turn; their politics were always more abroad than at home; more employed in weakening their neighbours, than in strengthening themselves. They were wise in the concerns of foreign courts; they were satisfied with being formal in their own domestic business. They relied too much upon their riches; and the whole state being moulded into a system of corruption from the top to the bottom, things grew at last so bad, that the evils themselves became a sort of remedies, and they felt so severely the consequences of their former conduct, that they have for some years past turned their thoughts into a very good channel, (written before the last Spanish war) and they may in time and with perseverance rise again, whilst others shall fall by adopting the abuses which brought them to ruin.

At present the politics of Spain, with regard to America, seem to be to preserve South America, and particularly the navigation of the South Seas, as much as possible to themselves; to destroy effectually the contraband trade, and to encourage the export of their own manufactures. Of us they have long shewn a remarkable jealousy; a much greater than of the French, whom they see quietly settling in the neighbourhood of New Mexico, and who

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are growing certainly in the West-Indies in a far greater degree than we are. I shall not pretend to account for this distinction*.

SOUTH-SEA, (Settlements in.) The editor of Harris's voyages observes, upon captain Woodes Rogers's voyage as follows:

I cannot forbear putting the reader in mind of the great utility of voyages to the South-Seas, and observing, as these can never be undertaken but when we are at war with the Spaniards, so that opportunity ought never to be let slip; since otherwise we are in danger of losing all knowledge of that navigation to which we have a right in common with the rest of mankind; which some time or other may turn to the infinite advantage of the British nation. The reader has seen what succession of adventurers there has been from the days of queen Elizabeth to this time; all of whom have intimated the mighty advantages that might be expected from our endeavouring to fix in some part, rather than be continual wanderers in the South-Seas. The grand objection has been that it is very difficult to furnish provisions for so long an expedition, or to keep our ships sufficiently manned, so as to be in a condition of settling when they come thither. But perhaps we ought to enquire whether these difficulties really spring from the design itself, or from our methods of managing it; for, undoubtedly if there be not so much prudence in the conduct of a public scheme, as is generally seen in the management of a private concern, we may easily guess what will be the fate of it. The good sense and great attention of the Bristol merchants, appear in the precautions they took for the right management of this expedition, which effectually answered their intentions: and shall we be weak enough to believe,

* Account of the European Settlements in America, Vol. I. P. 277.

that a project formed for the common benefit of the British nation; might not be as well regulated, and as successfully executed, as one which tended only to the benefit of a few merchants in one of its ports? It is easy enough to conceive that if wrong methods are used, or right ones neglected, if ships go out at improper seasons of the year, heavily loaded with things unnecessary, commanded by unexperienced or fresh-water seamen, who think any hardship intolerable, we need not wonder that things miscarry. But this very voyage of captain Woodes Rogers clearly demonstrates such a design to be very practicable, notwithstanding what is daily thrown out to make the contrary notion gain belief; for their ships were much fuller of men than is usual for ships of their burthen, and yet they carried provisions for sixteen months; which puts it beyond all dispute, that men of war and transports may conveniently go on this expedition well filled with men, and carry twelve months provision at least for each ship: besides, for every man of war or transport that carries considerable numbers of men, a proportionable victualler may be allowed with no more men than are enough to sail her; so that she may carry eight or ten months provisions more for the other ships that embark the men. Thus a sufficient number may go for a settlement, and fully victualled for twenty-two months, which is time enough, and to spare to go and return from the South Seas; and if any ship should lose company, there is little danger of their meeting again at places appointed for rendezvous. It is true the distance from home is great, but the ships that have traded thither, find it an easy passage in a proper season; and their men continue more healthful than those that trade to the West-Indies by the North-Sea. The general distemper in such long voyages is the scurvy, and the methods to prevent the ill effects of it are so well known, that they may be easily provided against.

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The ships may likewise refresh by the way, first at the Cape de Verd Islands, and then at Brazil, betwixt which and the South-Sea, is the longest passage, and that in all probability cannot exceed ten weeks at sea; so that when they arrive at Chili, the climate is so wholesome, and agrees so well with European constitutions, that such as are sick speedily recover. Then, as to proper places for a settlement where provisions abound, there are so many of them on the coast of Chili, &c. that a body of men disciplined, and under good commanders, may easily settle there. It is not indeed easy to say where such a settlement might be made with the greatest probability of success; but sure it is very strange that no attempt has been hitherto made to discover that continent that lies between California and Japan; since that there is such a continent seems to be a point the Spaniards are as industrious to conceal, as other nations are negligent of enquiring after it, though none of their subjects that ever were in those seas, quitted them without recommending it to the notice of their countrymen. Sir Francis Drake, the first, and perhaps the most knowing of our discoverers, took possession of California with this view particularly. The brave Candish, his only rival in reputation, suggested the same thing: and if I mistake not, delivered his thoughts at large on this subject, in a discourse directed to the queen, his mistress; and delivered to his patron, the lord Hunsdon, in relation to a map of China which he brought over, and of which I shall have occasion to speak more largely in another place. Captain Dampier, though he was far from being a deep politician, yet saw, and mentioned the expediency of some such settlement; which was again hinted by captain Rogers. If the reader should incline to be farther informed as to the advantages that might be reasonably expected from our having a colony in those parts, I will endeavour to give him some satisfaction in that particular,

particular. First then this situation would afford us an opportunity of corresponding in both the East and West-Indies, and that with much greater ease than the Spaniards find in carrying on their trade between Manilla and Acapulco; because we should not have above half the run of their ships to either of the Indies; and as the winds on that coast are constant and regular, we must in the space of a few years establish a safe and certain correspondence. In the next place there is the highest probability that in such a climate we might meet with, or in a short space, create a considerable demand for our coarse cloths, and other manufactures, which would be doubly advantageous to the nation, by encouraging industry at home, and increasing and enlarging our navigation. There is another circumstance that deserves to be mentioned, and it is this; that such a colony would give us an opportunity of examining effectually whether there be any such thing as a practicable passage into these seas, either from the north-east, or north-west; which is an old question revived of late years, and with good reason, since the solution of it would not only redound to the benefit of several nations, but to that of Europe in general.

If notwithstanding all that has been said, there should appear something romantic, or perhaps ridiculous, in supposing the public councils of this nation in such a situation as that projects of this sort should be esteemed worthy their notice, or any part of our naval force employed at such a distance, and where their commanders could expect so little, even from the success of their undertaking; what hinders that a private company, by which I mean a co-partnership of particular merchants, may not carry into execution such a design? We have seen by a variety of instances, by the East-India company in Holland, by the English East-India company, by our Levant, by the Hudson's Bay, but especially

by our Russia company, what private merchants are able to do if properly countenanced and encouraged. The Dutch and English East-India companies rose both of them out of private undertakings, while the state wisely assisted and supported them by her authority, for the sake of promoting the public good. If, therefore, at this juncture when there are so many private men who have acquired large fortunes, while the settled and ordinary trade of the nation is in some measure necessarily suspended by the war; while the interest of the public debt continues low, and yet that debt is daily increasing; if I say, while things are in such a situation, a body of merchants should undertake to discover new countries, and to make new settlements, what reason is there to doubt of their meeting with encouragement and success? There needs no mighty sum to fit out two privateers and a tender, and besides the very expences of the voyage might be probably borne by the prices taken in the South-Seas, or both schemes pursued at once, by wintering in California, and waiting the arrival of the Acapulco ships upon those coasts. It is on all hands acknowledged that the climate is temperate and healthy, that the natives are friendly and honest, that the opposite continent of America is very rich, and but thinly peopled by the Spaniards; so that on the whole there is nothing astonishing or absurd, in supposing that three or four hundred men well disciplined, and under experienced commanders, should maintain themselves here without any great difficulty or inconvenience, for seven, eight, or nine months. We think it no hardship to keep them continually on ship-board for two or three years in other services, to at least as little purpose. There is however another thing to be considered, and it is this; that sailing from California in a higher latitude than usual, they might if they found it practicable, winter in any new discovered port, and be sure to return time enough

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to California to accomplish the other part of their scheme: or if they should fail of meeting with a proper place in any of the islands or continent between California and the East-Indies, they may continue their voyage to China, where they might find themselves at liberty to form and execute new projects, equally honourable to themselves, and advantageous to their owners. At all events, therefore a scheme of this sort judiciously carried into execution, must be very beneficial to the nation: it would serve to extirpate old errors, by informing us of new truths, it would heighten our credit for maritime power and skill, it would exercise men of active spirits, improve their natural parts, and point out to them the means of transmitting wealth to their descendants, and their own fame to the latest posterity. If it should be demanded why I am so warm in recommending such a design, my answer is because I think it for the service of my country, which can never be made happy at home, or maintain her reputation abroad, but from the appearance of such a spirit as would be necessary to accomplish such a design; and therefore to labour in exciting this, seems the highest point of patriotism of which a private man is capable*.

SOUTHERN CONTINENT, called also *Terra Australis Incognita*. Under these names is generally comprized the various continents, islands, and countries, which are supposed to exist in the southern part of the pacific ocean; parts of which are known imperfectly, and parts conjectured. The former contain the immense tract or tracts of land called New Holland, Carpentaria, New Guinea, New Zealand, and very many islands. The voyages round the world which have been made during the present king's reign, and are still making with a view to discoveries, render all circumstances

* Harris's Voyages, Vol. I. p. 183.

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relating to these countries peculiarly interesting at present. We shall therefore lay before our readers some very masterly observations on these points, which are at present buried in two vast and expensive folios.

It is very certain that the discovery of Terra Australis Incognita is considered by many wise and knowing people, as a kind of philosopher's stone, perpetual motion, or in plain English as a chimera, fit only to take up the empty brains of wild projectors. Yet this seems to be no sufficient reason why those who are competent judges of the matter in dispute, should decide peremptorily that there is no such country; or if there be that it is not worth the finding. These sort of hasty conclusions are extremely fatal to science in general, and to the art of navigation in particular. To say the truth, all notions built upon conjectures only, however beautifully ranged in a system, serve only to puzzle and mislead people. The discovery of all parts of the world, seems to be at once the business and glory of man. It is the peculiar privilege of our species that we can traverse this globe by land and water, and thereby become intelligent with respect to all the various scenes of wisdom, which the world's Creator and ours has displayed therein. This is sufficient to shew that there cannot be any thing more noble, or more worthy of a great mind, than the surveying either in theory or practice, the disposition of this terraqueous globe, the harmony of its parts, and their relation to each other. Whoever employs any part of his time in this way, will discern that there is wanting to the eye a southern continent, in order to give one side of the globe a resemblance to the other. This is the first argument that there is such a continent; the next is, that experience confirms this notion; the fowls, the winds, the currents, the ice beyond Cape Horn, all confirm this opinion, that there is land towards the

the southern pole. We are to consider again, that though we have numberless voyages to the East-Indies, and a great many round the globe, yet we have few, very few, through that ocean in which this continent is supposed to lie; and these voyages serve all in some measure to confirm this opinion; because in every one of these voyages, some land or other was discovered, either continent or island. Now it is certain that islands great and small are seldom if ever at a very great distance from a continent; and therefore where there are many islands, it is at least a very probable sign that there is some continent not far from them. Thus much as to the certainty of the thing, that there really is such a country.

With regard to the next point, whether it is worth the discovery? This requires a much more ample enquiry. It is obvious in the first place, that the discovery of all new lands has a natural tendency to the increase of commerce, of which we have an instance in the whale fishery on the coast of Greenland, and the trade carried on in Hudson's Bay; but with respect to the lands we are now speaking of, we have as much certainty as the nature of the thing will admit, that they are really as rich and plentiful as any countries on the face of the globe, without exception. We have already in another place proved that the fifth climate is, according to the laws of nature the most fertile, as well as the most wholesome; and it must on all hands be allowed that a great part of the Terra Australis lies under this climate. Ferdinand de Quiros in his memorials, calls it a fourth part of the globe, and with good reason; for from the western point of New Guinea, to the eastern extremity of the country discovered by Hernando Gallego, there is a space of 2000 leagues, a great part of which has been, and the rest may be, certainly discovered. But of all proofs that can be offered in

such a case, those are certainly the most convincing that are taken from facts. Now De Quiros and Torres, who actually visited those islands, which by their first discoverer, Alonzo Savedra, were called the islands of Solomon, not only report that the country is beautiful in prospect, and exceedingly fertile in its produce, but that it abounds also with every thing that has hitherto been accounted riches, such as gold, silver, precious stones, and spices.

It is true that they acknowledge they visited only the coasts: but this rather fortifies than lessens their testimony; for though the coasts are often the most pleasant, yet they are seldom the richest part of a country. It is owing to accident, and the curiosity of such as report these things, that we have ever heard of these countries; and it is chiefly the effect of the impatience of discoverers, that we are not better acquainted with them. A man cannot be expected to describe a country he has only galloped through; and it is the same thing with regard to discoverers, who pretend to give distinct accounts of countries, without visiting any part of them but their ports: yet such people may have leave to say what they have seen, and latter experience seems to confirm the relations of de Quiros and Torres, with this difference only, that they remained longer on shore, and were consequently more capable of entering into particulars.

De Quiros absolutely affirms that the Indians he met with used vessels tolerably well built for the carrying on of commerce between their islands, of the truth of which our author says he was an eye-witness; and Schovten in his voyages confirms this by telling us, that he took a vessel with a considerable stock of live provisions on board, which must therefore have been intended for a voyage of some length. Our author not only maintains the truth of this from his own knowledge, but adds
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further, that they examined the sails of some of these vessels, and found them as good as if they had been made in Holland; the thread of them resembling hemp, and the canvass surpassing in all respects any thing of that kind made in Java or the Indies. We find in de Quiros's memorial, an account of a very fine gulph in the latitude of 15, where ships might anchor very commodiously: he thought fit to call it *golphe de Philippe*, where, according to him ships might anchor safe from winds, inasmuch as it ran twenty leagues up into the country. Hernando Gallego writes that in his passage from New Guinea to the Straights of Magellan, he was driven by a west wind to a country lying to the south, which he looked upon as cut off from the continent: this very probably might be the gulph mentioned by de Quiros. Abel Tasman reports, that he found in the southern continent, a large and spacious gulph very commodious for shipping; William Schovten and Herrera make frequent mention of havens and rivers in these southern countries, and Dampier actually saw some of these. If therefore we consider all the circumstances that have been mentioned, the credit of the several authors who report them, their apparent connexion, and impossibility of making forgeries tally so exactly, we must conclude that there is very full evidence in support of both these positions; viz. that there is a great continent, and many islands to the south, and that this continent and those islands, are very probably rich and well peopled, to which if a trade could be opened, it might, nay must be, very commodious, and produce as great or greater advantages than those which have resulted from the discovery of America.

It is most evident from captain Tasman's voyage, that New Guinea, Carpentaria, New Holland, Antony Van Diemen's land, and the countries discovered by Quiros, make all one continent, from

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which New Zealand seems to be separated by a strait; and perhaps is part of another continent answering to Africa, as this of which we are now speaking plainly does to America. This continent reaches from 122° to 188° of longitude, making indeed a very large country, but nothing like what de Quiros imagined, which shews how dangerous a thing it is to trust too much to conjecture in such points as these. It is secondly observable, that as New Guinea, Carpentaria, and New Holland had been already pretty well examined, captain Tasman fell directly to the south of these, so that his first discovery was Van Diemen's land, the most southern part of the continent on this side the globe; and then passing round by New Zealand, he plainly discovered the opposite islands only, and never fell in again with the continent till he arrived on the coast of New Britain, which he mistook for that of New Guinea, as he very well might, that country having never been suspected to be an island, till Dampier discovered it to be such in the beginning of the present century. Thirdly, by this survey these countries are for ever marked out, so long as the map or memory of Tasman's voyage shall remain. The Dutch East-India company have it always in their power to direct settlements or new discoveries, either in New Guinea from the Moluccas, or in New Holland from Batavia directly. The prudence shewn in the conduct of this affair, deserves the highest praise. To have attempted heretofore, or even now, the establishing colonies in those countries, would be impolitic, because it would be grasping more than the East-India company, or even than the republic of Holland could manage: for in the first place to reduce a continent between three and four thousand miles broad, is a prodigious undertaking; and to settle it by degrees, would be to open to all the world the importance of that country, which for
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any thing we can tell, may be much superior to any country yet known. The only choice therefore that the Dutch had left, was to reserve this mighty discovery till the season arrived in which they should be either obliged by necessity, or invited by occasion to make use of it. But though this country be reserved, it is no longer unknown or neglected by the Dutch, which is a point of very great consequence. To the other nations of Europe, the southern continent is a chimera, a thing in the clouds, or at least a country about which there are a thousand doubts and suspicions; so that to talk of discovering or settling it, must be regarded as an idle and empty project: but with respect to them, it is a thing perfectly well known; its extents, its boundaries, its situation, the genius of its several nations, and the commodities of which they are possessed, are absolutely within their cognizance; so that they are at liberty to take such measures as appear to them best, for securing the eventual possession of this country whenever they think fit. This account explains at once all the mysteries which the best writers on this subject have found in the Dutch proceedings. It shews why they have been at so much pains to obtain a clear and distinct survey of these distant countries, why they have hitherto forbore settling, and why they take so much pains to prevent other nations from coming at a distinct knowledge of them: and I may add to this another particular, which is, that it accounts for their permitting the natives of Amboina, who are their subjects, to carry on a trade to New Guinea, and the adjacent countries; since by this very method it is apparent that they gain daily fresh intelligence as to the product and commodities of those countries.

If we suppose the south pole to be the center of a chart of which the equinoctial is the circumference, we shall then discern four quarters; of the contents

tents of which, if we could give a full account, this part of the world would be perfectly discovered. To begin then with the first of these, that is from the first meridian placed in the island of Fero: within this division, that is to say, from the first to the ninetieth degree of longitude, there lies the great continent of Africa, the most southern point of which is the Cape of Good Hope, lying in the latitude of $34^{\circ} 15'$ south: between that and the pole, several small but very inconsiderable islands have been discovered, affording us only this degree of certainty, that to the latitude of 50° , there is no land to be found of any consequence. There was indeed a voyage made by Mr. Bover, in the year 1738, on purpose to discover whether there were any lands to the south in that quarter or not. This gentleman sailed from Port L'Orient July 18th, 1738; and on the 1st of January 1739, discovered a country, the coasts of which were covered with ice, in the latitude of 54° south, and in the longitude of $28^{\circ} 30'$.

In the next quarter, that is to say from 90° longitude, to 180° , lie the countries of which we have been speaking; or that large southern island extending from the equinoctial, to the latitude of $43^{\circ} 10'$, and the longitude of $167^{\circ} 55'$, which is the extremity of Van Diemen's land.

In the third quarter, that is from the longitude of 150° to 170° , there is very little discovered with any certainty. Captain Tasman indeed visited the coast of New Zealand in the latitude of $42^{\circ} 10'$ south, and in the longitude of $188^{\circ} 28'$. But besides this and the islands of Amsterdam and Rotterdam we know very little, and therefore if there be any doubts about the reality of the Terra Australis, it must be with respect to that part of it which lies within this quarter, through which Schovten and Le Maire sailed, but without discovering any thing more than a few small islands.

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The fourth and last quarter is from 270° of longitude to the first meridian, within which lies the continent of South America, and the island of Terra del Fuego; the most southern promontory of which is supposed to be Cape Horn, which, according to the best observations, is in the latitude of 56° ; beyond which there has been nothing with any certainty discovered on this side.

On the whole therefore it appears, there are three continents already tolerably discovered, which point towards the south pole, and therefore it is very probable there is a fourth, which if there be, it must lie between the country of New Zealand, discovered by captain Tasman, and that country which was seen by captain Sharpe and Mr. Wafer in the south seas, to which land therefore, and no other, the title of Terra Australis Incognita properly belongs. Leaving this therefore to the industry of future ages to discover, we shall now return to that great southern island, which captain Tasman actually surrounded, and the bounds of which are tolerably well known.

In order to give the reader a proper idea of the importance of this country, it will be requisite to say something of the climates in which it is situated. As it lies from the equinoctial, to near the latitude of 44° , the longest day in the most northern parts must be twelve hours, and in the southern about fifteen hours, or somewhat more; so that it extends from the first to the seventh climate, which shews its situation to be the happiest in the world; the country called Van Diemen's land resembling in all respects the south of France. As there are in all countries some parts more pleasant than others, so there seems good reason to believe, that within two or three degrees of the tropic of Capricorn, which passes through the midst of New Holland, is the most unwholesome and disagreeable part of this country. The reason of which is very plain; for in

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in those parts it must be excessively hot, much more so than under the line itself, since the days and nights are there always equal; whereas, within three or four degrees of the tropic of Capricorn, that is to say in the latitude of 27° south, the days are thirteen hours and an half long, and the sun is twice in their zenith, first in the beginning of December, or rather in the latter end of November, and again when it returns back, which occasions a burning heat for about two months; whereas either farther to the south, or nearer to the line, the climate must be equally wholesome and pleasant.

As to the product and commodities of this country in general, there is the greatest reason in the world to believe that they are extremely rich and valuable, because the richest and finest countries in the known world, lie all of them within the same latitude. But to return from conjectures to facts: the country discovered by de Quiros makes a part of this great island, and is the opposite coast to that of Carpentaria. This country the discoverer called *la Australia del Espíritu Santo*, in the latitude of $15^{\circ} 40'$ south; and as he reports, it abounds with gold, silver, pearl, nutmegs, mace, ginger, and sugar canes of an extraordinary size. I do not wonder that formerly the fact might be doubted, but at present I think there is sufficient reason to induce us to believe it: for captain Dampier describes the country about Cape St. George and Port Montague, which are within 9° of the country described by de Quiros: I say captain Dampier describes what he saw in the following words: "The country hereabouts is mountainous and woody, full of rich valleys, and pleasant fresh water brooks; the mould in the valleys is deep and yellowish, that on the sides of the hills of a very brown colour, and not very deep, but rocky underneath; yet excellent planting land; the trees in general are neither very straight, thick, nor tall; yet appear green and pleasant,

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fant. Some of them bear flowers, some berries, and other big fruits, but all unknown to any of us; cocoa-nut trees thrive very well here, as well on the bays by the sea side, as more remote among the plantations. Here are ginger, yams, and other very good roots for the pot, that our men saw and tasted. Here are hogs and dogs; other land animals we saw none." This account is grounded only on a very slight view, whereas de Quiros resided some time in the place he has mentioned. In another place captain Dampier observes that he saw nutmegs amongst them, which seemed to be fresh gathered, all which agrees perfectly with the account given by de Quiros. Add to this that Schovten had likewise observed that they had ginger upon this coast, and some other spices, so that on the whole there seems not the least reason to doubt that if any part of this country was settled, it must be attended with a very rich commerce: for it cannot be supposed that all these writers should be either mistaken, or that they should concur in a design to impose upon their readers; which is the less to be suspected if we consider how well their reports agree with the situation of the country; and that the trees on the land, and the fish on the coast, corresponding exactly with the trees of those countries, and the fish on the coasts, where these commodities are known to abound within land, seem to intimate a perfect conformity throughout.

The next thing to be considered is the possibility of planting in this part of the world, which, at first sight seems, I must confess, to be attended with considerable difficulties, with respect to every other nation, except the Dutch, who either from Batavia, the Moluccas, or even from the Cape of Good Hope, might with ease settle themselves wherever they thought fit. As, however, they have neglected this for above a century, there seems to be no reason why their conduct in this respect should become

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become the rule of other nations, or why any other nation should be apprehensive of drawing on herself the displeasure of the Dutch, by endeavouring to turn to their benefit countries the Dutch have so long suffered to lie, with respect to Europe, waste and desert.

If a design of settling should ever be attempted, perhaps the island of New Britain would be the properest place. As to the situation, extent, and present condition of that island, all that can be said of it must be taken from the account given by its discoverer captain Dampier, which in few words amounts to this—"The island, which I call Nova Britannia, has about 4° of latitude, the body of it lying in 4° , the northernmost part in $2^{\circ} 30'$, and the southernmost in $6^{\circ} 30'$. It has $5^{\circ} 18'$ longitude from east to west: it is generally high mountainous land, mixed with large valleys, which, as well as the mountains, appeared very fertile; and in most places that we saw the trees are very tall, large, and thick. It is also very well inhabited with strong, well-limbed negroes, whom we found very daring and bold at several places: as to the product of it, it is very probably this island may afford as many rich commodities as any in the world, and the natives may be easily brought to commerce, though I could not pretend to it in my circumstances."—If any objections should be raised from Dampier's misfortune in that voyage, it is easy to shew that it ought to have no manner of weight whatever, since, though he was an excellent pilot, he is allowed to have been a bad commander: besides, the Roebuck, in which he sailed, was a worn-out frigate that would hardly swim; and it is no great wonder that in so crazy a vessel the people were a little impatient at being abroad on discoveries; yet after all, he performed what he was sent for, and by the discovery of this island of New Britain

tain secured us an indisputable right to a country that is, or might be made, very valuable.

It is so situated that a great trade might be carried on from thence through the whole Terra Australis on one side, and the most valuable islands of the East Indies on the other. In short, all, or at least most of the advantages proposed by the Dutch West India company's joining with their East India company might be procured for this nation by the establishing a colony in this island of New Britain.

If the settling this part of Terra Australis should devolve on the South Sea company, by way of equivalent for the loss of their Assiento contract, (under supposition that neither the East India nor the African companies would undertake it) there is no sort of question but it might be as well performed by them as by any other, and the trade carried on without interfering with that which is at present carried on either by the East India or African companies. It would indeed in this case be absolutely necessary to settle Juan Fernandez; the settlement of which place, under the direction of that company, if they could, as very probably they might, fall into some share of the slave trade from New Guinea, must prove wonderfully advantageous, considering the opportunity they would have of vending those slaves to the Spaniards in Chili and Peru. The settling of this island ought to be performed at once, and with a competent force, since, without doubt, the Spaniards would leave no means unattempted to dispossess them; yet, if a good fortification was once raised, passes properly retrenched, and a garrison left there of between three and five hundred men, it would be simply impossible for the Spaniards to force them out of it before the arrival of another squadron from hence. Neither do I see any reason why, in the space of a few years, the plantation of this island should not prove of as great consequence to the South Sea company as that of

Curacao

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Curacao to the Dutch West India company, who raise no less than 60,000 florins *per annum* for licensing ships to trade there.

From Juan Fernandez to Van Diemen's Land is not above two months sail; and a voyage for discovery might be very conveniently made between the time that a squadron returned from Juan Fernandez and another squadron's arrival there from hence. It is true; that if once a considerable settlement was made in the most southern part of Terra Australis, the company might then fall into a large commerce in the most valuable East India goods; very probably gold and spices of all kinds; yet I cannot think that even these would fall within the exclusive proviso of their charter; for that was certainly intended to hinder their trading in such goods as are brought hither by our East India company; and I must confess I see no difference with respect to the interest of that company between our having cloves, cinnamon, and mace by the South Sea company's ships from Juan Fernandez and our receiving them from Holland, after the Dutch East India company's ships have brought them thither by the way of the Cape of Good Hope. Sure I am they would come to us sooner by some months by the way of Cape Horn. If this reasoning does not satisfy people, but they still remain persuaded that the South Sea company ought not to intermeddle with the East India trade at all, I desire to know why the West India merchants are allowed to import coffee from Jamaica, when it is well known that the East India company can supply the whole demand of this kingdom from Mocha? If it be answered that the Jamaica coffee comes cheaper, and is the growth of our own plantations, I reply, that these spices will not only be cheaper, but better, and be purchased by our own manufactures; and these, I think, are the strongest reasons that can be given.

If

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If it be demanded what certainty I have that spices can be had from thence, I answer, all the certainty that in a thing of this nature can be reasonably expected. Ferdinand de Quiros met with all sorts of spices in the country which he discovered; William Shovten and Jaques le Maire saw ginger and nutmegs, so did Dampier; and the author of commodore Roggewein's voyage asserts, that the free burgeses of Amboina purchase negroes from the natives of New Guinea for bits of iron. All therefore I contend for is, that these bits of iron may be sent them from Old England.

The reason I recommend settling on the south coast of Terra Australis, if this design should be prosecuted from Juan Fernandez rather than the island of New Britan, which I mentioned before, is, because that coast is nearer, and is situated in a better and pleasanter climate. Besides all which advantages, as it was never hitherto visited by the Dutch, they cannot, with any colour of justice, take umbrage at our attempting such a settlement.

It is most evident, that if such a settlement was made at Juan Fernandez, proper magazines erected, and a constant correspondence between that island and the Terra Australis, these three consequences must absolutely follow from thence: 1. That a new trade would be opened, which must carry off a great quantity of our goods and manufactures, that cannot at present be brought to any other market, or at least not to so good a market as if there was a greater demand for them. 2. It would render this navigation, which is at present so strange, and consequently so terrible to us, easy and familiar, which might be attended with advantages which cannot be foreseen, especially since there is, as I before observed, in all probability another southern continent which is still to be discovered. 3. It would greatly increase our shipping and our seamen, which are the true and natural

strength of this country, extend our naval power, and raise the reputation of this nation, the most distant prospect of which is sufficient to warm the soul of any man, who has the least regard for his country, with courage sufficient to despise the imputations that may be thrown upon him as a visionary projector, for taking so much pains about an affair that can tend so little to his private advantage.

It is very observable, that all the mighty discoveries that have been made arose from great men who joined reason with practice, and were men of genius and learning, as well as seamen. To Columbus we owe the finding America; to Magellan the passing by the streights which bear his name, by a new route to the East Indies; to Le Maire a more commodious passage round Cape Horn, and without running up to California: Sir Francis Drake too hinted the advantages that might arise by examining the north-west side of America; and Candish had some notions of discovering a passage between China and Japan. As to the history we have of Roggewein's voyage, it affords such lights as nothing but our own negligence can render useless; but in the other voyages, whatever discoveries we meet with are purely accidental, except it be Dampier's voyage to the coasts of New Holland and New Guinea, which was expressly made for discoveries, and in which, if an abler man had been employed in conjunction with Dampier, we cannot doubt that the interior and exterior parts of those countries would have been much better known than they are at present; because such a person would rather have chosen to have refreshed in the island of New Britain, or some other country not visited before, than at that of Timor, settled both by the Portuguese and the Dutch.

The idea of settling Juan Fernandez was first conceived by commodore Roggewein, who, having attentively considered the advantageous situation, and

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and the many conveniencies this island afforded, immediately conceived a design of settling it, as the most proper place that could be thought of for affording shelter and refreshment to ships bound, as he was, to southern lands; and he was encouraged particularly to persevere in this design from the consideration of the island's fertility, which, as he observes, allowed them no reason to doubt that it would afford sufficient subsistence for six hundred families at least: however this, like the settlement of Belgia Australis, was put off to their return, by which accident it happened that neither of these islands was settled at all. It must be allowed that both these projects of the Dutch commodore were every way wise and prudent, and shewed how fit a man he was to execute it; for, by the help of these two colonies, undoubtedly the southern Indies had been by this time effectually discovered. The former settlement would have afforded a proper place for ships to careen in and refit, after so long a voyage as from Europe to the streights of Magellan; and the latter would have furnished them with all imaginable conveniencies for repairing whatever injuries they might have received by so hazardous a passage as that round Cape Horn. I therefore venture to pronounce it the best laid scheme for promoting southern discoveries that ever yet entered the head of man, and I make no manner of question but that whatever nation shall revive and prosecute Mr. Roggewein's plan, will become in a few years master of as rich and profitable a commerce as the Spaniards have from their own country to Mexico and Peru, or the Portuguese to Brazil.

We have so many accounts of the beauty and fertility of Juan Fernandez, that I think it may be laid down as an undeniable truth, that a proposal for settling it would not meet with many difficulties either here or in Holland. In both places people

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are to be met with who, either for the sake of getting bread, or from the hopes of acquiring a fortune, would readily consent to visit the most unwholesome countries, and to remain in the worst climates. There would not therefore be wanting enough to offer themselves, upon proper encouragement, to go and reside there, and the expence of fortifying the island, and providing them in every respect with what they wanted, would require no great sum; yet whatever nation shall take this step, and be at the expence, will have it absolutely in their power to prosecute this scheme of discovery, after which perhaps it may be time enough to think of settling the island of St. Lewis on the other side of the Cape. The raising a fort, and putting in order the plantation of the island of Juan Fernandez, might employ the first year, whenever this important design is properly pursued; and if two or three small vessels were left with the inhabitants of that island, they might, by the arrival of a new squadron the next year, be able to report somewhat of the probability of a discovery from thence, because there are undoubtedly several islands which lie at no great distance from thence, and all of them in so good a climate, that no hardship need be feared in endeavouring to discover them. In consequence of the report, and of the assistance received from the new colony, where the sick might be put on shore, and their places supplied with fresh men, a great part of the south continent might be discovered in one summer; for when the seamen were once secure of a good retreat, as the island of Juan Fernandez, well settled, would be, they would not be uneasy or afraid of wanting provisions if they cruized a few weeks more or less in the South Seas: besides, there would be no occasion of reducing them to short allowance; and while they lived in present plenty, and without apprehension of future wants, they would certainly be in sufficient spirits to undertake

dertake any thing their officers could reasonably expect from them.

The voyages of Schouten and Dampier, as well as that of commodore Roggewein, plainly shew, that it is the dread of so long a run as to the East Indies which intimidates the sailors in these seas, and occasions such frequent mutinies, such perpetual dissentions, as must necessarily impede, and even defeat, the best laid project for discoveries. Add to all this, that in two or three years time there is the highest probability that the produce of the trade that might be established in these southern islands would not only defray the expence of the undertaking, but make considerable returns, and then all difficulties would be over. There would be enough struggling to share in the advantages of a commerce so long neglected; but the settlement at Juan Fernandez would prevent all this, and secure, for at least thirty or forty years, the greatest part of the profit to the original proprietors.

I must confess that I have taken a great deal of pains upon this subject, from an earnest desire that this scheme of discovering these southern Indies might appear in its true light to the British nation, and in order to shew how possible it is for us to reap the benefit, not of the discoveries only, but of the errors and oversights of other people. We are daily complaining (written in 1745) though I hope without reason, of the decay of trade; we are daily repining at the restrictions on our trade, for which, without doubt, there is more reason, since it is visible that the commerce between our own island and that of Barbadoes employs five times the number of ships that are in the service of all our exclusive companies put together: but complaints are effeminate things; we ought to behave like men, and endeavour to find remedies, if we really think ourselves aggrieved. If, as many people say, most trades are overstocked; or if, as most people say,

the most beneficial branches of trade are cramped by the above-mentioned restrictions, it is undoubtedly our business to find out new trades if it be possible; or at least, it is worth our while to make some attempt.

The safest, plainest, and most speedy method, is to endeavour to make new discoveries, that is, in effect, to endeavour to find out new markets. If there be so large a tract of country, and so many islands undiscovered in the south, they must be worth the discovering for these reasons. If any of these countries are absolutely uninhabited, we are at least sure that they lie in such a climate as gives us hopes of their producing the richest commodities, or a certainty of our being able to produce them by raising new colonies and plantations. We shall very soon be satisfied of this, if we reflect on the advantages derived from settling the small island of Barbadoes; and if the profits arising from sugar are so large, what might be expected, or rather what might we not expect from a country of the same extent which produce cloves, nutmegs, and cinnamon? It is true that formerly the power of the Dutch might have been apprehended, who have shewn a very stubborn resolution of keeping these rich commodities entirely to themselves; but at present there can be no such fear, because our maritime power is sufficient to protect any just pretension; and, on the other hand, we ought not to suspect that our governors would have such a complaisance for any foreign interest as to sacrifice to it our own. On the other hand, if these southern countries are inhabited by savages, there is a great probability of our obtaining the most valuable commodities, either in exchange for the necessaries of life, or for those trifles which we known by experience such savages naturally admire.

But it may be, and indeed is far more probable, that there are civilized nations in many, or at least
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in some of these countries, and with them, no doubt, we may carry on a very advantageous trade; for the commodities of one part of the world are always considered as rarities in another part, and, as rarities, they will naturally fetch an high price: so that if we can but once establish a trade, and a trade at so great a distance, it must turn much to our benefit*.

The same writer observes, in another place, that "it has been reported, that notwithstanding the vast importance of these islands, (the spice ones) there were countries at no great distance from them which deserved some degree of notice, as abounding in gold and precious stones, and not altogether deficient in spices. They were but half discovered by the Portuguese, yet, for all the world knows to the contrary, that discovery has not been so much as prosecuted, much less perfected by the Dutch. On the contrary, we have been given to understand that some mistake has happened in this business; that these countries are poor, barren, miserable places, and those who inhabit them a race of brutal, stupid, and starving people. This possibly may be so; however, as it has been otherwise reported, and as these countries lie upon the very line which divides the known from the unknown parts of the world, and may be as easily reached by the South Seas as by the Cape of Good Hope, it should be ascertained †."

We call by the name of Terra Australis, says another writer, all that part of our earth which lies beyond the three southern points of the known world on Africa, Asia, and America, that is to say, beyond the Cape of Good Hope, the Molucca and Celebes islands, and Cape Horn, or the Straights of Magellan. This space comprehends eight or ten millions of square leagues, which make above a

* Harris, Vol. I. p. 331. 334. 264. 318.

† Modern Universal History, Vol. IX. p. 347.

third part of our globe. In this vast tract it is impossible but there must be to the south of Asia some immense continent to keep our globe in equilibrio during its rotation, by serving as a counterpoise to northern Asia. Whoever examines the two hemispheres of the globe, divided horizontally, that is, by the equator (as they should always be) and not by the meridian, must be struck in observing so much land in the one hemisphere, and so little in the other, especially as he knows that the weight of earth is, to that of sea-water, nearly as five to three*.

As to the wealth and fertility of this continent, says another, both reason and experience seem to unite in making it one of the happiest countries in the world. Both De Quiros and Dampier have described it in glowing colours, such as might be thought to flow from the pencil of fancy, if further experience and the very nature of the thing did not support their assertions. The country, called by the former *La Australia del Espíritu Santo*, in the latitude of $15^{\circ} 46'$ south, he affirms to abound with gold, silver, pearl, mace, nutmegs, and ginger. It is opposite to the country called *Carpentaria*, and from its situation gives the strongest credibility to the warm description of the discoverer. Captain Dampier speaks of the land about Cape St. George and Port Montague in much the same language, but enumerates fewer of the rich commodities, which might probably arise from the superficial view he took of the country; whereas Quiros actually resided some time in the parts he describes, and consequently had better opportunities of being acquainted with the produce. Schouten and Tasman likewise take notice of nutmegs and ginger, as well as cocoa-nuts, pisans, &c. which they sow on the coast. If the islands of Sumatra,

* *Terra Australis Cognita*, Vol. I. p. 8.

Java, and Borneo, abound in precious stones and other valuable commodities, and the Moluccas in spices, New Guinea and the regions behind must, by a parity of reason, be as plentifully endowed by nature. If the island of Madagascar is so fine, and such a country as all authors speak it; if gold, ivory, and other commodities of great value, are common in the southern part of Africa, from Melinda down to the Cape of Good Hope, and up again to Cape Gonzalez; here are the same parallels in New Zealand, New Holland, and Carpentaria. If Peru overflows with silver, if all the mountains of Chili are filled with gold, the Brazils with every sort of wealth, this continent enjoys the benefit of the same position; and therefore whoever thoroughly discovers and settles it, will infallibly be possessed of territories as rich, as fruitful, and as capable of improvement as the Moluccas, the Cape of Good Hope, Peru, Chili, or the Brazils, and indeed as any that have hitherto been discovered in any part of the terraqueous globe. If we reflect upon all the circumstances mentioned in the journals of voyages here, the credit of the several authors, their apparent connection, and the impossibility of making forgeries coincide so exactly with reason, with experience, and with each other, we must conclude there is ample evidence of there being a continent and many islands to the south, all rich, fertile, and populous. If a trade to these was opened, the same reason shews that it must be very commodious, and produce as great, or greater, advantages than those which have resulted from the discovery of America. Is it not therefore astonishing that this powerful and busy nation should never have undertaken to gratify their curiosity by the fullest conviction of the state of this continent * ?

* Modern Universal History, Vol. II. p. 357. 359. Hist. des Navig. des Terres Austr. p. 257.

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Those parts of these vast tracts hitherto discovered have been found exceedingly populous. This alone is sufficient to prove that a trade of the most advantageous kind might be carried on with the inhabitants. The exportation of manufactures, and the employment of ships and seamen, are the great points which the present system of Europe most requires; these would be fully answered: for it is impossible to conceive that people inhabiting such climates, and consequently possessing the commodities most valuable in Europe, should not be as eager to exchange their products for ours as we could be; and it is much easier to be conceived than expressed, how far this exchange might be carried, or how many millions of people might be supplied with European manufactures, if these vast countries were discovered.

What was the amount of manufacturing for trade before the discovery of America? A mere trifle; sufficient to enrich and employ a few paltry Hansetowns, a city of Antwerp, or a state of Genoa: but compare the progress made since that event; consider the trade of Europe before and since; think of the exportation of British, Dutch, French, and other manufactures, nine-tenths perhaps of which are consumed in America, or in Africa, in consequence of America. What comparison can be drawn between the riches of Britain now and in the time of queen Elizabeth? and yet, if we come to examine the matter, we shall find the superiority of the latter times to the former to be chiefly owing to the discovery of America. What is the present grand want of Britain? A new demand for manufactures, great enough to set at work three millions of idle hands, who are now a burden upon the three kingdoms. Is such a market to be found in Europe? Those who are so apt to cry out, We have trade enough, and more colonies than we know what to do with, should be asked, Have you any unemployed

unemployed poor? If you have, you have enough of neither one nor the other. What is the use of trade? The enabling your own poor to maintain themselves at the expence of foreigners.

Is there not the greatest reason to suppose, that these immense countries, extending from the line possibly to the south-pole, must abound with productions of which we can have as little idea as the Europeans could have of America before it was discovered? If we throw a careless eye around us, what a new world of commodities, and many of the most useful nature, broke in upon us on that event! There are equal reasons, nay superior ones, for supposing these unknown countries to abound in peculiar productions. A number of commodities are there probably in being, which would open new species of manufactures unthought of, and give bread to millions now unborn.

But without considering these points merely in a commercial light, is it not astonishing that the princes and great men among the maritime powers of Europe have no more curiosity to become acquainted with the ideas, the manners, the customs, and the knowledge of so considerable a part of the globe, all which are at present as unknown as those of the inhabitants of the moon? What a wonderful idea is it to think of the arts, the sciences, and the species of human learning which may reside among these unknown people, and wait only for the active curiosity of some European to extend them in a million of beneficial shapes to the rest of mankind! Wonders as surprizing as glass, printing, and magnetism itself, may exist there in the womb of obscurity, which, if imported to Europe, would open new fields for the minds of mankind to range in. And let me at the same time add, that we are in want of such, to us unknown spheres of human knowledge. There has, for above a century past, been a kind of languor in the learned world,

world, a total cessation of all great and useful discoveries, which has thrown the warmest pursuers of the arts and sciences into a beaten tract, in which they are contented to re-say, in a new manner, what their more spirited ancestors had said before.

Nothing gives a greater activity and vigour to the human mind than unthought-of and important discoveries; they open new regions of science, and lift the ideas of mankind from the dull rotation of common-place facts to the glorious sphere of invention; one discovery brings on another; the general circle of knowledge is enlarged, and every art and science receives new improvements. These are noble advantages, but they can never spring from the tame and insipid repose which broods at present over Europe.

What noble benefits result from long voyages! These are the true nurseries for seamen, and breed the hardiest and most valuable; nor is navigation so much obliged to any trade as that which occasions them; they encourage the building and fitting out stout ships; they render courage, activity, vigour, and skill, necessary in a number of captains and seamen, which prove in all these, and other respects, of incomparable value to a maritime nation, inasmuch that those branches of commerce, and those settlements which are the support of long voyages, ought, from every sensible people, to receive peculiar attention.—“The notion of sailing by a west course to the East Indies, says a very penetrating writer, first entered into the imagination of Columbus; and yet there is great reason to presume, that if he could possibly have made a right calculation, and had understood that 230 degrees of longitude must be traversed in such a course, it would have appeared, even to him, a matter extremely doubtful, if not utterly impossible. But in a series of years, and that a very short one, since from the first voyage of Columbus to that of Magellan, there
scarce

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scarce intervened thirty, this was conceived, undertaken, and executed; and, consequently, incomparably greater improvement was made in this art of navigation than in the many hundreds, and even thousands of years preceding. Of such consequence it is to keep men in action, to excite their faculties, to enflame their courage by emulation, and to make one discovery a step to another. It was by means like these that so much was done in so small a time, and by the neglect of these means, that so little has been done ever since *."

Notwithstanding there is so little appearance of it in our common maps, yet, in all probability, the Pacific ocean might be full of islands †. Discoveries have been made in all directions. There has been no expedition through this ocean, of which we have any distinct account, without new islands being discovered. Magellan saw other islands, and the number of the Ladrones, and their names, have differed antiently from what they are now accounted ‡. Sir Francis Drake actually passed through the New Philippines; subsequent English commanders made other discoveries; and though this is a great deal, we could have shewn much more. Incidentally, and without seeking them, a chain of islands has been discovered to the north, almost as high as Japan ||. The New Philippines notwithstanding is the most striking proof of all, since they render it evident, that what we suppose of the whole is at least true of a part: nor is this

* Political Essays, p. 466. Modern Universal History, Vol. IX. p. 481.

† Observations Physf. & Matth. de l' Acad. p. 223.

‡ G. Battista Ramusio Raccolto delle Navigazioni et Viaggi, Tom. I. p. 375. Galvano's Discoveries. Hackluyt. Du Bois Geographie Moderne, p. 2. ch. 14. art. 5.

|| Heirera Description de las Indies Occidentales, cap. 28. Eden's History of Travaile. Sir William Monson's Naval Tracts.

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proof at all less authentic for its being accidental ; for that is a pregnant testimony in favour of another proposition, more than once mentioned, that the Spaniards are not so much ignorant of this as indisposed to acknowledge and unwilling to have it discovered. This appears from the extraordinary strictness of their sailing-orders, which we have good reason to believe are not casually defective, but intentionally restricted in this particular *. The same thing appears from their charts, but managed with great prudence and address ; for all new islands are inserted as soon as discovered, to prevent the surmise of their wishing to conceal them ; but then islands, long before discovered, are left out ; so that the modern charts are not at all fuller than those made two centuries ago. Add to this, that no discoveries whatever tempt this nation to proceed any further, how easily soever that might be done, or with whatever advantageous consequences it might be attended. But to bar the pretensions of any other nation, and to secure their title to islands not yet known, and which, perhaps, they never will know, they plead an exclusive right from the first discovery by Magellan of the archipelago of St. Lazarus, comprehending, according to their computation, eleven thousand islands † ; so that how much soever our doctrine may clash with their politics, there is nothing clearer than that they differ not much from us in their opinion ‡.

It is very singular that, considering the situation of the New Philippines, the number of them, and their lying as it were within several circles, one

* Galvano. Sir William Monson's Naval Tracts. Lord Anson's Voyage.

† G. B. Ramusio Raccolto, &c. Tom. I. p. 375. Argensola Conquista de las Islas Moluccas, Lib. I. Pere le Gobien Histoire des Iles Mariannes, Liv. I.

‡ Mod. Univ. Hist. Vol. IX. p. 622.

within

within another, in the very midst of countries possessed by the Spaniards, they should remain for two centuries in a manner unknown, or at least unnoticed. It is yet more strange, that after the first intelligence of them, and that too by accident, they should remain upwards of fifty years in a manner half discovered. It is certainly very surprizing, that in an age so enlightned as this, an event of this sort should be so little considered or attended to; and the finding of these islands should be registered among the relations of missionaries, the collections of societies destined to the promotion of science, and be in a manner wholly slighted by the great world, by geographers, historians, and statesmen; from all of whom, from the nature of things, discoveries of this kind claim more immediate regard*. This certainly shews, that the noble and heroic spirit which distinguished the fifteenth century, and which was attended with so many illustrious events, and such prodigious advantages to the inhabitants of Europe, however ill managed in some respects, and in all, perhaps, but too much misapplied, has been gradually evaporating, and is now on the point of being extinguished, and this from the very principle that first excited and ought ever to keep it alive, a propensity to commerce, which, while we endeavour to monopolize, we cease to extend; and while we quarrel and dispute about what we have, discourage those discoveries that might employ, enrich, and content us all. But it will be said, that the views of princes and politicians are very different from the visions of speculative men, who travel only in their closets, make discoveries upon paper, and frame schemes for themselves and men of as like turn to admire, but which great ministers treat with derision. The truth of this is not to be disputed; but the point to be

* L'Esprit des Loix, Liv. XX. c. 13.

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enquired into is, who are most likely to be in the right? Princes and politicians are great names; persons of science and sagacity are great men: the former are generally occupied about the concerns of their own times; the latter look forward, and endeavour the benefit of posterity. It was not Ferdinand, though honoured with the title of the Wise, the Great, and the Catholic, who discovered the new world, but poor Columbus; who had been treated as a chimerical projector, and whose vast designs had perished in embryo, if Isabella had not enabled him to carry them into execution by pledging her jewels*.

Before we close this article, which, from its great importance, has demanded more than common attention, we must make a few remarks on the voyages which have been made through the Pacific Ocean, with a view to discoveries, since the peace of Paris; which voyages were first set on foot by the late earl of Egmont, and since carried on under the patronage of the earl of Sandwich: these are much to the honour of the present reign. France also comes in for a share of the honour in the voyage of M. de Bougainville. Upon these exertions of spirit, which are beyond any thing we have seen in this century, we must observe,

I. That the discoveries made in these voyages greatly confirm the preceding observations in the two important points, the number of unknown islands thickly strewed through this ocean, and also the extreme fertility and beauty of them. Luckily these voyages were all made to the south of the line, whereas the navigation for near two centuries had been almost entirely to the north of it. From this circumstance, every voyage was attended with new discoveries; a chain of islands quite in clusters, and many of them considerable for size, &c. were

* Modern Universal History, Vol. IX. p. 573.

found extending through many degrees of latitude and longitude, forming an immense archipelago, of which the charts give no other sign than the lands to which they give the name of De Quiros, but which form only a small part of what is now discovered: of these Otaheite, so well known at present from the voyages of capt. Wallace, M. de Bougainville, and capt. Cooke, is but one island of a middling size, surrounded by many others, some much longer, but which were not visited. These islands are in the finest climate, and enjoy an unrivalled fertility. The accounts we have of their numbers are not clear, from the ships sailing almost directly through them, without making it their business to discover what they had seen. This circumstance, by the way, seems to have been an omission in their orders; for while they were in the midst of an unknown archipelago, situated in the richest of climates, their first business surely ought to have been to become well acquainted with every thing as they advanced; for in all probability islands, in such a latitude, would be found as beneficial to discover as any other business upon which they could be sent.

It is evident that there is a chain of islands, reaching almost across the Pacific Ocean, south of the line, to a greater number, and of a more important nature, than any which are to be found north of the line till you come to the New Philippines. Former navigators having principally taken the northern course, the islands seen by our ships, as well as those by M. de Bougainville, are new discoveries, if we except something on the account of De Quiros not to be clearly ascertained. Certainly there have been discovered, within seven years, near one hundred and fifty islands to the south of the line, and while the ships pursued a direct course, turning aside neither to the right nor to the left, all these islands are within 20 degrees of the

line, consequently enjoy a climate capable of producing the richest products in the universe.

II. Commodore Byron was sent out for the express purpose of discovering the islands of Solomon, which, two hundred years ago, were supposed to be the richest countries in the world. The Spanish discoverers of them found them to abound with gold, precious stones, and spices. The commodore could find no countries which answered the description, though he met with many unknown islands in the same latitude; nor have any succeeding navigators found any countries abounding with those rich commodities. It is well known that the islands of Solomon were sought for more than once, soon after Mendana's discovery of them in the fifteenth century, but in vain: their existence was then doubted, and yet more at present; but we must beg leave to observe, that such a conclusion seems hasty. Possibly the islands, to which the name of Solomon is given, join, or may be near to the same we have discovered; nay, it is not impossible but we may, without knowing it, have discovered the real Solomon's islands; and as to gold and jewels, the inhabitants may probably have secreted their wealth, knowing from intelligence, of which we cannot discover the source, that strangers, and especially Spaniards, would seek for nothing so soon.

That this is no wild or romantic way of thinking, is clearly proved from a very remarkable circumstance given by M. de Bougainville; it is, that the inhabitants of Otaheite are possessed of very fine pearls, but they carefully concealed them: this shews that these sensible, and, I may add, civilized, polished Indians, knew the commodities of real value, and concealed them from the new-comers; they might do the same with gold and diamonds.

III. But another supposition is to be started: perhaps the Spanish accounts of Solomon's islands are

are all romance : jealous of the attempts which Europeans might make, with a view to discover the great Southern Continent, or the New Philippines, they might invent the tale of these imaginary islands, and paint them as the richest countries under heaven, with a design to disappoint foreign navigators, and thereby bring into discredit all expeditions that might afterwards be made in search of them.

IV. The great discovery lately made is that of New Zealand, which was, till now, quite unknown. Geographers gave that name to a spot of coast which we see in their maps, not knowing whether it was part of a continent or a great or small island. It is now known that New Zealand is in two parts ; the northern parts of the southern division were examined, but the northern division was surrounded, and found to be an island nine hundred miles long, and two, three, and four hundred broad. Great part of this island lies in the finest climate in the world, possesses a most fruitful soil, and numerous valuable productions ; inhabited partly by barbarian savages, and partly by a civilized agreeable people. This discovery is truly one of the highest consequence.

V. The principles on which these expeditions have been made seem to be those only of making geographical and botanical discoveries, but without any views of forming settlements : the former object is certainly a very noble one, and worthy the reign of a great king, and the most powerful marine in the world ; but the latter is of the most capital importance, at the same time that it is infinitely more favourable to the former. Discovering countries accurately, and becoming well acquainted with their natural history, is not to be effected in a hasty visit ; they require a settlement as much as the commercial interests of the nation.

But we do not comprehend why expeditions of this sort, and at a considerable expence, should be

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made, and prove successful in discovering countries that appear in every respect perfectly desirable, and at the same time all equally neglected. That great commercial genius, the editor of Harris's Voyages, who has considered this point with a most uncommon attention, has in all his reflections proposed settlements in the new discoveries, as the only possible means of making them turn to any account; nor would he ever have conceived that any nation would have been at such a repeated expence, sufficient with but small additions to execute all his ideas, without effecting the most important part of the business. At the same time he has answered all objections to such a plan, and left no doubt of its prudence, expediency, and even necessity.

Countries have been discovered, which are situated within ten degrees of the line, and yet in a climate remarkably wholesome, as populous as England, in civilized, sensible, and very ingenious inhabitants. Will any person assert that it would not be highly beneficial to become master of the sea coasts of such islands, not with any view of colonizing in a country full of people, but of introducing valuable articles of culture, and then trading with the inhabitants. Other islands they found equally favoured by nature, but almost uninhabited; these, and parts of New Zealand, presented the finest advantages for colonizing.

If it is said that we have more colonies already than we know what to do with; we reply, for that reason we ought to procure new ones, which will not prove so troublesome: if we are uncertain of the dependence of our colonies, why is it so? But from planting an immense continent; but islands, however large, are, and must be dependent on naval power. But if we are in any danger of losing our present colonies, does it not behove us in a yet stronger manner to gain new ones to succeed them, if we may so express ourselves?

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The only proper light in which this point can be viewed, is that of the colony to which our emigrations shall be directed: all countries lose their emigrants, for none are to be found in which all the people stay at home: nations that have colonies lose them in order to gain: such as have not colonies lose them intirely: Great Britain has likewise at her disposal a regular emigration of foreigners, and can plant them where she pleases; thus with her it is not an inquiry whether there shall be any emigration or not, but whether the regular one shall be to one place or to another. Shall it be to the continent of North America, which we expect in half a century to become independent, or shall it be to islands in the richest climates of the world, that may prove beneficial colonies, when our present ones are no more so?

These considerations point out the great expediency of forming settlements in the Pacific Ocean, since the commercial and manufacturing interest equally demand it: but even the expeditions of curiosity would be rendered infinitely more effective, and be far more commodiously executed if there was a secure port fortified and garrisoned at Otaheite, or one of the neighbouring islands. The ships would then have a secure retreat; and vessels might from thence be dispatched every way upon discoveries, at half the expence and trouble which is at present experienced in going from England so long a voyage, and to enter immediately on the business of discovery. A trade might certainly be so established that would prove of very high importance, and secure no inconsiderable export of our manufactures.

S U A C H E N, on the Red Sea, the most considerable port on that sea in Ethiopia: the very name of this place is at present scarcely known in England, nor is any idea current, even among people conversant in trade of its present state; for this reason we shall here insert an account of it, written about

the year 1670, which should instigate the present enquirers to discover, if it has experienced any increase or decline.

Suachen is one of the richest cities of the Orient, situated within the Arabique gulph, on the coast of Æthiopia sub Egypto, and amongst all the famous cities of trade in the Orient this is accounted equal, if not superior to them in four things; the first in the goodness and security of the haven; the second in the facility and good service for lading and unlading of ships; the third in the traffic with very strange and remote people and countries, and of divers behaviours; the fourth in the strength and situation of the city. As for the goodness and security of the port, nature hath so made it, that it is defended from all storms whatsoever; the haven is capacious and large, of smooth tides, the ground good, and able in circuit to hold 300 great sail of burthen, with water at all times from six to twelve fathom; the ships are laden round about the whole circumference of the city, casting only a plank into the merchants warehouses where their wares are kept; and the gallies fastening themselves to the stones and doors of their houses, set their prows over the sheets, and by them, as by bridges, they are commodiously laden or unladen; and secondly as touching the traffic and navigation thereof, few cities can in these parts be compared with it; for this city is found to have traffic with all India intra and extra Gangem, that is Cambaia, Tanacerim, Pegu, Mallacca, and with the Arabick, with Judœa, Cairo, and Alexandria, and with all Æthiopia, and the land of Abexi; from whence it gathereth great abundance of gold and ivory: thirdly, for the situation of it; for it is such as if nature had framed it purposely for a royal mart; for it is an island round in form, incompassed with many holds and flats for defence of the port and city, occupying and taking up the whole body of the island,

island, so that it may as properly be named an island of a city, as a city in an island; for there is no one foot of waste ground upon the whole island, but is employed in housing and magazines.

It is now the principal port town in these seas belonging to Prester Jean, from whose court, called Dombia, it is twenty-five days journey by Caravan; and the concourse of merchants is here so great, that twenty caravans are yearly found to set out hence towards several parts of the neighbouring regions. The commodities they carry are all kinds of Indian cloathing, and also of our English commodities, as broad cloath, kerseys, lead, and tin; likewise velvets, damasks, sattins, taffeties, and all other sorts of silk stuffs; their colours most desired are reds, greens, violets, murries, and other light colours.

The commodities here abounding are these, civet in great quantity, waika, elephant's teeth also plenty, wax, gold, tin, and lead; but the Turks will not suffer any to be brought hither through their dominions, for they hold it a contraband commodity; from Grand Cairo there goeth always in August a great caravan for these parts*.

S T A T E, (present, of Denmark.) The government of Denmark has for many years given great attention to every thing that seemed promising, in favour of trade and manufactures: the means chiefly taken are to lower, and in some instances, totally to take off the duties upon exportation, which in several material articles had been so high, as much to cramp the industry of the people. Another means taken has been to encourage the building of ships, and the transport of all commodities on Danish bottoms; in this there has been some progress made in several towns in Denmark, and a few in Norway; for the government has a

* Roberts's Map of Commerce, p. 82, fol. 1700, 4th edit.

list of every ship, belonging to the king's dominions, and regular advice of every one that is built or broken up. This intelligence, which is had without any expence, is of the utmost importance, as the ministry see at once the variation in the shipping; if they increase at one place remarkably, they enquire, and make themselves masters of the reason, that the same course may be rendered alike active in other places. If they decrease, the same knowledge is gained, and by discovering the evil the moment it is in being, are able to provide a remedy; when they know why the shipping decreases, they can properly apply their encouragement, so as to make it the most effectual. The utility of this measure has best manifested itself in the effects, for I have been assured on very good authority, that in the last twelve years there has been an increase of above 30 sail of ships, and at the same time, that the general burthen of all is much higher. This is an extreme good sign, for nothing marks so well the state of commerce, as the increase or decrease of national shipping; no nations have ever made any figure in trade, without great quantities of shipping, the thing we know is possible, but still all the facts that history gives us are against it: that nation that is carrier to all the rest, will presently be master of the trade of all the rest.

Denmark, it is true, possesses very few commodities to send out to her neighbours. Norway, in this respect however is rich, her timber is an inexhaustible store for exporting in her own ships; but this is not the only object, for the Danish ministry have justly observed, that the trade of no nation is in proportion to its products. The commerce in England is infinitely beyond what its products would originally seem to entitle it to; and what are the products of Holland? Yet the trade of the Dutch has been by far the greatest in
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the world. It is thought in the North, that the poor nations are to draw the trade to themselves from their rich neighbours, and not upon very bad grounds; for the great wealth of those countries which have long been in possession of much commerce, renders every thing in it so dear, that its manufactures cannot find a sale any where but at home, the consequence of which is, that their trade by degrees migrates to much poorer countries. Upon these foundations it is, I apprehend, that the Danish politicians look for a greater commerce than the mere line of products at first sight entitles them to.

The attention which the two or three last kings have given to the encouragement of every thing useful, but especially his late majesty, has had such a strong effect, as is visible to all Denmark. The people are increased considerably, which I take to be the best sign of all others; and this has been pretty general through Norway, Jutland, Sleswic, Holstein, and the Isles. An exact register of population has been kept for near thirty years, by which it appears that the increase is pretty regular in all those countries, which shews that it is owing to a general order and attention in government, which spreads equally over the kingdom, nor is this increase without another reason, and that not an impolitic one; it is the accession which the king's territories receive from foreigners. Great encouragement has for some years been given to all who will settle in any part of his dominions, which has been such an inducement, that the number of Germans who have arrived is very considerable; many tracts of the king's demesnes in Sleswic and Holstein are entirely peopled with Germans, who have settled there for the sake of lands being given them, to cultivate for many years without paying any rent. Some of the great kingdoms in Europe complain of a declining population,
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and with reason, according to the general accounts; it is certain that France falls short four millions of people, from the number she had in the best time of Lewis XIV's reign. And this decline of population in the richest kingdoms, and the increase of it in Denmark, is certainly a sign that the affairs of this country are on the flourishing hand.

The next article which I shall mention is commerce. There is no comparison between the present trade of Denmark, and what it was thirty years ago: scarcely any thing has been omitted by the government that could promote and enlarge the commerce of the kingdom. Besides the registry of ships and the increase of the number and tonage of them, there have been numerous advantages given to trade, which shew themselves in most of the branches of the nation's dealings with other countries. These have had such an effect as leaves no room to be mistaken. After numerous obstacles were overcome, they succeeded in establishing an East-India company; the commerce of which does not indeed make the figure of some others, but the affairs of it are in good order, the trade increasing, and the profit considerable and regular, which is more than can be asserted of several others. The colonies in the West-Indies thrive more than ever, though not very considerable; and the general commerce with Europe is greatly increased, of which there cannot be better proofs than a rise in the crown revenues, and an increase of population and shipping.

But the trade depends on, and is much connected with the manufactures of the kingdom. Twenty books assert that the Danes have no fabrics: those who wrote so fifty years ago, spoke truth; but unfortunately they have been copied by others down to the very present day, although that former truth is such no longer. There has been a great turn in the
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the Danish commerce from the change in this point; for formerly they imported every thing they used, even to the most common articles of cloathing, and the implements, instruments, machines, furniture, &c. used. These ruinous importations are not totally done with yet, but many of them are cut off, by supplying themselves through the excellent means of establishing manufactures, which has been set about with great and real spirit, and attended to with so much care, that the number increases every day, so that there is the greatest reason to expect a constant diminution on the expensive imports which has been hitherto, and cannot fail of being in future a circumstance infinitely advantageous to the kingdom.

The improvements in agriculture which have been made with the same attention and care, are very great and conspicuous in divers parts of all the king's dominions; and nothing can exceed the means which have been taken in this work to accomplish the end; the former bad state of the kingdom was greatly owing to the misery under which the peasants groaned. This has been every where mollified; they have had numerous edicts in their favour; villainage is in many districts abolished, and the nobles and gentry prevented, by severe laws, from trampling upon the lower classes, in the manner they too commonly did formerly. The late king sent several very able men to travel through England, in order to report to him on their return the peculiarities, laws, customs, and conduct which in that kingdom seemed most conducive to the well being of husbandry. Their journey was executed with great ability, and from their memoirs his majesty and his ministers were enabled to judge what was, and what was not practicable in Denmark. The grand articles were to give more freedom to the class of cultivators, to secure their property, to abolish multipliable taxes,

taxes, and to let farms on long leases, with covenants of improvement. These were the great heads of the report, and the points upon which they most insisted, as those which were of the greatest benefit in England. They offered numerous inferior ones upon the particular conduct of certain soils, upon draining, manuring, ploughing, &c. Implements were sent over as patterns, and some ingenious men to instruct the Danes in the use of them: and the king in order to preserve the knowledge thus gained, fixed these with handsome salaries on his crown lands with their implements, and directed each to manage a given quantity of land, according to the English husbandry. The men who worked under them for three years, were then changed, and sent to other estates, and fresh ones instructed, and the implements were in course multiplied with all of them; so that at this time there are a vast number in constant use in different parts of the kingdom. The effects of such measures as these must in the nature of them be very slow, but still they are real, and increasing. But the consequences of the principal parts of the scheme have been rapid and great, particularly the letting lands on leases of improvement, which the king put in execution upon the crown-lands immediately, and upon a large scale; and by his recommendations to the nobility, &c. and granting privileges to estates in this management, the method spreads so much, that if the spirit which now animates the kingdom, lasts but for half a century, I believe Denmark will be as well cultivated as many parts of England, and those not the worst. Another encouragement which his late majesty gave to agriculture, was ordering the best books on that subject in the French, English, and German languages, to be translated into Danish, and many complete sets of these he made presents to such of his subjects as made themselves at all known

known by any undertakings in agriculture, that were beyond the common practice. He also published the offer of considerable premiums to be annually distributed among the tenants of the royal demesnes, who excelled the most in such and such works.

Copenhagen principally flourishes from the residence of the court: this is much the most brilliant object in Denmark, from the accounts they gave me; for I had no opportunity of viewing it myself. There are many great officers of state with considerable appointments; these with the numerous inferior ones, and the guards, must render the town very gay. The Danish army is kept in very good order, and well disciplined; the men are picked, and their cloathing is in general very neat. They are not all embodied at a time, but they could draw together at no long notice, about 40,000 men, with a fine train of artillery, and all stores proportioned. This renders the king a respectable monarch in the military light among the powers of the North; and has certainly been one reason for the long peace, in which two or three very wise kings have kept their dominions. Denmark has nothing to fear from any of its neighbours, except Russia, with whom she cannot compare in force; and the disputes which have long subsisted between the crown of Denmark and the duke of Holstein, would have brought her into no little trouble, had Russia interfered, and called upon her for an immediate settlement of them: whether this is likely to happen cannot be ascertained; but certainly the situation will remain very disagreeable and precarious, until it is completely decided. As the government of Sweden is now modelled, Denmark is an overmatch for her. But in any quarrel with the powers of the Baltic, Denmark would find her fleet of the greatest use in preserving her from the resentment of Russia, for the

the navy of this kingdom is much superior to that of the Russian empire in every particular; in number and goodness of the ships; in artillery, order, seamen, magazines, &c. and the harbour of Copenhagen is beyond comparison better than that of Petersburg or any other port belonging to the Russians on the Baltic; so that it would be no easy matter for that empire, with all her strength, to bring it to bear on Denmark: nothing could effect it but making herself superior at sea, and the harbour and docks, &c. at Petersburg, are not at all calculated for that end: and I am inclined to believe from the information I have received that the crown of Denmark is much better able to increase its navy than Russia; and is in possession of ten times the hardy, ready bred seamen, so that an attentive care to keep himself master upon the Baltick sea, will secure the king against any attempts from Russia, much better than any other means. By land he is very secure, for no Russian army can get at him.

The revenues of Denmark have been encreasing gradually for fifty years; but the two last kings at the same time that they did many great things for the good of their subjects, and the ornament of their kingdom, and even abolished some taxes that were the most burthensome, greatly improved the royal income. Mr. Molesworth computed them at six hundred and forty thousand pounds a year, but they are now upon the best computation I could procure near one million two hundred thousand pounds; and in some years much exceed that sum. This appears no great matter in England; but in Denmark it is an immense sum, from the great cheapness of every commodity the crown can want to buy at home. His army, if subsidies be reckoned, and the great numbers to whom he finds nothing but arms, costs him nothing, though there have been some years in which Denmark has been without any treaties of subsidy. His navy is maintain-
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ed at a very easy rate: the number in constant pay in times of profound peace, is not considerable; the rest are obtained by a month's pay in the year to be ready at a call, and which they find a most excellent way; so that the expence of the navy is little more than the building and rebuilding ships, and filling the stores and magazines: an army and navy most certainly is not to be kept for nothing, or for a trifle. All I mean by these observations is, that they cost the king of Denmark, incomparably less, than the usual sum allotted in other countries for those services; which makes his revenue, which at first sight appeared but small, to be in reality very considerable. It is well known that the two last kings saved considerable sums out of it; and one of them cleared off all the debts of the crown besides. Such a circumstance is essential in the history of the present state of a country; for it shews in what manner its affairs are conducted, and how well its revenue is able to answer all the calls of the state; which is upon the whole a great proof that the country is flourishing, and perhaps it is one that is not at all equivocal; for I am doubtful whether great national debts, when they increase to an enormous amount, do not bring as much mischief with them as they did service to the state in contracting them.

It is also to be observed here, that the increase of the royal revenue of Denmark, has been almost solely owing to a general improvement in the riches and welfare of the nation, and not in a single instance, to the addition of taxes. The increase of trade, the establishment of manufactures, and the improvement of lands, have all added to the general income of the people, and increased the number of the people themselves; and where taxes are at all general, as they are in Denmark, and indeed in most of the countries of Europe, all increase of income immediately makes taxes more productive;

tive; because the same taxes produce more in proportion as the wealth of the people increases, and as they consequently can afford to make a more free use of the things and commodities that are taxed. From hence it follows, that Denmark is not to be supposed poor, in proportion to the increase of the king's revenues, but, on the contrary, rich; and while taxes continue without increase or alteration, the product of them marks very exactly the general increase or decrease of the national stock and revenue, which is a circumstance that should never be lost sight of, by those who take any trouble in considering the state of Denmark.

I may from these particulars, which are collected from such information as I had very good reason to trust to, venture to draw this general deduction, that the state of this kingdom is flourishing, being in every circumstance on the improvement. The people increase, they are richer; the revenue of the crown is more than doubled without the addition of fresh taxes; numerous manufactures are established; much commerce acquired and encouraged, and in general the people are in a far better state and condition than some years ago. These facts are of importance to be known; for every man who wishes to be well acquainted with the transactions and present state of the world, ought to know how these circumstances vary, particularly in the several kingdoms of Europe, which it is extremely plain cannot be learned from books written many years ago: all the affairs of a kingdom are liable to change very much, and it is only from fresh intelligence therefore, that a just idea can be carried on. Nor should the inhabitants of Britain, of France, or of any other great kingdom or empire, most interested on the theatre of Europe, neglect the affairs of their smaller neighbours. The greatest empires rise from small beginning

ginnings, and the most trifling kingdoms sometimes meet with opportunities for appearing with distinguished eclat in the affairs of the world. Denmark is no trifling kingdom; though not considerable when compared with some others in Europe.*

SWEDEN. The trade of Sweden, and indeed every thing else in the kingdom, was left in a most miserable condition at the conclusion of the war with Muscovy, immediately after the death of Charles XII. Such a languor succeeded, that had not much attention been given to improvement, and a change in the constitution ensued, it would have taken at least a century to have recovered, and perhaps much more. Many of the wounds then received are not yet healed; there are tracts of country in many of the provinces, which once were well peopled, that are at this day deserts; and the ravages of the Russians destroyed some valuable copper mines, which are not yet recovered. Within these twenty years much has been done to spread improvements, so that the country wears a fine face; but all this is not to be called a creation of new industry, much of it is only a renovation of that which it long ago enjoyed.

The modern improvers, who have pushed most of the advantageous laws which have been made of late years in favour of commerce, &c. had one principal aim, which was certainly very meritorious; it was to force the Swedes either to manufacture for themselves, or to go without the commodities formerly imported from abroad; many laws were made with this view, and which at last ended in an almost general prohibition to foreign fabrics. This was very well meant, but it was driving too fast, and has had some consequences of a complexion by no means agreeable. It is true, several manufactories were established in different parts of the king-

* Marshall's Travels, Vol. II. p. 290.

dom, to enable the people to perform for themselves, and some of them succeeded well, but it is a business of much longer time to make a people a manufacturing nation. The attempt to do it at once was not only unsuccessful, but was attended with several evils to the whole kingdom. Sweden imported, it is true, large quantities of manufactures, but then she paid for all of them, or at least for much the greatest part, with the products of her soil; such as copper, iron, timber, ships, flax, hemp, pitch, tar, furs, skins, &c. so that the nobleman who dressed himself in French or English cloths, his wife who wore French and Italian silks, and all who expended their revenue in any foreign import, did at the same time encourage the lower classes of the people, and indeed assist the whole state by exporting the above products, in proportion to the goods so imported and worn. The legislature falsely imagined that foreigners could not do without those products they bought of Sweden, and paid for with their manufactures; they suppose they would buy in the same proportion, and pay for them with money, but this was at best a delusion, for other nations knew their interests as well as the Swedes, and immediately transferred a vast portion of their trade to Norway and Russia; the consequence of which has been that the copper and iron works in every province in the kingdom are discontinued for want of the old demand; and a great number of hands once employed in the timber trade, have ever since stood still. That this representation has much truth in it appears from several articles of the prohibition being taken off; which shews that the legislature themselves thought they had gone too far, when they began in their private estates to feel the ill effects of it; but the act was done, and the mischief was irremediable; the trade was gone; so that the partial revocation was of no use. This has made

made them redouble their activity in establishing manufactures, which may in time recover the blow by varying the former advantage; but it must be a work of some years.

Trade now flourishes in Sweden, the people are very attentive to it, and some of the laws that have been made to discover it have had good effect. The shipping belonging to the kingdom is much increased in the last thirty years; they export more of their commodities in their own bottoms than formerly; which has in every respect proved a very advantageous thing to them. All their shipping, and every article of naval stores are their own product; so that an increase of it is gaining one of the most advantageous markets in the world. Indeed, a very considerable article of trade with them is building ships for sale, in which articles the French and Dutch are the best purchasers. The former it is well known once bought a fleet of nine sail of men of war of the line of them, at one time; and the Dutch are regular purchasers of some merchant ships; but the chief increase of their ship building has been for themselves, in consequence of an increase of their foreign trade, which it is supposed is now on comparison with what it was thirty years ago, as five to three, tonnage reckoned.

The establishment of the East-India commerce has been of much consequence to them in this article of ship building, and indeed to all the other branches of commerce in the kingdom; for East-India goods were before bought with cash, without bringing in any advantages by ship building, or the employment of seamen; but now, the government has obliged the company to export to the Indies a great quantity of Swedish manufactures; all which exportation is clear profit, besides the circumstances mentioned above. This establishment of an East-India company in Sweden, employed the speculation

of all the trading part of Europe, who pronounced it a visionary scheme, and one which could not possibly answer; but experience has now told them, that nothing was less just than this condemnation, for the whole kingdom of Sweden is supplied by it, and there is a pretty considerable quantity of India goods exported to Poland, also some to Germany, and a few to Russia; all which are very great and considerable advantages, compared with the time when they themselves bought their whole home consumption of the English and Dutch.

Another scheme of trade which has been partly executed, though not entirely, is to import all their West-India commodities in their own bottoms; this was not an easy matter to execute, for it is contrary to the laws of all the nations that have colonies in that part of the world; but certain it is, that in spite of all obstacles of this sort, they do purchase large quantities of sugar, rum, &c. in the the West-India islands, and another channel through which they do this business, is through the Bahama islands, where they buy from the account of Boston merchants, goods which came from the English islands. This plan is not brought fully to bear; but if they get it to be quite successful, it will make a considerable deduction from the navigation of England, and add to that of Sweden.

Building ships for foreigners, has lately received a very laudable bounty of ten shillings a ton, which is one of the best considered measures that could have been executed; and if this bounty was to be raised so high as to enable the Swedish ship carpenters to undersell the English and Dutch ones by many per cent. in their own yards, it would be a most political measure, and perhaps give the kingdom a more advantageous market for most of her staple commodities, than all their other methods put together.

Among

Among the manufactures which they have been eager to establish, the principal is the woollen. They have in coarse cloths made some progress, and begin to work some that are fine; an improvement which has been much owing to their gaining a better breed of sheep from England, and which have been dispersed with much assiduity over most parts of the kingdom. Their own wool was a great impediment in their way; for it was of so bad and coarse a texture, that it would not do even for coarse cloth, without being mixed with that of Poland; for these purposes they import great quantities from that kingdom; and it is very well for them that they have a neighbour so little knowing in her own interest, as to permit the exportation of her raw products to be wrought up by other nations: not however that the Poles do not understand their own interests, but they have the curse of such a constitution, that nothing for the real advantage of the country can go forward for half an hour. By means of Polish wool mixed with the worst of their own, the Swedes make tolerable coarse cloths and other fabrics; and the best they import from Poland, mixed with the best of their own, makes a finer cloth that sells well at home, and precludes the import of any but the finest of all worn by the nobility and gentry of considerable fortunes. Their manufacture of the coarse sort is so enlarged by degrees, that they have for some years exported small quantities of it to Poland, which shews how far they have been able to carry their point.

Besides these woollen fabrics, which are in a way of proving considerable enough to stop totally all importation in time, they have also established some of linen, but these are not yet advanced so far as the former; they make large quantities of a coarse sort, which sells well amongst the common people, but all the higher classes of inhabitants use that

which comes from England, Holland, or Germany. Preventing this importation, is a favourite object with them at present; but the best judges of their trade think they will never be able to effect it.

Much the greatest manufactories in Sweden are those of hard ware. They work and cast their copper and iron into many forms, and make of them a great variety of implements, utensils, and materials, for manufacturing such as bars and plates of copper and iron, various sorts of wire, great guns, and numerous other articles in the foundery way. The number of mines of copper and iron in the kingdom is very great, and the forges that work constantly, notwithstanding the decrease explained above, form the most considerable employment of this sort in the nation. They export vast quantities of iron annually, for which England, Holland, and France, are their best customers; but the English pay them a balance of trade amounting to some hundred thousand pounds annually, of which iron and timber are the principal articles they take; whereas the French pay them in nothing but wines, brandies, and manufactures. Formerly they brought great quantities of paper; but the Swedes now supply themselves nearly with all they use, except the finer sorts. Of all the articles of their trade, iron and timber, are the most considerable; and the best politicians among them are strongly of opinion, that these articles being of the most certain dependance, such as foreign nations can least do without, and such as are most natural in all the operations concerning them, to their own people, ought principally to be encouraged. Much has of late years been done in favour of these branches; for all the ranks of owners of lands have found that the prosperity of them has the same influence in raising the rental and value of their estates, as improvements in agriculture itself; and for which reason it is to

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be expected that they will never neglect this part of their domestic oeconomy.

Respecting the improvements which have been made in their husbandry, taken at large, the grand article has been the preventing the importation of corn from abroad; high duties at first, and then a prohibition have in this instance been attended with every effect they could wish. By quick degrees they introduced the culture of wheat in many provinces, which before had never thought of such an article of cultivation; and by taking several proper measures for encouraging the peasantry, the point has been so thoroughly carried, that Sweden at present raises as much corn as she consumes, and in some years more, so that a small exportation has taken place more than once.

Encouragement has also been given in Sweden to several other things, particularly in the making great roads, in improving some inland navigations, and also to the body of artists in the kingdom. Respecting roads, there are few kingdoms in Europe where they are so bad, nor have the inhabitants been able in any one province, even with the assistance they have received from the legislature in enabling them to raise provincial taxes for that purpose, to do the work effectually. I am told there are one or two great roads pretty tolerably made, but it has been done by concentrating the whole expence of the province on that single point, and totally neglecting all others within it. Wherever I have travelled, except close to the metropolis, they are dangerously bad. Indeed, the good parts hold but a very little way out of Stockholm. There have been many deliberations in the senate upon this evil; but the general opinion is, that it will never be remedied to any effect.

There are some rivers in different parts of the kingdom, which wanted only small obstructions to

be removed, and which the government have enabled the people to render navigable by provincial taxes. There have been many proposals for increasing the number, but they go on very slowly in it, and never will make any great figure in this branch of improvement. Indeed, Sweden wants exertions of this sort less than any country I know, for the whole kingdom is cut and intersected in an amazing degree by lakes and rivers, and they have a sea coast prodigiously extensive, so that there can scarcely be a production that is not within reach of a navigation.

The encouragement given to artists of various sorts, is much better adapted to the improvement and advantage of the nation. The Swedish artists, except in working rough timber and iron, are surprisingly deficient. The means hitherto taken to remedy this evil, have been by offering premiums, by regulating apprenticeships, and by procuring workmen from several countries; but hitherto they have not performed much.

At the same that I procured this information, I made enquiries into the state of their public revenues and military power. The revenues of the kingdom are not at all improved, a piece of information which much surprized me; for I conceived that all the improvements of which I have been giving an account, must have much increased the revenue of individuals, and consequently that of the public; but the contrary is the case, and which is mostly owing to the evil which I before noticed attending the sudden prohibition of foreign manufactures; for as I there set forth, the ill consequences of depriving a vast number of people of an old market for their wood, iron, &c. the mischief was felt by the public income, as well as by those individuals; for the manufactures which were then prohibited, paid considerable customs on importation,

portation, most of which were lost by that measure; so that the revenue, which, all taken together, amounted before that measure to about twelve hundred thousand pounds a year, scarcely reaches that sum at present, although several new taxes upon articles of luxury have been since laid on. Several persons much experienced in the revenue, assert, that it will be many years before it recovers these strokes: that all the late improvements must have time to ripen into perfection, and spread a free and considerable circulation through the kingdom, before the national coffers will fill from them.

As to the military power of the Swedes, the change in the constitution after the death of Charles XII. sunk it entirely to the militia, except a few guards for the king's person; the former is entirely upon the old system, they are maintained by the farmers; but the number which was once 60,000 men, is not at present more than 42,000; however, they are very well disciplined, and sufficient for the defence of the kingdom, against any force that is likely to march against it. Sweden has nothing to fear but from Russia; and whilst she leaves the conquered provinces peaceably in the hands of the Muscovites, which undoubtedly she will do, there is not any danger of their disturbing her possession of the remainder. The fleet of Sweden was once pretty considerable, amounting to forty good ships of war, but it is much declined. They could not send out to sea twenty sail of the line in good order, so that their power is not equal to that of Denmark by sea; nor that of Russia. These are circumstances in which Sweden has been very remiss; it is saving money to a very bad purpose; for a nation that wishes to be possessed of a considerable trade and commerce, should never neglect her marine, which ever was, and ever must be essential to the preservation and well being of trade; and
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this shews that the ideas of national improvement in Sweden are but crude, and not near brought to that degree of propriety as to produce those new and great advantages they want. Nothing is of so much importance to a trading power as a maritime force; for all commerce without it is precarious. France has made for a century immense efforts for raising a great trade, but all of them have been nearly unsuccessful from her being more solicitous in the same period to keep up a formidable army, than a strong and well regulated navy, sufficient to guard her commerce in times of war. Nothing is so difficult to rear as a trade that has been once ruined. It is a great mistake to suppose that the present state of France contradicts this maxim; on the contrary, it confirms it; for France once possessed a flourishing trade, but it hath never arose again to its former prosperity, after once being demolished by a superior force at sea. The bringing home the product of colonies can scarcely be called trade, which may be done as well almost without a navy as with it, and which is evident in the course of the communication between France and her colonies, after the total destruction of her shipping by the English, in every war from King William's time to the present*.

T.

TA X E S have been established in all ages of the world under different names of tribute, tythe, tally, impost, duty, gabel, custom, subsidy, excise, and many others needless to recapitulate, and foreign to my subject to examine. I understand by tax, in its most general acceptation, a certain contribution of fruits, service, or money im-

* Marshall's Travels, Vol. II. p. 354.

posed

posed upon the individuals of a state by the act or consent of the legislature, in order to defray the expences of government.

This definition may, I think, include in general all kinds of burthens which can possibly be imposed. By fruits are understood either those of the earth, of animals, or of man himself. By service, whatever man can either by labour or ingenuity produce, while he himself remains free. And under money is comprehended the equivalent given for what may be exacted in the other two ways.

I divide modern taxes into three classes. 1st. Those upon alienation, which I call proportional. 2d. Those upon possessions, which I call cumulative or arbitrary; and 3d. Those exacted in service, which I call personal.

A proportional tax presents a simple notion.

It is paid by the buyer who intends to consume at the time of the consumption, while the balance of wealth is turning against him; and is consolidated with the price of the commodity.

Examples of this tax are all excises, customs, stamp-duties, postage, coinage, and the like.

By this definition, two requisites are necessary for fixing the tax upon any one: first, he must be a buyer; secondly, he must be a consumer.

A cumulative or arbitrary tax presents various ideas at first sight, and cannot well be defined until the nature of it has been illustrated by examples.

It may be known, *imo*, By the intention of it; which is to affect the possessor in such a manner as to make it difficult for him to augment his income, in proportion to the tax he pays.

2do, By the object, when instead of being laid upon any determinate piece of labour or consumption, it is made to affect past, and not present gains.

3tio, By the circumstances under which it is levied, which imply no transition of property from hand

hand to hand, nor any change in the balance of wealth between individuals.

Examples of cumulative taxes, are land taxes, poll taxes, window taxes, duties upon coaches and servants, that upon industry in France, and many others.

A personal tax is known by its affecting the person, not the purse of those who are laid under it. Examples are the *corvée* in France, the six days labour on the high roads, and the militia service before pay was allowed in England.

Having thus explained what I mean by proportional, cumulative, and personal taxes, it is proper to observe, that however different they may prove in their effects and consequences, they all agree in this, that they ought to impair the fruits and not the fund; the expences of the person taxed, not the savings; the services, not the persons of those who do them.

The method in which proportional taxes are drawn back may be illustrated in this example.

A tanner sells his leather to a shoemaker; the shoemaker in paying the tanner for his leather, pays the tanner's subsistence and profit, and the tax upon leather.

The man who buys the shoes for his own consumption, refunds all this to the shoemaker, together with his subsistence, profit, and the tax upon shoes; consequently the price of shoes is raised only by refunding the taxes paid by the industrious.

But if the shoemaker's subsistence shall happen to include either tavern expences, or his consumption on idle days, he will not draw these back; because other shoemakers who do not frequent the tavern, and who are not idle, will undersell him: he must therefore take his extraordinary expence out
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of his profit; and if his profit be not sufficient, he must run in debt to the tavern keeper.

The extravagance and idleness therefore of particular workmen do not check industry, nor raise prices; for these will always be in proportion to demand, and there is no reason why demand should either rise or fall, because a particular workman is extravagant, or consumes a commodity not necessary for his manufacture or subsistence.

The way to carry proportional taxes to their utmost extent, is to draw all commodities to market, to engage every one to carry thither the whole produce of his industry, and buy whatever he stands in need of.

But which way will you engage either a farmer to sell his crop and buy subsistence from another, or a shoemaker, to sell his own and buy his neighbour's shoes? The thing is impracticable; and were it attempted, it would prove an arbitrary proceeding, and a cumulative tax laid upon their industry; a tax which by the nature of it they cannot draw back, and from this circumstance alone proceeds the whole oppression of it.

Let me next analyze the price paid by the last buyer, whom we have called the rich and idle consumer of the manufacture, who can draw nothing back from any body.

Is it not composed of the whole value of subsistence, of the work, of the profits, of the tax? The whole reimbursement of all former payments and repayments lands upon him. Those who have been at all the expence, appear in the light of his servants and agents, who have only advanced money upon his account.

How absurd therefore is it either to say that all taxes fall ultimately upon land; or as others, for no better reason, pretend that they fall upon trade. I say that

that this category of taxes which I have now been describing, never can fall upon, or affect any person but the idle; that is to say the not industrious consumer. If there be found a possibility for any consumer to draw back the tax he has paid, I say he is of the class of the industrious in one way or other; and I farther say, that such a tax raises the price of the commodity. But by drawing back, I understand that the repayment is an inseparable consequence of his having paid the tax. I do not for example say that a place-man draws back his taxes by the emoluments of his office; but I say a brewer draws backs his excise by the sale of his beer.

Let this principle also be retained, that with respect to the consumption of superfluities by the manufacturing classes, they must be considered as being of the class of the rich and idle, as much as the first duke in England. When therefore the extravagance of the manufacturing classes becomes general, and when the rate of the market can afford them great wages, relatively to the price of necessaries, such profits consolidate into the price of the manufacture. The statesman then must endeavour to create a competition by introducing fresh and untainted hands into such branches. This will be a sure check upon the industrious, and if rightly complied with, prevent all frauds, all pretences for the rise of the price of labour on account of taxes; and if carried to the full extent, will prevent any industrious person from enjoying either a day's idleness, or the smallest superfluity, except in consequence of his peculiar dexterity or extrinsic advantages.

The most familiar examples of cumulative taxes to an Englishman are tythes, land tax, window tax, and poors rates.

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The most familiar examples to a Frenchman are *taille*, *tourage* and *ustencil*, (which go commonly together) also the *capitation*, the *dixieme*, the *vingtieme*, and the *industrie*.

The nature of all these taxes is to affect the income, possessions, and profits of every individual, without putting it in their power to draw them back in any way whatever; consequently such taxes tend very little towards enhancing the price of commodities.

Those who come under such taxes do not always consider that their past industry, gains, or advantages of fortune, are here intended to suffer a diminution in favour of the state, for which outgoing they have perhaps made no provision.

When people of the lower classes, instead of being subjected to proportional taxes, are laid under such impositions, there results a great inconvenience. They are allowed to receive the whole profit of their industry, the state however reserving to itself a claim for a part of it: this instead of being paid gradually, as in a proportional tax, is collected at the end of the year, when they have made no provision for it, and consequently they are put to distress.

Besides, how hard is it to deprive them of the power of drawing back what they pay? And how ill judged to trust money with those who are supposed only to gain an easy physical necessity? An equivalent for procuring the articles of ease and luxury, should not be left in the hands of those who are not permitted to enjoy them.

From this we may conclude, 1. That the more such taxes are proportional to the subject taxed. 2. The more evident that proportion appears; and 3. the more frequently and regularly they are levied, the more they will resemble proportional taxes, and
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the less burthen will be found in paying them. Let me illustrate this by some examples.

The stoppage upon a soldier's pay, either for the invalids or Chelsea, is a cumulative tax; but the method of levying it, gives it all the advantages of one of the proportional kind. 1st, It bears an exact and determinate proportion to the value of his pay. 2dly, This proportion he knows perfectly. And 3dly, Instead of receiving the whole into his own possession, and paying the hospital at the end of the year, it is regularly and gradually retained from him at every payment.

Tythes are a cumulative tax; but they are accompanied with all the three requisites to make them light; although in other respects they are excessively burthensome. 1st, They bear an exact proportion to the crop. 2dly, This proportion is perfectly known. 3dly, Nature, and not the labour, makes the provision. But they fall upon an improper object; they affect the whole produce of the land, and not the surplus; which last is the only fund that ought to be taxed.

The taille, in many provinces of France, bears, first, a very exact proportion to the value of the land.

But in the second place, the proportion is entirely unknown to the man who pays it; being nowhere to be seen but in the offices of the intendant and his deputies.

And in the last place, the whole payment comes at once.

What hides, and consequently destroys, this proportion is, that after the distribution is laid at so many shillings in the pound of valuation, the full sum intended to be raised does not come in; either because the intendant has given exemptions to certain parishes on account of accidents, of sterility, hail,

hail, mortality among the cattle, and the like; or because the property of a part of the parish has fallen into the hands of people exempted from the taille; or that others who were really bound to pay part of it are become insolvent. The intendant must then make a second, and perhaps a third general distribution of the deficiency upon all the contributors in the most exact proportion to the first, but yet by their nature impossible to be foreseen. It is for these reasons chiefly that the taille in that kingdom is so grievous.

These second distributions of the tax, 1st, Destroy the proportion between the tax and the revenue taxed. 2dly, They make it impossible to judge of the amount of them. And lastly, the demand comes at once, when perhaps the money has been otherwise applied.

The French tax upon industry is more grievous still; because none of the three requisites above mentioned are allowed to operate.

This tax is supposed to be proportional to the profits made upon trade and other branches of industry, not having the land for their object. All merchants and tradesmen in cities and in the country pay the tax called industrie, and the reason given for establishing this tax is, in order to make every individual in the state contribute to the expence of it, in proportion to the advantages he reaps. Nothing would be more just, could it be put in execution, without doing more hurt to the state, than the revenue drawn from it can do good.

All the three requisites we have mentioned, are wanting in it. 1mo, By its nature, it can bear no exact proportion to the profits of the industrious man; since no body but the person taxed, can so much as guess at their extent.

2do, It cannot possibly be provided for, as no check can be put upon the imposer, unless so far

as general rules are laid down for each class of the industrious; and from these again, other inconveniences flow, as shall be observed.

3^{tho}, It comes at once upon poor people, who have been frequently forced to beg for want of employment, before the tax-gatherer could make his demand; and those who remain, frequently become beggars before they can comply with it.

From the examples I have given of this branch of taxation, I hope the nature of it may be fully understood, and that for the future no inconvenience will arise from employing the terms of cumulative tax.

A cumulative tax is the accumulation of that return, which every individual who enjoys any superfluity, owes daily to the state for the advantages he receives by living in the society.

The principal inconveniences alledged against proportional taxes, may be reduced to three.

1^{mo}, That they have the effect of raising the price of labour, and the produce of industry, and thereby prove hurtful to the prosperity of foreign trade.

2^{do}, That they discourage consumption, by carrying the prices of many things too high for people in a middling rank of life.

3^{tho}, That they are both expensive in the collection, and oppressive from the many restrictions put upon liberty, in order to prevent frauds. The amount of taxes diminishes no part of the produce of either land or industry; the whole amount of these remains entire to the subjects of the state.

The taxes are paid out of the money which circulates in the alienation of them; from which we have concluded that they must constantly be confined within a certain proportion to alienation. The imposition of taxes augments the mass of circulation, and makes it requisite for a statesman to contrive

contrive some method of increasing money in proportion to their increase.

The amount of proportional taxes is ultimately taken from the superfluity of the rich, whom we have called the idle consumers; they are advanced by one set of the industrious, and refunded by another, until at last they fall upon those who cannot draw them back from any body. These last may be said to pay the taxes, the others only to advance them.

If therefore we suppose all desire of defrauding out of the way, we shall find the whole burden of proportional taxes confined to the inconvenience of advancing their amount by the industrious, and to the payment of them by the rich, which proportionally diminishes their income. Where credit therefore is well established, where payments are regularly made by buyers to sellers, and where people proportion their expence to their free income, the weight of proportional taxes will be very small. I appeal to experience for the truth of this.

No objection can lie against proportional taxes, so far as they affect the industrious, because they draw them completely back. Great objections lie against cumulative taxes, when they affect the industrious, because they cannot draw them back, and consequently they may affect the physical necessity of the contributor, in case no profit should remain to him upon his labour. On the other hand, I think, little objection can be made to cumulative taxes, when they are imposed upon possessions which produce a visible annual revenue, clear to the proprietor. This is the nature of the dixiemes and vingtiemes in France, where the whole amount of the person's income is taken upon proper proof, and taxed in proportion to it, without any subsidiary or second levy's taking place, to make up a determinate sum.

In the cumulative taxes, the person who pays does not always perceive the reason of his paying. He imagines he is taxed only because it is known that he is able to pay a certain sum.

In the proportional, the deceit is of another nature. When a person buys a consumable commodity, which has paid an excise, he does not perceive that the price he pays for it comprehends a tax upon his past gains in favour of the public; but he concludes the whole to be necessary, in order to procure what he has an inclination to consume. An example will make this plain.

Suppose a tax laid upon wheel-carriages, and that every person in the state were liable to pay a certain sum in proportion to the number of carriages he has for his convenience. The tax-gatherer comes at the end of the year, and demands the sum. The person complains that he is not at liberty to have a coach or a chaise without paying duty for it; and while he has occasion for one carriage only, and has but one pair of horses, he is obliged to pay for several sets of wheels.

Now suppose this cumulative tax were turned into a proportional one, and that wheels were to pay a stamp-duty, or the like, into the hands of the wheel-wright. The price would immediately rise, but this rise would soon become familiar to the man who has the carriage, and he would then be no more hurt by this additional expence than if it had proceeded from some new and expensive fashion of wheels; in short, wheels would generally begin to bear an advanced price, and very soon no body would enquire how it came about, nor once complain of the tax.

TAXES, (Consequence of.) After the imposition, of taxes the individuals of a state, whose income is already formed, begin to pay greatly more than they used to do for every thing they consume. A

great

great part of this additional price goes to the public, and is thereby laid out for national purposes. The whole of such expences are thrown into circulation, as much as if the rich proprietors had laid it out upon articles entirely adapted to their own taste.

Is it not evident, that in this way of appropriating the income of a country, it must produce a more extensive encouragement to industry of all kinds, than if the proprietors only had spent it? They never would have thought of becoming merchants, or of setting up manufactures for the supply of foreign markets; their whole expence would have been calculated to supply their own wants, and it would have been indifferent to them whether these were supplied by natives or by strangers.

I have shewn that the great amount of taxes is taken from the income of those individuals whose fortune is already made, or whose daily profits are considerable: I have suggested how circumscribed the expence of this class must be when considered with respect to the employment it procures to the body of a people. Does not the experience of former ages show how apt private opulence is to sink into treasures, when a taste for industry does not animate the lower classes to create new objects of desire in the wealthy? Wherein is a state benefited by the luxurious gratifications of the rich, unless it be by the employment they procure for those who provide the objects of luxury? Those very gratifications are, in one sense, taxes upon the rich in favour of the industrious: they increase expence, and throw money into circulation. In Spain and Portugal, where industry is not introduced among the lower classes, it is the strangers who in effect levy such taxes upon them. Were the taxes they pay properly applied to the encouragement of the arts, instead of being appropriated to private purposes, and to enriching private men, whose taste

for expence is always circumscribed to the objects of their own wants, how soon should we see them vying with us in every market of Europe, and supplying themselves as far as their country is calculated for it?

When the amount of taxes is properly laid out in premiums for the encouragement of the industrious, the prices of labour, upon articles of exportation, may be brought so low, that all nations, who do not follow the example, must languish and decay. Luxury at home will then cease to hurt the trade of the nation. In her treaties of commerce she may throw open her ports to many articles of foreign consumption, without running any risque by such allowances; and, on the other hand, she will reap the greatest advantages from a reciprocal permission.

TAXATION (Extent of.) One good way to discover the nature of taxes is, to examine how far it may be possible to carry them.

I have said, that the object of taxes was income, and not stock. I have shewn how those of the proportional kind affect the income of stock already made, and persons who enjoy large profits upon their daily industry. I have pointed out the impropriety of cumulative taxes, when imposed upon such as draw nothing more from their industry than an easy subsistence; and I have given a general preference to those of the proportional kind, because they consequently imply both alienation and consumption: alienation in those who advance the taxes, consumption in those who pay them.

Could therefore taxes be levied upon every alienation, where consumption is implied, and that in proportion to the whole superfluity of those who are to consume, proportional taxes would be carried to their utmost extent.

The

The objects of alienation comprehend all that is in commerce among men, moveable and immoveable.

What is moveable, is generally consumable; what is immoveable, is generally not so.

As consumption is a requisite, together with alienation, in order to form a proper basis for proportional taxes, we see how contrary to principles it would be to tax the alienation of lands, houses, &c. in the same proportion as consumable commodities: these are funds, not income, and the money with which they are purchased must be considered in the light of a fund, while it is in the hands of the buyer; when once it comes into the hands of the seller of the immoveable objects, it frequently indeed partakes of the nature of income; that is to say, it is spent in the consumption of fruits and of the labour of man, and then it will be affected by taxes.

The next thing we are to consider is the state of circulation. As to that, we have frequently observed how it must be in proportion to alienation.

This proportion is not determined by the value or denominations of the money circulating, but by that value combined with the frequency of transitions from hand to hand; as the force of a cannon-ball is estimated by the weight of the ball, and the swiftness of the motion at the time it strikes.

Consumption comprehends every thing produced by the earth or by man: alienation is confined to that part which is exchanged between men; and sale, to that part of alienation which is exchanged for an equivalent in money.

Whatever part is consumed without alienation, ought, I think, to be out of the reach of proportional taxes, unless by some circumstance or another, it can be made to fall under the eye of the public, in a manner resembling its coming to market. Thus, a tax upon malt is levied at the malt-house,

as if it were sold to the maltster, although it be made for the consumption of the grower of the barley. In like manner, a tax on corn for bread may be levied either at the mill where it is ground, or at the oven where it is baked.

The worst kind of proportional taxes are those which are levied upon private manufacturing and upon unmanufactured consumption, where no alienation takes place. An example of the first we have in the excise upon malt, cyder, candles, &c. made in private houses for private use; the last is known in Holland, where a man cannot kill his own pig, or his own calf, without paying a tax. Were taxes of that nature extended to the making of bread, cooking of victuals, &c. I apprehend they would become of a nature more burthensome than any hitherto invented, unless public cooks were established, as public ovens are in many parts of France: in such cases taxes might be levied upon every part of consumption.

The last and principal requisite to render proportional taxes easy and light, is sale. There the burthen must be proportional to the buyer's purse; and if it prevents the consumption of the thing taxed, the defect will manifest itself.

Of these taxes, we may say, that they are in proportion to circulation; and, accordingly, we see how difficult it was to raise them, so long as circulation remained confined to the small quantity of coin in the country. As money increased, both by the increase of trade and alienations, they became more productive; and were the nature of them rightly understood, and were they properly imposed, they would soon be more generally adopted.

It is the duty of a statesman to augment the quantity of money, in proportion as he intends to multiply taxes on his people.

The money of a country bears no determinate proportion to circulation; it is the money circulating,

ing, multiplied by the number of transitions from hand to hand.

When a proportional tax is imposed, it is in a manner as if the state interposed at the time of alienation, and exacted of the purchaser a certain value in money, in proportion to the commodity, as the price of the permission, to acquire what his own industry had not produced. From this I draw the following consequence; that in proportion to the tax an additional sum of money is drawn into circulation, which would otherwise have remained in the pocket of the purchaser, consequently on imposing proportional taxes they cannot at first exceed that proportion of money which is found in the pockets of the consumers, over and above what they used to pay for what they consumed.

The truth of this proposition is established upon many facts. First, In countries where people keep their money locked up, proportional taxes are very well paid. Hence the great amount of the alcavala and cientos in Spain, which amount together to 14 per cent. upon every consecutive alienation of the commodities, chiefly indeed for the consumption of the rich.

Secondly, When excises were augmented in England, in the reign of king William, Davenant tells us that the price of the goods excised fell.

Thirdly, When a war has lasted any time in France, taxes cease to be so productive.

Are not all these, and many other appearances, resolved upon the same principle, viz. that taxes must come out of that money which exceeds what was necessary for carrying on alienation before they were imposed.

In Spain they draw money from the chests of the hoarders, and increase circulation for a while.

In England, during king William's wars, the quantity of money being very small, and trade being

ing very low, the tax upon malt could come out of no other fund than the price usually given for barley.

In France people are better acquainted with taxes, and the great bulk of excises are administered by the farmers, who never lower their price; so that the diminution of the mass of coin diminishes consumption.

But when methods can be fallen upon to increase money, according to the uses found for it, taxes will continue to produce, consumption will not diminish, and circulation will keep pace with them.

Could we suppose, that before the imposition of taxes, every person in a state had laid it down as a rule to spend the whole of his income, but none of his treasure, in the consumption of what is brought to market, it is plain, that in a luxurious nation, taxes might be carried so high as to draw the last farthing of the treasure into circulation, even though it were supposed to exceed the value which demand had fixed for all that was brought to market; but without a luxurious turn this would not be the case. There are countries abounding with coin which it is impossible to come at by proportional taxes: the reason is plain, the value which demand fixes upon the total of the articles of consumption, exposed to sale in the country, bears but a trifling proportion to the coin which remains locked up. This was the case in antient Greece. In that case, proportional taxes can never exhaust the treasure; because, were they to be made high upon articles of the first necessity, all the poor would starve; if upon articles of superfluity, demand would stop.

Proportional taxes, therefore, can only be raised in proportion to the desire of spending money; and as this desire depends upon the spirit of the people, so must the extent of taxes.

From what has been said, we may gather the principles which lead to the most extensive establishment of

of proportional taxes, viz. either to draw by particular regulations the whole real and gross produce of land and work to market, or at least to bring it under the eye of the state, in consequence of some modification or manufacture performed upon it, as was observed with respect to malt-houses, mills, and public ovens. When, by such contrivances, the whole gross produce falls under taxation, the proportional taxes must be gently laid on, and gradually raised, until they begin to interrupt consumption; then they must be diminished for a while, until dissipation increases; a case which will probably happen, as it commonly keeps pace with industry.

When proportional taxes are carried to their full extent, I then presume every one will be obliged to pay as much as possible: I do not mean that every one will be forced to pay to the extent of his abilities, but I say, that the generality will; and therefore were cumulative or personal taxes to be super-added on those who already pay all they can, they would by affecting them unequally, deprive many of their physical necessary, or small profits, and consequently destroy the proper balance of their competition. The setting the lower classes free from cumulative taxes will only have the effect of putting the growing wealth of the penurious and saving part of the industrious inhabitants out of the reach of taxation. This ought in good policy to be done. But farther, we have observed that taxes can only be increased in proportion to the spirit of dissipation in the people. To force money, therefore, out of the hands of those who do not incline to spend it, is forcing the spirit of the people; and if not tyranny, is at least great severity. Besides, these savings cannot escape being taxed, whenever they begin to produce an income; and allowing that they may be greatly accumulated and thrown
into

into trade, yet still they must in one way or other appear in alienation, and become subject to the proportional taxes. The only part therefore of the savings not affected by taxes will be confined to that which is locked up. This, in a prodigal nation, should never be touched. The inconveniences resulting to the state from so small an inequality of taxation is too trifling to be attended to, and too difficult to be prevented.

I come next to examine the extent of cumulative taxes.

If we suppose the proportional taxes to be carried to their full extent, there will be little place found for the cumulative, as has been said. The only objects left for them are the savings locked up, and the pure profits upon trade.

But let us suppose proportional taxes out of the question, as they must be when contrary to the spirit of a particular nation, and then enquire into the principles which regulate the imposition of cumulative taxes, in order to discover to what extent they may be carried, and what consequences may follow when they are brought to a height.

This branch has two objects: first, income, which is determinate; secondly, profits from industry, which are, and must be, very uncertain.

In imposing cumulative taxes upon income, it is very proper to consider the nature of every species of it, with respect to stability. Landed property is fixed, and cannot escape taxation, were the tax to be carried to the extent of the full income. Were the same proportion to be laid on houses, they would soon fall to ruin, because the annual proprietor would not keep them up. Like circumstances must be attended to in taxing every other article of revenue.

The method of ascertaining the value of this kind of property is, to oblige all leases to be recorded under

under a sufficient penalty. This is the method in France, for the sake of the contrôle, which is exacted upon recording them; and this no doubt facilitates the raising of the twentieth penny, which operates upon all such incomes.

The value once ascertained, the whole income is at the mercy of the state, in proportion to the impossibility of avoiding it by any change on the nature of the fund. It is from this circumstance that I call all such taxes arbitrary impositions. And I call them also cumulative, because the reason given by the statesman for imposing them is, that it is just every one should pay a general tax for the support of the state in proportion to his abilities.

As these taxes cannot be carried beyond the value of the income, which the proprietor cannot withdraw from under the burden, we see the impossibility of establishing them upon that income which proceeds from money. If a tax of so much per cent. be imposed upon money lent at interest, the lender may immediately call in his capital from his debtor, and send it away beyond the reach of the tax. If the calling it in be prohibited, then all credit is destroyed for the future, and no more money will be lent. If the statesman should incline to profit by the advantage found in securing money upon landed property, and if trusting to the desire monied men have of settling their capitals in that way, he should take one or more per cent. upon capitals so secured, it will still have the effect of hurting the credit of landed men, who have frequently no good security but their land to give.

Were cumulative taxes properly laid upon personal service, a regularity in levying them at short intervals, and according to some determinate proportion, would do a great deal towards communicating to them all the advantages of those of the proportional kind.

Thus

Thus a tax laid upon those who work by the day may be levied in such a manner as to be tolerably easy. A penny a-day, (or more if necessary) paid by every industrious man regularly once a-week, would soon enable him to raise his price in that proportion; but then deductions must be allowed for all accidental impediments; and were a plan to be concerted, many other considerations would enter into it, which it would be superfluous here to mention *.

TAXES relative to Government. Taxes, says Montesquieu, ought to be very light in despotic governments, otherwise who would be at the trouble of tilling the lands? Besides, how is it possible to pay heavy duties in a government that makes no manner of return to the different contributions of the subject?

The exorbitant power of the prince, and the extreme depression of the people, require that there should not be even a possibility of the least mistake between them. Taxes ought to be so easy to collect, and so clearly settled, as to leave no opportunity for the collectors to increase or diminish them. A portion of the fruits of the earth, a capitation, a duty of so much per cent. on merchandizes, are the only taxes suitable to that government.

TAXES proportioned to Liberty. It is a general rule that taxes may be heavier in proportion to the liberty of the subject, and that there is a necessity for reducing them in proportion to the increase of slavery. This has always been, and always will be, the case. It is a rule derived from nature, that never varies. We find it in all parts, in England, in Holland, and in every state where liberty gradually declines, till we come to Turkey. Swisserland seems to be an exception to this rule, because they

* Political Oeconomy, Vol. II. p. 484—541.

pay no taxes ; but the particular reason for that exemption is well known, and even confirms what I have advanced. In those barren mountains provisions are so dear, and the country is so populous, that a Swiss pays four times more to nature than a Turk does to the sultan.

A conquering people, such as were formerly the Athenians and Romans, may rid themselves of all taxes, as they reign over vanquished nations. Then indeed they do not pay in proportion to their liberty, because in this respect they are no longer a people, but a monarch.

Taxes may be increased in most republics, because the citizen, who thinks he is paying himself, cheerfully submits to them, and moreover is generally able to bear their weight from the nature of the government.

In a monarchy taxes may be increased, because the moderation of the government is capable of procuring opulence ; it is a recompence as it were granted to the prince for the respect he shews to the laws. In despotic governments they cannot be increased, because there can be no increase of the extremity of slavery.

Liberty produces excessive taxes ; the effect of excessive taxes is slavery ; and slavery produces a diminution of tribute.

It was the excess of taxes that occasioned the prodigious facility with which the Mahometans carried on their conquests. Instead of a continual series of extortions, devised by the subtle avarice of the Greek emperors, the people were subjected to a simple tribute, which was paid and collected with ease. Thus they were far happier in obeying a barbarous nation than a corrupt government, in which they suffered every inconvenience of lost liberty, with all the horror of present slavery.

TAXES,

TAXES, (Management of.) The managing of the revenues by commission, is like the conduct of a good father of a family who collects his own rents himself, with œconomy and order.

By this management of the revenues, the prince is at liberty to press or to retard the levy of the taxes, either according to his own wants, or to those of his people. By this he saves to the state the immense profits of the farmers, who impoverish it a thousand ways. By this he prevents the people from being mortified with the sight of sudden fortunes. By this the public money passes through few hands, goes directly to the treasury, and consequently makes a quicker return to the people. By this the prince avoids an infinite number of bad laws extorted from him by the importunate avarice of the farmers, who pretend to offer a present advantage for regulations pernicious to posterity.

When the lucrative profession of a farmer of the revenue becomes likewise a post of honour, the state is ruined. It may do well enough in despotic governments, where this employment is oftentimes exercised by the governors themselves. But it is by no means proper in a republic; since a custom of the like nature destroyed that of Rome. Nor is it better in monarchies; nothing being more opposite to the spirit of this government. All the other orders of the state are dissatisfied; honour loses its whole value; the gradual and natural means of distinction are no longer respected; and the very principle of the government is subverted*.

TAXES (Poll.) In general all poll-taxes even when not arbitrary, which they commonly are, may be esteemed dangerous: because it is so easy for the sovereign to add a little more, and a little more to

* Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. p. 325.

the sum demanded, that these taxes are apt to become altogether oppressive and intolerable. On the other hand, a duty on commodities checks itself; and a prince will soon find that an increase of the impost is no increase of his revenue. It is not easy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruined by such taxes.

Historians inform us that one of the chief causes of the destruction of the Roman state was the alteration that Constantine introduced into the finances by substituting an universal poll tax, in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excises, which formerly composed the revenue of the empire. The people in all the provinces were so grinded and oppressed by the publicans, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the Barbarians, whose dominion, as they had fewer necessities and less art, was found preferable to the refined tyranny of the Romans.

I shall conclude this subject with observing that we have with regard to taxes an instance of what frequently happens in political institutions, that the consequences of things are diametrically opposite to what we should expect on the first appearance. It is regarded as a fundamental maxim of the Turkish government, that the grand signior, though absolute master of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impose a new tax; and every Ottoman prince who has made such an attempt, either has been obliged to retract, or has found the fatal effects of his perseverance. One would imagine that this prejudice or established opinion were the firmest barrier in the world against oppression; yet it is certain that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor having no regular method of increasing his revenue, must allow all the bashaws and governors to oppress and abuse the subjects: and these he squeezes after their return from their

Vol. II. X government.

government. Whereas if he could impose a new tax like our European princes, his interest would so far be united with that of his people, that he would immediately feel the bad effects of these disorderly levies of money, and would find that a pound raised by general imposition, would have less pernicious effects than a shilling taken in so unequal and arbitrary a manner*.

Various taxes, says another writer, seem to be a rabble of oppressions serving to enrich those princes that exact them, and to make the people poor and miserable which endure them; especially in those countries where these burdens are laid at heavy rates, as 4, 5, 6, and 7 per cent. But when all the circumstance and distinction of places are duly considered, they will be found not only necessary, and therefore lawful to be used in some states, but also in divers respects very profitable to the commonwealth.

First, there are some states, as namely Venice, Florence, Genoa, the united provinces of the Low Countries, and others which are singular for beauty, and excellent both for natural and artificial strength, having likewise rich subjects: yet being of no very great extent, nor enjoying such wealth by ordinary revenues, as might support them against the sudden and powerful invasions of those mighty princes which do environ them; and are therefore enforced to strengthen themselves, not only with confederates and leagues, (which may often fail them in their greatest need) but also by amassing up store of treasure and munition by those extraordinary courses above-written, which cannot deceive them, but will ever be ready to make a good defence, and to offend or divert their enemies.

* Hume's Essays, Vol. I. p. 382.

Neither are their heavy contributions so hurtful to the happiness of the people as they are commonly esteemed; for as the food and raiment of the poor is made dear by excise, so doth the price of their labour rise in proportion, whereby the burden (if any be) is still upon the rich, who are either idle, or at least work not in this kind, yet have they the use, and are the great consumers of the poor's labour; neither do the rich neglect in their several places and callings to advance their endeavours according to those times which do exhaust their means and revenues; wherein if they should peradventure, fail, and therefore be forced to abate their sinful excess and idle retainers; what is all this but happiness in a commonwealth, when virtue, plenty, and arts, shall thus be advanced altogether? Nor can it be truly said that a kingdom is impoverished, where loss of the people is the gain of the king, from whom also such yearly incomes have their annual issue to the benefit of his subjects; except only that part of the treasure which is laid up for the public good, wherein likewise they who suffer have their safety, and therefore such contributions are both just and profitable.

Yet here we must confess, that as the best things may be corrupted, so these taxes may be abused, and the commonwealth notoriously wronged, when they are vainly wasted and consumed by a prince, either upon unworthy persons, such as deserve neither rewards nor countenance from the majesty of a prince, but these dangerous disorders are seldom seen, especially in such states as are aforementioned, because the disposing of the public treasure is in the power, and under the discretion of many; neither is it unknown to all other principalities and governments that the end of such excesses is ever ruinous, for they cause great want

and poverty, which often drives them from all order to exorbitance, and therefore it is common policy among princes to prevent such mischiefs, with great care and providence by doing nothing that may cause the nobility to despair of their safety, nor leaving any thing undone, which may gain the good-will of the commonality to keep all in due obedience*.

TRADE. Peace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities.

Trade has some relation to forms of government. In a monarchy it is generally founded on luxury; and though it be also founded on real wants, yet the principal view with which it is carried on is to procure every thing that can contribute to the pride, the pleasure, and the caprice of the nation. In republics, it is commonly founded on oeconomy: their merchants having an eye to all the nations of the earth, bring from one what is wanted by another. It is thus that the republics of Tyre, Carthage, Athens, Marseilles, Florence, Venice, and Holland, engaged in commerce.

This kind of commerce has a natural relation to a republican government; to monarchies it is only occasional: for as it is founded on the practice of gaining little, and even less than other nations, and of remedying this by gaining incessantly, it can hardly be carried on by a people swallowed up in luxury, who spend much, and see nothing but objects of grandeur.

Cicero was of this opinion, when he so justly said, "That he did not like that the same people

* England's Foreign Trade.

should

should be at once both lords and factors of the whole earth." For this would indeed be to suppose that every individual in the state, and the whole state collectively, had their heads constantly filled with grand views, and at the same time with small ones, which is a contradiction.

Not but that the most noble enterprizes are compleated also in those states which subsist by oeconomical commerce : they have even an integrity not to be found in monarchies ; and the reason is this :

One branch of the commerce leads to another ; the small to the moderate, the moderate to the great : thus he who has gratified his desire of gaining a little, raises himself to a situation in which he is not less desirous of gaining a great deal.

Besides, the grand enterprizes of merchants are always necessarily connected with the affairs of the public ; but in monarchies these public affairs give as much distrust to the merchants, as in free states they appear to give safety. Great enterprizes, therefore, in commerce, are not for monarchical, but for republican governments.

I do not pretend to say, that any monarchy is excluded entirely from an oeconomical commerce ; but of its own nature it has less tendency towards it. Neither do I mean, that the republics, with which we are acquainted, are absolutely deprived of the commerce of luxury, but it is less connected with their constitution.

With regard to a despotic state, there is no occasion to mention it. It is a general rule, that a nation in slavery labours more to preserve than to acquire ; a free nation more to acquire than to preserve.

It sometimes happens that a nation, when engaged in an oeconomical commerce, having need of the merchandizes of one country, which serve

as a capital or stock for procuring the commodities of another, is satisfied with making very little profits, and frequently none at all in trading with the former, in expectation of gaining greatly by the latter. It is a known fact that there are some kinds of merchandize in Holland, which though imported from afar, sell for very little more than what they cost upon the spot. They account for it thus: a captain who has occasion to ballast his ship, will load it with marble; if he wants wood for stowage he will buy it; and, provided he loses nothing by the bargain, he will think himself a gainer. Thus it is that Holland has its quarries and its forests.

Further, it may happen so that not only a commerce which brings in nothing shall be useful, but even a losing trade shall be beneficial. I have heard it affirmed in Holland, that the whale-fishery in general does not answer the expence; but it must be observed, that the persons employed in building the ships, as also those who furnish the rigging and provisions, are jointly concerned in the fishery. Should they happen to lose in the voyage, they have had a profit in fitting out the vessel.

A free port may be established in the dominions of states whose commerce is oeconomical: that oeconomy, in the government which always attends the frugality of individuals, is, if I may so express myself, the soul of its oeconomical commerce. The loss it sustains, with respect to customs, it can repair by drawing from the wealth and industry of the republic. But in a monarchy, a step of this kind must be opposite to reason; for it could have no other effect than to ease luxury of the weight of taxes. This would be depriving itself of the only advantage that luxury can procure, and of the only curb which, in a constitution like this, it is capable of receiving.

The freedom of trade is not a power granted to merchants to do what they please; this would be more properly its slavery. The constraint of the merchant is not the constraint of trade. It is in the freest countries that the merchant finds innumerable obstacles; and he is never less crossed by laws than in a country of slaves.

England prohibits the exportation of her wool; coals must be brought by sea to the capital; no horses, except geldings, are allowed to be exported; and the vessels of her colonies, trading to Europe, must take in water in England. The English constrain the merchant, but it is in favour of trade.

TRADE may be prejudicial. Riches consist either in lands or in moveable effects. The soil of every country is commonly possessed by the natives. The laws of most states render foreigners unwilling to purchase their lands; and nothing but the presence of the owner improves them; this kind of riches, therefore, belongs to every state in particular; but moveable effects, as money, notes, bills of exchange, stocks in companies, vessels, and in fine all merchandizes, belong to the whole world in general; in this respect it is composed of but one single state, of which all the societies upon earth are members. The people who possess more of these moveable effects than any other on the globe are the most opulent. Some states have an immense quantity, by their commodities, by the labour of their mechanics, by their industry, by their discoveries, and even by chance. The avarice of nations makes them quarrel for the moveables of the whole universe. If we could find a state so unhappy as to be deprived of the effects of other countries, and at the same time of almost all its own, the proprietors of lands would be only

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planters to foreigners. The state wanting all, could acquire nothing; therefore it would be much better for the inhabitants not to have the least commerce with any nation upon earth, for commerce, in these circumstances, must necessarily lead them to poverty.

A country that constantly exports fewer manufactures or commodities than it receives, will soon find the balance sinking; it will receive less and less, until, falling into extreme poverty, it will receive nothing at all.

In trading countries, the specie which suddenly vanishes quickly returns, because those nations that have received it are its debtors; but it never returns into those states of which we have just been speaking, because those who have received it owe them nothing.

Poland will serve us for an example. It has scarcely any of those things which we call the moveable effects of the universe, except corn, the produce of its lands. Some of the lords possess entire provinces; they oppress the husbandmen in order to have greater quantities of corn, which they send to strangers to procure the superfluous demands of luxury. If Poland had no foreign trade, its inhabitants would be more happy. The grandees, who would have only their corn, would give it to their peasants for subsistence; as their too extensive estates would become burthensome, they would divide them amongst their peasants; every one would find skins or wool in their herds or flocks, so that they would no longer be at an immense expence in providing cloaths; the great, who are ever fond of luxury, not being able to find it but in their own country, would encourage the labour of their poor. This nation, I affirm, would then become more flourishing at least, if it did not become barbarous, and this the laws might easily prevent.

TRADE

TRADE (Antient and Modern.) The world has found itself from time to time in different situations, by which the face of commerce has been altered. The trade of Europe is at present carried on principally from the north to the south; and the difference of climate is the cause that the several nations have great occasion for the merchandizes of each other. For example, the liquors of the south, which are carried to the north, form a trade little known to the ancients. Thus the burden of vessels, which was formerly computed by measures of corn, is at present determined by tons of liquor.

The antient commerce, so far as it is known to us, was carried on from one port in the Mediterranean to another, and was almost wholly confined to the south. Now the people of the same climate, having nearly the same things of their own, have not the same need of trading amongst themselves as with those of a different climate: the trade of Europe was therefore formerly less extended than at present.

Trade is sometimes destroyed by conquerors, sometimes cramped by monarchs; it traverses the earth; flies from the place where it is oppressed, and stays where it has liberty to breathe: it reigns at present where nothing was formerly to be seen but desarts, seas, and rocks; and where it once reigned, now there are only desarts.

To see Colchis in its present situation, which is no more than a vast forest, where the people are every day decreasing, and only defend their liberty to sell themselves by piece-meal to the Turks and Persians; one could never imagine that this country had ever, in the time of the Romans, been full of cities, where trade convened all the nations of the world. We find no monument of these facts in the country itself; there are no traces of them, except in Pliny and Strabo.

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The history of commerce is that of the communication of people. Their numerous defeats, and the flux and reflux of populations and devastations, here form the most extraordinary events *.

TRADE (Stability of.) If we consult the annals of past ages, we shall find that those states, territories, or kingdoms, whose power or splendor depended on trade, have universally been of short duration; they have grown speedily to great wealth and power, but been in possession of it a short time, and then speedily declined, and either became a prey to neighbours, or sunk into insignificance. There are many men in this kingdom who see nothing but the riches of trade; they want us to be a mere trading power, holding all other foundations of greatness in contempt.

Carthage, in antient history, makes a great figure; but it is worthy of note, that she was utterly destroyed by a people who knew not what trade was. Tyre, Rhodes, &c. were rich states, but the grandeur of none was permanent. That state which in all antient history was of the longest duration, proportioned to the degree of its power, was Sparta; a republic in which all trade, and even money, was proscribed. Venice, Genoa, the Hanse Towns, Antwerp, and Portugal, successively became very great by trade; all of them instances strongly to the purpose. The Venetians and the Genoese lost all their commerce, and fell into contempt: the triumph of the Hanse Towns was very short, and their fall equally low. A transitory gust of adverse wind blew away the commerce of Antwerp, and the kingdom of Portugal was conquered notwithstanding all her trade. Then arose the most remarkable of them all, Holland; a state, that in less than seventy years from

* Spirit of Laws, Vol. II. p. 2. 28.

their being declared a free people, and after carrying on great wars with formidable potentates, were on the brink of ruin, and staid in the very land of their fathers, merely because shipping could not be found to waft the high and mighty States to another hemisphere. Although they at last weathered that storm, yet this power has ever since declined; and at this time, while they yet continue free states, they are sunk into such a sloth and weakness, that the motion of a few battalions of French troops, and the threats of a French ambassador, are now sufficient to overawe all their resolutions, being in reality, with all their trade, a very despicable power.

Trade has been highly beneficial to England, France, Sweden, and Muscovy; but it is a very different sort of trade from what has formed the grandeur of those states, which all arose by buying in one place to sell in another; but the trade of great kingdoms should lie in the export of their products, manufacturing as many of them as they can: this is the only trade that is consistent with their nature; but single towns and small states have no products, and must therefore subsist by the buying and selling commerce.

Products are a permanent foundation of greatness, and quite independent of that swift destruction which so often overtakes mere trade. France would often have been in utter ruin, had her power depended on trade; but long after her trade has been destroyed, in every war, she has been rich and formidable. No great empire was ever founded on trade; all the four, which have by turns domineered over the world, owed their inward greatness to arms, and their riches to products. The Roman empire was founded on, and supported by, agriculture.

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For these reasons the British nation should principally attend to products, under which head I class the productions of manufactures, as well as those of the soil, and to such a portion of naval power as can be built on this foundation; such a share of trade will unite with and improve her vast territory, and make her power as formidable as it is capable of attaining to. This is the great object of her politics, which demands the utmost attention; not the trade, which Sir William Petty, and writers of that cast, are ever recommending. Their ideas are occupied alone with the example of Holland; and they want this great landed empire to take her lessons of policy from a people who have no land to live on.

Whatever these writers may take upon themselves to assure us, still the fact remains, that nothing is more precarious than trade; there is an insecurity in every thing that depends on it, which should make all wise nations, that have an extended territory, look much higher in the commercial world than to be the buyers and sellers, and carriers for other people. If there was an instance in history of such an employment proving the foundation of real greatness, I would not hesitate to change my opinion; and yet this is the part of trade which Sir William Petty and his followers hold up to the attention of the great kingdoms of Europe, as the only thing worth aiming at.

Respecting the prosperity of the Dutch, such as it has been, I shall beg leave to remark, that the great pillars of that state are not mere trade and carrying, but vast possessions, landed territories, &c. in the East Indies; and another species of product, fishing, which have done more for the Dutch by far than all their mere trading. The latter has been long in a low state of decline
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in every nation in Europe; for they have all, of late years, given so much attention to the better branches of commerce, that little business is left to your mere buyers, sellers, and carriers. Sir William Temple, in king Charles II's reign, observed, that there was scarcely any trade left in Amsterdam that paid interest enough for money to make it answer to a merchant to engage in; but the more solid business of the East, and fishing, have held them in greater account.

The most important object of Britain's attention is the increase of her land products, her fisheries, and her manufactures; and of the last, those are most worthy protection and encouragement which are wrought from her own products: others, such as silk, &c. depend too much on foreigners, and have rivals in countries more naturally carried to them, for her ever to make them a capital article, further than her own consumption. These articles of commerce are, and ever will be, of very great importance: they are by no means liable to those miserable revolutions which overturn the mere trading states from their very foundations, and will, as far as human affairs can admit, prove firm supports of her wealth and her greatness*.

TRADE (Balance of.) I find it is the opinion of the learned Mr. Hume, that there is no such thing as a balance of trade; that money over all the world is like a fluid, which must ever be upon a level, and that so soon as in any nation that level is destroyed by any accident, while the nation preserves the number of its inhabitants, and its industry, the wealth must return to a level as before.

* Letters concerning the present State of England, p. 130.

To prove this, he supposes four-fifths of all the money in Great Britain annihilated in one night; the consequence of which he imagines would be, that all labour and commodities would sink in their price, and that foreign markets would be thereby entirely supplied by that industrious people, who would immediately begin to draw back such a proportion of wealth as would put them again upon a level with their neighbours.

This reasoning is consistent with the principles we have examined, and humbly rejected.

General propositions, such as those we have been treating of, are only true or false according as they are understood to be accompanied with certain restrictions, applications, and limitations. I shall therefore say nothing as to the proposition itself, but only examine how far the example he has taken of the sudden annihilation of a great proportion of a nation's wealth can naturally be followed by the consequences he supposes.

For this purpose, let me suggest another consequence (different from that of the author, and flowing from the doctrine we have established) which possibly might happen upon the annihilation of four-fifths of all the money in Great Britain. I shall take no notice of the effects which so sudden a revolution might occasion; these have not been attended to by the author, and therefore I shall consider them as out of the question. I suppose the event to have happened; prices to have been advanced; and every immediate inconvenience to have been prevented. My only enquiry shall be directed towards the unavoidable consequences of such a revolution as to foreign trade, as to drawing back the money annihilated, and as to preserving the same number of inhabitants, and the same degree of industry as before. If I can shew that the event alone of annihilating the specie,

cie, and reducing prices in proportion (which I shall allow to be the consequence of it) will have the effect of annihilating both industry and the industrious, it cannot afterwards be insisted on that the revolution can have the effect of drawing back a proportional part of the general wealth of Europe; because the preservation of the industrious is considered as the requisite for that purpose.

Here then is the consequence which, in my humble opinion, would very probably happen upon so extraordinary an emergency.

The inhabitants of Great Britain, who, upon such an occasion, would be found in possession of all the exportable necessaries of life, and of many other kinds of goods demanded in foreign markets, instead of selling them to their poor countrymen for a price proportioned to our author's tariff, and to the diminution of the specie, which he takes to be the representation of them, would export them to France, to Holland, or to any other country where they could get the best price, and the inhabitants of Britain would starve.

If it be replied, that the exportation would not be allowed; I answer, that such a prohibition would be highly seasonable, but quite contrary to the principle of laying trade open, and impossible to be effectual, as that author justly observes, when he says, "Can one imagine that all commodities could be sold in France, for a tenth of the price they would yield on the other side of the Pyrenees, without finding their way thither and drawing from that immense treasure?" Suppose this phrase to run thus: Can any one imagine that provisions could be sold in Britain for a fourth part of the price they would yield on the other side of the water, without finding their way thither and drawing from that immense treasure? This is
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entirely consistent with our principles, and ruining the whole of Mr. Hume's former supposition; because the exportation of them would annihilate the inhabitants.

From this I conclude, that a nation, though industrious and populous, may reduce itself to poverty in the midst of wealthy neighbours, as a private person, though rich, may reduce himself to want in the midst of the amusements and luxury of London or of Paris; and that both the one and the other, by following a different conduct, may amass great sums of wealth, far above the proportion of it among their neighbours.

This is not a matter of long discussion. It is not by the importation of foreign commodities and by the exportation of gold and silver that a nation becomes poor, it is by consuming those commodities when imported. The moment the consumption begins, the balance turns; consequently it is evidently against the principles which we now examine, either to sell at home or destroy confiscated goods. The only way of repairing the damage done by such frauds is to export the merchandize, and by selling them cheap in other countries to hurt the trade of the countries which first had furnished them. From this also we may conclude, that those nations which trade to India, by sending out gold and silver for a return in superfluities of the most consumable nature, the consumption of which they prohibit at home, do not, in effect, spend their own specie, but that of their neighbours, who purchase the returns of it for their own consumption; consequently a nation may become immensely rich by the constant exportation of her specie and importation of all sorts of consumable commodities. But she would do well to beware of this trade, when her inhabitants have taken a luxurious turn, lest she should come

to resemble the drunkard, who commenced wine-merchant, in order to make excellent cheer in wine with all his friends who came to see him ; or the milliner, who took it into her head to wear the fine laces she used to make up for her customers.

Is it not therefore the duty of a statesman to prevent the consumption of foreign produce ? If tapestry or other elegant furniture, such as is seen in a certain great capital in Europe, were allowed to be imported into a neighbouring nation, who doubts but this article would carry money out of that nation ?

It may be answered, that as much elegance of another kind may be sent in return. True ; and it would be very lucky if this could be the case ; but then you must suppose an equality of elegance in both countries ; and farther, you must suppose a reciprocal taste for the respective species of elegance. Now the taste in one country may indeed be common to both ; but it may happen that the taste of the one may not be that of the other, though nothing inferior, perhaps, in the opinion of a third party : and the difference may proceed from this, that the young people of one country travel into the other, where the inhabitants stay at home ; a circumstance which would prove very prejudicial to the country of the travellers, if a wise statesman did not, by seasonable prohibitions upon certain articles of foreign consumption, prevent the bad consequences of adopting a taste for what his subjects cannot produce.

Without being expert in the computation of exports and imports, or very accurate in combining the different courses of exchange between the different cities of Europe, a statesman may lay it down as a maxim, that whatever foreign commodity, of whatsoever kind it be, is found to be con-

sumed within the nation he governs, so far the balance of trade is against her; and that so far as any commodity, produced either by the soil or labour of the inhabitants, is consumed by foreigners, so far the balance is for her.

A nation which has no occasion to have recourse to foreign markets, in order to supply her own consumption, must certainly grow rich in proportion to her exportation.

These riches again will not circulate at home in proportion to the domestic consumption of natural produce and manufactures, but in proportion to the alienation of them for money; the surplus wealth will stagnate in one way or other in the hands of the money-gatherers, who are the small consumers.

But suppose it is said, that "by laying trade open you are sure that wealth will naturally come to a balance in all countries, and that all fears of a wrong balance of trade are only the effect of a gloomy imagination." See Mr. Hume's Political Discourses.

Several answers may be made to this objection. The first, that it is in order to prevent this kind of balance that every nation gives themselves disquiet; for by balance here is understood an equality of wealth, and it is rich nations only who are anxious lest they should be brought to such an equality. In the question here before us, it is the loss of the superiority which is understood by a balance turning against a nation. If therefore it be the interest of a nation, poor in respect of its neighbours, to have trade laid open, that wealth may, like a fluid, come to an equilibrium, I am sure it is the interest of a rich nation to cut off the communication of hurtful trade, by such impediments as restrictions, duties, and prohibitions, upon importation, that thereby, as by dykes, its wealth

wealth may be kept above the level of the surrounding element.

Another answer is, that laying trade open would not have the effect proposed, because it would destroy industry in some countries at least, if not every where. A manufacture must be very solidly established indeed not to suffer any prejudice by a permission to import the like commodities from other countries. The very nature of luxury is such that it prompts people often to consume, from caprice and novelty, what is really inferior to home-production. It may be answered, that this argument cuts two ways; for if a nation, from caprice, consumes foreign commodities, why may not other nations, from caprice, likewise take off those which are left on hand? This reasoning may appear good in a theory which does not take in every political consideration. But a poor manufacturer, who cannot find work, because the branch he works in is supplied from abroad, cannot live till the caprice of foreigners makes them demand his labour. If a certain number of inhabitants be employed in a necessary branch of consumption, there must be a certain demand preserved for it; and whatever can render this precarious will ruin the undertaking, and those employed in it.

A third answer is, that any nation who would open its ports to all manner of foreign importation, without being assured of a reciprocal permission from all its neighbours, would, I think, very soon be ruined; and if this be true, it is a proof that a balance of trade is a possible supposition, and that proper restrictions upon importation may turn to the advantage of a state.

In order to promote industry, a statesman must act, as well as permit and protect. Could ever the woollen manufacture have been introduced in-

to France, from the consideration of the great advantage England had drawn from it, if the king had not undertaken the support of it, by granting many privileges to the undertakers, and by laying strict prohibitions on all foreign cloths? Is there any other way of establishing a new manufacture any where?

Laying, therefore, trade quite open would have this effect: it would destroy at first, at least, all the luxurious arts, consequently it would diminish consumption; consequently diminish the quantity of circulating cash; consequently it would promote boarding; and consequently would bring on poverty in all the states in Europe. Nothing, I imagine, but an universal monarchy, governed by the same laws, and administered according to one plan, well concerted, can be compatible with an universal open trade. While there are different states, there must be different interests; and when no one statesman is found at the head of these interests, there can be no such thing as a common good; and when there is no common good, every interest must be considered separately. But as this scheme of laying trade quite open is not a thing likely to happen, we may save ourselves the trouble of enquiring more particularly into what might be its consequences; it is enough to observe, that they must in their nature be exceedingly complex, and if we have mentioned some of them, it has only been to apply principles, and shew how consequences may follow one another: to foretell what must follow, is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

In discovering of the balance of trade, I have hitherto considered it only so far as the specie of a country is augmented by it; but a balance may be extremely favourable without augmenting the most of the precious metals, to wit, by providing subsistence
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for an additional number of inhabitants; by increasing the quantity of shipping, which is an article of wealth; by constituting all other nations debtors to it; by the importation of many durable commodities, which may be considered also as articles of wealth, as a well-furnished house, a well-stored cellar, an ample wardrobe, and a fine stable of horses, are articles which enhance the value of the inheritance of a landed man.

Can any judgment be formed concerning the state of the balance of trade of a nation barely from the quantity of specie that is found in it? I answer in the negative. A great proportion of all the specie of Europe may be found in a country against which the balance of trade has stood regularly for many years. An inconsiderable proportion of it may be found in another, which has had it as regularly in its favour for the same time.

The balance upon every article of trade may be favourable to a nation which squanders away more than the returns of it upon foreign wars.

The balance of every article of trade may be against a country which receives more than all loss incurred either from her mines, from countries tributary to her, or who willingly furnish subsidies upon many political considerations.

Besides these varieties, there are still other combinations relative to the specie itself. The money found in a country may be either said to belong absolutely to the country, when neither the state itself, or the particular people of it, are in debt to foreigners, or only so by virtue of a loan. Now whether it is borrowed or not, the property of it belongs to the country; but the difference consists in this, that when it is borrowed, the acquisition of the metals adds nothing to the national patrimony, that is to say, there is no acquisition of wealth thereby made; but when it is gained by

industry, the money adds to the real value of the country in consequence of the principles laid down.

May not a nation then, having very little gold or silver, open a subscription for millions at so much per cent. ? Will not strangers lend to her when her own subjects cannot ? May she not yearly, by paying away the interest of the money borrowed, and by a heavy balance of trade against her, be constantly diminishing her specie, and yet by new contracts keep up, and even increase, the mass of the circulating value to such a degree, as to be possessed of a greater proportion of specie than any of her neighbours ?

Farther, is it not certain that all nations will endeavour to throw their ready money, not necessary for their own circulation, into that country where the interest of money is high with respect to their own, and where, consequently, the value of property in land is low, since they may either draw an high interest from it, or make the acquisition of solid property ? Forbidding, therefore, the acquisition of solid property to strangers, is, in effect, a prohibition upon the gratuitous importation of specie. I allow there may be examples of people who make such purchases, with a view to draw the rents of the lands bought out of the country ; but whatever be the intention at the time of purchase, such however is the effect of an established fortune in a country, that sooner or later it draws the proprietor to it ; and when this does not happen, a subsequent alienation commonly takes place.

Were the purchase, therefore, of lands permitted universally, and were it established that property in land to a certain value should give a right to naturalization, no doubt large sums would be brought into those countries where lands

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are found cheapest; and as no exportable commodity is given in return, the specie of such countries might mark the quantity of lands sold, as well as that of merchandize exported.

May not a country which is actually in possession of great quantities of gold and silver, call in these metals, and circulate in their place a symbolical money. May not a nation then as well as a private person employ this specie in a profitable foreign trade, and gain daily by it? May she not after some time, withdraw her stock by calling in her debts? And may she not also call in her paper, and remain with an additional acquisition of specie in her pocket? Consequently, during the circulation of the paper, no judgment can be formed as to the balance of her trade, by examining the state of her specie; because I can suppose that at this time every shilling of it may be in the hands of strangers. Consequently the richest nation in Europe may be the poorest in circulating specie*.

TRADE (Future, of the North.) I will venture to hazard a thought of my own, which I desire may not be despised till the arguments I offer in support of it are clearly refuted. It is this, I am apprehensive that while we are contending about the balance of power, and sacrificing each other's trade to a spirit of mutual jealousy, trade itself will remove to the North; and when it is too late, we shall perceive that not only the French and Spaniards, but the English and Dutch have been doing the business of the nations bordering upon the Baltic, and putting it in their power to become rich and potent at our expence. For to me it is a thing past all doubt, that if the Swedes had not an actual and immediate benefit accruing to them annually from the trade to China, they would not

* Political Oeconomy, Vol. I. p. 414, 436.

carry it on, since Sweden is a country that cannot afford to export great quantities of bullion, as all the other nations engaged in this trade actually do; and if by the bare vending their own manufactures, they can make this trade turn to account, it must be visible to all who have a true insight into commerce, that sooner or later they will become entire masters of this branch of traffick, or at least, whatever share we have in it must be a dead weight upon us, as furnishing the instruments of luxury only in exchange for our coin; and when once this comes to be the case, we may please ourselves with the thoughts of the China trade, but considered in a national light, it would be better for us that we had none.

There is nothing more common than for such as are actually concerned in commerce to smile at, and despise speculations upon that subject; but I believe it would on due search be found, that though companies of merchants and private traders may be enriched by pursuing their own schemes, contriving to make the management of them an impenetrable mystery; yet with respect to national advantage, the notions of speculative men have been generally speaking right. It is agreed on all hands that trade is a thing of a nice and delicate nature, that from secret and imperceptible causes ebbs and flows, is possessed now by one nation, and then by another; and that when it is once lost, it is very hard to be regained. If therefore we obstinately persist in the old road, till the northern nations actually become possessed of this and other branches of traffick, and in consequence thereof, of a great naval force, it will be to no purpose to look back, or to consider by what means this might have been prevented. There is a natural vigour that attends an increasing growing trade; and there is also a natural supineness and negligence

negligence which accompanies the declension of trade; so that when nations in these different circumstances come to contend with each other, it is no difficult thing to perceive which must go to the wall.

We well know that there was a time when we had very little trade, that it was with great difficulty we first raised and then extended it, and that our doing this made way for the declension of the Spanish and Portuguese trade, which have never recovered since. We also know, nay we even remember, when the Swedes and Danes had little or no trade, and when themselves considered it as impracticable for them to interfere with us, or the Dutch, in the trade of the East-Indies; but we now learn from experience that they are able to do it, and we cannot but be sensible that the greatest obstacles to such endeavours are felt at the beginning; and that when these are once got over, as in respect to them they are already got over, things go on apace, that is to say exportation increases, navigation is extended, wealth rolls in, shipping multiplies, and a naval power is suddenly raised. The business therefore is to reflect in time, and to make enquiries into the properest means for preserving what we have got, while it is yet in our hands. Opportunities once slipped are never to be retrieved; we are still a naval power, and a great naval power; but if we imagine that this depends on the nature of our government, upon the supplies granted for the navy, and the orders issued from the admiralty, we shall very soon become sensible of our mistake. Philip II. of Spain fell into this mistake; he fancied that naval power might be maintained, as well as employed by policy; but what followed? In 1588, the efforts of Spain were terrible to Europe in general,

neral, and to us in particular; in less than twenty years the returns from the Indies became absolutely precarious, the Spanish fleets were the contempt of their enemies, and in half that time both we and the Dutch insulted the coasts of Spain. The source and support of a naval power is commerce, and if we cannot keep this, we must lose that, let the administration in this country be ever so honest or so wise; from whence my conclusion is, that though there may be other very important concerns, yet the most important of all is our trade; and may providence incline us to see this in time!

But that we may not seem to be always complaining, and never thinking of any means of removing the evils of which we complain, let us consider a little with ourselves, if somewhat may not be thought of which may afford us rational hopes of preserving the commerce we have left, and even of extending it. Such an attempt as this would be serviceable many ways; it is peculiarly adapted to our present situation; we have a rich and powerful company, who are interested with the commerce in these parts, and who might be excited by the desire of expressing their gratitude to the public for what they have received, to try what might be achieved on this side.

We have mentioned somewhat of the possibility of re-entering once more into the island of Japan. But if that should be thought too hazardous, what can hinder some of our ships from visiting Formosa? A fruitful, pleasant, and well situated island. Are there not a thousand pretences that may be suggested for putting in there? And if the vessel that makes this attempt be a ship of force, and well manned, is there any reason to doubt that she would be able to procure that respect
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which would make way for trade? It may be replied that the Chinese laws are so strict, that there is no trading in Formosa without the emperor's leave. To which I reply, that it is very well known the Chinese insist upon their laws in the most peremptory manner, where they are sure they have force enough to support and carry them into execution. On the other hand, where this is not to be done, they are very slow in coming to extremities, and had rather bate some of their punctilios than run the hazard of a dispute that might be attended with bad consequences.

In times past the Dutch made the conquest of this island, or rather the Dutch East-India company made it, and kept possession of it in spite of the whole force of the Chinese empire. I am very far from saying that this should become a precedent to our East-India company, or that they ought to attempt either a conquest or a settlement by force; all I contend for is, that if the Dutch East-India company conquered it, the English East-India company might find a way to trade there. They would find their account in it, and the nation would find their account in it; and though it might cost some time and trouble to bring it about, yet this very time and trouble would for so long a space exclude other nations, and we might perhaps find a means of putting the trade there on such a foot as to keep it wholly, and for ever to ourselves.

If we never try, it is certain we shall never succeed; and if the Swedes or Danes had been discouraged by such obstacles, there is no doubt but they had never brought that trade to bear, which they now enjoy. Besides, when our Drakes and Cavendishes undertook those perilous voyages in the dawn of our navigation, they had much greater difficulties

difficulties to struggle with, and much less assistance to hope for, yet they overcame them all; and to their boldness and intrepidity we owe that figure we have since made as a maritime power. If therefore a spirit of this kind could be raised, or rather revived, why should not we expect some such like effects? Or why should we rest satisfied with the present state of things, and lay aside all thoughts of improving or extending our commerce, when we see other nations far less able and powerful than our own, and under much greater difficulties than we have any grounds to fear making such attempts, and making them with success*.

T R O O P S. A new distemper has spread itself over Europe, infecting our princes, and inducing them to keep up an exorbitant number of troops. It has its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious. For as soon as one prince augments his forces, the rest of course do the same; so that nothing is gained thereby, but the public ruin. Each monarch keeps as many armies on foot, as if his people were in danger of being exterminated; and they give the name of peace (true it is that this state of effort is the chief support of the balance, because it checks the great powers) to this general effort of all against all. Thus is Europe ruined to such a degree, that were private people to be in the same situation as the three most opulent powers of this part of the globe, they would not have necessary subsistence. We are poor with the riches and commerce of the whole world; and soon by thus augmenting our troops, we shall be all soldiers, and be reduced to the very same situation as the Tartars. All that is wanting for this is to improve the new invention of the militia

* Harris's Voyages, Vol. II. p. 999.

established in most parts of Europe, and carry it to the same excess as they do the regular troops †.

TROOPS (Prussian.) Among the troops of his Prussian majesty, are a body of eight squadrons of hussars, each of 130 men, all chosen men, and remarkably comely, strong, and well made; it was really surprizing where they could be culled, but the king had emissaries all over Europe. Whilst Mr. Hanway was at Dantzick, a young man of whom he had some knowledge, had procured himself a lodging in prison; his debt, which was about twenty pounds, was immediately offered to be paid, provided he would enter into the Prussian service.

Besides the hussars, the king had a small body of men whom they call hunters, who were reputed the most faithful couriers in his army, and were oftentimes during the late war, promoted for their fidelity in hazardous enterprizes. The Austrians are said to have employed men under this denomination among their ranks, with pieces loaded with single balls, to mark out the officers of the enemy; in which they are very dextrous. This, which is confessedly an unwarrantable practice, induced the Prussians, according to the report of the latter, to take the same method. When these hunters are taken prisoners, no quarter is granted on either side. The arms of the hussars are a light musket and sabre, both which are kept in admirable order. Their cloathing is of coarse red cloth, made close to their bodies, and strengthened at the elbows with leather, in the shape of a heart. Their breeches are of well dressed sheepskin, their boots short and light, but the soles of them made durable; their caps are strengthened in the common way, so as to stand a cut. They

† Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. p. 320.

are the only denomination of soldiers in the Prussian service that have no chaplain. The Prussian soldiers in general are remarkable for their short cloathing, which at first view seems to be frugality, to a degree of ridiculousness; but is most plainly calculated for many wise ends. The Prussian soldiers also have their elbows armed with leather, as already observed. It saves the reputation of patching an old garment; and one never sees a Prussian soldier the least in rags: on the contrary, they appear as gentlemen with regard to the cleanliness of their persons. The king's guard, and some few other regiments, are cloathed annually; but in general the army has new regimentals once in three years only. The late king required the soldiery to wear white spatter-dashes, winter and summer; but his present majesty, observing the inconvenience, as well as inelegance of it, gives his men black for the winter; these are made of fustian, or a thick kind of linen cloth. The soldiers have also breeches of woollen cloth in this season, whereas in summer they are of white dimity, or linen, which are very light and clean. They observe an uniformity about their heads by wearing pigtails, which are easily kept in repair: they are generally powdered, but always so when on duty; and this modern elegance in dress, not only serves to preserve the natural hair, or wig, but gives the soldier a respect for his own person; and the rank in which he is taught to consider himself, compensates in some sort for the smallness of his pay. The soldiers hats, and the caps of the grenadiers are small; but at the same time as they answer all the purposes of a covering and a uniform, their heads by this means are kept the cooler, this must also afford considerable advantages both in march and action, beyond the ridiculous magnitude of those coverings which

which once prevailed so much in the British army, that the soldiers affected a reputation for courage in proportion to the dimensions of their hats. †

TURKEY. If ever the Russian empire engaged in a war with a certainty of success, it is in the present; for the Turkish army is perfectly enervated with peace; ten quiet years doing more mischief to it in this respect, than forty to any other army in Europe: the Janissaries have the absolute command of the empire; and their luxury and riot in a time of peace, is such, being almost without discipline, that they reduce themselves to a level with the worst forces in the Turkish army. Besides this evil, another of a worse tendency is the equality of the Grand Seignor's revenues: money in Turkey is of the same cheapness as in all other countries of Europe, but the taxes of the empire continue always the same; so that the Turkish monarch, although he has now the same revenue as his predecessors, still is beyond comparison a much poorer prince. Many authors have given strange accounts that the Turkish policy is squeezing the bashaws, and by that means raising a regular revenue; but it is a great mistake to think this any equivalent for the decline in the value of money: now and then the grand seignor fleeces a bashaw, and gets a considerable sum, but in no respect to be named with any regular revenue: the forfeiture of estates in christian countries might almost as well be set down for a revenue as this of the Turks. The effects which are within the power of curious persons to become informed of, have shewed, that the revenue of the Turkish empire was smaller than in former times: one strong instance was the number of their troops being less, and

this by so considerable a number as 60,000 men. It is asserted as a fact, that the grand seignor cannot bring into the field so many men as the Ottoman armies consisted of forty years ago, by 60,000. Their artillery, while great improvements have been made through all the rest of Europe, has declined considerably; it does not consist of so many pieces as formerly, nor are the magazines of ammunition so well supplied. In addition to this evil the richest province of his empire, which is Egypt, is in a state of little less than rebellion; and the war with Russia bears so heavy on them, that they dare not call for a categorical declaration, almost knowing that it would denounce nothing but war.

In opposition to this picture, Russia, instead of being a delining, is really a rising power: the empress's army never was in so good order, nor so numerous as at present: the troops are veterans, and not such as had, in a hot and luxurious climate, slept away their time in peace, but fresh from a vigorous service, men who scarcely knew what peace was. The success which the Russians have already had, shews that there is a great difference in the principle of this war, from any former one between the two empires. It was the business of two or three campaigns to prepare for the war, and gain a situation from which the Turks might be attacked. The Russian armies fought to infinite disadvantage, they had an immense march across deserts to make, in order to get at the enemy; and after a campaign, as long a march back to get at winter quarters: but now the scene has been changed; the northern shore of the Euxine is gained; conquests made in Moldavia, and other Turkish provinces; so that the war is pushed at once into the enemies country, and winter quarters gained there, which is precisely the

the thing that was always wanting before; and therefore the possession of it at present can hardly fail of being attended with the most fortunate consequences. I think it would be no extravagance to predict the fall of the Turkish empire being not very far off.

On the other hand, there are not arguments wanting to shew that the Turkish empire is in no such danger, and that the Russians are far enough from making a conquest of it.

The fact cannot be contradicted that the arms of Russia have a better prospect of success in this war than in any former one; but there are two circumstances which appear sufficiently strong to prevent any such brilliant success. First, by beating the Turks and carrying on two or three campaigns their army will be daily improved, while no success can make the Russian one better than when they began the war. In every war which the Ottoman empire has carried on against the house of Austria or Russia, they have improved in the success of their arms, from the continuance of the war: their raw, undisciplined troops, become veterans, and order and courage introduced among them from experience. This circumstance makes a long and protracted war dangerous in itself, or at least more favourable to the Turks than it can be to the Russians. The revenues also of the two empires will not bear a comparison relative to the conduct of a war. The Grand Signor can certainly support great expences longer than the Empress; and what is of much greater consequence, his situation will ever make one ruble go as far as five of the Russians; for the Black-sea keeps open a constant navigation for supporting their armies, directly from their grand magazine, Constantinople; and which will always be of great service, though a

Russian fleet was upon the same sea: but if they were deprived of that advantage, yet there is no comparison between the ease of recruiting the Turkish armies with the best troops, from their provinces immediately at their backs, and the immense distance which every thing from Russia has to go before it can arrive at the army; and this is almost sufficient to prevent any very important success. All these points can hardly fail of making a protracted war more fatal to the Russians by the greatness of the expence, than it can be to the Turks. As to making a very bold push to finish the war in two or three campaigns, by aiming speedily at Constantinople, there are too many dangers in the plan, to think that any commander would hazard it. From the two great frontier fortresses, Ockzakow and Bender, there are near four hundred miles to Constantinople. The Danube with its six mouths and vast marshes, besides a great line of fortresses all lie in the way: and after that, near three hundred miles of a very defensible country. Such a march must in the nature of the proposition, leave all the provinces to the west of Moldavia and Wallachia behind; so that nothing would be easier than a Turkish army to be collected in those provinces, and to cut off the communication and retreat of the grand army: in such a situation, it would be almost impossible for it to escape ruin. The Turks would have nothing to do but to destroy the country, or harass its march, and dispute every inch of land and every post, still avoiding a general engagement: the least error in the Russian general would be destruction, and nothing but continued and signal victories would be crowned with success. In such a situation it is not clear that the taking Constantinople would be decisive. But the war could never be carried on upon this plan;

plan; none is feasible but making absolutely sure of all the country as you advance; to leave nothing behind unconquered or unpossessed; but to advance slowly, campaign after campaign. If ever the Russians are able to make any impression of consequence upon the empire of the Ottomans, it must certainly be in this method:

Further, supposing a victorious Russian fleet in the Euxine, events of such great importance can never arise from it, except in one case, and the possibility or impossibility of that must depend on circumstances, of which we are all ignorant till they are tried. In making a conquest of the Crim, or of the provinces to the north of the Danube, and to awe and curb the Tartars in the Turkish alliance; in all these cases a victorious fleet would be of infinite importance, and give advantages to our arms, which no other circumstances could. But it is hardly possible for a fleet to force its way through the Streights, and attack Constantinople by water. But if the fleet on the Black-sea was numerous enough to take on board the whole Russian army, with all its camp, baggage, artillery, provisions, &c. perhaps it would be possible to land them within two or three days march of Constantinople; nay, in case the coast is favourable to disembarking, in one day's march. In this case the expedition would not be in the absolute danger of miscarrying, from a march of 400 miles, with a certainty of the retreat being cut off, but the event thrown at once upon that of a battle, in a situation where a victory supported and maintained by such a fleet, would probably overthrow the empire: for there is a wide difference between gaining such a victory fresh from the ships and so supported, and the same success without any support, and after the repeated and certain losses of a long and des-

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perate march. But to such a scheme there would be many objections, though not so strong as to the other: the greatest would be the difficulty of procuring, manning, and supporting such a fleet, as would be necessary to make the conduct at all secure: and this is so great that it would never be possible to effect, in consequence of events that fell out after a war began; for many years would be necessary for the mere building such a fleet, and great treasures must be expended in it. It could never therefore be executed without the idea being conceived in time of peace, and the fleet built in consequence, and ready for use, with skilful mariners and pilots ready at the breaking out of the war; which state of the case supposes the empress be in possession of all the north coast of that sea, and to have the free navigation of it: for without both, it would be impossible to think of the execution of such a plan. Thus you see what long preparations must in any case be necessary to form a consistent plan for attacking Constantinople; and yet this is the only plan that can ever prove successful. First, there must be a war, and a successful one; for such must be that which gives possession of little Tartary, and the Crim to the empress. After this war no time should be lost in raising a naval force upon the Black-sea, superior to any thing the Turks can fit out. Thirdly, that sea must be most minutely navigated, that every ship may have a pilot who knows the rocks, banks, currents, &c. And lastly, a succeeding war must happen so successful as to give possession of the provinces north of the Danube; for even by sea it might be fatal to make the attempt, if Ockzakow, Bender, or any places in that country were left behind. When all these previous steps were taken, and had proved successful, then the attempt might be made, and with a probability

bility of success. The south-west coast of the Euxine is all a very safe coast, and proper for landing on. *

The possession of the Crim, with a free navigation through the Black-sea to the Mediterranean, would give the Czarina such an advantage over the Turks as to endanger the very existence of Constantinople, and with it that of their empire. And if the plan upon which Peter the Great conducted his wars against the Turks be considered, it will appear, that he never lost sight of this great object. Azoph was the town which he acquired at a very great expence of men and money: he fortified it at a yet greater expence, and built a fleet of stout ships for that navigation, with docks, yards, and magazines of all sorts; but the unfortunate campaign of the Pruth, put an end to his hopes, and gave back that conquest to the Turks. Had he been successful, he designed the conquest of the Crimea, which would at once have given him possession of a noble province, and the command of the Euxine. The same idea was steadily pursued in the war of 1735, which ended with the cession of Azoph to the Russians, a fortress of all others the most important for the prosecution of this design.

A very little reflection will give us an idea of some of the consequences which would in all probability attend the execution of this plan.

Relative to strength in war, the success of such a plan would only be too great; for one can hardly suppose the Turks would submit to a Russian navigation through the heart of Constantinople, without they were first reduced to the last extremity; and in such a state of weakness their submitting to it would, in case of a succeeding war,

* Marshall's Travels, Vol. III. p. 210.

be but another word for the overthrow of their empire. It would depend on the naval force of the two empires on the Black Sea; for which ever fleet, in case of a quarrel, was superior, they would nearly command the event of the war: if the Turks had the better, the Russians would be cut off from all the advantages proposed; and if victory declared for the latter, Constantinople, and all the provinces of the Ottoman empire, would be exposed to them in the most dangerous manner; and if the advantages of the Russians in building and equipping fleets, with their territory behind them so abounding with all sorts of materials, be considered, it can hardly be doubted but they would gain the most decisive superiority. Nor should I omit observing that the mere possession of Azoph might be made a means of putting this plan in execution, and carrying any future war, if well directed, to the gates of Constantinople.

Let any one consider the present aspect of affairs in that quarter, and the motions of the Russian troops, and it will be evident that this idea is now in being, and that in all probability before the present war sees a period, the Turks will find the arms of Russia infinitely heavier than in the last, and themselves attacked with a maritime force on the Black-Sea much too great for them to contend with. I have been told that it is a fixed determination of the Czarina not to conclude this war without gaining a powerful establishment on the Black-Sea, so that Azoph may be but one step to connect with farther, and equally important acquisitions.

If we judge from the present state of the Russian army, we may look for great success; for the first foundation of it, experience, is strong in most of the officers, and the men may be called veterans. It is the same army that saw all the
campaigns

campaigns against the king of Prussia, that were beat without flying at Zorndorf, and conquered at Cunnersdorf; and that have since been in continual action in Poland, and always victorious. It consists of two hundred and fifty thousand old soldiers, sixty thousand of which are horse, better mounted, and finer troops than ever were in the Russian army before, with a train of artillery as fine as any in the world; and what is of yet greater consequence, well supplied with officers and engineers from all parts of Europe, attracted by every munificent encouragement. The Russians are very sensible that the losses they sustained, and their want of success in general against the king of Prussia, was owing to their artillery being very badly served, and it has given them a great eagerness to remedy this fatal evil; and at present I believe they have done it effectually: they will not any where be wanting in success on that account.

This empire has not any neighbours to whom it is not much superior in force, and in the constitution of its army. Poland is at its mercy, and will continue so till she is reduced to a province, an event I should never be much surprized at. Prussia is not comparable in power to Russia, and could never make the stand against her arms again that we saw in the last war, because the Russian army is better, more numerous, and with an artillery that yields to none in Europe; and at the same time with an advantage she never enjoyed before. Poland behind her, three fourths of it absolutely in her power, to winter in instead of falling back to Russia, which was the case before. I dwell the more upon these particulars, because it appears very clearly to me that the next general war will see these two powers again in opposition, and I conjecture with very different success.

The present state of the Russian navy promises

also well to the empire; for it never saw so many hands employed in it since the time of Peter the Great to the present. New ships are every day launching at Petersburg, and all the old ones repairing with great expedition; a stout squadron is fitting out of such a force, that one would think the empress meant to awe the Baltic, while her army is employed against the Turks. She has many ship carpenters on the Tanais, and will be extremely formidable on the Black-Sea. So that if ever Russia began a war with a good prospect of success, it is this against the Turks*.

There is in the Turkish provinces in Europe a principle of insecurity that has never been changed; it is the bulk of the inhabitants being Greeks; the remains of the antient Greek empire of the East, which was overthrown by the Turks under Mahomet the Second; a governing people that do not mix and become one with the people governed, must ever be insecure. Montesquieu has illustrated this maxim by many instances much to the purpose.

The Greeks throughout the Turkish European provinces are very numerous, miserably oppressed by the Turks, different from them in language, manners, and religion; of the Greek church, whereof the sovereigns of Russia are the head; and to whom, since Peter the Great's time they have constantly turned their eyes for support. A specimen of this has been seen in the quick and active submission of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia to the Russians, and their flocking in crowds with the greatest haste to swear allegiance to the empress as their sovereign. The Greeks of the Morea were likewise the same, and shewed

* Marshall's Travels Vol. III. p. 138.

the same eagerness to take arms the moment they were countenanced by a foreign power.

This is a circumstance incredibly favourable to the Russians; they have the advantages of fighting in a country where every peasant is a friend; and whatever acquisitions they make, will be of a people who wish to be their subjects: such acquisitions are in their nature secure, and not liable to those revolutions which are pretty sure to happen when all the power that is used is founded in force alone. Acquisitions under such circumstances are infinitely desirable to Russia, as their situation brings them nearer to the Mediterranean, and gives them the full command of the Black-Sea.

Relative to future and greater acquisitions, which it is highly probable the present war will bring them, they will doubtless push for Constantinople; the fate of that capital while two victorious Russian armies press them hard, and gain the point which they never were able to gain before in any of their former wars, that of wintering in Turkey, every one must allow is extremely precarious.

The probable event of the war is the destruction of the Turkish power in Europe, as far at least as circumstances prognosticate; but if the German powers unite, in order to prevent such a vast accession to the Russians, then the turn of affairs cannot be conjectured, but they would probably terminate very differently: European Turkey would be a vast addition to the Muscovite power; but I do not think it would pave the way by any means to universal empire. The grand seignor driven into Asia, and probably at peace, or more likely a truce with Russia, would be at leisure to destroy the rebels of Egypt, and unite all the power of his Asiatic territories. When he was somewhat recovered, the war would again break out with Russia; for we may be certain that the
Turks

Turks would never leave Europe without infinite contention to return, and endless wars; nor could the Russians well think of pushing their conquests far upon the Turks in Asia, from the distance and vast extent of those provinces, which would involve them in greater mischiefs than the power of their enemies. Thus the acquisition of European Turkey would bring with it the attendance of a perpetual war, in which great success would rouse all Persia and Arabia to arms, and certainly excite such a jealousy in the European protentates, as to lay the foundation of a storm too general for the power of the Russians to encounter *.

U.

UNITED PROVINCES. Sir William Temple remarked more than a century ago that the Dutch had passed the meridian of their trade; and from the events of the last fifty years, nothing is more evident than the declension of their power. In the middle of the last century they were a match at sea for the combined fleets of France and England; but in the succession war their navy was much sunk; and in that of 1741, their maritime force was not comparable to that of England. At present it is quite sunk, if we consider it as the fleet of the republic, which joined with England, was called a maritime power. That they have a fleet cannot be denied, but the ships are very few in number, in very bad order, and scarcely any force ready for real service; so that we may safely speak of it as an annihilated marine: it is true they have vast numbers of sailors, but these alone do not constitute a force at sea; ships regularly building in succession, and kept in

* Letters concerning the Present State of England, p. 192.
excellent

excellent order, stores, magazines, yards, docks, timber, and an hundred other articles, all different from what trade employs, are necessary, and must be kept regularly, or a powerful fleet will never be constituted. The marine of England costs an immense annual sum, and yet the best judges of it assert that we are much too sparing in our expences in it; but in Holland the expence of the navy is so retrenched and curtailed, that it is hardly an object in the finances.

This neglect of their marine is a most impolitic conduct in the Dutch; for a trading power to rely more on its land forces than on its navy, is such an infatuation, that nothing but a very favourable complexion of affairs among its neighbours, can prevent extreme ill consequences following. During the last war the Dutch were driven into an open violation of their treaties with England, by refusing to send the succours agreed on by the treaty, in case of a threatened invasion of Britain by France. The republic depends on the force of her land troops, and yet is governed by French councils, not from affection, but through fear. France has little to fear from her anger, and therefore bullies her without ceremony; but this would not be the case if Holland was possessed of a formidable marine; she would treat the republic with more respect, if an hundred sail of the line of Dutch ships could at a short warning be added to the fleets of England.

The Dutch army has generally proved insufficient for their defence in a land war, whereas their fleets have more than once brought them off in triumph, and concluded their quarrels to their advantage. Their very being depends on the prosperity of their trade, and of what avail are their armies in defence of that? In the invasion of 1672, when the proud monarch of France kept his court at Utrecht, their army was of very little consequence;

quence; but at that dangerous crisis it was not so with their fleet, the Dutch were masters at sea, or at least safe from great dangers. France had no force to oppose them on that element whereon all trade is carried.

But let us look to future events, against whom can Holland ever want to arm? Certainly against none but landed enemies or naval ones: probably against either England, through a jealousy of trade, and the domineering disposition of France, or against France, through the solicitations of England, or impossibility of complying with the demands of France. In either of these cases the republic would find that strength by sea would be of the most use to her. Of what avail would her army be against England? In the present condition of her navy she would be utterly ruined by the shipping of Britain, that is, she would have all her trade destroyed, and would probably lose some of her colonies and settlements, at least suffer immense losses. In case of a war with France, her treasures, joined with those of England, would be able to defend her by land through the assistance of the mercenary forces, and her fleets might be let loose on the French trade and settlements to their destruction, if they joined an hundred sail of the line to the marine of England; and which in good politics they ought to be able to do, their vast trade considered.

But in answer to all this, it is said, and in part justly, that the revenues of Holland are so deeply mortgaged, that their government is absolutely precluded from all expensive undertakings; and that as to a renovation of their marine to any effectual purpose, it is a business much beyond their power: there is some truth in this, but not to so great a degree as asserted by many persons who make use of the argument. The arrangement of
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the state expences is not formed according to the real interest of the country; their army on comparison with their navy is too great, and there is a negligence and interestedness crept into their finances, which cramps them in all their operations. It is the opinion of many very sensible, as well as candid persons among them, that if their navy was once more the principal object of their attention, with a spirited, active, and disinterested administration, that their state would have it well in their power to restore their marine, if not to so high a pitch of prosperity as in the middle of the last century, at least to be extremely formidable to the combined fleets of France and Spain, and respectable even to the potent marine of England.

Considering how natural a naval force is to so great a trading power, I do not think this opinion has any thing extravagant in it. Their finances well managed would allow it, and at the same time keep a respectable body of troops in pay, but upon a reformed system. It is true the republic is much in debt, but then they have a custom (which would at once overturn our public credit) of taxing the principal and the interest too; but the grand object in such exertions is favourable to them; the expending a great part of their revenue in the channel most consistent with their real interests, and according to the inclinations, and the wishes of their subjects; money generally goes very far, and is well spent when it is done under such circumstances.

France has had a remarkable prevalence in the councils of the republic, since the successes of counts Saxe and Lowendahl; this has been evidently owing to a fear of being over-run by the armies of that monarchy; but such a radical fear, which is like a dubious existence, should be shook off by a sovereign state; for a dependence on the will of a neighbour is miserable politics, and little
less

less than being subject to it. If any power is great enough to demand this attention, it approaches so near to an absolute subjection, that any measure is preferable: the existence of such a formidable power, is argument sufficient to oppose it, and endeavour to reduce it by alliances and military operations to a condition less haughty. This was the wise conduct of the Dutch through the latter half of the preceding century, and the beginning of this, a time when France was more powerful than at present; and the great success which attended the plan was proof sufficient of its propriety.

The sovereignty of Holland depends extremely on the power of France being kept within such limits as to prevent her from giving umbrage to any of her neighbours. A kingdom that keeps a neighbouring state in check, and governs her councils, is too powerful for such a state; and a submission or acquiescence in her dictates only increases the disease; an immediate, bold, and resolute opposition is the only effectual remedy: This the Dutch found effectual against Lewis XIV. in the height of his power; but they have not behaved with so much firmness against his less powerful successor.

I have more than once heard the conduct of the Dutch in their partiality to France, commended upon the principles of lessening the competition of England in trade. Such persons asserted that the power of any neighbour, who grows great at sea, and by means of a vast commerce, cannot fail of being far more mischievous to the Dutch, than any danger they may be in from France; but this is only a superficial argument, it has nothing real in it; they must know very little of the trade of Europe, who assert that the growth of the British commerce is proportioned to, or occasioned by the decline

decline of that of Holland. The great increase of commerce in England arises almost totally from her colonies and settlements, in which she by no means rivals the Dutch; even in the East-Indies the great growth of her company has nothing in it detrimental to that of Holland. The real rivals to the Dutch in trade are first, the general spirit of commerce lately diffused through all the countries of Europe, and which has destroyed much of her carrying trade. Secondly, the rise and increase of commerce at Hamburgh and the Hanse towns, and in general among the northern kingdoms, which in many articles undersell the Dutch in their own trade. These are the causes which have operated most against them, and not the competition of England any more than that of all their other neighbours. The vast commerce once carried on by Holland, was greatly owing to the negligence and backwardness in trade of all the other nations in Europe; while they were the carriers, and had the commissions of all Europe. While Amsterdam was the only great general magazine in the world, no wonder their nation grew great by trade; and it is not surprizing, that, after their neighbours have found out their interests better, their great commerce should decline.

England therefore is by no means their rival in trade, since the prosperity of her commerce arises from sources extremely different from any that ever flowed in favour of the Dutch; to oppose that neighbour therefore, by submitting to the imperial dictates of France, can never be for the true interest of their country. France by land is much more than a rival to them: she threatens their very existence as an independent state: it is not by negotiation that she brings them into her measures, but by the terror of her encampments. This is inconsistent with the freedom of the republic;

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public; and an acquiescence with such violent requests will, by degrees, pave the way for more minute demands.

As to the prospects in future of the republic, they are not difficult to conjecture, for they are solely dependent on her trade. The country of the seven provinces is too poor and inconsiderable to support the people, much less to maintain their power and independence; all reflections therefore on the duration of their republic, must turn on that of their commerce. As to the events of military operations, they must be thrown out of the question: not that there is any, even the least probability of her fate being decided by them, whether she continues absolutely neuter, or opposes that of France; for that monarchy is now sunk too low to create any longer in her neighbours any fears about their independency, provided they follow the dictates of their interest in opposing her.

I cannot agree with those writers who predict an early downfall of the Dutch commerce. I think on the contrary, that it may continue in the degree it in is at present for some ages; and my reasons for thinking so are as follow: they have for some years withstood the opposition of as severe a competition as can ever happen to them. For twenty or thirty years past all Europe has been eager to get as much trade and manufactures as possible; the commerce of England has risen to a pitch beyond which it can scarcely mount much higher; that of France has certainly seen its most flourishing days; for those who are best acquainted with the manufactures of the French assert that they are much declined, and that they can never arrive at the prosperity which they once enjoyed. Now neither of the nations which, Holland excepted, possess the greatest trade of Europe, have
ever

ever been able in their most prosperous days to succeed the Dutch in their carrying trade; their commerce has been all of a different nature; that people consequently can have no fears in future of the rivalship of a declining commerce. Hamburgh and the North do them some mischief by carrying on that commerce for themselves, which formerly the Dutch executed for them; but as to their gaining a superiority in their general trade, it was never dreamed of, and as to the other powers of Europe, they are of no consequence in the enquiry.

Thus we find, that the general rivalship of the Dutch has consisted in little more than their neighbours buying and selling of one another, instead of letting the Dutch navigation come in between; this they have strenuously endeavoured to do, and have in part succeeded: but take a view of the commerce of Holland, and you will see that even in this age, while all the powers of Europe have been so eager in matters of trade, that the Dutch, though they have suffered much, are by no means driven to the wall; even in this point, the buying and selling trade, they possess at present much more than all the rest of Europe put together. So difficult is it, without very great advantages, in war or politics, to overturn an established trade. The advantages of great stocks, experience, plenty of shipping, and numerous manufactures, will drive on a trade, when almost every other circumstance seems adverse.

But the buying and selling trade is not the most material part of the Dutch commerce; their fisheries are of much more importance; and in these they are, comparatively speaking, without a rival: these bring in immense riches to the state, support a vast population, and provide a certain and independant market for very many of the best ma-

manufactures in Holland. Besides this material branch of trade they possess another, in which they are totally unrivalled, and which is an essential part of their East-India commerce, the spices; in the West-Indies they have some flourishing colonies; and in the Terra Australis Incognita, they have a sheet anchor to avail themselves of, when all other resources fail.

But respecting discoveries, it much imports the Dutch to reflect, that their republic arose to the highest pitch of grandeur, in the midst of the most adventurous expeditions. While they were involved at home in the miseries of perpetual quarrels, and defending themselves in a long war against their old masters the Spaniards, they ventured into distant regions and unknown seas; they made numerous discoveries, and many conquests in the East-Indies, laying the foundation of that power, which has since so much surprized all the powers of the East. At a time when it was thought impossible for them to defend themselves, they adventured upon a thousand hazardous expeditions. It was an age of enterprize and heroism: while all this seeming extravagance continued, their republic flourished in an unexampled manner: trade was perpetually upon the increase, nothing could satisfy the spirit of their industry; while a commerce was rising which much exceeded that of the greatest kingdoms, they were not satisfied but adventured further, and undertook a number of important expeditions, which in this age would carry the appearance of romance. It was this spirit of enterprize that laid the foundation of all their trade in the East-Indies, and let it ever be remembered that from the time it died, their commerce declined.

While they were upon the increase in trade and prosperity, they never considered whether they

had trade enough; on the contrary, they ever sought after more, and adventured boldly in quest of it: it was this spirit that created trade. But since they have been upon the decline, and have been guided by poorer ideas, we have seen none of this spirit exerted; but in proportion as their commerce has fallen, they have been careful to smother all such enterprising spirits; to damp the noble ardour which fired the founders of their republic, and to rest fully satisfied with what a more ignoble fate decreed them. They have for more than an age been well satisfied with that degree of trade, which their neighbours in the ordinary course of business left them. It was therefore very plain, that they would make no advances; for those who are willing to stand still, are not likely to push beyond mediocrity. If their principles were just upon which they first neglected the prosecution of enterprizes, and the discoveries of new sources of trade, they ought immediately to have restored that animating spirit, when they found themselves upon the decline, which is more than an hundred years ago. The moment that such a suspicion broke forth, they should have roused the latent ardour which once carried them to enterprize and conquest. Then was their time for making every effort of this kind to raise new sources of trade, to answer those which the competition among their neighbours in Europe began to undermine.

Nothing can be more contrary to the spirit of enterprize and discovery, than the pacific disposition of the Dutch for many years last past. I will venture to say, that nothing is more contrary to the genius of trade. Their commerce arose and flourished in the midst of incessant war, it falls in the midst of perpetual peace. Discoveries of the nature which I have been mentioning, might

restore it to its original prosperity. The present markets for Dutch manufactures, are every where hurt by the competition of their neighbours; but in the populous regions of the South, new ones of the most advantageous nature might be opened, in which no rivalry could prejudice them. I cannot understand the arguments that are used against their accepting what is so liberally offered them. But to return.

All these articles of trade, of which the republic is yet in a flourishing possession, appears to be sufficient to ensure her against that ruin which some authors are so ready to denounce. They do not properly consider the importance of that established industry which is found in Holland: nothing is more difficult than to oppose and rival a nation, long fixed and established in all the articles that constitute a great trade. The several advantages which I have just named, all unite to favour in an high degree the general commerce of Holland, by filling the national magazines with a variety of commodities no where else to be had; this gives her an advantage in the preparing assortments of all commodities well known by the nations long in trade. It is the nature of the trade carried on by the European companies in the East-Indies, in which the Dutch have a great advantage from the monopoly of spices: this gives them a superiority to other people in every article they deal in.

Another great advantage to Holland is, the nature of the countries, which may be reckoned their principal rivals in trade. England and France are fertile and extensive kingdoms, which have an object of much greater importance than commerce, which is agriculture; and of course they cannot give that entire attention to the concerns of trade, which laid the foundations of the Dutch republic.

Inhabit-

Inhabiting a miserable neglected spot, which almost sets culture at defiance, and full of cities, towns, and villages almost crouded upon one another, the Dutch found themselves under a necessity of applying to the sea for a subsistence. Fisheries and commerce in such circumstances throve wonderfully; the number of their sailors increased amazingly, and their ports were presently surrounded with docks for building ships; until they came to possess more of that manufacture, if it may be so called, than all the rest of Europe put together. This quick progress was much occasioned by the vast number of people crouded into a small barren spot. But France and England being in every thing different, although they could raise a very considerable trade in their products, and particularly in the supply of their colonies, could never gain that great general commerce of buying and selling, freighting and commission, which the Dutch so long possessed, and do yet possess so much more of, than any other country in Europe.

The other rivals of Holland have no chance of equalling that country in commerce; Hamburgh is without an East-India company, and has no colonies in the West-Indies, besides consisting of a single weak town. And the powers of the North cannot in the nature of things, make any greater advance, than supplying themselves with their imports, and exporting pretty much in their own bottoms; and even this they will not be able fully to accomplish, so that we may venture to suppose, that the Dutch have experienced as dangerous a competition as any they have reason to expect.

An allowance, however, I am sensible should here be made, for the evils which multiply when a nation tends more to decline than prosperity. When they are advancing every accident almost

is favourable, every limb of the body is vigorous and active, nothing hurts; but there is an increasing corruption in a declining state, which no remedies can cure. This is a truth with the Dutch; but then it is also a truth with every nation on the globe. It is now the case strongly with their neighbours the French; it was the case with their old masters the Spaniards; and probably will be the event in the history of all other people. Such effects, which are in common with all other countries, are not to be reasoned upon; we can only examine the probability of those events which depend upon themselves.

The Dutch are yet most certainly a considerable people; and though not upon the increase, yet very flourishing. In possession of much more trade, all things compared, than any nation in the world, they are more populous than any country in Europe; and continue to give that general reception and protection to all who will resort thither. They are wealthy, and though burthened with public debts, yet are formidable if they exert themselves. They are in this situation at a time when they have long stood a violent competition in trade with all their neighbours. That competition cannot probably be carried further; it is not easy therefore to assign any good reasons for their soon decaying, but many for thinking that they may long continue a great commerical people.

Political disputes may certainly arise that may prove more dangerous than trading ones, but it is not easy to name any potentate who has the least probability of making conquests on the Dutch. France, as long as they preserve their neutrality, will have no interest or inclination to quarrel with them; but in case of a French war, other nations would not allow France to make a conquest of them. Holland therefore would never have

have to stand singly against France; England and a considerable part of Germany, would be sure to be in alliance with her, which would form such an union that France, in all probability, would never be able to overpower. The decay of the French power is so clear and manifest, that she has more reason to fear such an alliance than to hope advantages from fighting against it.

Some little disputes have happened within these few years, which manifested no good will in the king of Prussia towards the republic; but there is not any reason to imagine, that they will ever break out into an open rupture; the Dutch have nothing to fear from him. That monarch is well known to harbour too many ambitious designs, ever to be allowed to march an army against any of his neighbours, without a force sufficient to repel him being in readiness: the powers of Germany would never allow him to make any conquests on the Dutch; and a war which will not bring advantages, will never be undertaken by his Prussian majesty. In the present system of affairs in Germany, France would undoubtedly march to the assistance of the Dutch; and certainly make no small merit in future negotiations of such an exertion of their own interest. But in case France and Prussia fell into an alliance, Austria would be equally interested in falling on Silesia, while the king was engaged in so distant an undertaking; to say nothing of the part which Hanover and many other German princes might take.

There are no other potentates from whom the Dutch have any thing even in idea to fear. And, upon the whole, there is not any probability of their being drawn into a war. The operations of the last were very general in Europe; and that between the French and English close upon their

frontiers; yet they escaped from taking any part. Nothing but a violent determination in some of the parties to force them from a neutrality, by attacking them in case they do not declare themselves, will have the effect of driving them from their pacific system: but such a conduct in any party is extremely improbable.

From every view that can be taken of the events which are likely to happen, I think there is good reason to suppose the affairs in Holland will continue much in the same state they are at present. Their trade will not increase; it may rather decline, but not dangerously; they will avoid any quarrels with their neighbours, and continue in wealth and peace probably for many years.*

To give some idea of the number of ships which depart from Holland, it will be sufficient to observe, that from the port of Amsterdam alone, upwards of 1500 vessels set sail freighted for the North and the Baltic-sea, and that all other foreign trades employ a proportionate number; for a Dutch author asserts, that sometimes more than 1500 buffes have been seen to go out of the ports of Holland in three days: and the herring fishery usually employs upwards of 3000 yearly.

The commerce of the Dutch to France was formerly very considerable; it appears from the memoirs of a Dutch Ambassador, that they exported yearly from France to the amount of about £. 1,600,000 sterling in French commodities, exclusive of corn, as also salt, with which they loaded between 5 and 600 ships.

About 40 ships from 200 to 400 ton, depart annually for Archangel from the ports of Holland, and particularly Amsterdam; to which this trade seems more peculiarly appropriated.

* Marshall's Travels, Vol. I. 373.

The commerce of Norway employs every year upwards of 300 Dutch ships from 4 to 500 tons, but manned only with ten or twelve men each.

The merchandize brought from the Baltic being of a large bulk, the Dutch are obliged to send there a great number of ships, which depart less than half loaded, but return always with a full cargo.

The number of Dutch ships employed in this commerce, amounts, one year with another, to about 1000 or 1200.

The ships which trade directly to the estates of the Grand Seignor, are usually 30 or 35 in number.

The ships fitted out in Holland for the Mediterranean have not less than 20 or 26 pieces of cannon, and 60 or 70 men to each ship, and the convoys are usually ships of 50 or 60 guns each, manned with 100 or 170 men.

The taxes of the Dutch are incomparably heavier than ours. This was the case in Sir William Temple's time, king Charles the Second's ambassador at the Hague, a most accomplished statesman; and since his time their taxes have greatly increased, although their trade and their treasure have not in the like proportion. Sir William tells us in general, "That they are oppressed with the most cruel hardships, and variety of taxes, that was ever known under any government: that the excise upon all commodities is so great and general, that he hath heard it observed at Amsterdam, that when in a tavern a certain dish of fish is eaten, with the usual sauce, above thirty excises are paid for what is necessary to that small service." In queen Ann's time, besides what we call the land tax, which is heavier with them than with us in the general, they pay,

says my author, excise for every thing they eat, drink, use, or enjoy.

The impost upon all corn ground in the mills of Holland, which every body pays without exception, amounts to 5*l.* 5*s.* per quarter of wheat, to half as much for rye, to 35*s.* for barley and oats; in a word, it is generally computed there, that the duty upon all bread corn is equal to the prime cost.

The excise on beer is as follows: First, the brewer pays 12*d.* a barrel, private families pay 20*d.* more, and victuallers, or retailers, pay another 20*d.* French wines pay 6*d.* a stoup, other wines twice as much. Butter pays 6*s.* a barrel, tobacco 10*d.* a pound, fish 20*d.* a pannier, and soap 11*s.* a barrel. Every horse above three years old, pays 2*d.* a month; every horned beast above that age 3*d.* a month. Every coach pays 10*s.* a year, and every little bark 20*d.* All cattle, sheep, or hogs that are killed, pay one penny in seven of the money they are sold for. Old wood made use of for fuel, pays one penny in eight of what it costs. Every master pays 20*d.* a head yearly for each servant that he has in his family, male or female. All ships, lands, and houses, that are sold by one man to another, pay to the government a fortieth penny of what they are sold for: hangings and household stuff pay one penny in nine, and woollen cloths a fourth part of their value. In one word, the Dutch pay excise for salt, candles, lead, lime, coals, stone, &c. There is not a turf or a log of wood in their chimnies, not an herb or onion in their gardens, but what pays a duty more or less to the states. Our author assures us, that a cow of nine years old, if it be sold for 5*l.* will pay above 6*l.* to the states; and there is never a dish comes to table but has paid excise above twenty times.

These

These are the impositions that our neighbours are subject to in time of peace, which in war are raised to a degree hardly to be believed : at such time land and houses have paid 10 or 11s. in the pound, of their intrinsic value.

The reader may be apt to ask per chance, how it is possible for people to bear up under such heavy pressures, such loads that even the English would certainly sink under ? To this it is answered, that their extraordinary industry and parsimony enables them to support such prodigious taxes. A burgher of Amsterdam will dine contentedly on a red herring, when a citizen of London of the same condition, will scorn to sit down to table without a sirloin of beef, or a couple of capons before him. Sir William Temple again tells us that " it is a common rule among them, for every man to spend less than what he has coming in, be that what it will ; and that if a man's expence equals his revenues, it discredits a man among them, as much as any vicious or prodigal extravagance does in other countries, so that frugality is become honourable amongst them."

Another thing that reconciles them to those excessive impositions, is that confidence which they have, that their money is laid out for the good of the community. The salary of a Burgo-master of Amsterdam is but 500 guilders a year, which amounts not to 50*l.* sterling ; nor was it ever known that they who have the disposal of offices in that republic, took any money on that occasion. The prime ministers of state are obliged to no sort of expence more than ordinary modest citizens, in their habits, their attendants, their tables, or any part of their domestic affairs. Sir William never saw the two greatest officers belonging to their state, the vice admiral de Ruyter, and the pensioner de Witte, with above one servant
a piece

a piece in their train, but most usually on foot and alone in the street, like common burghers: and this was the general fashion among all the magistrates. This has made the people part chearfully with their money, when it is not made use of to fill the coffers, or maintain the pompous equipages of the servants of the public.

Upon the whole, when we reflect upon the small extent of this republic, their maintaining more men considerably than we have done, at an average during the three great wars, in comparison to the extent of their territories, &c. with those heavy taxes they submit to, we cannot doubt but they are the bravest people in the world; and it is certain, that they have made the most prodigious efforts for the common liberty of Europe, that ever any state of the like dimensions did: and do they not deserve our utmost aid and assistance when needful, as well as our praises and encomiums? *

UTRECHT, (Peace of.) It was this treaty which laid the foundation of all the political mischief which Britain (and a great part of Europe) has experienced since the accession of the house of Hanover. That famous war conducted with such unparalleled success by the duke of Marlborough, offered an opportunity of restraining the enormous power of the house of Bourbon, which would have saved Europe from the pernicious plans of ambition and aggrandizement, which have since been so prejudicial to all the neighbours of France and Spain. By this treaty an opportunity was lost, of forcing France to restore the usurpations she had made during the reign of Lewis XIV. Flanders, Luxemburg, Franche Compté, &c. usurpations which were made without the pretensions of right or

* Poslethwayte's Dictionary, Art. United Provinces.

justice,

justice, but mere open violence and despotic sway. Instead of confining within due bounds that insolent power which dragooned the protestants, destroyed the Palatinate, bombarded Genoa, poured destruction like a torrent upon Holland, and, in a word, injured and oppressed all its neighbours—instead of doing this common justice to mankind, this infamous treaty rewarded Lewis with Spain and the Indies for his grand-son. It has been a very false argument to insist that they knew not where to bestow it better, after the Archduke Charles became emperor; why not pass to the next prince in the succession, who would probably become neither emperor nor king of France? Or rather why not insist on the states or nobility of Spain choosing a king of their own nation, which would at once have put an end to the miseries that overflow from the succession devolving on a foreign prince of any nation? Leaving Spain and the Indies in the possession of the house of Bourbon, was converting them nearly into a province of France, the proof of which has been repeatedly seen and felt by all Europe; and at this day we are kept in check by a compact, truly called “the most formidable conspiracy against the liberties of Europe that has appeared for many ages:” these are among the mischievous effects that have flowed from a French king in Spain. The same treaty that lost the only opportunity of reducing the power of France to just bounds, and gave Spain to the house of Bourbon, also sacrificed every interest of British trade, and laid the foundation of all the quarrels which have since risen in America; lent the most helping hand to establish the French commerce; and put them in possession of those fisheries to which they owed the re-establishment of their marine. But it would take a volume to analyze all the mischief that

that has flowed from this pernicious treaty, which was made by the greatest domestic enemies Britain ever had, who were as deep in the interest of the Pretender, as anxious to restore the power of France.

Treaties that are concluded at the end of an unsuccessful war, generally and justly escape criticism, because they are made under every disadvantage: but for conquerors in the very career of victory, suddenly to stop their arms, and agree to terms that throw all the advantages of the war into the hand of the enemy, and which look more like receiving the law than giving it; this can never be the effect of any thing but treachery, or that rancorous spirit of faction which sacrifices every thing to party and private interest.

Britain has been remarkably unfortunate in her treaties after successful wars. The wars of the duke Marlborough, and of Mr. Pitt, were in all respects the most glorious which Europe had seen since the time of Gustavus Adolphus the Great. By both she might have constructed the edifice of her own grandeur on the most solid foundations; she had it twice in her power to reduce France to such a state as to secure the peace of Europe in future: she had an opportunity to construct a general security on the ruins of the family compact: she neglected all this; and now sees the navies of France and Spain every day increasing in power, by means of those island and fisheries which she gave back, and soon will find a new war necessary to do that, at the expence of an hundred millions, which twenty would have effected by continuing the last war. See FRANCE.

W. would take a volume to analyze all the mischief

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W A R. Comparison of land and naval wars to Britain.

We have not the least reason to be discouraged at the expence of a much greater fleet than ever this nation beheld. If we had a fleet as powerful again as we have, we should scarce feel the expence of it; nay, I could almost presume to affirm, that the greater our royal navy is, the richer, instead of the poorer, will the nation be: and therefore we can scarce spend too much on our maritime force.

Exclusive of what we spend for naval stores with other nations, the residue of our naval expences is raised within ourselves, and centers and terminates within ourselves. 1. Our royal-navy is victualled among ourselves, and this enriches the landed gentleman, as well as the farmer and the grazier. 2. Our ships are built and masted with our own timber, and built by British artificers. 3. Though we take hemp from Russia yet our cordage, and sail cloth, and iron, are chiefly manufactured amongst ourselves, for the employment of our manufacturers and artificers. 4. Our ship chandlery particulars, great in number, are produced among ourselves; and our ships are supplied with liquors by our own brewery, and our own distillery. 5. Though we used formerly to be obliged to take our pitch and tar from Sweden, yet at present we have the bulk of it from our plantations, and so we may in time have all our hemp from thence: and whatever adds to the circulation of commerce between England and her colonies and plantations, tends to augment the opulence and power of both. 6. The appointments paid to our sea officers, and wages of our mariners,

mariners, also revert again into our own hands. 7. The great estates frequently obtained in time of war by our admirals and other chief officers, as well as by privateering, generally make the nation more than an ample recompence for the mercantile losses we sustain by sea in those calamitous times. 8. The prizes which we commonly make of the enemies ships of war and naval stores, can scarce fail to be equivalent to those we may happen to lose of our own.

Upon the whole, if we compare the national expence raised upon our royal-navy, when it shall be exerted in its fullest extent in times of war, with the national returns as the necessary consequence thereof, according as our affairs are now happily circumstanced, we need not be at all apprehensive that a war carried on by sea can ever impoverish or hurt the kingdom. For let it be supposed, that £. 3,000,000 a year, or more, was raised annually above the ordinary expence for the support of the royal-navy, it will not be easy for any one to shew, that near the whole expence raised would not return into Great Britain again. From past experiences in relation to the three last great wars, the expence of our naval affairs considered in the several lights before intimated, did the nation no great injury, and would have done much less, if we could then have provided ourselves, as we now can, with so great a part of our naval stores.

Nor could it do us any detriment if the expence was considerably greater, provided the money was constantly raised within the year, for the greater our naval power is, if exerted as it ought to be, the greater might, and very probably would be our advantages by sea over the enemy, and therefore the returns of treasure into the kingdom

would

would be equivalent to the expence raised : and this would be almost all gain to the nation.

Certain it is, that let these our naval expences be any way considered, it should seem as if they had a tendency rather to enrich the nation, than any how to injure or impoverish it: for so much of the money expended this way in time of war, is really something like extracting so much gold and silver out of our mines ; and what is the common produce of our lands and our labour, are mines of the greatest utility to the state. Neither should it be forgot, that our royal-navies, built and equipped with such money, become really permanent riches for many years, of which we enjoy the benefit ; and the service and glory which the kingdom derives from these her naval treasures, far more than compensate for the expence of the interest of the money they cost, be that considered in what light it may.

OF WAR IN FORMER AGES.

The advantage of regular armies has been known in all ages ; and yet we find that for many centuries they appeared in a manner discontinued ; that is to say, we read neither of legions, nor of regiments, nor of any denomination of bodies of warlike men kept up and exercised in time of peace, as was the custom while the Roman empire subsisted : and now, since trade has been established, we see the antient Roman military œconomy again revived.

During the Roman empire there was a very great flux of money into the coffers of the state, which proceeded more from rapine than from taxes. Consequently, it was an easy matter to keep up large bodies of regular forces.

With these they subdued the world, as I may call it, that is, all the polite nations then known ;

the Carthaginians, Greeks, and Asiatics. Had they remained satisfied, their empire might possibly have subsisted; because people who are rich, luxurious, and polite, are commonly peaceable. But nothing could satisfy their ambition; they conquered Gaul, and stretched the boundary of their empire from the streights of Gibraltar to the mouth of the Rhine. All was peaceable on that side, and in two or three centuries, both Spain and Gaul had adopted the spirit, language, and manners of the Roman people. But when they passed the Rhine, the Danube, and the Euphrates, they found mankind still less cultivated, and very little known. Their enemies fled before them, and left a territory which was not worth possessing. This of all barriers is the strongest. By carrying on war against such people, the match was very unequal: those nations had every thing to gain, and nothing to lose; the Romans had all to lose and nothing to win. Those wars continued till the Barbarians learned the Roman discipline, and became warriors. It was the most profitable trade for them, as well as the only means of safety. That this was the plan of their oeconomy appears plainly from the form of government every where established by them. Where every free-man was a soldier, there was no occasion for a regular militia.

Men are governed by prejudice more than by reason: to this I attribute the sudden change in the government of Europe. In place of one man governing the world, as was the case of the emperors, the new spirit was that all soldiers were equal, and a king was but *primus inter pares*. The sudden revolution had the effect of ruining every thing; learning, industry, politics, all went to wreck. One hundred years of barbarity must ruin the effects of a thousand centuries of politeness.

ness. This is the date of the annihilation of standing armies. A powerful prince, such as Charles the Great, who acted in a high sphere, and made the world his own, might during his life-time, establish the old economy. But the general establishment of the feudal form of government, which no doubt was the best for preserving a great empire, filled with barbarity every where, joined with the weakness of that prince's successors, introduced a new form less barbarous than the former, but equally compatible with a numerous standing militia. Every baron became a sovereign, and his vassals were bred to arms; but as they were forced to attend the plough for subsistence, as well as the camp, wars were carried on consistently with agriculture. Certain months of the year were appropriated for war, others for peace. This was easily accomplished: war was constantly at the door; a campaign was finished in a week, because every man's nearest neighbour was commonly his worst enemy.

Europe remained in this general state of confusion for some centuries. Princes had, during that period, a most precarious authority; and when any nation chanced to be under the government of one who had talents to unite his subjects, he became so formidable, that there was no possibility of resisting him. In those days it was a hard matter to form an idea of a balance of power; because there was no rule to determine the force of nations. Under the Othos, Germany threatened Italy with chains; under Edward and Henry, England seemed on the road of adding all France to her monarchy; Ferdinand the Catholic laid the foundation of the Spanish greatness, and his successors bid fair for the universal monarchy of Europe. In our days the acquisition of a small province, nay of a considerable town, is not to be made by conquest, without a general convention between all the

powers of Europe, and those who are conversant in foreign affairs can estimate in a minute, the force of princes by the troops they are able to maintain; nothing is so easy as to lay down on a sheet of paper, a state of all the armed men in Europe. A prince can hardly add a soldier to a company but all the world is informed of it. Excepting the extent of their credit, and the talents of their generals and counsellors, every thing relative to power is become the object of computation. Hence the balance of power formerly unknown, is now become familiar. So much is sufficient for the matter of fact; let us now examine why trade and industry have given rise to so regular a system of war.

The reason is, because in a state where those are introduced, every thing must be made regular, or all will go to wreck. The keeping up of large armies is the remains of that turbulent spirit which animated royalty for so many centuries. All literature is filled with warlike sentiments from the books of Moses, to the newspapers of this day. A young person cannot learn to read without imbibing the fire of war. But as nothing is so evident from the consideration of the total revolution in the spirit of the people of Europe, as that war is inconsistent with the prosperity of a modern state, I sometimes allow my imagination to carry me so far as to believe the time is at hand, when war will come to cease. But there is no such thing as predicting in political matters: general peace is a contingent consequence, which a thousand accidents may prevent; and one amongst the rest is, that the whole plan of modern policy may be broken to pieces before princes come to discover that it is their interest to be quiet. The ambition of one arms all the rest, and when once they are at the head of their armies, want of money

ney only assembles a congress not to make peace, but that the parties may have some years to gather new force.

It is not therefore trade and industry which have given birth to standing armies, they have only rendered war impossible without them. It is the ambition of princes to extend their dominion, and even sometimes to extend their commerce, which gives occasion to war. And we see daily how difficult it becomes to provide troops for this purpose, from no other reason so much as from the progress of trade and industry. Those who have the money, cannot have the men, those who have the men cannot have the money. Do we not see how the greatest monarchy in Europe, the prince who has the most millions of subjects, cannot preserve the rank of power he has prescribed to himself, without a body of above thirty thousand strangers in the time of the most profound peace, and after the greatest reduction judged consistent with the safety of the country. These cost vastly more than national troops, and brave men of all countries are alike; so that the only reason of keeping up so large a body of foreigners, is to facilitate augmentations when occasion requires it; and not to spare the subjects who are willing to serve, but to spare agriculture and industry, after the superfluities of these have fallen in, to compleat that body of troops which experience has determined to be proportioned to such superfluities.

From this short exposition, let me deduce a principle: that since every state has occasion, according to the present system of Europe, for a certain number of armed men for their defence, the first care of a statesman is to discover to what number those of his subjects who willingly prefer the conditions offered for military service, to the

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occupations of industry may amount. If he finds these exceed the number wanted for recruiting the army, it is a good reason to diminish the pay; until the encouragement comes upon a level with the supply demanded. If, on the contrary, the number of volunteers falls below the standard required, he must examine the state of the balance of work, and demand before he can give any farther encouragement. If this balance stands even, he must take care that the pay given to soldiers, be not carried so high as to engage those of the lowest class of profitable industry to desert it.

What measures therefore can be fallen upon? There are two, either to hire foreign troops, as many states do; and I suppose for good reasons only, because it is done. But I should prefer another method, which is to create a new class of inhabitants, appropriated for supplying the army, upon the principle above laid down, that he who feeds may have as many mouths as he pleases.

I would therefore fix the military pay at a rate below the profits of useful industry, and accept of such as should offer. For the augmentation of this class, I would receive all male children who should be given or exposed by their parents, these should be bred to every sort of labour for which the state has occasion, and their numbers might be carried to 20 per cent. above that which might be judged necessary in time of the hottest war. Out of this class only the standing forces might be recruited: those who remained might be employed in every public service; such as working in arsenals, docks, highways, public buildings, &c. By taking care of the children of this whole class, their numbers would rise to whatever height might be judged necessary. The same spirit would be kept up; they might serve by turns, and all become disciplined. This is a good scheme in many cases, and is an improvement upon the distribution

distribution of the inhabitants: the execution is gradual, therefore no sudden revolution is implied. But it is fit only for a state which can augment its numbers, without seeking for subsistence from without. It would spare the land and manufactures, and be a ready out-let for all supernumeraries in every class*.

WHALE FISHERY. That of the Dutch is as follows:

In forty-six years, ending 1721, they employed in it 6,995 ships.

Caught 32,908 whales.

Value at *l.* 500, *l.* 16,000,000.

The medium crew of the ships is forty men and boys, the total number therefore 279,800.

Ships per annum 151.

Seamen ditto 6,000.

Value ditto, *l.* 347,826 †.

This is justly reckoned one of the most valuable fisheries in the world: it was first discovered, together with the seas, coasts, and frozen territories of Greenland by the English, who fished in them for fourteen or fifteen years before any other nation. When the Dutch pushed themselves into it, they were beat off; and the exclusive right claimed by the English fishermen, and with as much, if not more, justice than other exclusive rights have been since: but unfortunately the Dutch began their operation in the reign of James I. To mention more is needless; it is at once sufficiently evident that they carried their point. He who would submit to the affair of Amboyna, it was not to be expected would act with spirit in the preservation of a fishery. That nation, as well

* Political Oeconomy, Vol. I. p. 45.

† Postlethwayte, art. Greenland. Anderson's Deduction, Vol. II. p. 350. Elkin's Memorial to Sir John Eyles, Political Essays, p. 541.

as others, were first obliged to hire English harpooners and steersmen; but the tables are now strangely turned, for at present that is precisely the case with us.

If it is considered that the ships which undertake this fishery are very stout and large, from 200 to 500 tons, and that each is attended by from four to seven shallops, and carry forty, fifty, and sixty men; that they are furnished with immense quantities of new casks to put blubber oil in, with a great variety of harpoons, grapples, knives, axes, anchors, &c. and lastly, that the product of the fishery is a material of manufacture, it will easily be conceived that this fishery is of immense national value; occasions a vast consumption of manufactures; is the source of great riches, and perhaps the best nursery of bold daring seamen that is in the world.

In the year 1724, the South-Sea company undertook to revive the British whale fishery, and engaged pretty largely in the branch till 1732; but then finding themselves considerable losers, they gave it up: they accordingly sold all their ships, stores, and utensils; and upon finally stating their accounts, it appeared,

That their total disbursements on account of the whale fishery in eight years, came to £262,172.

And the total amount of the sales, of their oil and whale fins, and likewise of all their ships, &c. was but 84,390.

Loss in eight years, besides interest, 177,782.

It has been usually computed, that if a Greenland ship brought home but three whales, it would be a reasonable gainful year: but most unfortunately for the South-Sea company they had not in all the said eight years fishery, brought home at the rate of one whale per ship. It has moreover been a maxim among the whale fishing adventurers,

fers, that one good year in seven usually makes up the losses of six bad ones. But unhappily all these eight years happened to be bad, not only to the company, but to most of the adventures of other nations.

In 1733, a bounty was granted by parliament, of no less than 20 s. a ton upon all ships of 200 tons and upwards employed in this fishery; a few ships were thereupon fitted out; and in 1736, one from London caught no less than seven whales. In 1740, an additional 10 s. a ton bounty was granted during the continuance of the war, and a freedom from pressing. In 1748, the bounty was extended to 14 s. and for the American colonies as well as Great Britain; and naturalization granted to all foreign protestants who served three years on board our whale fishing ships. But notwithstanding these noble encouragements, very few ships have engaged in it; and the Dutch undersell those that have, which is a great national misfortune; for such fisheries as these are the most desirable branch of commerce this kingdom can engage in, as they occasion a great and sure consumption of our manufactures, and at the same time breed up an infinite number of excellent seamen*.

An invention was lately laid before the society, for the encouragement of arts, manufactures, and commerce, which bid fair for being attended with very great advantages in this fishery; it was an harpoon to be shot from a swivel at the whale, instead of the common method of launching it from the hands of a man called an harpooner. The latter must always be within ten or fifteen yards of the whale when he throws the harpoon, but by this invention, the moment the fish appears, though

* Anderson's Deduction of Commerce, Vol. II. p. 339. Political Essays, p. 511.

at sixty, or even one hundred yards distance, he is struck from the swivel, and secured by a rope fixed to the harpoon; it was tried at Deptford before a committee, and found to answer perfectly well in respect to the throwing it with a true aim, &c. but for a real trial was put on board a ship bound for the fishery.

Z.

ZANGUEBAR. Upon this coast in Africa the Portuguese have their settlement of Mosambique, &c. of which Melinda is the capital. The best of all governments, says a late writer, that still belongs to the Portuguese viceroy of the Indies, is that of Mosambique, which is an island situated near the coast of Africa, in the lat. of 15° south, within half a league of the continent. They have a strong fort there with four good bastions, which command the channel, and in which there are seventy pieces of brass cannon; and here there is always kept a good garrison, and in tolerable order. The governor is honoured with the title of general of the river Senna, where he has his lieutenant, which employment was worth to him several hundred thousand crowns a year; there are but a few houses about the fort, the inhabitants keeping their effects on the neighbouring continent. But notwithstanding the narrowness of the place, there are monasteries of Jesuits, Dominicans of St. John de Dios, besides the chief church and that of Misericordia. The merchandize brought to this place by the ships of the company are bought at a set price by the royal factory, which afterwards sends them to Chelimani, the mouth of the river Senna, running three hundred miles along the coast, in galliots and small vessels, because

because of the flats from hence to Chelimani; the goods are sent up the river, against the stream, in Almandies or little boats, which are ten days going up, and about five coming down. It is very difficult going up for those that are not acquainted with the shallows and windings of the river. Caffres and blacks resort to this fort, from provinces and kingdoms three or four months journey distance, to buy and take up goods upon trust, for so much gold, which they never fail to bring punctually the next year, unless death prevents them. This trade yields above cent. per cent. so that the Portuguese may be said to have another India in Africa. Sena is a little town on the right hand of the river, inhabited by fifty Portuguese families, who make it populous enough by the great number of blacks they keep. They till the ground, dig the mines, and by that means maintain their masters, instead of being kept by them. About fifteen days journey from hence lies Sofala, where the Portuguese have likewise an establishment, subject however to the general of Mosambique; and here a prodigious trade is driven on, of which the Portuguese are, or might be masters. It consists chiefly of gold, of which there are greater quantities here than in any other country in the world, since the annual produce of this market is computed by the best judges at forty-six thousand ounces. There are vast quantities of Spanish and Canary wines, loi, silks, linens, cotton, coral, and other European goods sold here, which are carried by the inhabitants of the little kingdom of Sofala, through all the great empire of Monomotapa, which the Portuguese stile the empire of gold, from the prodigious quantities of that precious metal which is brought to them from thence. There are likewise some very rich commodities brought hither by the negroes; such as the most excellent ebony
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in the world, great quantities of ivory, abundance of fine mats, which are much esteemed in the Indies, and a great number of slaves; so that Goa, and all the rest of the Portuguese settlements, are furnished from hence. One may justly wonder that, considering the value of this settlement, and its convenient situation, the Dutch had not made themselves masters of it long ago, as well as all the other places belonging to the crown of Portugal on this coast. As for the share which the Portuguese still retain, the gold obtained thereby is sent to Goa and to Diu, where it is coined into small pieces called St. Thomas's, which are not worth above half a crown of our money; and it is observed that this coin is of a worse touch, that is, of a baser alloy, than any other in the Indies, which is another sign of a declining trade; for the sarafins, which were formerly coined at Ormuz when in the Portuguese hands, were esteemed the best gold in the Indies, but they are now become extremely scarce; and the St. Thomas's are said to be coined in less quantities every year.

These possessions are said to produce so little to the king of Portugal, that it has been more than once debated in the council of that prince, whether it would not be for the interest of the crown to abandon them altogether, withdrawing their artillery and effects; and we are likewise told that it is not any political, but purely a religious motive, that has hindered this resolution from being taken; the priests having suggested, that in that case a multitude of souls would be lost to the church. We shall the less wonder at this, if we consider that such as are best acquainted with the East-India trade assure us, that a single merchant, and a single ship of a reasonable burthen, may carry on as great a commerce as what at present subsists between Lisbon and Goa: this matter however deserves

deserves some explanation. There are yet a great many ships employed from Goa, Diu, and Daman, to the coasts of Persia, Manilla, and China; but they are mostly on account of Indian merchants, there being scarce a Portuguese trader at Goa able to furnish a cargo of ten thousand crowns; and it is very much doubted, whether in the whole of their trade, they employ above two hundred thousand crowns; so that it is not at all strange, that one year with another, there are not above two ships sent directly from Goa to Lisbon, and those not a fourth part so rich as when they annually sent twenty.

Yet there has been a late regulation made at Goa, for the preservation and promotion of trade, which those who understand that subject best agree, compleated its ruin.

This is an exclusive company, which has the sole right to the commerce of Mosambique and Mocha, which company has taken upon itself the payment of the royal officers, who are also two-thirds employed therein; which has given such a blow to the natural commerce of Goa, that the best part of the Indian merchants that were left, are now retired from thence. To say the truth, it was the great share of the vice roys, governors, and other officers always took in commerce, without contributing any thing thereto, except protecting the merchants from the violence committed by themselves, on such as did not admit them to a share of their trade, that first destroyed the extensive commerce they enjoyed. And upon this subject the wits of the Indies have framed a very pretty allegory: they say that when the Portuguese came first to them, they had a sword in one hand, and a crucifix in the other; but that they might fill their pockets the faster, they quickly dispensed with the first, and soon after laid down the last, by which they have
lost

lost all. But though their power and their commerce are so much declined, their pride is as great as ever, insomuch that they refuse the natives of the country, who are called the Canarins, the wearing of stockings, though they employ them as physicians, lawyers, and merchants; by which many of them are so rich, that they keep a dozen or fourteen slaves, and are in much better circumstances than the Portuguese themselves.

The very last advices from this part of the world inform us that several Indian princes were driven from before Goa, which they had blocked up with a numerous army, by the powerful succours sent by the king of Portugal, and by the excellent conduct of the late viceroy, who was the count de Laurical, and who, if I mistake not, was twice in the Indies, and behaved there with great reputation. Such expeditions, however, are to be considered as expedients only, which may for a time preserve that settlement, but can never restore it, or bring the affairs of the nation in these parts into so good order as to make them worth the attention of a prince, who has the honour of his crown, and the good of his people at heart.

It is morally certain that the establishments which the crown of Portugal still has in the East-Indies, might, in the hands of an active, an industrious nation, turn to considerable account; for it has been long ago observed by Mr. Tavernier, that the port of Diu is as well situated for trade, and as capable of improvement, as any in that part of the world, or more so; and if put under proper regulations, that is, if made in some measure a free port, it must necessarily come in for a large share of that commerce now carried on at Surat, and in all probability retrieve much of the Arabian and Persian commerce, that has been so long

long lost to the Portuguese: on the other hand, as they have still some factories at Binnagar, and other places on that coast, it would be no difficult matter to re-establish their commerce in the heart of India, at the same time that the port of Macao would furnish them with the means of supplying the China market, as cheap or cheaper than any other European nation; because their colony at Mosambique is so situated as to serve them for the same purpose as the Cape of Good Hope does the Dutch, or the island of St. Helena does the English.

But all these advantages signify nothing in the hands of those who are so far from possessing the virtues requisite to such improvements, that, on the contrary, they are not only tainted with, but over-run by such vices as must unquestionably overturn the best establishment in the world. We may therefore safely predict that the continuance even of that slender power which the Portuguese have still left, cannot continue long, and that for these two plain reasons, first, because it has been long, and is still in a declining condition; so that its force being extremely decayed, and at the same time continually employed in resisting the efforts of its enemies, it is impossible in the nature of things, that it should subsist for any time; secondly, the manners of the people are entirely ruined, so that there is not the least probability that any such reformation will ever be effected, as might enable them to make such use of the convenient ports, of which they are still possessed, as is necessary to revive and restore their commerce in the Indies. I venture, therefore, to pronounce, that in the compass of twenty or thirty years, their establishments in these parts will be quite lost, and that in all likelihood Goa, Diu, and Daman, will

will be lost first; which will necessarily draw after them the desertion of Macao, which cannot long subsist by its own force, and lies at much too great a distance, to receive any effectual succour or support from Portugal directly *.

* Harris's Voyages and Travels, Vol. I. p. 697.

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